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Abstract
This dissertation makes an original contribution to knowledge of how irregular
military actors operate in modern mass atrocity crises, providing an evidence-
based multi-perspective analysis of the irregular military dynamics that accom-
panied the violent collapse of Yugoslavia (1991-1995). While it is broadly accep-
ted that paramilitary or irregular units have been involved in practically every
case of genocide in the modern world, detailed analysis of these dynamics is
rare. A consequence of paramilitary participation in atrocity crises –which can
be seen in academic literature, policy-making, and in popular understanding–
has been to mask the continued dominance of the state in a number of violent
crises where, instead of a vertically organised hierarchical structure of violence,
irregular actors have comprised all or part of the military force. Here, analysis
of structures of command and control, and of domestic and international net-
works, presents the webs of support that enable and encourage irregular military
dynamics. The findings suggest that irregular combatants have participated to
such an extent in the perpetration of atrocity crimes because political elites bene-
fit by using unconventional forces to fulfil devastating socio-political ambitions,
and because international policy responses are hindered by contexts where re-
sponsibility for violence is ambiguous. The research also reveals how grassroots
armed resistance can be temporarily effective but, without the benefits of cent-
ralised capabilities, cannot be easily sustained. While the variety of irregular
military activity that took place in former Yugoslavia was significant, it is clear
that the irregular dynamics were more substantial and more effective when op-
erating within, or in close coordination with, structures where the state retained
greater powers of central command and control. Furthermore, the dissertation
identifies substantial loopholes in current atrocity prevention architecture and
suggests the utilisation by state authorities of irregular combatants as perpetrat-
ors in atrocity contexts will continue until these loopholes are addressed.
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Prologue
In 1992, Yugoslavia was fracturing along lines of conflict and identity. The
former communist state, first created in 1918 and put back together in 1945 in
the wake of the Second World War, was a federation of six republics; Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. After
1974 and the adoption of a new constitution, two autonomous provinces, Kosovo
and Vojvodina, flanked Serbia. It was a religiously and culturally mixed state
but not all the republics reflected the same demography; Slovenia was the most
homogenous, Bosnia the more mixed. Under Marshal Tito, who had led the
multiethnic ‘Partizan’ resistance to Axis occupation, Yugoslavia had embraced
communism and forged a unique path of socialist politics. The Yugoslav experi-
ence of the Second World War had involved civil war and an attempted genocide
of Serbs at the hands of Croatian Ustaše as well the trauma of the Nazi mael-
strom. The communist party succeeded in uniting the republics under a banner
of “Brotherhood and Unity,” which subverted older identities of religion, culture,
republic-patriotism, and perceived ethnic differences, with a collective identity of
Yugoslavism. But when Tito died in 1980 it was clear that the communist state
needed to reform. Economic and political crisis worsened in Yugoslavia as other
communist countries in Europe began to repudiate the regimes that had been
forced upon them by Moscow. In the constituent Yugoslav republics, communit-
ies rediscovered and reinvented past identities as nationalism filled the political
vacuum left by the dead patriarch.
In 1990 Slovenia voted to to leave the federation, leading to a ten-day conflict
between the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) and the Slovenian Territorial De-
fence. Unlike what was to follow in Croatia and Bosnia, the Slovene government
had protected its defence structures from being stripped by the JNA. Croatia and
Bosnia both held referendums and also voted for independence but here the re-
discovered identities clashed; many Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia wanted
to remain in a Yugoslav federation ruled by Belgrade while Croats and Muslim
Bosnians (sometimes referred to as Bosniaks) sought self-determination. What
followed was a series of bitter conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and later in Kosovo,
that broke apart the federation and destroyed all remnants of Tito’s brotherhood
and unity.
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Part I
Introduction
While it is broadly accepted that what are commonly referred to as non-state
armed groups are often present in modern instances of mass atrocity, little is
known about the causal processes that have led to the phenomenon.1 Since the
end of the Cold War it has been suggested that irregular military combatants
have increased in both number and significance in many conflicts around the
world.2 This perceived rise of non-state combatants and military formations
has been interpreted as being demonstrative of declining state strength.3 States
or regions where non-state armed groups are present are therefore considered
to be weak or failing.4 As a result these violent actors are frequently assumed
to operate independently of state auspices.5 Observations that non-state armed
groups have become a significant feature in post-Cold War conflicts have led to
linear divisions being drawn between violent situations where non-state forces
are present and where they are not, irrespective of the nature of the violence
being perpetrated.6 The effect has been to similarly diminish the role of the
state in the analysis of non-state, or irregular, armed groups and modern atrocity
crimes.7
1Non-state armed groups is used by many international policy-making and monitoring
institutions, including the European Union’s External Action Service and the United Nations,
in particular the Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG); Mass
atrocities is a non-legal term for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic
cleansing. For more see David Scheffer, ‘Defuse the Lexicon of Slaughter,’ New York Times,
February 23, 2012
2Among the first to do so was Mary Kaldor in 1999, New Wars, Old Wars, (Second Edi-
tion), Stanford University Press, 2007; see also Martin Shaw, War and Genocide; Organised
Killing in Modern Society, Polity Press, 2003, p155
3James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,’ American
Political Science Review, 97:1 (2003), pp75-90; Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors; The Rise
and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias, Stanford University Press, 2011
4Robert H. Bates, ‘Probing the Sources of Political Order’ in (ed.) S. N. Kalyvas, I. Shapiro,
and T. E. Masoud, Order, Conflict, and Violence, Cambridge University Press, 2008; David T.
Mason and Dale A. Krane, ‘The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the
Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror,’ International Studies Quarterly, 33:2 (1989) pp175-198;
Ariel I. Ahram, ‘The Role of State-Sponsored Militias in Genocide,’ Terrorism and Political
Violence, 26:3, (2014) pp488-503; Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe, ‘States,
the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-Government
Militias’, Journal of Peace Research, 50:2, (2013), pp249–24
5Kaldor, New Wars, p.9-10; for misinterpretation of the militias during the Rwandan
genocide see Linda Melvern, ‘Missing the story: The media and the Rwandan genocide,’
Contemporary Security Policy, 22:3, (2001), pp91-106
6Kaldor, New Wars; also Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’
7Ahram, ‘State-Sponsored Militias’; John Mueller, ‘The Banality of Ethnic War,’ Interna-
tional Security, 25:1 (2000) pp42-70, regarding Yugoslavia p47-8
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The research findings presented in this work challenge two dominant as-
sumptions that prevail in parts of scholarly and policy-making communities;
first, that the presence of non-state armed groups in mass atrocity situations
are interpreted as evidence of a loss or absence of state control, and second,
that such actors are seen to belong to independent perpetrating structures of
violence that may for a time run in parallel to those of the state.
This work focuses on the period between the outbreak of violence in Croatia
in 1991 and the end of the Bosnian war in 1995, and represents the first detailed
analysis of the structural relationships and informal supporting networks that
led to the significant participation of irregular armed groups, many of which
claimed to be non-state. The irregular military dynamics of the Yugoslav con-
flicts were substantial and armed groups that purported to operate independ-
ently of official structures fought on all sides. Studying the Yugoslav conflagra-
tion provides a unique opportunity to compare the use of irregular combatants,
by several states, as purveyors of violence within very different military and
political formations, but contained within a relatively small region with shared
historical, cultural, geographic and economic experiences. Uncovering the multi-
dimensional processes that preceded and accompanied the irregular military dy-
namics of Yugoslavia’s collapse has made it possible to more accurately compare
the different national strategies side-be-side. Although I do not seek to present
new paradigms, this comparative analysis has highlighted certain commonalities
among the ex-Yugoslav states that can be seen beyond Balkan borders.
Identifying the primary sources held by the International Criminal Tribunal
for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that relate to the irregular military dynamics and
then collating those findings has exposed a coherency hitherto ignored not only
in the history of Yugoslavia but in the broader study of irregular armed groups
in mass atrocity crimes. The ICTY sources reveal covert structures of command
and control existed between sovereign powers and the armed groups that were
considered to have operated independently, and thus challenge the assumption
that non-state armed groups operate at their own behest and always in pursuit
of their own interests. Such arguments have ignored the impetus of state elites
as architects of mass atrocities and the operational role of state structures of
command and control. Perhaps most importantly then, the findings laid out in
this work reveal how states are able to conceal their relationships with irregular
or paramilitary armed groups in order to present such groups as existing out-
side of state structures, and of thus being ‘non-state’ actors. In the collapsing
Yugoslavia, direct responsibility for committing acts of violence was frequently
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devolved, away from the central bodies of the state, to different forms of armed
groups that were not always officially under state command; while some small,
local armed groups emerged spontaneously, many of the most ‘effective’ forma-
tions were intentionality created, funded, trained and directed by state bodies.
These non-linear command structures were replicated on the local level in many
parts of Croatia and Bosnia, where local enterprises of violence and corruption
were formed between local state elites and paramilitaries. Evidence of formal
and informal networks connects local bureaucracy with local and more national
irregular armed groups. Irregular combatants were supported by familial and
community networks that emerged as social norms became increasingly radical
and exclusionary, creating a distorted societal environment or what I term a
wartime (a)moral social order. Sources from the ICTY and contemporaneous
accounts of the decade preceding the violence indicate that Serbian and Croatian
state policies and practices shifted the moral parameters of Yugoslav societies,
producing a pervasive normalisation of violence and fermenting anticipation of
violence that would occur outside of the parameters of the state.8 It is clear
that identifiable processes such as propagandist rhetoric, divisive scapegoating
and marginalisation, patterns of cultural appropriation, and the conscious stim-
ulation of identities, cannot be separated from the paramilitary processes that
occurred during the conflicts. Thus affirmative state influence, rather than state
failure, facilitated the more spontaneous dimension of pro-Serb and pro-Croat
irregular “non-state” military activity during the conflicts. In contrast, the ir-
regular dynamics that operated in support of the Bosnian government and the
Bosnian Muslims was initially almost wholly a spontaneous defensive response
to attack because the state was unable to protect its citizens.
The presence of ostensibly non-state combatants were frequently stage-managed
by the Yugoslav political leaderships in order to purposefully misdirect atten-
tion from their own roles or manipulate international opinion, which served to
both protect those most responsible and to obscure the final objectives of the
crimes long enough to ensure they were largely fulfilled. These processes were
facilitated in part by the propagation of (pseudo)historically driven narratives
of non-state violence in domestic and international discourse. Pre-existing nar-
ratives of community violence present in Yugoslavia’s domestic cultures, and the
8Here, and throughout, morals and morality are addressed using Durkheim’s position that
morality can never teach us what is right, but only what or why people believe things to be
right, or wrong. see Emile Durkheim, Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society, (ed.) Robert
H. Bellah, University of Chicago Press, 1973
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western international (imperialist) cultural experience of Balkan history, served
to legitimise such strategies and obscure state influence.9
Finally, the findings present evidence that a more defined, well organised,
and better equipped structure of violence was operating in support of Serbian
powers. The use by Serbian elites of irregular combatants was planned and
the instigation of community-based formations was intentional. There were
substantially more irregular groups fighting in support of Serbian aims and
their influence substantially greater.10 Thus, in the pages that follow there
is a somewhat inevitable bias of attention towards Serbian and Bosnian Serb
structures, reflecting the disproportionate information available relating to, and
the disproportionate role played by, Serbian forces.
The implications of these findings are significant and have bearing not only
on understanding the Yugoslav conflicts, but how we conceptualise the roles
of non-state armed groups in modern atrocity situations.11 It is evident that
irregular military dynamics obscure the realities of the conflict situations. The
presence of different combatants creates confusion. In conflicts that are ostens-
ibly about identity, paramilitarism of all kinds can conceal patterns of mass
violence and obscure the context in which the violence occurs, which can suffi-
ciently perpetuate false or murky narratives that justify, legitimise or deny the
rationality of the crimes. When we consider that paramilitary groups have, in
various forms, been involved in ‘virtually every case of genocide in the twentieth
century’12 it is clear that the presence of irregular actors in identity-based mass
violence should not be understood to be a new trend.
Although the scope of this work is limited to the geographic area of former
Yugoslavia, the findings present evidence of structural military habits and pat-
terns that are recognisable in other modern (even contemporary) contexts of
9Edward Said, Orientalism; Western Conceptions of the Orient, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1980; Ivan Čolović, The Balkans: The Terror of Culture: Essays in Political Anthropology,
Nomos, 2011
10‘Final Report of the Commission of Experts, Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992)’, United Nations Security Council, 27 May 1994, Annex IIIA ‘Special
Forces,’ p6
11I do not question that Bosnia and Croatia experienced mass atrocity crimes during the
period covered here; for such discussion see Norman L. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia; The Policy
of ‘ethnic Cleansing,’ Texas A&M University Press, 1995; Michel Anthony Sells, The Bridge
Betrayed; Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, University of California Press, 1998; Cathie Car-
michael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition,
Routledge, 2002; Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-
century Europe, Harvard University Press, 2001
12Uğur Ümit Üngör, ‘Team America: Genocide Prevention?’ Genocide Studies and Pre-
vention, 6:1, (2011), pp32-38, p33
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identity-based mass violence. Sabine Carey, Neil Mitchell, and Christopher
Butler recently presented new data showing that between 1982 and 2007, in
over 60 countries, governments were linked to and cooperated with informal
armed groups within their own borders, which they term pro-state militia.13
While their paper does not address why and how states ‘delegate to informal
armed groups,’ the authors do question ‘why pro-government militias are likely
to increase the risk of human rights violations.’14 Their data set reveals the ex-
tent to which states engage irregular armed groups in contexts of human rights
abuses and emphasises that, if future crimes are to be prevented, understand-
ing how regimes use complex and purposefully confused military and political
structures, including the use of paramilitary-type units, to carry out violence
against civilian groups is crucial.
Governments benefit by using unconventional forces to fulfil violent socio-
political ambitions. Deniability and devolved responsibility make paramilitary
groups the perfect tools with which to carry out atrocity crimes, while the ob-
scurity of military and political commands conceal the intentions behind the
participation and actions of those groups.15 This clouds responsibility, which
hinders external intervention responses and can prevent those most accountable
from facing justice. Furthermore, irregular structures of violence or war-making
are more difficult to combat on the international stage, when applying political
pressure, economic sanctions, or military action.16 In the west, irregular mil-
itary structures operating abroad are simultaneously seen as increasing threats
to global security17 and as being an inhibitor to international action to prevent
atrocity crimes.18
In an increasingly globalised international system, combative or chauvin-
ist states have increasingly more to gain by devolving direct responsibility for
violence. The case of Darfur is perhaps the most explicit19 but similar ef-
13Sabine Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, and Christopher Butler, ‘The Impact of Pro-Government
Militias on Human Rights Violations,’ International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical
Research in International Relations, 40:5, (2014) pp812-836
14Ibid., p813-4
15Alvarez ‘Militias and Genocide,’ War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity,
2 (2006), pp1-33; and Ahram, ‘State-Sponsored Militias’
16It is worth noting here that the west is far more likely to succeed in conflicts against
similar structures to their own, see Bart Schurman, ‘Clausewitz and the “New Wars” Scholars,’
Parameters, 2010, pp89-100, p89
17Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends & Future Challenges, Horizon Working Paper
2015, DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), p12
18Unclear chains of military command or what were claimed to be non-state armed groups
were cited by western policy makers and member states at the UN as reasons not to become
militarily involved in Bosnia, Rwanda, initially in Darfur, and more recently in Syria.
19ICC-02/05-01/09 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ; ICC-02/05-01/07
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forts to conceal state responsibility for atrocity crimes or identity-based mass
violence committed by irregular forces can be seen today in Syria and Myan-
mar/Burma.20
International relations since the end of the Cold War have been characterised
by a gradual but perceptible shift in attitudes towards collective responsibility
to prevent and punish atrocity crimes.21 As norms towards the prevention and
punishment of such crimes increases, the incentives for architects of identity-
based mass violence to conceal their practices will increase.
0.1 Towards a methodology
Specific research into irregular military actors in Yugoslavia during the 1990s is
limited.22 The many accounts written by foreign journalists during and in the
immediate aftermath of the Bosnian war contain numerous references to para-
militaries and volunteers, and formed the initial vivid –if sometimes clichéd–
picture of the fighters.23 Tim Judah, for example, wrote in the Times during
the height of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, that war was “being waged by a
kaleidoscope of militias, armies and freelance groups. Accurate numbers are
impossible to ascertain, loyalties overlap, and who really controls whom, if any-
The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali
Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”); Philipp Kuntz is currently undertaking research into how the
Khartoum government presented paramilitary perpetrators of genocide in Darfur as non-state;
‘Selling mass atrocities abroad: Analyzing the rhetorical strategies of perpetrator regimes’
(paper presented the International Network of Genocide Scholars Conference 4-7 December
2014, University of Cape Town)
20‘Syria Human Rights Report 2013,’ United States Department of State, Bureau of Demo-
cracy, Human Rights and Labour, 2013; ‘ “The Government Could Have Stopped This” Sec-
tarian Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State,’ Human Rights Watch, 1
August 2012
21This can be seen in the unanimous agreement during the 2005 World Summit of a Re-
sponsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from mass atrocity crimes, ‘2005 World Summit
Outcome Document,’ United Nations General Assembly, 24 October 2005, paras 138 and 139;
the creation in the US of an Atrocity Prevention Board in 2011, and growing reference in
national, regional and international policy making and political discourse to R2P and human-
itarian responsibilities.
22Despite reading more like a thriller than studied research, Christopher S. Stewart’s Hunt-
ing the Tiger; The fast life and violent death of the Balkans’ most dangerous Man, provides
interesting insights. (Thomas Dunne Books, 2007); frequent reference to the paramilitary
dynamic is made through Peter Anders, Black Market and Blue Helmets; The Business of
Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo, Cornell University Press, 2008, Jame’s Gow’s The Serbian
Project and its Adversaries includes detailed analysis of some major Serbian paramilitary
formations (Hurst, 2003)
23In addition to those mentioned above, see Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia; The
Third Balkan War ; Penguin, 1992; Marcus Tanner, Croatia A Nation Forged in War, Yale
University Press, 1997; David Rieff, Slaughterhouse; Bosnia and the failure of the West,
Vintage, 1995
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one, is a moot point."24 The question of who controlled whom, surely, was –and
remains–anything but a moot point.
Paramilitaries are commonly associated with the Yugoslav collapse and their
participation is frequently referenced in academic literature as well as in the
contemporary reports of the international press, yet to date there is no compre-
hensive academic study of the irregular activity. James Gow’s deconstruction
of the Serbian war machine contains detailed analysis of the dominant paramil-
itary groups operating with and in direct support of the Serbian and Bosnian
Serb governments, and exposes the role certain armed groups played in state
strategy in Bosnia and Croatia.25 Although they did not know each other until
after the war, throughout the 1990s Ivan Čolović (in Belgrade) and Ivo Žanić
(from Zagreb) both wrote about the paramilitary dimension of the conflicts
as social anthropology and discussed how Yugoslavia’s historical tradition of
banditry and non-state violence was being reinvented in the (Croatian and Ser-
bian) nationalist image.26 Research into paramilitaries who fought on the side
of Bosnian Muslims is dominated by post-9-11 retrospective histories of the Mu-
jahideen.27 For the most part, a few better known paramilitary groups, such as
Arkan’s Tigers, dominate common conceptualisation of what was a much larger,
more complex dynamic, which was influenced by and impacted upon all strata
of political, military, and societal life. Thus, while paramilitaries are known
to have played a role in the violence, even in popular discourse, for the most
part this knowledge remains relatively superficial. Most conclusions in this work
then are evidence based, although the context has of course been informed by
the secondary literature relating to the region.
The paramilitary dimension of the Bosnian and Croatian conflicts existed
on three levels, each with its own networks and dynamics: the state, the re-
gional/local, and community and or family. Organised crime became integrated
into the paramilitary structures fighting in support of all national entities and
spanned national and societal infrastructure. The following chapters present a
24Tim Judah, ‘Kaleidoscope of Militias Fights over Bosnia,’ The Times, 30 May 1992
25Gow, The Serbian Project
26Ivo Žanić, Prevrarena povijest: guslarska estrada, kult hajduka i rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni
i Hercegovini 1990-1995. godine., Durieux (Zagreb), 1998; see also Žanić, The Flag on the
Mountain; A political anthropology of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-1995,
(translated by Graham McMaster, with Celia Hawkesworth), Saqi Books, 2007, p500-508;
Čolović, Bordel Ratnika; folklor, politika i rat, Čigoja štampa (Belgrade) 1993
27Evan F. Kohlmann, ‘The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe,’ Swedish Na-
tional Defence College, 2006; also Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network,
Berg, 2004; Vlado Azinović, ‘Al-Kai’da u Bosni i Hercegovini’, Radio Slobodna Europa (Radio
Free Europe), Sarajevo 2007
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new, evidenced-based interpretation of the irregular military dynamics during
the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts that examine the military, political, social,
cultural, criminal –even familial– contexts that the irregular combatants ex-
isted within. Therefore, the methodology and approach are interdisciplinary.
The guiding and most constant thread of the work is rooted in the tradition of
historical study but tools from sociology, anthropology, international relations
and policy, and international law, have leant valuable perspectives and analytic
techniques. Nevertheless, this work is largely an historical one. The conventions
of the discipline can be seen in the analysis of the rich source material from the
ICTY archives that forms the backbone of the work and inform many of its con-
clusions. Thus, the methodology is for the most part a simple one of situating
the sources and their contentions within the historical context to which they
belong.
Several core theoretical tenets form cornerstones of this approach. Benedict
Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm’s concepts of nationalism and the construction of
national identity, or in this case perhaps its reconstruction, are discussed as pro-
cesses integral to the paramilitary phenomenon.28 The nation-building projects
that emerged in the republics of the Yugoslav federation created new paths of
nationalist discourse, propagating imagined histories and mythical shared exper-
iences, which altered social and political conceptualisation of irregular or para-
military violent actors.29 Understanding myth-making and historical memory
as invented tradition is of course taken from Hobsbawm and Ranger 30 but the
theoretical approach has also been influenced by Tony Judt’s study of a com-
mon continental desire in post-war Europe to create modern national myths
that reflect historical, mythical, even mystical, and other imagined national
experiences.31
Bound to the construction of national identities, memory and myth, the
centrality of language in pre-atrocity processes is well documented, although not
28Benedict R O’G Anderson, Imagined Communities; Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism, Verso, 1991 (revised ed.); Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since
1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, 1990
29On the rise of nationalism see Snježana Milivojević, ‘Nacionalisacilja svakodnevnog života’
in Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju, (ed.) Nobojša Popov, Re-
publika (Belgrade), 1996; also Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols; Religion and Nationalism in
Yugoslav States, Oxford University Press, 2002
30Eric Hobsbawm & Terence O. Ranger (ed.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1992
31Tony Judt, ‘The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,’ The-
oria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, 87 (1996), pp36-69; and Postwar; A History
of Europe Since 1945, William Heinemann, 2005
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universally accepted.32 Propaganda and agitation has preceded all instances of
mass violence; the significance of perpetuating grievance is crucial in the form-
ation of “us” versus “them” identities.33 Here, taking Wittgenstein’s contention
that words are actions, and that as such language should be interpreted in the
same way as behaviour, the methodological approach is rooted in the tradition
of discourse analysis.34 Such an approach is all the more apt here because, as
became clear during the research process, efforts were repeatedly made by state
elites to both separate themselves from the irregular perpetrators of violence,
and to stimulate paramilitary criminality, through their use of language. Thus
the spoken and written word are examined from three perspectives: what they
are about, what the speaker or author does with them, and their effects on the
listener or reader.35 The role of words, rhetoric, and language forms a theme
of this work, and, if indeed words are deeds, then so too does the question of
responsibility for linguistic misdeeds.
It is my belief that better understanding of mass violence is our strongest
tool in the prevention of future catastrophes. Marc Bloch wrote in reference to
the study of the Holocaust that ‘a single word, “understanding” is the beacon of
light in our studies’.36 It is this conviction that has served as motivation for this
project. The work is therefore consciously situated in the emerging academic
fields of genocide and mass atrocity studies, a multidisciplinary school that
seeks to better understand the world’s worst crimes through diverse scholarly
approaches.
Many scholars of genocide have observed the phenomenon of paramilitary
participation in mass violence but few have made detailed studies of irregular
perpetrators37 and some case studies have been carried out into the paramilitary
32Cathie Carmichael and Stephen Barbour, Language and Nationalism in Europe, Oxford
University Press, 2000; note that William Schabas has challenged the causal role of propaganda
in mass violence; William A. Schabas, ’Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide’McGill
Law Journal, 2000
33On Yugoslavia see Mark Thompson, Forging war: the media in Serbia, Croatia, Bos-
nia and Hercegovina, Indiana University Press, 1999; Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the
Balkans, p33-35; for overview of works on the media and propaganda in Rwanda see Allan
Thompson (ed.), The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, Pluto Press, 2007; on link between
every-day rhetoric and propaganda of genocide see Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive
Introduction, Routledge, 2006, p299
34Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch, (ed.) G. H. von Wright,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, p46
35Linda A. Wood and Rolf O. Kroger, Doing Discourse Analysis; methods for studying
action in talk and text, Sage, California, 2000, p5
36Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, Manchester University Press, 1992 (revised ed.), p118
37General works include Shaw, War and Genocide, p155; Philip Spencer, Genocide Since
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dynamics in particular identity-based conflicts.38
A stand-out influence has been Alex Alvarez and his tripartite approach to
the study of genocide through the social sciences.39 First, Alvarez considers gen-
ocide to be a political crime, and therefore explores the role that the state plays
in perpetrating it.40 Second, noting that genocide is often carried out through
bureaucratic institutions, Alvarez suggests that genocide should be considered
as a form of organisational crime and examined from the perspective of logist-
ics and structure.41 Finally, Alvarez uses the study of criminology to under-
stand how individuals come to participate in genocide crimes.42 Alvarez takes
an interdisciplinary approach that encourages a broader, more comprehensive
explanations that avoids the either-or-debate of structuralist and intentionalist
theory, presenting instead more robust multidimensional analysis.43 As a result,
Alvarez’s discussion of paramilitary perpetrators in genocide contains analysis
of their relationships with the state, their place in the perpetrating structure,
and the psychological behaviours that enable paramilitaries to commit mass vi-
olence.44 Nevertheless, for the most part Alvarez’s conclusions are general and
based on observations rather than source material.
Martin Shaw similarly notes that examination of paramilitaries in genocide
must be governed by the understanding of genocide as a political crime.45 In
noting that states often leave the execution of the mass violence to ancillaries,
Shaw addresses the sometimes contradictory issue of spontaneity and militia
forces in genocide.46 Writing in 2003, Shaw stated that ‘génocidaires of the
current era...usually include people recruited more or less spontaneously into
killing operations’ but emphasised that ‘[g]enocides are political processes, not
1945, Routledge, 2012, p43-4; similar observations are made by Üngör in ‘Team America’ and
Sheri Rosenberg, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention’, Global Centre for
the Responsibility to Protect, 1 (2009), pp442-477, p451-52; see also for development in 1990s
of significant movement towards pursuing individual accountability for mass atrocities.
38Columbia and other states in South America have attracted much attention, as have
Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and many African states, however, this is rarely from
the perspective of genocide, mass violence or identity-based violence.
39Alvarez, Governments, Citizens, and Genocide; A Comparative and Interdisciplinary
Approach, Indiana University Press, 2001, p8 for discussion of methodology
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
43On structuralism and intentionalism in the social sciences; Stuart McAnulla, ‘Structure
and Agency’ in (ed.) David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science
(Second Edition), Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p274-278
44Alvarez, Governments, Citizens, and Genocide, p91-97 for discussion of paramilitaries
45Shaw, War and Genocide, p155; for genocide as political process see also Shaw, What is
Genocide? A New Social Theory, Polity Press, 2007, p74
46Shaw, War and Genocide, p153-4
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spontaneous outbreaks of mass hysteria.’47 However, like Alvarez, Shaw speaks
of generalisations rather than evidence-based research relating specifically to
paramilitary or irregular dynamics. Nevertheless, Shaw offers a useful warn-
ing against conceptualising the implementation of genocidal projects as highly
rational or consistent, citing the unique dynamics of destruction that lead to
shifts in targeting and methods.48 From the perspective of the implementing
structures in Yugoslavia, the further away the actual violent perpetration of
mass atrocities were devolved from the state to armed groups, the greater the
inconsistency of execution. Shaw reminds us to look for nuance, even if this
means that the explanations we offer must appear less neat and tidy. In this
ambiguity between violent implementation and commanding structure lie funda-
mental questions about how we perceive the relationship between the state and
individual choice. If violence, as Hannah Arendt argued, is bound with power,
then there is a perceptible logic to the ambiguity that benefits both states and
irregular violent actors.49
Ethnic cleansing, perhaps even more so than genocide, is about political
power and, put more simply still, land. Where genocide seeks to destroy in
whole, or in part, a group, the intent that lies behind ethnic cleansing is the
removal of a group by any means that are necessary. Genocide is ideological
and therefore less ‘rational’; ethnic cleansing may also become ideological in
order to justify the policy to the pubic or international community but the de-
struction of the group is secondary to the political objective. The inconsistency
of implementation articulated by Shaw in regards to genocide can then per-
haps be seen as more integral to the process of ethnic cleansing. Thus policies
of ethnic cleansing can include incidents of genocide or genocidal methods, as
well as numerous other forms of human rights abuses that will lead to the re-
moval of victim group(s). The presence of paramilitaries and irregulars in ethnic
cleansing therefore becomes crucial; their utilisation by state elites as prominent
perpetrators is not only inherently logical from the perspective of implement-
ing a shared military tasks but of also fostering an process of violent societal
entropy that will facilitate the realisation of the ultimate objective. In a sense
then, this work uses the paradigm of ethnic cleansing more than paradigms of
either war or genocide to provide a theoretical context.50
47Ibid., p155
48Shaw, What is Genocide?, p74
49Hannah Arendt, On Violence, Harvest Books, 1970, p35
50On the paradigm of ethnic cleansing; Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine,
Oneworld Publishing, 2006, p.xvi; see below for discussion of terminology used in this work
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Since the Bosnian war, studies of paramilitary-type groups have been overshad-
owed by works influenced by Mary Kaldor’s New Wars, Old Wars. Kaldor was
inspired by the Bosnian conflict and she saw in its irregular military maneuvers
evidence for a new type of war, waged by a new type of combatants;
In contrast to the vertically organised hierarchical units that were
typical of ‘old wars’, among the units that fight these [new] wars are
a disparate range of different types of groups, such as paramilit-
ary units, local warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, mercenary
groups and also regular armies, including breakaway units from reg-
ular armies.51
Michael Ignatieff, also influenced by his observations of Yugoslavia’s collapse,
put forward a similar thesis in Blood and Belonging when he wrote ‘[t]he key
narrative of the new world order is the disintegration of nation states into eth-
nic civil war; the key architects of that order are warlords’.52 Mueller made
similar claims regarding the criminal and self-interested nature of new irregular
combatants.53
Without entering the more protracted scholarly disputes over Kaldor’s the-
ory, two problems with her approach are worth drawing out as they have left
a deep impact upon the literature. First, suggesting that these actors are (or,
perhaps more accurately, were) ‘new’ is highly problematic; the irregular actors
listed in the quotation above have been present in some capacity or another
since warfare began. In labeling them new, Kaldor breaks any links that such
groups have with historical or cultural pasts, thus presenting her new milieu as
spontaneous, which is misleading. The second issue is that in her presentation
of an unpredictable coalition of combatants Kaldor greatly reduces, or removes
all together, the role of the state and political rationality in conflicts where
irregular combatants are present. Kaldor’s presentation of these new wars, of
which Bosnia was her case study example, serves to entrench three of the fun-
damental errors of analysis that dominated foreign responses to Yugoslavia’s
51Kaldor, New Wars, p9
52Michael Ignatieff, Blood And Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 1994, p2
53Mueller, ‘The Banality of Ethnic War,’ p43
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crises: that irregular military dynamics were the product of spontaneity; that
the state structures were not central to the conflicts; that the conflicts were not
rational.
Unlike the explicitly political struggle over ideology that had dominated in-
ternational relations for the previous five decades, this “new” phase of conflict
in the 1990s was interpreted as an expression of older identities, which seems
to be immediately contradictory. While, it was assumed, you could choose your
politics, your religion, race, culture, and ethnicity were considered innate. As a
result, conflicts committed in the name of any such attribute were interpreted as
instinctive and therefore irrational, and were thus distinct from the Euro-centric
experience of war in the post-Enlightenment era, where national interest and
rational politics had been explicit. The 1990s brought a number of identity-
based conflicts, particularly in Africa, but it was the Bosnian crisis because
of its proximity to European powers, and, because of its scale, the Rwandan
genocide of 1994, that came to represent a kind of war that was understood
as both new and ancient. In part because of the visibility of irregular com-
batants, it was described as ethnic conflict, which in its very terminology bound
motivation with identity.54 Neither conflict was interpreted as the product of
a classical Clausewitzian continuation of politics but instead as spontaneous
and irrational, implicitly reducing sovereign responsibility and elevating the
role of the community.55 The genocidal elements of both crises complicated
rather than simplified international analysis because external observers could
not reconcile the apparent primitiveness of ethnic conflict with the modernity
of Hitler’s holocaust.56 This is is a problematic extrapolation as it assumes that
community-based violent activity precludes state influence and strategy.
Using the evidence of the ICTY trials, this work shows that in Croatia
and Bosnia, many of the irregular formations that were interpreted as local and
autonomous in fact operated as part of state structures of violence and often un-
der state command. Thus, the findings below refutes Kaldor’s original premise
and challenges the assumptions that persist as a result of similar misreadings of
irregular military dynamics, especially in Bosnia.
54For refutation of “ethnic conflict” see Ibid. but note Mueller’s overemphasis of non-state
actors
55Cigar wrote in 1993 that the Serbo-Croat conflict of 1991 was Clausewitzian; ‘The
SerboCroatian war, 1991: Political and military dimensions,’ Journal of Strategic Studies
16:3 (1993), pp297-338
56Such interpretations of the Holocaust do not take into consideration the significant degree
of spontaneous, and more visceral violence that contributed to the destruction of the Jews
and other groups
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Although separated by geography and historical experience, the visible pres-
ence of paramilitary perpetrators during the mass violence committed in both
Bosnia and Rwanda meant that both atrocity situations shared similarities not
only in the formation of the perpetrating structures but of how those struc-
tures were interpreted by the international community. Both crises occurred
during the same period of the 1990s and, in their aftermath, contributed as a
pair to altering attitudes towards paramilitaries, local violence and genocide.57In
both Rwanda and throughout the Yugoslav crisis, the paramilitary dynamic was
complex and one of layers.58 However, as with the Yugoslav literature, there
have been few studies into the structural relationships between the militia, local
armed groups, and state elites. A tension exists in the literature of Bosnia and
Rwanda between arguments of state responsibility and civilian (or community)
spontaneity.59 Ariel Ahram, for example, not only interprets the presence of the
interahamwe as evidence of voluntary and spontaneous local participation in the
violence, but of the frailty of the Rwandan state.60 Ahram’s interpretation of
the Rwandan militia groups stands in stark contrast to the observations made
by UN Force Commander Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire who, as much
as six weeks before the genocide began, “no longer questioned that there were
direct links between the cadre of powerful ministers that controlled the interim
government and the militias”61 Yet perhaps Ahram is correct when he claims
57A resurgence of interest in the subject of paramilitaries came in response to the visual
brutality of paramilitary actors in genocidal violence in both Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s.
Kaldor’s New Wars was written in response to both conflicts, prompting further interest in
the topic; see also Mueller and Alvarez who both compare the paramilitary dynamics present
in Rwanda and Yugoslavia; for Rwanda’s paramilitary component also see Scott Straus, ‘How
many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An estimate’, Journal of Genocide
Research, 6:1 (2004), pp85-98
58Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with out famil-
ies; Stories form Rwanda, Picador, 1998; this was followed by Alison DesForges, Leave None
to Tell the Story; Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch, 1999
59In literature about Yugoslavia this is characterised by those (often journalists) who put
forward cultural explanations of “ancient hatreds,” epitomised by Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan
Ghosts; A Journey Through History, Vintage, 1994, but there are many others, including
Tim Judah, The Serbs; History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Yale University
Press, 1997; Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbour; A Story of War, Macmillan, 1996, and more
generally William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil; Warlords and Peacekeepers in A World of
Endless Conflict, Bloomsbury, 2000, in relation to Yugoslavia see p33; those who emphasise
the continued and rational role of Serbian state include Gow, The Serbian Project ; also
Naimark, Sells, and Cigar.
60Ahram, ‘State-Sponsored Militias,’ p488
61Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil; The failure of humanity in Rwanda, Vin-
tage Canada, 2003, p194; in early January 1994 Dallaire’s informant within the interahamwe
warned the Rwandan leadership was preparing to distribute weapons to every interahamwe
cell in Kigali, prompting the infamous “genocide fax” to UN Secretary Genera Kofi Annan.
The episode revealed the reluctance to understand the militia groups as under the instruction
20
that ‘the prevalence of these groups is a significant puzzle for state-centric the-
ories on genocide.’62 For this reason, Ahram’s notion of “devolving violence” is
helpful in establishing both a theoretical approach to the organization of viol-
ence, but also in better conceptualising the spectrum of relationships between
states or elites and irregular combatants.63 The conceptual and organisational
framework of ‘devolved structures of violence’ used in this work is adapted from
Ahram’s. The term conveys a relationship with a state-centre from which the
violence has been intentionally devolved, and therefore encompasses many of
the political and (para)military networks that formed on all sides during the
Croatian and Bosnian wars.
Luke Fletcher’s paper on community and individual choice during the Rwandan
genocide draws attention to an absence in the current historiography regarding
elite state structures of command and control and local autonomy for the vi-
olence.64 It is interesting that Fletcher poses many of the same questions that
arise in this work regarding the relationships between different paramilitary
cohorts and levels of state infrastructure. Both this work and Fletcher’s own
conclusions suggest that more research is needed into these relationships on the
local level, particularly regarding local bureaucracies and local elites.
Thus, while it is assumed that paramilitary and other “non-state” armed
groups are important actors in mass atrocity contexts, as perpetrators and de-
fence forces, irregular military dynamics have yet to be explored specifically in
relation to identity-based mass violence. Perhaps this is because the study of
mass atrocity crimes is an emerging field. The analytical tool of an atrocity
(prevention) lens, recently termed by Alex Bellamy in 2011, is useful here.65
While Bellamy intended the mass atrocity lens as a methodological viewfinder
through which to assess current and future crisis situations, the lens is equally
helpful in the study of historical contexts. Applying a mass atrocity lens assists
the researcher in ensuring the violence lies at the heart of the work without
having to first situate the crimes on a scale of violence.
of Rwandan state entities. p144
62Ahram, ‘State-Sponsored Militias,’ p490
63Ahram, Proxy Warriors, p2
64Luke Fletcher, ‘Turning interahamwe: individual and community choices in the Rwandan
genocide,’ Journal of Genocide Research, 9:1 (2007), pp25-48
65Alex Bellamy, ‘Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflicts; Links, Distinctions, and Implications
for the Responsibility to Prevent,’ Policy Analysis Brief; innovative approaches to peace and
security from the Stanley Foundation, The Stanley Foundation, 2011
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0.2 Working with ICTY Sources
The ICTY archives contain the single most significant body of source ma-
terial relating to modern mass atrocity.66 Thanks to the work of the tribunal,
thousands –perhaps millions– of documents are now available online, and within
the archives the most comprehensive, although uncollated, data on paramilitar-
ies in identity-based conflict ever collected.67 Local scholars have also noted the
wealth of material that the ICTY has created relating to the society and culture
of the 1990s.68 While its search tools could certainly be improved, the database
provides easy access to transcripts, indictments, judgements, and exhibits. This
thesis represents the first substantive investigation into these archives with a
focus on the paramilitaries that fought on all sides of the conflicts. It the first
attempt to filter and then synthesise evidence brought to light at the ICTY with
an analytical focus of the irregular military dynamic that so characterised the
period. Examination during the ICTY trials of the paramilitary component has
not been consistent, nor was it ever an explicit goal of the tribunal to establish
an understanding of the irregular military dynamic. Thus there remain sub-
stantial gaps in what the ICTY investigated or examined. Filtering documents
that were not relevant to this project and locating those that were was a long
and difficult process, and there will inevitably have been some that have been
missed. Furthermore, accessing the data requires careful and detailed reading
through each case and its supportive body of evidence. There are scholarly
precedents for historical investigation into paramilitary actors in mass violence
using primarily legal documents. Christopher Browning’s study into the Re-
serve Police Battalion 101 similarly relied upon legal documents relating to the
indictment of the battalion’s members and of their judicial interrogations.69
Nevertheless, when dealing with court documents and testimonies it does well
to consider the tension of methodological difference which exists between his-
66The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the domestic Gacaca courts
of Rwanda have recorded a larger body of evidence and testimony regarding the role of militia
groups such as the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi however the archives of the ICTR are
only partially available online and it was only recently announced that the Gacaca documents
are to be digitalised to form an online archive, Collins Mwai, ‘Gacaca archives digitisation
starts in January, CNLG says,’ The New Times, December 12, 2014 (Rwanda), (n.b.. CNLG
is The National Commission for the Fight against Genocide)
67For website of the ICTY see http://www.icty.org or for legal library of court records see
http://icr.icty.org
68Dunja Rihtman-Auguštin, ‘Haški sud i antropološka ekspertiza,’ Narodna Umjetnost, 39:2
(2002), pp9-32
69Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men; The Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solu-
tion in Poland, Penguin Books, 2001, for notes on Browning’s sources and methodology
preface p.xvi
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torians and lawyers, and that distinguishes the approaches and conclusions in
this work from those of the ICTY enterprise. Richard Ashby Wilson, in his
discussion of the ICTY and the historical record sets out the differences thus:
History...is more pluralistic, open, and interpretative in both its
methods and conclusions. Courts ultimately must embrace one en-
tire account to the exclusion of all others, whereas historians often
accept aspects of competing accounts. Historians live more comfort-
ably with difference of opinion, and they often recognize that their
evidence and conclusions are not always falsifiable or verifiable.70
The relationship between the scholarly and legal communities has become still
more blurred during the experience of the ICTY as numerous historians and
other scholars have taken the stand as expert witnesses for both the Defence and
Prosecution. Robert Donia, whose work on Sarajevo I cite often, was one such
witness and described his experience as “more an extended lecture on regional
history than court testimony.”71
In his discussion of the pitfalls of studying mass violence Uğur Ümit Üngör
advises scholars to avoid legalistic approaches in their work: ‘We should avoid
the overuse of terms such as “crime,” “criminal(s),” “punishment,” “blame,” and
especially “guilt.” ’72 He adds, ‘[l]egal responses to genocide lack relative autonomy
from power and do not offer a useful mode of orientation.’ I heed Üngör’s advice
and make no attempt to pursue legal methodologies. However, dealing with so
many legal sources has meant that at times legal language is difficult to avoid.
Furthermore, studying the ICTY archives has revealed significant gaps in the
tribunal’s conceptualisation of devolved structures of mass violence, which has
led to legal loopholes in the prosecution process. Constraints that govern the
practice and theory of international law are therefore sometimes discussed.
More practical difficulties arise from relying upon a still active tribunal. The
trials move slowly and are beset by the (willful) delays brought by many of the
Defence teams. Appeals are brought and new judgements given, making assess-
70Richard Ashby Wilson, ‘Judging History: The Historical Record of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,’ Human Rights Quarterly, 27 (2005) pp908-942,
p912
71Robert J. Donia, ‘Encountering the Past: History at the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal,’
The Journal of the International Institute, (University of Michigan), 11:2-3, (Winter 2004)
72Üngör, ‘Studying Mass Violence: Pitfalls, Problems and Promises’, Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal, 7:1, (2012) pp68-80, p71
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ment of how the ICTY has responded to the irregular military dynamics more
difficult to determine. Pieces of evidence have been released and verdicts made
throughout the course of the research project, often shifting the research con-
text significantly. In January 2015, for example, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
reversed an earlier judgement regarding the genocide at Srebrenica that had
previously included the paramilitary organisation the Scorpions in the Joint
Criminal Enterprise (JCE) to Murder.73 Although the judgement did not sig-
nificantly alter the convictions of the accused, the removal of the paramilitary
group from the JCE had two implications for the context of the research. The
Appeals Trial Chamber concluded that while they accepted the Scorpions had
been a unit of the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP), the unit ‘was not included
in the military and civilian structures of the [Bosnian Serb Army (VRS)]’ and
therefore could not be considered part of the JCE; inference that there had been
any coordination between Serbia’s professional paramilitaries and the Bosnian
Serb command was considered speculative and therefore not admissible.74 The
decision was made in spite of the established fact that the murders carried out
by the Scorpions in Trnovo, filmed by one of the paramilitaries, ‘share cer-
tain features with other crimes committed in furtherance of the common plan,
namely that the victims were Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica, the killings
occurred “in July 1995, after the fall of Srebrenica,” and the victims were lined
up and shot with automatic rifles.’75 The initial inclusion of the Scorpions in
the original JCE judgement over the massacres in Srebrenica had set a preced-
ent that perpetrators did not necessarily have to be found to be themselves a
member of a JCE for the principal perpetrator to be found guilty if the crime
in question forms part of the common purpose.76 The Appeals judgement re-
moved that premise, which had connected a paramilitary organisation to a JCE
to Murder during a period of genocide, thereby altering the jurisprudence and
increasing the threshold of evidence required to establish convictions for state
parties for crimes committed by forces (apparently) operating within a different
command structure. This impacted the research context not so much because
of its legal implications but rather in the assessment of advantages gained by
the Serbian and Bosnian Serb state as a result of the devolution of violence.
The second implication for the research was simply to underline the importance
73IT-05-88, Vujidin Popović et al, Appeal Judgement, 30 January 2015, p368, para 1063
74Ibid., p369, para 1067
75Ibid., p368-9, para 1066; for the video recording, IT-05-88, Exhibit P03249, ‘Scorpion
video and accompanying transcripts’
76IT-05-88, Judgement, 10 June 2010, p413, para 1080
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of uncovering covert devolved structures active in mass violence. The Appeal
judgement drew upon the Scorpions being part of the MUP structure and not the
VRS, effectively emphasising the (legal) ambiguity that results from involving
multiple chains of command and control in the perpetration of mass violence,
which is subtly –but significantly– distinct from focussing solely on the benefits
of devolution.
More frustrating has been the slow progress made in the Šešelj and Karadžić
trials.77 Until judgements are released, accessing case exhibits is much more
difficult and so a number of potentially significant documents relating to the
Serbian command structures remain inaccessible until verdicts are reached.
Without the key judgements, and that of Ratko Mladić,78 the question of
whether the Serbian leaderships benefitted personally by utilising irregular com-
batants cannot be satisfactorily answered. During the research project, the ac-
quittal of the Croatian Generals Markac and Gotovina, and then of Serbian
State Security chiefs Stanišić & Simatović, challenged what appeared to be an
emerging understanding in international jurisprudence of command responsib-
ility in joint criminal enterprise.79 Instead, the acquittals cemented in law the
benefits of obscuring command responsibility through the use of irregular mil-
itary forces.
The limited international jurisprudence relating to paramilitary structures
and issues of aiding and abetting provide significant legal benchmarks in this
emerging arena of international law, but the lack of autonomous process and
consistency in application suggests legal norms regarding paramilitaries in mass
atrocity crimes have yet to develop. The most notable and relevant case relates
to Nicaragua and the judgement implicitly raises questions regarding the con-
clusions of the ICTY and current gaps in international law.80 In 1984, the
Nicaraguan government submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
that the ‘United States, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing,
supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military
and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua, has violated and is violating
its express charter and treaty obligations to Nicaragua.’81 In its judgement of
the ICJ Trial Chamber, relating to these specific claims of the structural rela-
77IT-95-5/18 Radovan Karadžić and IT-03-67 Vojislav Šešelj
78IT-09-92 Ratko Mladić
79IT-06-90 “Operation Storm” Gotovina et al. and IT-03-69 Stanišić & Simatović
80Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua V. United States of America)
81Nicaragua V. United States of America, Application, 9 April 1984, p16
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tionship between the US state and paramilitaries operating on the ground in
Nicaragua, was as follows:
By twelve votes to three, [the Chamber] Decides that the United
States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and
supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and
aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua,
has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obliga-
tion under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs
of another State82
The judgement poses an interesting comparison for those made by the ICTY.
Serbian state security services, for example, were found to have recruited, trained,
armed, equipped, financed, and otherwise supported the paramilitary activities
of certain armed groups that committed international crimes, but the personnel
who oversaw this relationship were not found guilty themselves.83 The shifting
legal landscape serves to support’s Üngör’s warning to avoid legal approaches
in the study of mass violence; not only does the legal meridian change accord-
ing to the political pressures and contexts of a court but interpretations of the
evidence can only ever be subjective. However, if irregular military actors are
frequently present during mass atrocity situations, and the international com-
munity continues to pursue a legalistic approach to prevention, these gaps in
the international jurisprudence will need to be addressed.
The success of the court’s efforts is widely contested, throughout the former
Yugoslav region, in the field of international law, and across academic discip-
lines. From the historian’s perspective, however, the temporal context of the
court –questions of political influence, or more methodological criticisms that
are leveled at the ICTY enterprise– may not appear of primary concern. We
may have serious objections regarding the legality of the Nuremberg tribunal,
but the source material collected as a result of the trials remains ‘uniquely
valuable’ to students of Nazism.84 If nothing else, the ICTY has provided an
unrivaled historical record of the period of conflict that saw the Yugoslav fed-
eration disintegrate. Yet legal investigation into the crimes of the Holocaust,
82Nicaragua V. United States of America, Judgement, 27 June 1986, p136
83IT-03-69 Stanišić and Simatović, Judgement Summary, 30 May 2013
84Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial; War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust
History and Memory, Oxford University Press, 2003, p2
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not only on the international level but also within national jurisdictions, has
contributed so greatly to our historical understanding of the Nazi experience,
which suggests that the context of those investigations are also relevant. Writ-
ing in reference to Nazi atrocities, Donald Bloxham warns that, ‘[a]s so much
evidence on the murder of the Jews has emerged from the legal milieu, under-
standing that context is an important step in understanding the genocide, and
in breaking down generalisations used to construct all-encompassing concepts
like “the Holocaust” ’.85 Where necessary then, the cases and their sources were
assessed with reference to the court and its particular peculiarities.
Despite its difficulties, the evidence heard at the ICTY trials contains excep-
tional source material concerning the irregular military dynamic during the wars
of Yugoslav secession. While the irregular military structures have not been ad-
dressed systematically, a number of the trials centred upon efforts to establish if
and where chains of command and control connected state elites to those suspec-
ted of having perpetrated crimes.86 Of all the cases heard by the tribunal, that
of Serbian security chiefs Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović most explicitly
addressed the issues of irregular and paramilitary forces and their relationships
with state authorities. Despite what many see as a disappointing judgement,
the case documents contain substantial and crucial details regarding this rela-
tionship, and, when pieced together, how it was concealed.87 The case of Naser
Orić, for example, tracked the development of the irregular corps in Srebrenica
and its integration into the Bosnian army (ARBiH). Numerous trials of polit-
ical leaders on the national and local level, from all sides of the conflict, contain
references to their individual and professional relationships with irregular com-
batants that have either been forgotten or never drew attention at trial or during
the wars. Piecing these references together has been like putting together the
middle sections of a jigsaw puzzle. There are still pieces missing, or waiting
to be found, but the findings set out below present a fuller and in parts more
85Ibid., p222
86see Article 7 of ICTY Statute; Individual Criminal Responsibility, particularly (1) person
who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall
be individually responsible for the crime. and (2) The official position of any accused person,
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment, Updated Statute for
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, United Nations (as amended
7 July 2009 by Resolution 1877), 2009, p6
87IT-03-69 Stanišić and Simatović, Judgement Summary, 30 May 2013
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detailed picture of the paramilitary process and presence than has hitherto been
achieved.
I would like to add one final note in reference to the ICTY sources and acknow-
ledge that the voices of victims are prominent in the trials, and, I hope, also
have a voice in this work. The courage of those who have given testimonies has
created a substantial record of victim experiences during the conflict. This is
in contrast to the absence at Nuremberg of Nazi victims or survivors, where
documents were used in lieu of victim testimony.88
Other sources
Most of the findings contained within this work are based upon sources available
through the ICTY database, however many contemporary reports compiled by
international observers have provided important corroborative evidence. Unlike
the majority of the conflicts that preceded Yugoslavia’s collapse, the political
and military commands in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia were aware that they
were being closely observed by the international community. From 1993, the
world’s first international tribunal was being established and began collecting
evidence. Not only was Yugoslavia’s demise rigorously observed by teams of ex-
perts from the European Commission, United Nations, Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch and the Red Cross, but it was filmed
practically in real time, by perpetrators as well as journalists.
The report completed by the United Nations Commission of Experts contains
a list of all paramilitary groups identified by international observers, together
with notes (although not always accurate) on their relationships with the official
command structures, as they were perceived at the time.89 Although its analysis
of paramilitaries is limited, it represents a kind of encyclopaedia of what was
known and recorded during the conflict.90 The research and publications of civil
society organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and
88For discussion of the voices of victims in international justice see Susanne Karstedt, ‘From
Absence to Presence, From Silence to Voice: Victims in International and Transitional Justice
Since the Nuremberg Trials,’ International Review of Victimology, 17:1 (2010) pp9-30; or
Lawrence Douglas ‘From IMT to NMT; The Emergence of a Jurisprudence of Atrocity,’ in (ed.)
Kim C. Priemel and Alexa Stiller, Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Berghahn,
2014, p287
89For list see UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA
90Ibid.
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the Red Cross, during the conflicts and up to the present day, constitute a small
but detailed library that has proved invaluable.91 The transcripts of the many
interviews that were carried out by the BBC team for the Death of Yugoslavia
series, filmed before the end of the Bosnian war and aired in September 1995, are
remarkable for the candour, even brashness, with which so many of the Yugoslav
elite present their interpretation of and roles in the federation’s collapse. 92
International reportage holds many references to paramilitaries during the
wars, particularly those operating in Sarajevo. The accounts by journalists offer
descriptions of their experiences on the ground and a sense of how the conflict
was viewed and discussed abroad. The Hansard Archive serves as a window
into the British political discourse of Yugoslavia’s collapse, which revealed dis-
cernible trends in both Houses of Parliament that characterised attitudes of
the political establishment towards the conflicts.93 Similarly, CIA and other
US state documents that have either been released to the public or leaked by
WikiLeaks give insight into the American view of the violence. Memoirs, diar-
ies, and other first hand accounts of politicians, journalists, soldiers, victims,
and other actors have also been useful.94Unconventional online sources such as
YouTube videos, Facebook profiles and discussion forums give insight into the
countercultures that the paramilitary dynamics left behind, and occasionally
can point the researcher towards hidden stories of the irregulars that would be
otherwise remained concealed.
0.3 Definitions & terminology
The inconsistency of the lexicon associated with devolved violence poses a
91These include; ‘Yugoslavia: further reports of torture and deliberate and arbitrary
killings,’ Amnesty International, March 1992; ‘War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: U.N.
Cease-Fire Won’t Help Banja Luka,’ Human Rights Watch, 6:8 (June 1994); ‘Bosnia and Her-
cegovina Unfinished Business; The Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons to Bijeljina,’
Human Rights Watch, 12:7 (May 2000); ‘The Unindicted: Reaping the Rewards of “Ethnic
Cleansing,” ’ Human Rights Watch, January 1997
92Television series in 5 episodes The Death of Yugoslavia, BBC, Norma Percy (producer),
Released 3 September 1995; Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, (Revised
Edition), BBC Books, 1996; note that the transcripts are available in the English translation
only and the original interviews are either lost or damaged. The transcripts are now held by
the Liddell Hart Military Library, Kings College London.
93Kate Ferguson, The Bosnian Debates: Bosnia in British political discourse, 1992-1995,
MPhil thesis, Oxford University, 2010
94Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje: nojska bez države, Politika, 1993; Sefer Halilović, Lukava
strategija, Maršal: PJ "Matica Sandžaka" (Sarajevo), 1997; Richard Holbrooke, To End A
War, Randomhouse, 1999; David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, Victor Golanz, 1995; Emil Suljagić,
Postcards from the Grave, The Bosnian Institute, 2005
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challenge to the researcher. At its simplest paramilitary groups can be defined
as formations that carry out military activity usually considered to be outside
the remit of a state’s regular army, but particular definitions or usages of the
term varies greatly.
‘Non-state armed groups’ (or NSAGs) is used in many international policy
documents but, as this research demonstrated, there are conceptual and prac-
tical problems in how the term is applied. Hofmann and Schneckener suggest
that ‘non-state violent actors can be defined as being willing and capable to use
violence to pursue their objectives; not being integrated into formalised state
institutions; and therefore possessing a certain degree of autonomy whether in
regard to politics, military operations, resources, or infrastructure.’95 Yet to use
non-state as a blanket categorisation for all irregular actors that are not visibly
integrated into state institutions is to ignore the possibility of covert structures
of command and control that connect the violent actors with state bodies. De-
termining what groups are legitimately non-state and which are state-sponsored
or operating covertly as part of state structures of command is necessary for both
effective academic and policy analysis. Furthermore, NSAGs encompass a wide
spectrum of characters, from local volunteers who may be untrained and polit-
ically uneducated, to private security firms, mercenaries, professional militia, or
rebel armies. Such a range of actors all warrant their own investigation, and in
relation to different forms of conflict. The evidence make plain that applying the
term ‘non-state’ to describe the entire irregular Yugoslav milieu is misleading.
As the term implies, non-state armed groups should refer only to formations
of combatants that operate entirely outside of and independently from state
auspices.
Throughout this work I prefer to use terms such as ‘paramilitary’ and ‘irreg-
ular,’ and do so interchangeably. Both terms are sufficiently flexibly descriptive
to be applied to all the armed actors and formations that are the focus of this
study while providing terminological and conceptual boundaries that ensure the
regular armed and civilian actors remain separate. Employing these terms also
enables the use of the words and descriptions favoured by actors themselves
and that appear in the primary and secondary sources. However, where pos-
sible I distinguish between terms that imply additional descriptive information
or value judgements. ‘Volunteers’ for example represent a particular group of
95Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Engaging non-state armed actors in state-
and peace-building: options and strategies,’ International Review of the Red Cross, 93:883,
September 2011, pp603-621, p604
30
irregulars who chose to participate in an armed struggle in a paramilitary capa-
city from a civilian position; thus some paramilitaries are volunteers and not all
volunteers are paramilitaries. ‘Special Forces’ or ‘Special Purpose units’ tend
to be paramilitary formations more closely associated with official military or
political structures, they are usually better trained, more disciplined and form
part of a chain of command, but in Yugoslavia these terms were at times appro-
priated by the independent formations, adding further to the confusion. The
word mercenary has become something of a pejorative and so it is only used in
this work when the pursuit of mercenary aims are explicit, or when the term has
been used by the combatant themselves or some other persons. It is worth mak-
ing the distinction between paramilitary or parainstitutional groups and private
security (military) contractors whose roles are explicitly set out in contracts
between the state and the firm.
In the surrounding literature used in this work and throughout documents
of the ICTY a broad number of terms are used inconsistently and interchange-
ably. During the trials, witnesses used a range of terms to refer to paramil-
itary formations, including ‘Specials, Special Forces, Volunteers, Camouflaged
Ones, Multi-coloured, Special Purpose, Policemen and Paramilitaries’.96Some
witnesses referred to civilians who bore arms as bandits.97
In international law, paramilitaries are considered to be lawful combatants
and therefore must be under responsible command, carry distinctive signs, carry
arms openly and obey the customs of war.98 Therefore, if it can be found that
they operated during an armed conflict, paramilitaries cannot be tried for simply
taking part in hostilities, but like any other combatant can be held accountable
for breaches of domestic and or international law.
I reject terms such as ‘non-traditional’ forces largely because of the historical
experience in the western Balkans of irregular military formations and for the
same reasons I am wary of Kaldor’s descriptions of ‘new’ actors. I do not use
the term ‘death squads’ just as I avoid the term ‘death camps’ to describe the
network of concentration camps where many prisoners were murdered. The use
of emotive definitions, especially when they already hold strong connotations
96IT-95-9, Simić et al, Judgement and Order recalling Judgement and substituting new
judgement, 17 October 2003, p.69; during this case other terms used included The Grey
Wolves and “Lugar” ’s men
97IT-04-75, Goran Hadžić, see Transcripts of 17 July 2013, p7237; here and in several other
cases Defence lawyers used the term bandit to diminish the military significance of their client
or client’s associate(s)
98See Rule 4. Customary Human Rights Law, as protected by the International Committee
of the Red Cross
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with other historical contexts, encourages a a slip towards the fetishisation of
violence that I reject. In choosing not to use such terms I do not diminish the
gravity of the subjects but simply seek to steer clear of comparisons along scales
of suffering.
The second challenge of definition relates to the violence itself. Perhaps in
latent response to global failures over Yugoslavia (and also Rwanda, and more
recently still, during the Save Darfur campaign) attitudes to the language of
genocide have, in many ways, pluralised since the 1990s. The word is more
freely used and better understood. However, to my mind, genocide is a crime
and it is therefore primarily the purview of lawyers and legal scholars. Naming
mass violence is important, but often appears to have more to do with politics
and emotion than with academic research.99 Instead I prefer, where possible,
to use mass atrocities –a nonlegal catch-all for ethnic cleansing, war crimes,
mass murder, and genocide100 –or identity-based (mass) violence, which cap-
tures the intent and avoids comparative scales.101 Identity-based violence is
distinct from other forms of violence or conflict and deserves different analytical
attention. Whether the violence is committed against one person or thousands,
each victim suffers specifically because they are perceived by the perpetrator(s)
as belonging to an enemy identity group.102A further distinction is that identity-
based violence is always a crime, whether committed in peace time or during
conflict. International law and domestic laws in much of the world criminal-
ise the intentional violent targeting of unarmed people, although identity-based
violence remains common across the globe.103
99For good discussion on terming mass violence see Mahmood Mamdani, ‘The Politics of
Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,’ The London Review of Books, 29:5, 8 March 2007
100Terming mass atrocities in response to the politicisation of genocide see Scheffer, ‘Defuse
the Lexicon of Slaughter’
101I am not aware of any previous use of the terms identity-based violence or identity-based
mass violence as a conceptual framework in the study of mass violence, mass atrocities, or
genocide, or as a catch-all definition. I have developed the term in order to assess as a
whole the different levels of violence that were committed in Bosnia and Croatia by irregular
military actors while being to emphasise the shared impetus or intentionality of the violence,
but without having to distinguish between legal categorisations or numerical scale.
102Conceptualising the victim group as defined by the perpetrators is adapted from Chalk and
Jonassohn’s discussion of typology of genocide using the frame of reference of the perpetrator,
Frank Robert Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses
and Case Studies, Yale University Press, 1990, p31
103A number of international treaties prohibit abuses that constitute acts of identity-based
violence; ‘International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,’
adopted by General Assembly (resolution 2106) 21 December 1965, entry into force 4 January
1969; ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,’ adopted by General
Assembly (resolution 2200A) 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976; ‘Declaration
on the rights of indigenous peoples’ adopted by the General Assembly, (Resolution 295) 13
September 2007; ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,’
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The ambiguity that surrounds the crime of ethnic cleansing, which rather
perversely is a term that Radovan Karadžić himself coined, has, since its intro-
duction into our vocabulary of violence, posed several problems. The first is
its association with the crime of genocide.104 Perhaps because both genocide
and ethnic cleansing require identity-based mass violence, but also because of
the perceived moral weight that the label of genocide bestows, one has become
bound to the other; the debate is often “its not genocide, but maybe its ethnic
cleansing,” again returning to that rather unpleasant hierarchy of atrocity.
I have written before that the patterns of violence committed by Serbian and
Bosnian Serb forces against Bosnia’s Muslim population should be considered
genocidal but do not enter that discussion here.105 This work is framed by
examining the human rights abuses that took place during the period. The reg-
ular and irregular armed forces acting in support of Serbian and Bosnian Serb
ambitions clearly committed the overwhelming majority of abuses, which is re-
flected in the analysis below.106 However, the focus is not to rank or categorise
the human rights violations, or to take up debates of genocide and counter-
genocide that continue to endure in western Balkan politics. Therefore, the
findings have been assessed through a mass atrocity (prevention) lens and the
analytical deconstruction of identity-based violence as a (preventable) global
phenomenon.107
0.4 Setting the Scene on the gathering storm
The decade between Tito’s death in May 1980 and the outbreak of violence in
the summer of 1991 transformed Yugoslavia. The federation suffered economic
collapse, ideological bankruptcy, international alienation, and internal crisis.
As the social order of the communist system fragmented, its values and policies
adopted by the General Assembly (Resolution 260) 9 December 1946; theoretically at least,
according to the legal definition of genocide as recorded in the Convention and in the Rome
Statute, the killing of persons belonging to the group, with the intent to destroy, in whole
or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, constitutes genocide. Thus, it would
be possible to argue that many acts of identity-based murder, whether against one person or
thousands, should be considered as genocidal.
104Note that there is no formal legal definition of ethnic cleansing but instead is included in
the ICC Statute as a crime against humanity
105Kate Ferguson, ‘Masking Genocide in Bosnia,’ in (ed.) Cathie Carmichael and Richard
C. Maguire, The Routledge History of Genocide, Routledge, 2015
106A CIA investigation found that Serb forces were responsible for ‘at least 90 percent of
the destruction, displacement, and loss of life associated with ethnic cleansing,’ ‘Intelligence
Report DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing, December 1994,
p.v
107On an atrocity prevention lens see Bellamy, ‘Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict’
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were discredited (although many clung on to them). In their place, virulent
and sometimes violent nationalism took root. Ambitious politicians, a powerful
state-controlled media nexus, and the post-communist desire to reconnect with
lost identities collided: the organic celebration of religious and national spirit
that spread across the republics, as people experimented with what appeared
to be a new freedom of autonomy, became intwined with an elite fascist revival
in Serbia and Croatia. Understanding the changes that took place in the 1980s
in social values, popular culture and societal dynamics provides an explanatory
backdrop to the political policies that were later pursued.
By early summer of 1980, Yugoslavia had entered what Sabrina Ramet has
described as a period of ‘apocalypse culture.’108 The communist state was
being challenged by dissidents and social movements up and down the country,
and the authorities had neither the means nor conviction to respond. Not
ten years before, in 1971, the Croatian Spring had been crushed ruthlessly
but not comprehensively; and as Marcus Tanner puts it, ‘an entire generation
that included the majority of the most talented people in Croatia went into
exile, or was forced into obscurity.’109 The increase in international terrorist
activity in the name of Croatian nationhood was a direct consequence of the
purge of the student movement, which had created a frustrated and radical
diaspora that sought to destabilise Yugoslavia from outside of its borders (and
its control). Inside Yugoslavia, the economy was failing, the political system
had lost legitimacy, and the national question was gaining momentum.
After the boom of the late 1970s, Yugoslavia became locked in economic
crisis.110 Prices rose and living costs fell, contributing to the waves of strikes that
hit the country throughout 1987-88. On the instructions of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Dinar was devalued and free movement of prices was
initiated as a precursor to the lifting of all price controls.111 The effects of these
reforms were limited and Branko Mikulić’s administration was forced to resign
en masse at the end of December 1988.
The developments in Eastern Europe further contributed to the country’s
108Pedro (now known as Sabrina) Ramet, ‘Apocalypse Culture and Social Change in
Yugoslavia,’ in (ed.) Ramet, Yugoslavia in the 1980s, Westview Press, 1985
109Tanner, Croatia, p.202; Furthermore, for many of the younger generation who experienced
their formative years between 1967 and 1971, the Spring was a defining political moment; a
sixteen year old in 1967 would have been in their early 40s when fighting broke out in the
1990s –the age bracket of many of the wartime paramilitary and political leaders.
110Gow, Legitimacy and the Military, The Yugoslav Crisis, Pinter Publishers, 1992, p62
111On IMF terms see Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up
1980-92, Verso, 1993, p95-96
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economic instability and its psychological sense of alienation. The cooling down
and end of the Cold War had a profound and dislocating effect in Yugoslavia that
added to the internal crisis and dramatically altered the country’s international
role and image.112 The polarisation of the Cold War world had brought a strict
geopolitical dichotomy of West against East, Capitalism against Communism.
Yugoslavia, uniquely, had never been quite out of the middle.113
As a result, in the late 1980s Yugoslavia’s geopolitical security became sud-
denly unclear. The Yugoslav experience of socialism had not been monolithic
but diverse and complex –their revolution had been ‘genuine’ and home-grown,
not imposed at the point of Soviet bayonets. The crisis of domestic and inter-
national communist politics impacted Yugoslavia and Yugoslavs considerably.
As Mark Thompson describes, ‘their socialism could not be thrown off like a
suit of someone else’s clothes.’114 To ‘throw off’ socialism, Yugoslavs faced a
task far greater than pulling down symbols of occupation and repression; the
causes of their frustrations were internal. Thus Thompson wrote in 1992 that
federalism and socialism in Yugoslavia were ‘Siamese twins’ and if the two were
to be separated, only delicate surgery could leave the state intact.115
Nationalist politics promised an alternative. In 1981, Dobrica Ćosić, father
of Serbian nationalism, demanded that the Titoist limitations on free speech
be lifted. In the same year the Francuska 7 Tribunal was established and put
on a series of evenings “On Kosovo – For Kosovo,” where impassioned nation-
alist intellectuals, including Ćosić, spoke in ‘defence of the Serbs’. In January
1986, two hundred Serb intellectuals, led by Ćosić, signed the ‘Memorandum
of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences’, in which they declared that the
Serbs were the most oppressed peoples in Yugoslavia and accused the Koso-
var Albanians of rape and ‘genocide’; Serbia was, they claimed, suffering their
third genocide.116 Texts were published by intellectual thinkers such as Dobrica
Ćosić and Gtokar Kersovani that were ‘permeated with anxiety for the Serbian
112Mark Thompson, Paper House, Pantheon Books, 1992, p7
113On Yugoslavia’s communism and relationship with the Soviet Union see see Aleksa Djilas,
The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953, Harvard
University Press, 1991; Ivo Banac,With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav
Communism, Cornell University Press, 1988; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nona-
ligned World, University of Princeton, 1970; and new legacy edition, 2015
114Thompson, A Paper House, p7
115Ibid.
116The first being the First World War where they lost one quarter of their population, the
second at the hands of the Ustaša, and the third was supposedly being perpetrated in the
1980s through a supposed deliberate policy of rapid reproduction by the Kosovar Albanians
(see more below)
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people’.117
Resurgent religious patriarchies within the Catholic and Orthodox Churches
became politically vocal and championed the Serbian and Croatian national
projects. After a decade of growing Muslim identity, the Islamic community in
Bosnia proclaimed stricter implementation of Islamic law in order to become
free from state interference.118
Up until the end of the 1980s, all television and radio stations belonged to
the national governments, and so maintained substantial control over what was
broadcast during those crucial years. With newspaper circulation other than
the tabloid press becoming ever more the purview of the middle classes, the
content and control of TV and radio held the key to social mobilisation. Most
programmes were broadcast on all stations but by the mid-1980s, as republics
increasingly sought to limit the flow of information, only the Sunday evening
news aired to the whole federation.119 In Croatia and Slovenia, this artificially
constructed sense of alienation was enforced by strict language rules that pre-
vented programmes from the other republics being aired.120 Once in power,
Milošević ensured that the Politika news agency and Belgrade Television were
purged of journalists and editors who were not willing to toe his aggressive party
line.121 The state television stations had the resources to maintain full schedules
that transmitted their political messages more regularly and comprehensively
than their communist predecessors. The strategy of state-owned media outlets
in Serbia and Croatia (but also in the other republics) in the latter years of the
federation was similar to those adopted by movements of exclusionary identity
politics around the world.
Throughout the 1980s Serbian media singled out Kosovo’s Albanians as the
focus for nationalist frustrations, and anti-Albanian sentiment was later taken
117Ramet, Balkan Babel, p63; see also or example Branko Petranović, Revolucija i kon-
trarevolucija u Jugoslaviji: 1941-1945, Rad (Belgrade), 1983 which painted the Chetniks as
anti-fascists as well as anti-communists; for discussion see Pamela Ballinger, History in Exile:
Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans, Princeton University Press, 2002 p107-08
118Sead S. Fetahagić, Chapter 3.3, ‘Islam in Socialism and Post-Socialism’ in (ed.) Zilka
Spahić-Šiljak, Contesting female, feminist and Muslim identities : post-socialist contexts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, Uni-
versity of Sarajevo 2012
119Pedrag Šimić, ‘The Former Yugoslavia: The Media and Violence,’ RFE/RL Research
Report, 3:5, 4 Feb 1994, pp40-47, p41; Thompson argues this process did not begin until
the late 1980s, see Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina,
University of Luton Press, 1999, p16
120Ibid.
121Keith Somerville, Radio Propaganda and the Broadcasting of Hatred: Historical Devel-
opment and Definitions, Macmillan, 2012, p75
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on by media outlets in Croatia. The latent animosity between Croat and Ser-
bian national programmes grew more visible as the decade came to a close.
Documentaries about the Second World War, the Independent State of Croatia
(NDH), the Ustaše genocide of the Serbs, and Serbian guerrilla culture drew
attention to old wounds and encouraged new resentments among the younger
generations. Interestingly, Bosnia’s Muslims were rarely targeted by either the
Serbian or Croatian press. As the media wars escalated, exclusionary and often
violent narratives became not just common but normalised. The rape of Serbian
women by Albanian men, for example, was reported throughout the latter half
of the 1980s as a constant threat. Behind the media hype, incidents of reported
rapes were in fact lower in Kosovo than in other parts of Yugoslavia.122
The vacuum left by the socialist regime enabled, as Ramet put it, a ‘pat-
riarchal backlash.’123 The new culture of masculinity coincided with and re-
inforced the regional discrediting of ideals associated with the communist re-
gime, including gender equality.124 Sports and supporters’ clubs provided spaces
where male identities and localised patriotism could be embraced. In 1986, one
month before the Memorandum was leaked, approximately 80 supporters of Red
Star Belgrade football club, following a match with Partisan Belgrade, ‘sang na-
tionalist songs and slogans,’ including “Attack the Albanians!” and “the Serbian
trumpet can be heard in Kosovo!” while they also targeted Albanian businesses,
breaking the windows and equipment of shops and food outlets, beating up the
proprietors.’125 The Red Star fans then moved on to Belgrade maternity hos-
pital and sang nationalist songs; Richard Mills suggests that the location was
chosen not only to ‘bear witness to the birth of young Serbs’ but was influenced
122Between 1982 and 1989, inner Serbia recorded, on average, 2.43 cases per year for every
10,000 men in the population; the figure for Kosovo was 0.96. Furthermore, of those rapes
in Kosovo, the great majority involved assailants and victims of the same nationality; only
31 rape and attempted rape cases were found involving an Albanian man against a Serbian
woman during the same period. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo; A Short History, New York University
Press, 1999, p339
123Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe; The Sources and Consequences of the Great
Transformation, Duke University Press, 1995, p226; see also Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković,
Serbia since 1989: Politics and Society under Milošević and After, University of Washington
Press, 2005, p5
124See Wendy Bracewell, ‘Women, Motherhood, and Contemporary Serbian Nationalism,’
Women’s Studies International Forum, 19:1-2 (1996) pp25–33; For Yugoslav traditions of
machismo and essentialist gender relations see “Because we’re just boys” in Dubravka Ugresić,
Culture of Lies: Antipolitical Essays, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998, pp113-127;
on the young Arkan being instructed in ‘toughness, machismo, and tenacity’ in the gyms of
Belgrade see Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p21; on masculinity in Serbian culture, Čolović,
(trans. Celia Hawkesworth), The Politics of Symbol in Serbia, Hurst, 2002, p48
125Richard Mills, ‘Domestic Football and Nationalism in the Construction and Destruction
of Socialist Yugoslavia, 1945-1995’, PhD. Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2013, p83
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by nationalist anxieties regarding the high Albanian birthrates.126 By 1989,
Red Star fans, also known as “warriors” (delije), sang “Delije, delije, u nama je
spas, Slobodan Milošević navija za nas” : “Warriors, Warriors, that’s our pride,
Slobodan Milošević is on our side.”127 Red Star’s supporters’ association would
later become run by Arkan Ražnatović and form the basis of his paramilitary
group, the Tigers.
As the decade waned, the economy collapsed and the central political in-
frastructure began to buckle. Milošević’s coup brought political victory for the
nationalists but an exclusionary culture was already well established in parts
of Serbian and Croatian societies. National symbols and historical myths were
consciously appropriated by the nationalist movements and the latent animosity
between Croat and Serbian national programmes grew more visible.128 Among
Serbs, memories of the Second World War Chetnik struggle and myths of Prince
Lazar and the Battle of Kosovo Field were revived, creating an ‘historically
proven’ legacy of violent Serbian martyrdom.129 In 1989, Milošević oversaw
the exhumation of the bones of Prince Lazar and their evocative pilgrimage to
every village in Serbia.130 Such acts stimulated forgotten (or imagined) iden-
tities, and created a media sensation that framed Serbia’s defeat at the hands
of the Turks exactly 600 years before as something recent and humiliating.131
Similarly, the trappings of Franjo Tudjman’s new Croatia reflected a conscious
tribute to Ustaša legacies; these included the renaming of Croatian currency
kuna, as it had been in the NDH, the dismantling of the Jasenovac camp mu-
seum, and the naming of several streets throughout the country after Ustaša
minister Mile Budak (to whom the policy of expelling one third of the Croa-
tian Serbs, converting one third to Catholicism, and murdering the final third,
is attributed).132 These divisive narratives created new paths of nationalist
126Ibid. p83
127Marko Lopušina, Komandant Arkan, Legenda (Čačak), 2001, p76
128Čolović, The Politics of Symbol
129On Serbian myths Dejan Djokic, ‘Whose Myth? Which Nation? The Serbian
Kosovo Myth Revisited,’ in (ed.) Janos M. Bak, Jörg Jarnut, Pierre Monnet and Bernd
Schneidmueller, Uses and Abuses of the Middle Ages: 19th-21st Century, Wilhelm Fink (Mu-
nich) 2009
130Judah, The Serbs, p39
131Milošević said in his speech as Gazimestan, “Six centuries later, today we are again engaged
in a battle, facing more battles. They are not armed, although armed battles are not to be
excluded.’ Politika, 29 June 1989 cited in Žanić, Flag on the Mountain, p.37
132Marko Attila Hoare, ‘Whose is the Partisan movement? Serbs, Croats, and the legacy of
a shared resistance’, The Journal of Slavic Militaries Studies, 15:4 (2002), pp24-41, p37; note
too Tudjman’s revisionist history of Jasenovac camp in which he argued between 30-40,000
Serbs had died there Franjo Tudjman, Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti: rasprava o povijesti i
filozofiji zlosilja, Matica Hrvatska (Zagreb), published in 1988, 1999 1990, and 1994; here, 3rd
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discourse, altering social and political conceptualisations of irregular or para-
military violence by presenting identity-based non-state warfare as honourable
and part of patriotic tradition.133
By the end of the decade, these forces had overturned the established Yugoslav
social order; the political establishment had broken down, economic prospects
were bleak, family values changed, concepts of gender equality were threatened,
and as western influences flooded the republics consumers struggled to balance
new materialist desires with the realties of what was available. Organised crime
soared as the socialist infrastructure collapsed and former security agents from
Yugoslavia and former communist neighbour states built powerful smuggling
networks. The grey and black economies came to subsidise incomes across the
federation; what had been considered criminal activity a few years before had
quickly become part of life.134 The violence that followed in the 1990s and many
of the networks that came to support the irregular combatant had their roots
in the years immediately preceding 1991. Furthermore, the patriotic pageantry
of the late 1980s, by the 1990s succeeded in dressing mass violence in cultur-
ally symbolic costume and context. A consequence was that the paramilitary
presence during the wars was portrayed by the aggressor elites and their media
outlets as the product of historical community hatreds. Another was that many
inside and outside of Yugoslavia were prompted by the divisive narratives to
volunteer and join either official or unofficial military formations, which served
only to reinforce the misconceptualisation of the crises as being non-state led.
Thus, when the international community watched the federation fracture in con-
fused dismay, the nationalist framing of the identity-based violence presented
a ready-made explanation for the chaos that placed the onus of responsibility
on Balkan or Yugoslav cultural traditions. Such a crisis, it was considered, lay
outside the accepted sphere of external moral accountability.135
edition, p365; Under Tito, 600,000-700,000 were considered to have died at the camp; Robin
Okey, ‘The Legacy of Massacre; The “Jasenovac Myth” and the breakdown of communist
Yugoslavia,’ in Mark Levene & Penny Roberts (ed.), The Massacre in History, Berghahn
Books, 1999, p273
133For the rise of nationalism, Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols; Religion and Nationalism in
Yugoslav States, Oxford University Press, 2002
134‘Anti-corruption in Southeast Europe: First Steps and Policies,’ Southeast European
Legal Development Initiative, Center for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria), 2002, p16
135For situating Bosnia outside western sphere’s of responsibility see Gearóid Ó’Tuathail,
‘An Anti-geopolitical Eye: Maggie O’Kane in Bosnia, 1992-93’, Gender, Place & Culture, 3:2,
1996, pp171-186; on western understanding of the violence as Balkan see Maria Todorova,
Imagining the Balkans, Oxford University Press, 1997, p136-8
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Part II
The Architecture of Violence
[War] is being waged by a kaleidoscope of militias, armies and
freelance groups. Accurate numbers are impossible to ascertain, loy-
alties overlap, and who really controls whom, if anyone, is a moot
point.
Tim Judah, ‘Kaleidoscope of Militias Fights over Bosnia,’
The Times, 30 May 1992
Almost all states use paramilitary groups but even the most militarised regimes
shy away from parading their covert and clandestine purveyors of violence. Des-
pite the prevalence of armed formations that exist outside formal armies, under-
standing how these groups operate remains a core challenge to global peacekeep-
ing and atrocity prevention efforts.136 The participation of paramilitary groups
in conflicts is not prohibited by international law, so long as they are incorpor-
ated into the ordinary command structure. The Rules of War and Customary
Human Rights Law state that “the armed forces of a party to the conflict con-
sist of all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.”137 The problem
arises when extra-ordinary units participate and do so apparently independently
of state or other external control.138 It is this obscurity of command that can
conceal the intentions that sometimes lie behind the participation and actions
of those groups, thereby clouding responsibility and accountability.
The significance of the state is critical when we look at incidents of organised
identity-based violence and mass atrocity crimes. Such crimes are political acts
that are usually framed in a context of uncontrollable civilian struggle. In the
modern world, mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and genocide often require a sig-
nificant degree of social collaboration and complicity. Perpetuating narratives
of non-state violence enables state elites to encourage and sanction a spectrum
136The OSAPG for example, cites that non-state armed groups ‘should be held accountable
for their actions’ but as yet a strategy to implement R2P in relation to NSGAs or other
irregular dynamics has to be formed.
137Rule 4. Customary Human Rights Law, as protected by the International Committee of
the Red Cross
138Such groups can still bound by Customary Human Rights Law and even if a military
formation or a guerrilla organisation cannot be considered an independent party to an armed
conflict, the combatants of such groups can be bound by the provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Conventions if their organisation is related to a state. See Third Geneva Convention, article
4, paragraph 2. This is discussed in more detail in Part V
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of actors, civilian or otherwise, to participate in military struggle while them-
selves remaining on the margins. However, while the presence of paramilitary
perpetrators in the history of atrocity crimes is not disputed, understanding
the chains of command and control that connect irregular formations to states
continues to challenge scholars, policy makers, and civil society groups. Paramil-
itary or irregular units have participated to such an extent in the perpetration
of these particular crimes because governments and political elites benefit by
using unconventional forces to fulfil devastating socio-political ambitions.
Deniability and devolved responsibility make paramilitary groups perfect
tools to commit atrocity crimes. Such violence is political and committed with
intent against civilians identified as an enemy group while being framed by an
often artificially constructed context of polarised and defensive struggle that
provides both the legitimacy and inevitability of the assault. Social collabor-
ation, whether active or passive, is often secured by perpetuating a state of
pervasive fear that escalates “us versus them” dichotomies. The radicalisation
of society is usually accompanied by collusion from the media and a militarisa-
tion of communities, uniting the ideological cause with the approaching military
struggle. It is these processes, or precursors to the crimes that, in their recruit-
ment of civilian supporters, provide the external legitimacy for identity-based
violence because it appears to be spontaneous. The role of paramilitary groups
here is crucial. Having sanctioned their development, if not created, funded,
armed and trained the groups, political powers possess crucial covert networks
of communication with irregular military forces who support their own ambi-
tions. Most importantly, these forces can be presented to the public at home
and abroad as wholly independent from their politics and strategy. Without
detailed investigation or deep understanding of the realities on the ground, it is
difficult to disqualify such assertions, especially if they are made by a head of
state, or imitate traditions or pre-existing prejudices that overshadow critical
analysis.139 It is no coincidence that paramilitary or irregular units have played
an enduring though often concealed role in the long history of identity-based
mass violence. Paramilitary groups have been involved in “virtually every case
of genocide in the twentieth century.”140And the benefits of using forces de-
tached from the political establishment to fulfil socio-political ambitions such
as ethnic cleansing, mass murder, and genocide have only increased as global
norms regarding human rights and the responsibility to protect civilians have
139For international comparisons see Part VII
140Üngör, ‘Team America,’ p33
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strengthened.
In both the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, special irregular units
were instrumental in destroying ethnic enemy communities. In 1890, the Ot-
toman Sultan Hamid created a well trained force called the Hamidiye, literally
belonging to Hamid, in order to ‘deal with the Armenians as he wished’.141 The
Hamidiye regiments were ‘fanatically loyal’ to the Sultan who exploited Kurd-
ish resentment of the relative prosperity of the Armenians to his political and
military advantage.142 The extensive role played during the Armenian geno-
cide by Kurdish militia, who had their roots in the Hamidiye, occurred in close
coordination with the Ottoman army and has been well documented.143 Oper-
ating within a more recognisable and conventional military command structure,
the Nazi Einsatzgruppen were special paramilitary taskforces and used as SS
death squads in eastern Europe.144 Often recruiting local civilian and police
auxiliary support, the Einsatzgruppen were responsible for liquidating one mil-
lion perceived political and racial enemies behind the German front lines.145 In
military structures such as the Nazi machine, comprehending the chain of com-
mand, and therefore of accountability for the crimes committed by paramilitary
groups, is relatively straightforward. Determining who is most responsible for
crimes committed by groups operating under a more devolved or covert mil-
itary structure such as the Kurdish militia in the Armenian genocide is more
complicated in both legal and moral frameworks.146
Accountability for the Armenian genocide remains a tortuous issue in the
international historiography and Turkish nationalists have used the role of the
Hamidiye and Kurdish militia to deflect responsibility from central Turkish au-
thorities.147 What is more, the Kurdish militia –like the majority of devolved
141 Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris; The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response,
Harper Collins, 2003, p44
142Ibid.
143Uğur Ümit Üngör and Mehmet Polatel, Confiscation and Destruction; The Young Turk
Seizure of Armenian Property, Continuum International, 2011
144Hilary Earl, The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen trial, 1945-1958: atrocity, law, and his-
tory, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p4; Einsatzgruppen literally means “recruited for the
purpose in hand” and conveys their purpose, but can be translated in English as task force or
“specially recruited groups.”
145Ronald Headland, Messages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of
the Security Police and the Security Service, 1941-1943, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,
1992, p124
146On individual criminal responsibility as defined by the Statute of the ICTY see Article
7; on surperior criminal esponsibility see Article 7.3, p8; similar definitions are given in the
statutes of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (ECCC), the ICC and ICTR.
147For debate of historiography see Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militia in
the Ottoman Tribal Zone, Stanford University Press, 2011, p8-9
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parainstitutional perpetrators– often ignored central instructions, pursuing per-
sonal interests rather than the state’s exclusionary ideology.148 In contrast, the
Einsatzgruppen fell under the ultimate command of Heinrich Himmler and had
a clear mandate to pursue the extermination of the European Jewry and other
Nazi enemies. There is a wealth of evidence that sets out how the Einsatz-
gruppen were part of Nazi military and political command structures, and the
reports Einsatzgruppen units sent back from the field detail the crimes they
committed in precise, technical detail.149 It is therefore comparatively more
straightforward to establish first, individual and command responsibility; and
second, intent to commit the violence. Establishing these factors in covert de-
volved structures is difficult both in international law and from a sociological
“moral” perspective.150
As the Office of the Prosecution (OTP) at the ICTY has found, uncovering
the chains of command that existed during the Yugoslav conflicts and prosec-
uting those most responsible within the existing confines of international law
poses several legal as well as practical challenges. This is important because
while there is a clear legal obligation in international human rights law for
states not to commit atrocity crimes, when crimes are committed the law does
not implicate states but individuals and therefore, after the fact, seeks to hold
individuals most responsible, not states, to account.151 Sheri Rosenberg has
said, ‘in today’s world, many of the atrocity crimes that we experience around
the globe are committed surreptitiously at the hands of non-state actors, with
varying degrees of relationship to the state.’152 Thus, as the international com-
munity continues to frame its responses to genocide within the constraints of
international law, whereby the onus is placed on proving that the crime has
taken place and prosecuting those understood to be most responsible, these
difficulties in establishing accountability will need to be addressed.153
148Ibid. p9-10
149For analysis of this evidence see Headland, Messages of Murder and Earl, SS-
Einsatzgruppen trial
150Again, moral is used here in reference to perceptions of what was or became permissible
and what was not.
151Note ICJ cases involving state parties, which focussed on failure to prevent and punish
genocide; Applications of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro; and Croatia v. Serbia.
152Rosenberg, ‘A Framework for Prevention,’ p451-52; see also for developments in 1990s
pursuing individual accountability for mass atrocities.
153On shift towards individual criminal responsibility see Kirsten Ainley, ‘Responsibility for
atrocity: individual criminal agency and the International Criminal Court,’ in Parry, John T.
(ed), Evil, law and the state: perspectives on state power and violence, Rodopi, 2006
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The names of the paramilitary groups, which were usually taken after the leader
of the unit (Mecet’s babies, Glavaš Unit, Martićevci), aggressive animals (Vat-
rine Konji –Horses of Fire, Sokoli –Hawks, Kiseljak Tigers, Grey Wolves), his-
torical figures (Knights, Četniks, Dušan Silni –Dušan the Great) or historical
military formations (Handžar Division, Četniks) suggest that the irregular dy-
namics were dominated by personal armies, personifications of wild animal be-
haviour, and a glorification of the violent aspects of the region’s history. Other
names suggested that paramilitaries did not take their roles or the violence
seriously –the Rambos, the Knidža Turtles, the Jokeri –or Jokers. Muslim
formations took names of passive or peaceful creatures –the Black Swans, the
Mosque Doves. The formations each had their own identity but much was ap-
propriated from the virulent nationalist narratives that had recently revived
historical memories of the Second World War, bandit culture, and identity-
based divisions. The interaction between many of the irregular units and official
structures changed as the wars progressed and both official and unofficial actors
experienced the realities of conflict.
While many of the perpetrators of such crimes during the Yugoslav wars did
not wear national uniforms, nor apparently fall under the command of those that
did, paramilitary units carried out actions that furthered the political and milit-
ary ambitions of their state or federal authorities. The relationships between the
paramilitary units and the political and military architectures of the emerging
states can be understood along two frameworks; one that was demonstrably in-
tentional, organised, and hierarchical; and another that was the indirect product
of the entropic processes discussed in the previous chapter. Many of the para-
military units that committed the worst crimes were created by leading political
figures or their parties.154 Others were established before the conflicts began as
organs of interior ministries.155 The units were recruited on three levels; some
like Arkan’s Tigers were recruited and trained by the state, the membership of
paramilitary structures set up by political parties such as the Patriotic League
or the Četniks came from party supporters, while local groups came together
through personal networks.
Preparations for war on all sides involved the prioritisation of armed net-
154Šešelj exercised great influence over the Beli Orlovi; from his position in the Croatian In-
terior Ministry, Tomislav Merčep created the Merčepovi; the HOS was the product of Paraga’s
political party.
155Arkan’s Tigers and other Red Beret formations were run by the Serbian MUP; Croatian
forces incorporated paramilitaries into their ranks and establishes special units that worked
directed with the Croatian interior ministry
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works outside the official armed forces. This is hardly surprising given that
in 1990 the federal structure of the Jugoslovenska narodna armija (Yugoslav
Peoples’ Army or JNA) was systematically dismantled from Belgrade, stripping
Zagreb and Sarajevo of conventional means of defence (or, for that matter, of
offence.)156 However, irregular dynamics were more pronounced in both num-
ber and activity on the Serbian side. Furthermore, Serb efforts to intentionally
create and stimulate an armed coalition of irregular actors, to stretch from the
state to the community, were the result of careful planning and organisation.
This strategy was pursued in spite of the fact that Serbian military capabilities
far exceeded those of Croat and Bosniak structures –even when accounting for
the vast numbers of Serbs who dodged the drafts. In Yugoslavia, paramilitaries
were not evidence of weak state control. Instead, the research emphasises the
flexibility and fluidity irregular military dynamics lend modern warfare, par-
ticularly in conflicts characterised by divisions of identity and identity-based
atrocities.
A symbiosis existed between the political architects of the atrocity crimes
and irregular units that committed them. The nationalist machines elevated
the irregular combatants not only to glorify their actions but to normalise their
crimes, while simultaneously denying influence over the fighters themselves. At
the same time, paramilitary leaders reap the special rewards only political im-
munity and military capacity can bring. For a relatively short-lived time, these
young warriors became a privileged class –exploited by those often more power-
ful and more educated. Members of extremist irregular groups become catalysts
in their own communities, and thus perpetuate a secondary process of violence
and legitimisation of violence. Therefore, to look in isolation at the political
and military decisions that determined paramilitary involvement is to disregard
the significant economic, social and cultural forces that altered the moral and
social order of Yugoslavia so dramatically, but also to ignore the manner in
which such processes were interpreted abroad. Throughout this and following
chapters it is important to recall the themes of the previous chapter and consider
the highly charged environment that was the context for the actions discussed
below. Encouraged by divisive state media and malevolent politics, there was
a radicalisation of swathes of society that adopted the ‘tribal’ identities being
promoted from above but also from below. The coagulation of extremists, crim-
inals, the politically converted, and the ill-informed into volunteer brigades,
156On restructuring of the JNA in 1990 see Gow, The Serbian Project, p57-61
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weekend warrior bands-of-brothers, and paramilitary units was a social phe-
nomenon as well as a military strategy. Encouraged and legitmised by those in
authority, some smaller, less significant groups were spontaneously created on
the community level. Whether in response to genuine fears for their identity
group’s survival, or as an opportunity to reclaim lost personal autonomy, the
social factors that facilitated the prevalence and glorification of paramilitaries
in 1990s former Yugoslavia are as important to understanding their role as those
forces that came from the infrastructure of the state.
In the Yugoslav conflicts, all manner of paramilitary actors were present. Their
involvement was interpreted as “third-world,”157 uncivilised,158 and as evidence
that the crisis was in fact a civil war.159 There was a sense that the paramilitary
participation was exceptional in that their presence lay outside the mainstream
European experience, and was thus demonstrative of the tribal and spontan-
eous nature of the violence.160Balkan military traditions of guerrilla warfare
and bandit culture were exploited by the belligerents to lend a legitimacy to
this interpretation that far outstripped the reality.161 External commentators
and foreign policy makers also adopted the trope. The then Defence Secret-
ary Malcolm Rifkind registered during a debate in the House of Commons “the
ability of the inhabitants of Bosnia of all backgrounds to indulge in guerrilla
warfare.”162 And so the use of paramilitaries through devolved structures of vi-
olence provided the belligerent political and military elites with the duel benefits
of assisting in the violent implementation, and of obscuring where responsibility
for the violence lay by projecting a nightmarish image of indecipherable and un-
controllable conflict, which inhibited external intervention and later protected
leaders from prosecution.
This part, subdivided into four chapters, deals with how military and political
157As the term was then
158Guardian journalist, and Foreign Correspondent of the Year 1993 Ed Vulliamy described
Serbian paramilitaries as “a neanderthal bunch” in Seasons in Hell; Understanding Bosnia’s
War, Simon & Schuster, 1994, p54
159On interpreting the Bosnian crisis as a war of aggression as well as or instead of a civil
war see Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p191
160See contemporary international reportage; and for analysis Gregory Kent, Framing war
and genocide: British policy and news media reaction to the war in Bosnia, Hampton Press,
2006, particularly p309
161Tom Gallagher, The Balkans After the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy, Routledge,
2003, p.100; Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p33
162Hansard, 14 January 1993, col.1064
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representatives of the different national command structures interacted with
the paramilitaries. As well as presenting evidence for how and why paramil-
itary actors were used by the different commands, the analysis also seeks to
draw attention to the manner in which state-elites manipulated domestic and
international prejudices by perpetuating myths of non-state combatants as part
of their imagined exclusionary narrative in order not only to legitimise identity-
targeted violence but to seemingly explain or even predict it.163 Beneath the
hyperbole there are straightforward and practical reasons why paramilitaries
are so often used, and not only by genocidal states. The evidence supports the
arguments that paramilitaries can indeed ‘provide a quick and easy augment-
ation to the regular military forces.’164 In Bosnia and Croatia, a spectrum of
paramilitary formations plugged gaps in the underdeveloped, under resourced
and poorly commanded conventional military structures of the Croatian and
Bosnian governments. In this regard, the Yugoslav context supports the con-
ceptualisation of paramilitaries as being associated with conflicts involving new
or emerging states. Alvarez is one of many to suggest that ‘paramilitary groups
offer governments the benefits that military training brings to an organisation
without some of the ideological baggage against attacking the defenceless.’165
However, in addition and perhaps most significantly, the findings relating to
the Serbian forces suggest that in utilising and encouraging the growth of irreg-
ular non-linear structures of violence Serbian elites were able to conceal their
political and military intentions. Underneath and running parallel to the self-
perpetuating logic of the entropic violent culture that found expression in com-
munity based formations, was a rational, organised hierarchical structure of
communication, command, and control. Here Ahram’s euphemistic notion that
‘the devolution of command and control give militia commanders latitude to
improvise techniques...suited to their environments’ is evident.166 The Serbian
case demonstrates the strategic merit to be gained from devolving military im-
plementation of campaigns that are driven by violent political objectives such
as ethnic cleansing and identity-based mass violence.
The broad spectrum of different paramilitary groups operating in Croatia, Bos-
163Kate Ferguson, ‘Paramilitaries as prophecies and proxies for genocide,’ International Net-
work of Genocide Scholars Fourth International Conference, University of Cape Town, 4-7
December 2014
164Alvarez, ‘Militias and Genocide,’ p21
165Ibid., p24
166Ahram, Proxy Warriors, p14
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nia, Serbia (and later in Kosovo) represent the various methods and structural
relationships that regimes can employ during times of crisis. The Serb, Croat
and Bosniak authorities all made use of non-regular military groups. Each op-
ted for different structures of command and control. The decade of economic,
social and ideological disintegration, as we saw in the previous chapter, fused
dangerously with the rise of chauvinist politics and nationalist culture, leading
to a rapid collapse in moral perspective. Attitudes and actions towards “oth-
ers” were infected by ethnically specific vilification by the media outlets in the
republics. The Serbian and Croatian state organs began preparing for armed
conflict in 1990, although in 1989 Serbia began to amend its constitution and
assume control of the TO and police not only in Serbia but in its autonomous
provinces.167 The Bosnian government in Sarajevo made no such preparations
until December 1991, when Sefer Halilović, later the first commander of the Bos-
nian Army, urged President Izetbegović to accept his strategy for the defence
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.168
In the months preceding the Croatian and Bosnian referendums on inde-
pendence two simultaneous processes were taking place, one on a national level
and another on the local. Both resulted in the emergence, in different forms, of
paramilitary groups. Formations organised on the national level (although not
necessarily by the state) tended to be disciplined, well trained units established
along lines of command and control that operated in planned coordination with
the ordinary armed forces, and whose leaders formed part of the national milit-
ary command staff. From the local and community level came sporadic bands
of armed individuals, who took part in localised action on an ad hoc or spon-
taneous basis.169 Many political organisations established their own units, as
did local police forces. Diaspora soldiers returned home to join the fight for the
homeland, creating their own formations, or simply attaching themselves to ex-
isting groups.170 From late 1992, Islamic jihadists arrived in Bosnia –although
167Gow, The Serbian Project, p40
168Transcript of interview with Sefer Halilović, July 1994-July 1995, document 3/28 Death
of Yugoslavia Archive, p2; see also Gow, The Serbian Project, p244
169Even within this umbrella group, the difference between local self-styled defence units
and ‘weekend warriors’ who travelled into Bosnia to participate was substantial and will be
discussed in more detail below. On weekend warriors see Louise Branson, ‘On the front
line with Serbia’s bold “weekend warriors,” ’ Sunday Times, 16 August 1991; however, even
weekend warriors and other ‘proven’ volunteers were endorsed by the authorities in a number
of Serbia municipalities, where they were able to claim paid leave, annual holiday, and sick
leave. See Ofelija Backović, Milos Vasić and Aleksandar Vasović, ‘Who Wants to be a Soldier?
The call-up crisis –an analytical overview of media reports,’ in Magaš & Žanić, The War in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, p335
170Vjekoslav Perica, ‘Ethnic diaspora as political actor and national myth,’ in Bosković et.
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perhaps not how we imagine jihadists today– from the Middle East and Europe
(notably from the United Kingdom). Their presence reinforced the distorted
narrative of a civilisational conflict between East and West.171
Within Yugoslavia, conscription to military service meant that almost all
men in the federation had some kind of basic training.172 What is more, the
legacy of Tito’s Partisans meant that the Yugoslav forces were designed for the
mobilisation of small, semi-autonomous units.173 As a result, the majority of
(native) paramilitary personnel had received some kind of training from the
JNA before the conflicts began, which would have included an understanding
of international law regulating the conduct of war.174 Many of the official Ser-
bian paramilitary and irregular units that carried out violent instructions had
also been trained often by state subsidiaries, while other formations provided
their own adhoc training, which was rarely bound by the kind of formal codes
of conduct that feature so strongly in national armies.175 In situations where
armies were engaged for other tasks such as combat situations with the enemy
and paramilitary groups were deployed to carry out atrocities against civilians,
these irregular actors, unlike their regular comrades, were operating in a distor-
ted (and often traumatic) moral environment. It is also reasonable to consider
that the fraternal bonds of paramilitary service took on a significance beyond
the formative masculine war-time self-identification; as the political tensions
rose various kinds of military units began to consolidate around local leaders
and familiar faces. The bonds of pre-war military service proved insufficient
to counter the ethnic divisions that separated many men who had trained to-
gether; Milutin Kukanjac, JNA Commander in Sarajevo, and Hasan Efendić,
Commander of the Bosnian Territorial Defence, had been classmates at the
Military Academy but in 1992 found themselves on opposite sides of the battle
lines.176 It was a situation replicated across the federation as pressures from
the political and institutional structures were reinforced by popular pressures
from within communities.
The following chapter examines the strategy employed by Serbian elites,
al., Political Myths, p60
171Kohlmann, ‘The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network’
172Although a number dodged the draft, even before the outbreak of war
173See UN Report of Experts, Annex III. The military structure, strategy and tactics of the
warring factions
174This was taught in the military academies. IT-01-48 Halilović, Testimony of Salko Gušić,
03 Feb 2005, p19
175Erdut training camp in Eastern Slavonia was set up by the Serbian MUP for the purpose
of training paramilitary formations and local combatants
176Transcript of interview with Milutin Kukanjac, (no date), (DoY ) doc.3/46, p24
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both from Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale. The covert structures
of command and control connecting paramilitary groups with state auspices
were better planned, more clearly organised, and received comprehensive sup-
port from military and political hierarchies. Unlike the Croatian and Bosnian
(Muslim) forces (addressed in the subsequent chapters) that evolved during con-
flict period to become more centralised and better disciplined, to the detriment
of many non-state irregular formations, paramilitary processes were an inten-
tional part of Serbian strategy.
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1 Serbian Command
Zvornik was one of the first towns to be attacked and can be seen as a
template for how the coalition of Serbian forces collaborated. On April 8 1992,
two days after Bosnia’s independence had been recognised by the European
Community (EC), units of the JNA shelled the town of Zvornik from across a
river, from inside Serbia proper. Thousands of the town’s inhabitants attempted
to flee. On April 9, leader of Belgrade-based paramilitary group the Tigers,
Arkan Rażnatović, issued Zvornik’s sixty percent Muslim population with the
order to surrender.177 On April 10, the Tigers entered the town and carried
out the first ethnic cleansing of the war. The Muslims had not surrendered, but
nor were they equipped to defend themselves. On the same day, by coincidence,
the UNHCR’s most senior official in the region, José Maria Mendiluce, travelled
through Zvornik, on his way to Sarajevo, following a meeting with Milošević in
Belgrade. He witnessed the JNA units along the Serbian bank of the Drina, the
heavy artillery, and the smoking Serbian cannons.178 In the town he recalled
seeing “trucks full of dead bodies. I could see militiamen taking more corpses of
children, women and old people from their houses and putting them on trucks.
I saw at least four or five trucks full of corpses.”179 Having escaped the besieged
town, Mendiluce met the five thousand refugees attempting to flee. Mendiluce
witnessed the collaboration of JNA troops and trained paramilitaries of the
Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP) and the security services (DB).180 It
should have been clear that it was an operation, as paramilitary leader Vojislav
Šešelj later boasted, that was “planned in Belgrade”.181
And it had been well planned. As the war in Croatia reached its crescendo
in 1991, Belgrade had transferred Bosnian Serbs into JNA units across Bosnia
and Herzegovina, mobilising them to key communications points and strategical
positions along the border. Simultaneously, the Serbian DB had established and
in some cases hired secret units of paramilitaries to carry out ‘special military
actions’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, just as they had in Croatia.182 The pattern
177For an account of the destruction of the Muslim community in Zvornik see Ismail Se-
limović, Stradanje muslimana Općine Zvornik: 1992-1995, Breza, 2010
178For full account Mendiluce’s testimony see, Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia,
p223
179Ibid., p246
180IT-03-69, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgement II, May 30 2013, p49918
181Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal,
Oxford University Press, 2011, p112
182IT-03-69, Stanišić and Simatović, Indictment, 15 May 2006, p1
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Mendiluce witnessed in Zvornik was repeated across Bosnia and Herzegovina
throughout the summer and autumn of 1992. Millions of Muslim civilians were
expelled from their towns and homes; thousands were killed.183 Ethnic cleansing
was not a blanket policy that was carried out uniformly across Bosnia; it was
strategically pursued by irregular formations that had been armed by, received
payment from, and were in regular communication with Serbian and Bosnian
Serb state structures.
The structures of command and control from Belgrade, Krajina, and Pale were
flexible and fluid but identifiable. The Serbian DB positioned itself at the heart
of Serbian military operations by deploying its paramilitary units, distributing
arms, and providing military, financial, political and logistical support to JNA
and local structures. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, far more so than
the fighting in Croatia, was planned in Belgrade and implemented through a
combination of regular and irregular military units from BiH and Serbia. State
assistance was not limited to the larger or better trained irregular formations.
The Serbian irregular dynamics in both conflicts was multilayered and stretched
from state and state-building enterprises to the localised community level. As
the conflicts changed and as the balance of power of the other internal and ex-
ternal actors shifted, so too did the power dynamics on the field. In Croatia,
the power structure was much more local, but was backed ideologically, finan-
cially and logistically by Belgrade.184 The paramilitaries under state instruction
proved an essential conduit of this support. Their discipline and ruthlessness
pushed forward Belgrade’s political objectives and radicalised community-level
violence. This was replicated in Bosnia but on a greater scale, with a more soph-
isticated coordination of multiple actors working in coalition. The application
of Serbian strategy was not always consistent in Croatia, and the participation
of paramilitary auxiliaries less prominent (although no less significant) than in
Bosnia. In both cases, state controlled paramilitaries dominated patterns of
identity-based mass violence and worked with local official and unofficial milit-
ary formations in order to cement Serb gains.
Two simultaneous and mutually reinforcing processes characterised the Ser-
bian irregular military dynamics in both Croatia and in Bosnia. One was state
183On numbers; Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, ‘War-related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed
Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results,’
European Journal of Population, 21:2-3 (2005) pp187-215
184See testimony of Reynaud Theunens, IT-04-75, Hadžić, 9 May 2013, particularly p4365
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led, and took many forms, and the other was a community response to what
was perceived to be. Describing the structural relationship between community-
based irregular groups and state command in some rural areas of Croatia, Milan
Babić, first President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK),
stated that it was the Serbian police who distributed weapons to the largely
autonomous Serbian village defence units, suggesting that despite some low level
support the local military defence units in some rural parts of Krajina had few
strong contacts with JNA command.185 The regular, military, and special police
operated as paramilitary structures, augmenting the Serbian structure and fol-
lowing varied chains of command. However, Babić also described how villagers
in the same region began to sell their cattle in order to purchase hunting guns
manufactured in a factory in Kragujevac; that papers were forged to get author-
isation to buy arms; and that many weapons were of a World War II vintage,
recalling an almost comically amateur attempt by local volunteers to break into
the Samarica museum to steal all the weapons on exhibit.186 Local networks
and community-level patterns of behaviour that developed will be addressed in
Part IV but it is important to hold in mind the impact that pro-state irregular
violence had upon Serbian communities who witnessed it. Neither the fighting
nor civilian-targeted violence occurred in every canton, either in Croatia or Bos-
nia; for the most part, where state strategy was pursued, local irregular military
dynamics emerged but in areas that were not part of that strategy, community
relations were often able to continue without disintegrating into violence.
There were said to be at least 83 identified paramilitary groups operating in
the former Yugoslav territories; 56 of which worked in support of the Belgrade
government and the Serbian cause, numbering somewhere between 20,000 to
40,000 combatants.187 This number does not include foreign volunteer units nor
many of the small, local, often temporary formations. Of the pro-Serb groups at
least five were organised by political parties: the Serbian Guard (Srpska Garda
–SG) was led by Vuk Drašković of the Serbian Renewal Party; Šešelj’s Ser-
bian Radical Party established the Serbian Chetnik Movement (Srpski Četnički
Pokret –SČP); and the Serbian People’s Renewal Party created both Dušan Silni
and the While Eagles (Beli Orlovi).188 Red Berets referred generally to MUP
special forces because of their uniforms and included the Skorpions (or Scorpi-
185Transcript of interview with Babić, no3/5, (DoY)p12; p25
186Ibid. p17
187UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p6
188Taken from discussion in Gow of Serbian political paramilitaries, The Serbian Project,
p81
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ons) and the Serbian Volunteer Guard. The Serbian Volunteer Guard (Srpska
Dobrovoljačka Garda –SDG, also known as the Tigers189) was convened by the
Serbian DB and is described by James Gow as ‘effectively the paramilitary wing’
of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, led by Milošević’s wife,
Mira Marković.190 Some of these were born out of the Serbo-Croat conflict but
all participated in some way in the violence in Bosnia. The state’s role is still
denied and remains ambiguous, in part because of the obscurity of the command
structures of the irregular military networks.
The Red Berets and Šešelj’s formations were the most active paramilitary
forces in both the Croatian and Bosnian theatres of war191 and of the Berets, the
units led by Arkan Ražnatović became the most well known. Arkan’s groups,
the Tigers and the Scorpions, were better organised, more disciplined and re-
ceived logistical, financial and substantial general support from the political and
military elites in Serbia and throughout the RS structures.192 Other formations
such as the groups commanded by Šešelj, though utilised by the Serbian war
effort and in the strategies of ethnic cleansing, were considered more peripheral
in centralised manoeuvres.
Relationships between state auspices and the paramilitary units varied ac-
cording to their size, political weight, and military capability but Belgrade’s
support was strongest for the units created and trained by the DB and MUP. In
their final judgement, the ICTY found that the Serbian DB and MUP, following
a series of meeting in Belgrade in early 1991, established a string of military
camps for the recruitment, training and support of their paramilitary formation
the Red Berets.193 The first camp to be set up was Golubić, and was run jointly
by MUP chiefs Stanišić and Simatović. Training was carried out by a number
of personally selected individuals, including now well known paramilitary lead-
ers Captain Dragan and Arkan.194 Initially formed of between twenty-five and
thirty men in the Summer of 1991 (between April/May and July), the Red
Berets grew to 300-700 strong by the end of August.195 The Chamber found
that the Serbian DB provided financial and logistical support to the units, and
189As MUP units, the SDG and the Scorpions were also known as Red Berets. Use of these
different terms in the source material is rarely consistent; unless I am quoting sources, I
differentiate where possible between the Tigers, Scorpions, and the Red Berets in general.
190Gow, The Serbian Project, p83-4
191UN Expert Report, Annex III.A, p.17
192Ref Stanisic judgement; Scorpions in Srebrenica judgement
193IT-03-69, Stanišić & Simatović, Judgement, Part II, p460
194Ibid. p461
195Ibid. p462-3
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from 1991 controlled deployment through its leading members.196 In 1993, the
Red Berets became formally a part of the DB. The DB also financed the SAO
Krajina police, organised logistical support and supplied weapons.197
In Krajina, Milan Martić, through his position as chief of the local police
force-turned military organiser, became the most prominent paramilitary leader
in the territory of the RSK. His militia fought together with official Serbian
forces and had access to federal uniforms, vehicles and weapons, although the
Martićevci never had a national reach.198 Nevertheless, Martić and his men were
integrated into the emerging structures of the RSK and more established chains
of command from Belgrade. Martić became Secretary of Internal Affairs of the
new government.199 Like many irregular formations that fought in particular
geographic areas, the Martićevci began as Serbian members of the police, the
TO and volunteers.
The Special Police also came under the command of the Serbian MUP and
formed an additional paramilitary component of the Serbian military structure.
The Special Police developed a reputation as an elite force and by autumn
1995 numbered 15,500 to 21,400 outside of Kosovo.200 The Special Police were
least as numerous as Serbian Army (VJ) special forces and some were better
trained.201 According to a CIA report undertaken in 1995, in part to establish
the relationship between the MUP and the paramilitaries, the Special Police op-
erated under the command of the State Security Service (headed up by Stanišić
& Simatović) at least for operations outside of Serbia, but it remained unclear if
this was the official or unofficial chain of command.202 The report describes the
training and skills of the Special Police, and sets out how paramilitary forces
were prioritised by Serbian state structures:
Service in the Special Police is voluntary, according to defence
attaché reporting. Each volunteer reportedly is given physical, psy-
chological, and medical tests. He then undergoes a year of special
196Ibid., p849; furthermore, the Trial Chamber concluded that “these contributions of the
Accused assisted the commission of the crimes.”
197Ibid., p462-43 and IT-95-11 Martić, (Witness JF-041), 23-25 May 2006), pp4436-4437;
Witness JF-041, p.7901-7902, 7951, 8004
198UN Expert Report, Annex IIIA, p61 (ref.517)
199Ibid.
200The Military Role of the Serbian Interior Ministry in the Yugoslav Conflict, Intelligence
Report DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, 26 October 1995,
p2-3
201Ibid.
202Ibid., p3; on commission of report see Holbrooke, To End A War, p211-212
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training, including basic, specialised, and team/unit training. The
volunteers learn a variety of skills, including basic infantry tactics,
martial arts, knife fighting, mountain climbing, parachuting, use of
explosives, foreign weapons familiarisation, and team training for
specific missions.203
The Special Police came to include a large number of VJ officers; at a Yugoslav
Supreme defence Council meeting in January 1994, it was reported that 30
percent of the VJ’s company grade officers had left to join the Special Police
where they received better pay and privilege.204 Research undertaken by the
CIA in 1995 found that the Special Police deployed to Banja Luka reported
directly to Stanišić.205
Thus, the acquittal of the Serbian State Security officials ostensibly respons-
ible for a number of paramilitary groups that committed atrocity crimes has
proved problematic for the thesis laid out below. The acquittal of Jovica Stanišić
and Franko Simatović in May 2013 was seen by many, this author included, as
controversial because evidence catalogued throughout the trial and the 800-plus
pages of the Trial Chamber Judgement established beyond reasonable doubt the
significant degree to which the Serbian DB had coordinated, trained, funded and
monitored certain paramilitary groups, particularly the Special Purpose Unit of
the MUP (Red Berets), and to a lesser extent the Serbian Volunteer Guard (Ti-
gers) and the Scorpions.206 Specifically in relation to the Red Berets, between
1990 and 1995, Stanišić and Simatović established training camps; recruited
experienced military commanders; directed and organised the formation of the
unit; organised its involvement in a number of operations in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina; directed and organised its financing, logistical support and other
substantial assistance or support.207 What is more, the Trial Chamber acknow-
ledged that such was the scale of the units’ crimes, both Stanišić and Simatović
must have been aware of the crimes being committed by the Red Berets in Bos-
nia.208 The charges included crimes against humanity and murder; however,
203The Military Role of the Serbian Interior Ministry, p3; note that this training would have
been in addition to the 18 months JNA training most recruits would have received during their
conscripted military service.
204Ibid., p3
205Ibid., p.4
206See IT-03-69, Stanišić & Simatović, Judgement, Parts I and II, 30 May 2013, p848
207Ibid. p.482-83
208Ibid., p465-68 and evidence given of Serbian MUP wiretapping Daniel Snedden (Captain
Dragan) from as early as December 1990
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the Trial Chamber, Judge Picard dissenting, was unable to establish the intent
of the accused with regards to their participation in a joint criminal enterprise,
of which the alleged objective was the forcible and permanent removal of the
majority of non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.209
A major issue here, which is one for legal scholars rather than the historian to
address, is of the problems that the premise of joint criminal enterprise has
generated throughout the ICTY experience. On a more straightforward point,
even without the special intent necessary to prove counts of genocide, interna-
tional prosecution of elites who have been able to devolve responsibility of grave
international crimes to others is exceptionally difficult to achieve.210 So as we
begin our dissection of the structures of command and control that existed, of-
ten covertly, it does well to bear in mind the legal loopholes that have benefitted
at least some of the commanders and punished many of the foot soldiers.
There is no clearer relationship between the Serbian state and irregular units
that committed grave international crimes than that of the MUP and its network
of official and unofficial paramilitary formations. However, in both Croatia
and Bosnia, it was individual paramilitary leaders such as Arkan Ražnatović
and Captain Dragan Vasiljković that provided the bridge between the official
structures of national political and military command and the irregular devolved
military structures of the paramilitary groups that pursued their objectives,
although not always at their explicit behest. Arkan never faced the ICTY and
Dragan has yet to stand trial so their position as lynchpins in the irregular
dynamic has never been scrutinised in court. Nevertheless, ICTY and other
sources give insight into the national architecture of violence, the roles played
by paramilitary groups and their leaders, and their clandestine interaction with
Serbian state chains of command.
Arkan’s celebrity status during and after the war, and his assassination fol-
lowing his ICTY indictment, has ensured that his figure looms large in the
popular understanding of Serbian paramilitaries. Much more is known of his
activities than of most of his contemporaries. Together with Šešelj, their in-
famy has overshadowed the paramilitary dimension of the 1990s and come to
209Ibid., p.849; For Judge Picard’s dissenting opinion see pp.852-867; He concluded saying
“If we cannot find that the Accused aided and abetted those crimes, I would say we have come
to a dark place in international law indeed.”
210Special or specific intent (or dolus specialis) is the intent to destroy in whole, or in part,
national, racial, ethnic, or religious group
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personify what in reality was a complex interaction of top-down and grass-roots
socio-cultural and political processes. Of all the Yugoslav paramilitaries, the
story of the Tigers is the best known but it is also the most damning for the
political leaderships who promulgated narratives of spontaneous conflict and
denied knowledge or responsibility for the irregular violence. Through Arkan,
official structures and informal networks met; as this epitome of paramilitary
prowess, Arkan’s biography is of a shadowy but consistent relationship with
state authorities and the criminal underworld.211
Arkan, born Željko Ražnatović in 1950, was a petty criminal as a youth but
was soon hired by the socialist ministry for Internal Affairs (SSUP) as a hit-
man.212 On the side, he was a sophisticated bank robber and was convicted in
Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Germany.213 In 1986, Željko became a pastry-
shop owner but continued to work for the SSUP.214 In 1990, he became head of
the fan club for Belgrade’s Red Star football team –an intimidating masculine
milieu of hardened criminals and frustrated unemployed youth. Through the
club he recruited the core of his own paramilitary group, the Serbian Volun-
teer Guard but better known as Arkan’s Tigers, which he formed on 11 October
1990.215 While the Tigers were fighting in Croatia, Željko reportedly once boas-
ted to a visitor to one of the unit’s dormitories that there were 250 years’ worth
of prison time in the room.216
Where the onus lay for the creation of the Tigers is not clear, although in-
vestigative journalist Filip Švarm, who has studied Arkan closely, believes that
the state security service at the Serbian interior ministry tasked Arkan with
setting up the unit in autumn 1990 in order to carry out “black operations” in
Croatia.217 Arkan was involved in the Serbian war strategy from the beginning.
He was present with Milan Martić at the planning meeting of the war council of
the Knin uprising,218 through to the end of the decade, when he and many of
the Serbian Red Berets were responsible for some of the worst war crimes com-
mitted in Kosovo.219 From 1991, the Tigers were closely involved in Belgrade’s
211For a full biography of Arkan, see Stewart, Hunting the Tiger
212Ibid., p19
213Ibid., Chapter 5, from p46
214Alvarez, ’Militias and Genocide’, p9
215IT-02-54, Milošević, 16 April 2003, p19419
216See IT-04-75, Hadžić 02 September 2013, p7913
217Denis Dzidić et. al, ‘Arkan’s Paramilitaries: Tigers Who Escaped Justice’, Balkan In-
vestigative Reporting Network, (BIRN ), 8 Dec 2014
218UN Experts’ Report, Annex IIIA, p18
219‘Under Orders; War crimes in Kosovo,’ Human Rights Watch, 26 Oct 2001, Chapter 3.4
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military strategy in Croatia and Bosnia. They saw action in Eastern Slavo-
nia in Croatia between 1991 and 1992, and in various locations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina up to 1995. While Arkan’s death in 2000 and Milošević’s in 2004
put an end to criminal investigations against them and prevented further evid-
ence of their working relationship coming to light, the statements, documents
and witness testimony that remain present a pattern of collusion between the
Serbian President and Yugoslavia’s most infamous paramilitary that was central
to the military, paramilitary, and political objectives of the Serbian strategies
in Croatia, Bosnia, and in Kosovo.
Through the investigations of the ICTY, a potentially more detailed un-
derstanding of the relationship between Arkan and the Serbian authorities has
come to light, and indicates a long term network, largely hidden from the or-
dinary ranks of the JNA that began in Croatia and was perfected in Bosnia.
The turning point came in 2003, during the Milošević trial, and the testimony
of witness B-129. The former secretary of Arkan’s headquarters gave evidence
that described the intimate relationship between Arkan, the Serbian DB, and
the Republika Srpska leadership, including details of regular telephone and ra-
dio communication, and the exchange of soldiers.220 B-129 herself was in daily
contact with Arkan throughout the Bosnian conflict and was able to identify his
voice and that of Milorad Legija Ulemek on an intercepted telephone call where
they discuss a joint operation with the “Stinkers” –the Stinkers being shown to
be a codename for the Serbian State Security Services.221 Central to her testi-
mony was that the Tigers operated under the command of the Serbian DB in
Belgrade; “Arkan would always say that without orders from the DB, the state
security, the Tigers were not deployed anywhere.”222 She gave evidence that
argued Biljana Plavšić, second in command at the Presidency of the Bosnian
Serb republic, was in regular contact with Arkan and Legija, and so too was
Ratko Mladić.223
The Defence team for Goran Hadžić argued that the Serbian Volunteer
Guard were under the command and control of the JNA.224 As a defence wit-
ness in the same trial, JNA General Aleksander Vašiljević testified that when
the Tigers were in Slavonia and Srem, Arkan was subordinated to Radovan
220IT-02-54, Milošević, 16 April 2003, pp.19417-8; See also Judith Armatta, Twilight of
Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milošević, Duke University Press, 2010, p230
221Ibid., pp19436; For Armatta’s discussion of the witness and her testimony see pp230-233;
222IT-02-54, Milošević, 16 April 2003, pp19426
223Ibid.
224Hadžić was first Prime Minister of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (SAO)
and then President of RSK. Sense Agency, ’Who was in charge of Arkan’, 4 Sept 2013
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Badža (Brute) Stojičić,225 head of the public security services (the MUP) and
considered to be part of Milošević’s Belgrade inner circle, reporting directly to
the Serbian President, bypassing the interior minister.226 Like state security
chief Stanišić, Stojičić had access to information most likely only shared with
Milošević. Vasiljević claimed that Stojičić was sent by Belgrade to the Croa-
tian front lines to command “all these local units in the territory of Baranja
and Srem” adding that he “in fact, had the greatest authority, authority behind
which the president of the Republic of Serbia stood. And he was a man who
had a decisive say for everything regarding these units.”227 Put more clearly
still, Stojičić ‘had such power that he could remove people, move them from one
place to another, engage them, and so on.’228 According to Judith Armatta,
Stojičić was sent to Slavonia to set up an anti-terrorist unit and to organise the
local TO.229 Stojičić received weapons, equipment and his salary from Serbia
and ‘of the fifteen men he brought with him to Croatia, ten worked for the
SDB.’ 230 During the same period of cross-examination, a video-clip was played
to the court in which Arkan Ražnatović is seen to state “You know that we
are under the command of the 11 Territorial Defence of the Serbian District
of Slavonia, Baranja, and 12 Western Srem."231 Following his stint in Croatia,
Stojičić was made assistant minister of internal affairs at the MUP. Thus there
is evidence of Arkan taking instruction from the JNA, the VRS, the Serbian DB
and MUP. His unit was fully integrated into the Serbian, Krajina, and Bosnian
Serb structures, yet each constituent department or organisation was able to
deny command or control over their actions.
Stojičić was gunned down in 1997 in downtown Belgrade while dining with
his teenage son, preventing any legal investigation into his own war record. Like
so many of the Serbian elite connected to the irregulars of the war, Badža was
assassinated before evidence that he was also heavily involved in the Belgrade
mafia scene came properly to light.232
Even during the conflicts, state responsibility for Arkan’s unit was acknow-
ledged. Sometime military ally but later political adversary Šešelj claimed dur-
225IT-04-75-T, Hadžić, 02 September 2013, p7911-2
226Armatta, Twilight of Impunity, p273
227IT-04-75-T, Hadžić, 02 September 2013, p7912
228Ibid p7913
229Armatta, Twilight of Impunity, p165
230Ibid.
231IT-04-75, Hadžić, 02 September 2013, p7913
232Tracy Wilkinson, ‘Key Ally of Serb President Gunned Down Yugoslavia: Leader of
Milošević’s feared security forces is slain in attack inside Belgrade restaurant,’ Los Angeles
Times, April 12, 1997; this is discussed in more detail in Part IV
60
ing the war that the Tigers were operating under the auspices of the MUP233
and though this was reported in the western press, his comments were usually
presented in context of the emerging rivalry between Šešelj and Arkan.234 JNA
General Andrija Biorčević was commander of the 12th JNA Novi Sad Corps
in November of 1991 and was videotaped after the brutal Battle of Vukovar
praising Arkan’s involvement, where his unit were responsible for a catalogue of
crimes.235 Biorčević denied that Arkan’s men were paramilitaries236 and in the
same video describes Željko as “a just and honourable Serb.”237
Arkan himself left the Bosnian front lines in 1993 to establish a political
platform, creating the Party of Serbian Unity with hopes of winning a seat in
the Serbian Parliament as a representative for the Kosovo Autonomous Region of
Serbia. It was widely believed that Milošević was supporting, if not sponsoring,
Ražnatović’s political manoeuvres throughout the 1993 snap elections.238 In
autumn 1995, as the HVO and ARBiH were pushing Serbian forces back, Arkan
returned to the front to lead his unit, this time in Sanski Most, where men under
Arkan’s direct command committed a series of gross human rights violations,
war crimes and crimes against humanity.239
While it is clear that Arkan’s leadership instilled a loyalty in his unit and
a personality cult in parts of Serbian culture, Ražnatović was created by the
powers in Belgrade. His men, though loyal, were paid by the Serbian DB,
including for their participation in the massacres at Srebrenica.240The DB, often
through representatives of the MUP, remained in constant contact with Arkan’s
unit, the Scorpions, and the Red Berets.241 The Stanišić Defence argued that
Arkan was supplied with weapons by the Serbian MUP and the JNA, and not
233UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p18
234Chuck Sudetic, ‘Rival Serbs are Admitting Bosnia-Croatia Atrocities’, New York Times,
13 November 1993
235Videotape used as evidence, see IT-04-75, Hadžić, 16 October 2012, p102
236Ibid.
237IT-04-75-T, Hadžić, 2 September 2013, p7914
238Jonathan S. Landay, ‘New Star of the Serbian Right Željko Ražnatović, Also Known
as Arkan, Pushes His Dark Background Aside and Promises His Supporters ‘Everything,”
Christian Science Monitor, 3 Dec. 1993
239It should be noted that according to his ICTY indictment, which was issued in the year
before his assassination, responsibility for the crimes committed in Sanski Most is attributed
solely to Ražnatović rather than his superiors in the Serbian military or political command;
IT-97-27 Ražnatović, Initial Indictment, 23 Sept 1997
240IT-03-69, Stanišić & Simatović, Exhibit P467 (JATD List of Persons Who Are Receiving
Daily Allowances from 16 to 30 June 1995), p15; Exhibit P468 (JATD List of Employees to
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the Serbian DB, but it is clear that the interior ministry and the security services
worked closely and that payments were made to the irregulars by the DB.242
Like Arkan, Captain Dragan Vasiljković acted as a bridge between senior
state representatives and various paramilitary formations. Vasiljković is alleged
to have trained and commanded Red Beret units, the Kninže, the Martićevci,
and Italian volunteers known as Garibaldis.243 Although he did not serve in
the JNA, Dragan had served for four years in the Australian army and then as
a weapons inspector in Africa and South America.244 In the 1980s Vasiljković
was involved in a series of convictions in Melbourne for brothel ownership. In
many ways, Vasiljković can be seen as an of archetype of the successful Serbian
paramilitary profile: pained upbringing; part of the diaspora; military expertise;
a criminal past. In 1990, he returned to Belgrade where, it is alleged, he was
recruited and trained by the Serbian MUP before being sent to Knin to meet
Milan Martić.245 Giving testimony during the Milošević trial, Vasiljković stated
that Simatović was “the first man I met from that service in Yugoslavia, who
later became my family friend.”246 Serbian Defence Minister General Simović’s
Chief of Staff, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić, testified that Vasiljković had told her he
had been “invited” to fight by Radmilo Bogdanović, Minister of Interior Af-
fairs.247 Gajić-Glišić added “that was all directed by Jovica Stanišić” and that
Vasiljković was one of seven men in the first despatch to Knin from the state
security service.248 Gajić-Glišić,’s testimony points further to the working re-
lationship between the MUP and DB regarding these particular paramilitary
units and presents the Red Berets and their units as constituent parts of the
official military structure. However Vasiljković also suggested that setting up
the training camp for “anyone issued with any kind of weapon” was a sugges-
tion he made to Simatović by way of assisting the Serbian efforts in Krajina.249
Perhaps most significantly, Vasiljković claimed that he was acting on Karadžić’s
242IT-03-69, Stanišić & Simatović, Stanišić Defence Final Trial Brief, 17 December 2012,
paras 438-445; the Trial Chamber did not find this argument persuasive, see Judgement II,
p644
243This name was probably taken in homage to the Camicie Rosse volunteers supposedly
established in either Buenos Aires or New York who followed Giuseppe Garibaldi to southern
Italy during his Mille expedition, demonstrating that the desire among irregular combatants
to emulate national historical figures is not solely a Balkan one. The Red Shirts were in many
ways the archetypal guerillas. On Garibaldis see UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p46-7
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orders when he set up the training camp in Zvornik in 1992.250 This is in keep-
ing with the testimony of Expert Witness historian Christian Nielsen at the
Hadžić trial, in which he argued police stations in Serb-held parts of Croatia
were run from Belgrade during the first months of war, before being handed
over to local Serbian command.251 Either way, Captain Dragan was able to
form an irregular network that not only fought in support of Serbian objectives,
with official army forces and paramilitary groups such as Arkan’s Tigers and
Martić’s militia, but that participated in crimes against civilians. By July 1993,
Dragan himself claimed that as many as 114 missions had been performed by
units trained by him at the camp.252
The third major Serbian paramilitary leader was Vojislav Šešelj. In 1989, he
had travelled to the US and met with the chairman of theMovements of Chetniks
in the Free World Momčilo Djujić, who on the day of the 600th anniversary
of the Battle of Kosovo appointed Šešelj Vojvoda, or duke.253 After leaving
Djujić, Šešelj travelled widely in throughout the States, Canada, Australia, and
western Europe, reportedly collecting funds to support nationalist activities
back home.254 As well as financial support, Šešelj’s militias attracted foreign
fighters too.255 From within the diaspora network emerged what we could term
a combatant column that became an integral component of the irregular military
dynamic, providing funds, fighters, and patriotic fervour.
Despite their later differences, Šešelj was in close contact with Milošević at
the beginning of the Bosnian conflict, and was encouraged by him to mobilise
his paramilitaries:
In ‘92 in May, I started seeing Milošević very intensively. And at
that point every time directly Milošević asked for volunteers to be
sent. He didn’t really need to convince us very much. We understood
this as an obligation of our duty.
At that time (1991, ’92 and ’93), when we were sending volun-
teers, we had a good collaboration with Slobodan Milošević who
250Natasha Robinson, ‘Dragan Vasiljković ‘took orders from Radovan Karadžić,’ The Aus-
tralian December 16 2011
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63
gave us uniforms, weapons, buses, barracks...we had all the neces-
sary equipment.256
By this point Šešelj had already played a significant part in the Serbian campaign
in Croatia, particularly leading paramilitaries during the battle for Vukovar,
which he said would be “razed to the ground.”257 Šešelj was charged with
having
participated in the recruitment, formation, financing, supply,
support and direction of Serbian volunteers connected to the SRS
and/or SČP through and/or with the assistance of the SRS Crisis,
then War Staff. These volunteer units were created and supported
to assist in the execution of the joint criminal enterprise through the
commission of crimes in violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute
of the Tribunal.258
He contributed to the planning of Serb take-overs of territory and contributed
volunteers under his command as well as financial support to the operations,
working with local and national structures, including central powers in Bel-
grade. His irregular units were involved in ethnic cleansing in SAO SBWS
(Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem), and in the municipalities of Zvornik,
“Greater Sarajevo”, Mostar, and Nevesinje in Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts
of Vojvodina in Serbia. The crimes include the murder of civilians on ethnic,
racial or religious grounds, forced deportation, establishment and perpetuation
of inhumane living conditions, killings and repeated torture and beatings of
detainees, sexual assault, destruction of property, and direct and public denig-
ration through “hate speech” of non-Serbs.259 In all these territories, Šešelj’s
irregular units coordinated with Serbian authorities and regular military forces.
The case against Šešelj also included charges of instigation regarding his
speeches, communications, acts and/or omissions that contributed to the per-
petrators’ decision to commit the crimes including mass deportation, forcible
256Interview with Šešelj, (DoY); brackets in original transcript
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transfer and inhumane acts.260 In the summer of 1991 Šešelj gave almost daily
rallies where he called for Serb unity and war against Serbia’s “historic enemies”,
namely the ethnic Croat, Muslim and Albanian populations within the Yugoslav
territories.261 Vesna Bosanac, the former director of the Vukovar hospital, told
the ICTY that he “came to Vukovar on various occasions [in 1991] to encourage
his followers to enjoy the slaughter, poisoning them with his well-known politics
of hatred”262
Once mobilised, Šešelj’s SRS groups were usually subordinated to the local
command structure, but whether it was the local Serb TO, JNA or VRS forces,
it was Šešelj they considered their supreme commander.263
In these regards, though himself often outside official structures of command
and control, Šešelj performed a similar role of other paramilitary leaders like
Arkan and Dragan who were more integrated into the national infrastructure.
Yet unlike Arkan and Dragan, and perhaps in part as a result of his radical dia-
spora connections, Šešelj became an example of the ‘unintended consequences’
for state elites of paramilitary collaboration. His political potential grew as Ser-
bian society became increasingly radicalised by the brutalities of ethnic war and
he was supported by a body of armed extremists, posing what was considered
to be a considerable threat to Milošević.
* * *
While there was a significant overlap in paramilitary personnel, the presence
of an integrated state structure of command and control is much more evid-
ent in the actions in Bosnia than in Croatia. Planning for ethnically-based
nation-building began earlier, and was supported by military and paramilitary
manoeuvres before BiH declared independence in 1992. Serbian strategy in Bos-
nia was not more coherent simply because military and political structures had
gained experience in Croatia. Their intentions in Bosnia were more ambitious
and as a result more ruthless and systematic. The local component in Krajina
had in fact undermined Serbian efforts and the parallel chains of command
260Ibid., p2
261Ibid., p2
262Elma Mahmutović, ‘Doctor Says Šešelj Incited Vukovar Paramilitaries,’ Institute for War
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from SAO, RSK and Belgrade demonstrated the ideological differences of their
respective political elites, like the ideological divergence between the Tudjman
leadership and the more radical Croatian Party of Rights (HSP). In Bosnia,
state infrastructure was in a position to reinforce (or prepare for) the paramilit-
ary actions. As a result, the integration of the key paramilitary formations into
political and military commands was not only more evident but more effective.
The programme was set out explicitly in a confidential document called the In-
structions for the Organisation and Activity of Organs of the Serbian People in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances, issued from Sarajevo
in December 1991 by the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (SDS).264
The Instructions elaborate uniform tasks, measures and activit-
ies which will be carried out within the national community of the
Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of carry-
ing out the results of the plebiscite at which the Serbian people in
Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to live in a single state.265
The instructions set out two variants of strategy to be carried out in all the
municipalities where Serbs lived; Variant A required the instructions to be car-
ried out ‘in their entirety, in municipalities where the Serbian people from a
majority’ whereas Variant B called for partial implementation in those muni-
cipalities where Serbs were not in the majority.266 Both variants formed parts
of the same strategy; to first strengthen or create municipal political structures
staffed by SDS representatives, and to then implement joint political and mil-
itary objectives along those structures. The secretariat of the SDS Municipal
Boards were, according to the document, considered responsible for monitoring
the local situation and taking ‘necessary measures’ as to ensure such objectives
were met. The SDS Municipal Boards were each to form their own ‘Crisis Staff
of the Serbian people in the municipality’ that would consolidate local Serbian
political command with Serbian organs of control, such as the municipal pub-
264IT-00-39, Krajišnik, ‘Instructions for the Organisation and Activity of Organs of the
Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a State of Emergency,’ 19 December 1991,
Exhibit P529.375.1; various copies of this document have been used throughout the trials
held as the ICTY
265Ibid., p2
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lic security, police, T.O and National defence forces.267 The Municipal Boards
centralised local networks of political and military structures and connected the
municipalities to the national leadership. Expert analyst of the Bosnian Serb
War Presidencies Dorothea Hanson concluded that:
By ensuring this crucial coordination at municipal level and re-
gional level, the Crisis Staffs were the mechanism by which the Bos-
nian Serb leadership seized and maintained control of territory in
the initial months of the war. They supported, enabled, and in
some cases directed the armed units in the municipalities; they car-
ried out the procedures and the policies for the forcible departure of
non-Serbs from the territories claimed for the Bosnian Serb state.268
Hanson’s analysis presents a ‘spectrum of different relations’ between the muni-
cipal Crisis Staffs and the military, but ‘no significant conflicts between them.’
She adds that ‘[t]he common denominator everywhere [was] coordination and
support by the Crisis Staffs. The further end of the spectrum is the Crisis Staff
giving operational orders to the armed units, and the head of the Crisis Staff
personally commanding armed units.’269
The document provides evidence of the intentionality on the part of the Bos-
nian Serb state to secure municipalities as ethnic property belonging to Serbs. It
reveals too that the ‘spectrum of different relations,’ including irregular armed
groups, were intentionally created and encouraged as part of the implementation
process, further undermining the interpretation of the multiple irregular actors
present in Bosnia as evidence of a cultural rather than state-led conflict.
Before Bosnia’s referendum, Serbian command had worked to prevent Bos-
niak resistance, which would have taken the form of irregular volunteer defence
brigades. Giving evidence at the ICTY, a protected witness described how in
Višegrad, in February or March 1992;
[t]he Yugoslav People’s Army issued an order that all firms, com-
panies, and institutions who had arms in their possession intended
267Ibid.
268Dorothea Hanson, ‘Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions
1991-1995’, 4 July 2012, Research report prepared for the cases of Ratko Mladić, (IT-09-92),
see executive summary
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for Territorial Defence purposes were to lay down those arms and
hand them to the army; that is to say, to the Yugoslav People’s
Army. And that’s what happened during this period of time.270
The witness went on to describe how weapons were distributed by the JNA to
Serbs in villages.271 The implementation of the Instructions was seen across
Bosnia before war broke out. Then, in the first months of war, the Serbian
forces systematically attacked strategically significant towns, and meticulously
dismantled the local Muslim communities.
At the outbreak of war in Bosnia, the Serbian forces, though organised,
were made up of a variety of formations; the regular JNA and TO formed a
centralising core, supported by the irregular units of the political parties that
had seen action in Croatia. By June 1992, the composite elements were being
combined into the Repubilka Srpska Army (VRS) and the JNA merged with
local structures to become the official Bosnian Serb army.272 The bulk of the
VRS was divided into six geographically-based corps all subordinate to, and
under the command of, General Mladić and, in turn, the Commander-in-Chief,
Radovan Karadžić.273 Despite his postulating of spontaneity, from its creation
Karadžić situated the VRS within the context and language (and thus the per-
ceived political legitimacy) of a burgeoning Bosnian Serb state.”274 Haphazard
and spontaneous groups of volunteers were present but were engaged either
in localised skirmishes or infrequently joined loose coalitions. In Bosnia, the
JNA, the VRS, and a small number of elite paramilitary groups participated in
coordinated manoeuvres during the first months of the war and successfully se-
cured strategic military and geo-political positions. This meant besieging towns
and villages and “cleansing” their Muslim inhabitants.
At Višegrad a number of these different strands came together and therefore
serves as a useful case study of Serbian command structures in action; Višegrad
was both strategically and symbolically important, and was one of the first
targets of the conflict. It was also the site for some of the more violent and
visceral war crimes. The town is located on the main road connecting Sarajevo
270Witness VG22, Case IT-98-32-T, 10 November 2001, p136
271Ibid.; and James Gow has written extensively about how the JNA, local Serb officials and
police ensured that Muslims were disarmed throughout the last months of false peace and
given expert testimony himself at the ICTY
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to Belgrade but also connects Titovo Užice just across the border in Serbia with
Goražde in Bosnia. It was this road that became the thoroughfare for the Užice
Corps of the JNA with its base camp in Uzamnica, five miles or so down the road
from Višegrad.275 The Uzamnica Camp was later used as a detention centre for
local Muslim prisoners and is where a number of violations, including crimes
against humanity, were committed, predominately by paramilitaries belonging
to the White Eagles unit.276
There were other reasons for Višegrad’s geopolitical significance too. The
hydroelectric dam that controls the water levels of the Drina valley lies outside
the town and was seized by the JNA, after some local Muslim resistance during
the first days of the war, on 12 April 1992. Historically, the Drina had been
an important symbol for Croats and Serbs but continued to resonate with Serb
nationalists ‘long after it had dwindled in importance for Croatia.’277 Ivo An-
drić’s 1945 Nobel-winning novel, Bridge over the River Drina, is set in Višegrad
where, upon the bridge, the Serbian hero is brutally and vividly impaled. As
the young man dies, he curses “Turks on the bridge...may you die like dogs.” 278
Furthermore, the Drina valley witnessed some of the worst atrocities commit-
ted by Chetniks against Muslims during the Second World War, and by Serbian
paramilitaries against Muslims in the 1990s.279
Particularly in Višegrad but also in Zvornik, Goražde, and throughout the
Drinksa banovina, violence in the 1990s against the local Muslim population
was often highly ritualised. In the Drina valley the two narratives fused. The
political objective to cleanse the towns of their majority Muslim populations
was legitimised by the exclusionary hate speech campaigns of Karadžić and
Šešelj, but largely accomplished by historcised violence perpetrated by units
that apparently lay outside the official command structure. While there is no
evidence that Serbian units, whether paramilitary or otherwise, ever received
orders to commit ritualised crimes, the incitement to violence employed by the
state and its key allies was saturated with historical resentment and (re)invented
symbolism. The use by Serbian authorities, for example, of the 1915 nationalist
275Ibid.
276IT-98-32, Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, See Second Amended Indictment, 24 February
2006
277The Drina only remained important for more extreme Croatian nationalists who pur-
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more mainstream. Cathie Carmichael, ‘Watch on the Drina: Genocide, War and Nationalist
Ideology’, The historical Association, John Wiley & Sons, 2013, pp592-605, p599
278Ivo Andrić, Bridge Over the River Drina, The Harvill Press, 1995, p51
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anthem, Marš na Drinu –March on the Drina– purposefully imbued the present
with the past. Women in detention centres in Foča knew when they heard Marš
na Drina being played from the loudspeaker of the local Mosque that the rapes
were about to begin.280
The culture and atmosphere that national authorities created in the Drina
valley, and elsewhere, should not be considered distinct from their incitement
to violence and facilitation of irregular military groups outside of the national
infrastructure. The rhetoric and historical glorification had specific and ma-
lignant purpose. Often, histories of identity-based violence examine either the
social environment in an attempt to explain the psychological factors behind the
atrocities, or focus on the military manoeuvres; consider here that as the Dr-
inska strategy was implemented, the historcised and symbolic backdrop to the
crimes had already been well established by 1992. The effect in Višegrad was
to further dehumanise the Muslim civilians targeted for expulsion or worse; the
Muslim neighbour became instead the Turk that slayed Serbia’s greatest literary
hero and therefore deserved “punishment”.281 The Drina River, ‘the backbone of
the Serbian national body’, was strategically important and therefore became,
once again, symbolically important; beneath the superficial pseudo-historical
staging, the Bosnian-Serb Parliament declared on May 12 1992 their commit-
ment to “establish a Drina valley corridor, thereby eliminating the Drina River
as a border between Serb states.”282 The valley was a priority. The Drina
Corps, created in November 1992, consisted of about 15,000 men in thirteen
geographically-based subordinate units, which fought alongside local police and
special forces under the RS Ministry of Interior.283 Incorporated into the units
were official paramilitary battalions including the Red Berets and the Drina
Wolves. The Višegrad campaign involved coordinated action between the JNA
280US State Department Dispatch, July-August 1992 (published by the Bureau of Public
Affairs); Marš Na Drinu continues to be a symbolic touchstone, on 16 January 2013 the
song was played at the United Nations at a concert organised by Serbian Ambassador to the
UN, Vuk Jeremić who at the time was General Assembly President. The incident sparked
outcry from survivor groups and human rights organisations. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon
apologised but Jeremić defended the performance. Reportedly, the song formed part of the
encore and therefore was not included on the programme. ‘Serbian military song at U.N.
concert sparks Bosnian outcry’, Reuters, 17 January 2013
281Lynda E. Boose, ‘Crossing the River Drina: Bosnian Rape Camps, Turkish Impalement,
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Parliament both quoted in Edina Becirević, Genocide on the Drina River, Yale University
Press, 2014, p81
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units from Republika Srpska, JNA units from across the border in Serbia, and
paramilitary formations. It was one of a number of coordinated campaigns to
secure key communication points during the first few weeks of war. Bosanski
Brod was taken on 27 March, in April Bijeljina fell on the 2nd, Kupres two
days later, Foca and Zvornik (as witnessed by Mendiluce) on the 8th, followed
by Višegrad, Bosanski Šamac, Vlasenica, Brčko and Prijedor by the end of the
month.284 The successful encirclement of the Bosnian centre by the JNA and its
irregular and paramilitary allies was rumoured to have been the implementation
of an operational plan known as RAM –a possibility that James Gow describes
as “very likely well-founded.285 Certainly evidence of coordination in action and
objectives between JNA forces and the paramilitary type groups is clear.
In Višegrad, on 6 April 1992, Serb JNA units targeted the town, particu-
larly Muslim neighbourhoods and the surrounding Muslim villages. When a
small group of local Muslim men retaliated by seizing the dam and holding it
as a bargaining chip for negotiations, a large contingent of JNA forces from
Serbia –the Užice Corps– crossed the border and took control of Višegrad. The
JNA then positioned tanks and heavy artillery to secure the town before pub-
licly assuring the safety of the local Muslim population. However, according to
witness testimony, Lieutenant-Colonel Jovanović intimidated 4,000 Muslim ci-
vilians by saying that he had the Beli Orlovi under his command.286 According
to ICTY judgements in cases involving members of the White Eagles operating
in Višegrad in spring 1992, after the JNA left the town, Serbian and Bosnian
Serb paramilitary formations moved in, killing and abusing the non-Serb pop-
ulation.287 The UN Experts Report includes in their list of special forces sup-
porting Serbian war aims a Beli Orlovi unit operating in Višegrad, under the
twenty-five year old Milan Lukić.288 It describes their uniform as ‘masked with
camouflage uniforms and “Četnik’ insignia.” ’289 However, during his ICTY trial,
Lukić was described contradictorily by witnesses as being either the leader of a
White Eagles unit made up of members mostly from outside Višegrad (namely
from Serbia) or as leader of a local company of volunteers called the Avengers,
drawn from and around Višegrad.290 Journalist Ed Vulliamy claims that Lukić
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‘assembled a gang of 15 bravos, including members of his family’ in the spring
of 1992.291 During interviews with the Serbian police at the end of 1992, Lukić
himself stated that he was leader of the Avengers, known initially as the Obren-
ovac Detachment, with a mixed membership from the outskirts of Višegrad and
from Serbia, and had been attached to both the Višegrad SUP and the Višegrad
TO.292 There are frequent accounts linking Lukić with the White Eagles and
it is probable he was involved in the command of both units, or that the local
unit was later subsumed into the better organised paramilitary group.
The relationship between the White Eagles unit in Višegrad and Vojislav
Šešelj as overall commander of the national paramilitary group known as the
White Eagles is addressed throughout Šešelj’s trial.293 Šešelj himself denies that
the Eagles were associated with his Serbian Radical party (SRS) and specifically
denied knowledge of Lukić’s paramilitary manoeuvres or his membership to the
SRS, however the established presence of so many paramilitary personnel from
Serbia points strongly to coordinated outside influence of command.294 What
is clear is that Lukić, himself from Rujiste, a small town about 15 kilometres
from Višegrad, had spent time before the war in Germany, Switzerland and
Obrenovac, Serbia, but returned in 1992 to form a local paramilitary unit that
played a leading participatory role in the ethnic cleansing of Višegrad.295
There are rumours that Lukić enjoyed a close relationship with the Bosnian
Serb leadership and has been described as an aide of Karadžić.296 According
to a joint investigation by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and the
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, Lukić was part of Karadžić’s ‘business
network,’ and in charge of a lucrative drug manufacturing operation where drugs
were smuggled through Serbia into Bosnia, and vice-versa.297
Before the conflict started in 1992, Višegrad had a population of over 21,000
of whom 61 percent was Muslim. The entire Muslim population was ‘cleansed’
during the war; 12,000 were forcibly removed or killed.298 After Srebrenica,
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Višegrad ‘lost’ the most people –many, mostly men and teenage boys, are still
missing. Furthermore, wartime loyalties and anti-Muslim networks still persist
preventing local memorialisation or acknowledgement of the crimes that were
committed there. In 2014, Bosnian Serb municipal authorities, supported by
local police, removed the word “genocide” from a memorial to Bosniak victims
in a Muslim cemetery.299 This post-atrocity legacy is confronted in the Bosnian
film For Those Who Can Tell No Tales, about an Australian tourist who during
her first visit to Višegrad stays a night in hotel Vilina Vlas and is forced to
confront the apparent amnesia that endures in the town twenty years after the
atrocities were committed.300 Paramilitaries under Lukić’s command used the
Hotel Vilina Vlas as a base and and as a rape camp.301 The protagonist Kym
Vercoe (playing herself) observes “I didn’t really know that you could just clean
up a place and pretend that nothing ever happened.”302
In Višegrad the post-atrocity divides run particularly deep because of the
high level of local paramilitary participation in the violence. As is the case else-
where in Bosnia, many local paramilitaries were not prosecuted and continue to
live side-by-side the surviving Muslim community. In 2010, the ex-White Eagles
paramilitary Mitar Vasiljević returned to Višegrad after being was released by
the ICTY, having serving two-thirds of his 15-year sentence for Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes.303 Vasiljević was welcomed home by his support-
ers ‘as a hero with music and processions of cars, all cheering his name.’304
Vasilijević, dressed in Četnik insignia, told the crowd that he had never felt
happier in his life.305 However, rumours that the relationship between Karadžić
and Lukić had soured, and that Lukić had been in contact with the ICTY before
his arrest, seemed to be confirmed when a raid in 2004 by RS Interior Ministry
special forces left his brother Novica Lukić shot dead.306
Višegrad was not unusual. It is an example of many towns that witnessed
the effects of the devolved implementation of identity-based mass violence by
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irregular units. The anomaly was Srebrenica, not because of the violence that
was committed there in July 1995 but because of the implementing structure
that carried out the massacres.
After the fact, Karadžić described the massacre at Srebrenica “not as a slaughter
organised by the army, but revenge attacks by Bosnian Serbs whose relatives
had been killed by Muslims earlier in the war.”307 Far from being acts of
local or community level violence, the role during the Srebrenica atrocities of
official forces and of professional paramilitary groups –such as the Red Berets–
was as primary perpetrators, even if some local militias were involved. As
part of the Drina Corps, the Red Berets, subordinated to the 1st Bratunac
Light Infantry Brigade, and the Drina Wolves, under the command 1st Zvornik
Infantry Brigade, participated in the 1995 massacres308 and their participation
was coordinated by central authorities. Volunteers from Greece, Ukraine and
Russia were also present, indicating an emphasis on professionalism on the part
of the command, rather than local numbers.309
Involvement of the paramilitaries in the massacres at Srebrenica was con-
firmed with the release of a twenty minute video capturing the execution of six
Muslim men in civilian clothes by members of the Scorpions.310 On their arms
the Scorpions wore patches of the sword that was the insignia of the Serbian
DB and after the unit was disbanded, some of the members were given a docu-
ment informing them that they were a reserve force of the Special Unit of the
Serbian DB, known as the JSO.311 Commander of the unit Slobodan Medić had
decided to videotape the murders as evidence of their “combat prowess”; the
videotape was later copied and distributed to Skorpions who had taken part in
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the crimes.312 For a time, the video could be rented from a local rental shop in
Šid and it can still be viewed on Youtube.313
Responsibility for the tragedy at Srebrenica, unlike the pattern of atrocities
elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was not devolved to paramilitary groups.
The attack on Srebrenica in July 1995 was a centrally planned operation, or-
chestrated by the VRS command, which subordinated VRS brigades, official and
state supported paramilitaries (that included foreign mercenaries) to a centrally
planned and well orchestrated military strategy.314
Whether the assault on Srebrenica was more centralised than other town
sieges because it occurred towards the end of the war or because the unholy task
was that much greater in scale has, not to my knowledge, been much addressed.
As we await the outcome of Mladić ’s trial at the ICTY, I will perhaps simply
note, as a generalisation, that elsewhere in Bosnia by summer 1995, pro-Serbian
paramilitaries that were still active were already focusing on their own economic
gains and consolidating local power bases. Irregular military activity as a state
and as local phenomenon, was at its height during the first year of the conflict,
although units payed by Serbian and Bosnian Serb security services and interior
structures continued to operate right up until to end of the conflict.
In an interview during the war in Bosnia, President of the Bosnian Serb Repub-
lic, Radovan Karadžić, claimed that for the first 45 days of the conflict there,
“we had no unified command” because “this was a war between civilians”, adding
that “we had no single command in the army and the police.”315 By way of ex-
planation, Karadžić reinforced this representation of the military situation with
cultural cliché: “the fighting involved people who had fought each other in 1941,
it was a continuation of World War II. We had no telephone communication
with the people in Foča and eastern Bosnia, including Bijeljina, and I didn’t
know what was happening there.”316
The rhetoric of spontaneity and historical grievance framed the visible par-
ticipation of the paramilitaries through a prism of moral equivalence by simul-
taneously downplaying the capacity of the Serbian irregulars and exaggerating
the capabilities of the opposition, and most importantly by elevating the role
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314see IT-05-88, Popović et al, Appeal, 30 Jan2015, Disposition, p713
315Transcript of interview with Radovan Karadžić, 3/38, (DoY) (no date)
316Ibid.
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of (largely imagined) communities. Historical revisionism provided a premise
from which the Serbian leadership could falsely equate the Serbian and Bosnian
forces, while continuing to exercise command over well trained, well equipped
irregular units behind the scenes. Throughout the crisis Karadžić offered ex-
planations for the decentralised nature of the violence in Bosnia that used the
presence of paramilitary and irregular units as evidence that it was a non-linear
conflict:
The first two months of the war were completely obscure. You could
not know who was fighting whom and where, there was no control
and no military command, and people fought each other, because
the Serbs feared that the Muslims would massacre them, and the
Muslims feared that the Serbs would kill them all, and they started
killing each other in what could be described as ’preventative action’
and this was a civil war.317
This discourse, or script,318 had significant influence over the western policy
makers who determined that the conflict, particularly in Bosnia, was historic-
ally and culturally inevitable. The British Foreign Office, the reluctant leader
of the west’s Yugoslav policy, pursued these explanations with enthusiasm and
was thus able to legitimise the UK’s steadfast position against intervention by
recycling the Serbian party line.319 The Instructions alone not only quash the
Karadžić spontaneity script but also reveal the structural and organisational
differences between the Serbian command and control that existed in Croatia
and in Bosnia. Nevertheless, in a conflict considered to have been determined
as much by outside powers as the internal developments, it is important to con-
sider the impact, intent and consequences of political discourse as an extension
of Serbian policy by other means.320 Such rhetoric polluted understanding bey-
317Ibid.
318I initially borrowed the term ‘script’ from Ó’Tuathail, who described different ‘scripts’
deployed by the west to discuss the Bosnian war (see ‘An anti-geopolitical eye’ (1996)); But
the term is also used by Čolović and others to identify patterns of wartime discourse within
Yugoslav borders. The use here acknowledges both contexts as well as its broader use discourse
analysis.
319On role of UK in western policy over Bosnia see Carole Hodge, Britain and the Balkans,
Taylor & Francis, 2006; for how Foreign Office and British military absorbed Belgrade’s ana-
lysis see Simms, Unfinest Hour
320Gallagher, Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789-1989, From the Ottomans to Milošević,
Routledge, London, 2001, p181
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ond the political sphere. International civil society observers such as Amnesty
International also unwittingly perpetuated the picture of multiple commands
within the Serbian forces. In a report of March 1992, Amnesty recounted the
events at Lovas in eastern Croatia, where Serbian paramilitaries were respons-
ible for the killing of civilians and various other atrocities against the non-Serb
population. In support of its analysis, Amnesty quoted a military dispatch from
a JNA officer sent to the HQ of the JNA First Military District in October 1991
that had subsequently been reprinted in the Belgrade magazine, Vreme.
In the section of the dispatch concerning factors negatively in-
fluencing the morale of his soldiers, the officer complained of the
presence of “various paramilitary formations from Serbia, including
Četniks, Dušan Silni units and various self-proclaimed volunteers,
whose primary aim is not to fight the enemy but to plunder local
properties and to terrorise local innocent people of Croatian nation-
ality.”321
Whatever veracity may be attributed to the individual JNA officer’s concerns,
his statement did not reflect the reality of the situation either on the ground in
Lovas nor within JNA command. Evidence later collected by the UN Commis-
sion of Experts found that the Dušan Silni forces were suspected of attacking
Lovas in collaboration with the TO.322 The final indictments of both Goran
Hadžić and Slobodan Milošević include counts of responsibility for the atro-
cities committed at Lovas in October 1991.323 In both cases, the Prosecution
presented the attack at Lovas as part of the Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)
between the political leaderships in Belgrade and Pale, the military command of
the JNA and VRS, elements of the Bosnian Serb and Serbian security services
and the paramilitaries. Referring directly to collaboration between the Dušan
Silni unit and the JNA, Hadžić’s indictment states “members of the JNA, the
TO of the SAO SBWS, and Dušan Silni volunteer unit forced fifty Croat civil-
ians, who had been detained for forced labour in the Zadruga building in Lovas,
to march into a minefield on the outskirts of the village of Lovas.”324 Of the
321‘Yugoslavia: further reports of torture and deliberate and arbitrary killings’, Amnesty
International, March 1992
322UN Expert Report, Annex IIIA, p50, reference 463
323IT-04-75, Hadžić, First Amended Indictment, 22 July 2011, p10; IT-02-54, Milošević,
"Croatia", Second Amended Indictment, 28 July 2004
324see IT-04-75, Hadžić, Final Indictment, case is awaiting judgement
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fourteen men found guilty by a special war crimes court in Belgrade in 2012,
four former JNA soldiers stood by four former Dušan Silni in the dock.325 Am-
nesty International’s report and the many other reproductions of the Serbian-led
narrative served to strengthen the false script of the Serbian nationalists and
obscure the fact that the devolved nature of the Serbian war command was,
unlike the Croat and Bosniak structures, planned well ahead of time.
325Marija Ristić, ‘Guilty Verdicts For Crimes In Lovas’, 26 June 2012, Balkan Insight
78
2 The Croatian model
The paramilitary dynamics that supported the Croatian government in Zagreb,
Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna (Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna), or in
some cases simply the Croatian people, have never occasioned the level of in-
terest accorded to the Serbian, or even Bosnia Muslim, irregular forces. The UN
Commission of Experts observed only 13 paramilitary groups working in support
of the Republic of Croatia, apparently numbering in total between 12,000 and
20,000.326 Their list was intended to record all paramilitary groups operating
outside of the ordinary army but does not even include the influential armed
wing of the Croatian Party of Rights, Hrvatske obrambene snage (HOS or Croa-
tian Defence Forces). Furthermore, this number does not include any of the
local defence brigades that mobilised in Croatia or territories of Herceg-Bosna.
In its examination and judgement of Croatian Generals Gotovina and Markac,
the Trial Chamber used the formulation “members of Croatian military forces
or Special Police” in its factual findings, in which they included HVO forces and
but excluded paramilitaries and civilians wearing uniforms.327
While the irregular nexus of paramilitaries and state structures was never
as planned nor as efficient as the Serbian counterparts, pro-Croat paramilitary
groups enjoyed varied levels of patronage and coordination with the political
and military authorities. As the conflicts progressed and the national com-
mand structure strengthened, many irregular groups were either disbanded or
absorbed into the ordinary army but Croatian leaderships benefitted politically
and militarily from using an irregular elements with and within their military
structures, while denying control over the actors or responsibility for their ac-
tions. At the same time, reports on the Croatian military by Serbian nationalists
was almost always couched in the language of the Second World War Ustaše and
of grassroots armed units committed to the destruction of the Serbian people.
Serbian Television, for example, would present the Croat forces as being under
state command while also being unofficial and uncontrollable;
The panic-stricken Tudjman mercenaries and villains, calling them-
selves the guards, have barricaded themselves in the centre of Kosta-
jnica, shooting at everything. We also found out that a horde of
butchers from Tudjman’s Black Legion is headed towards Banija.
326UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p6
327IT-06-90, Gotovina et al., Judgement I of II, 15 April 2011, p34
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The horde of mercenaries and murderers thirsty for Serbian blood
barricaded in Kostajnica seem to realise that they have been written
off.328
The Serbo-Croatian conflict was characterised on the Croatian side by the prom-
inent role played by the police force and the emergence of local ‘defence’ units.
Although the Croatian government did not publicly advertise their support for
paramilitaries, the state and many of its officials were actively involved in arm-
ing local brigades. Later, as new paramilitary forces began to emerge, some
enjoyed the tacit approval of the government while others were considered to
threaten state authority and were dismantled.
The Serbian-led restructuring of the JNA had left Croatia without a signi-
ficant army and as tensions increased between Croat and Serb communities in
Croatia, maintaining order and security fell to local police units. The Ministry
of the Interior began to restructure the Croatian police force in 1990, arm-
ing local units in strategically important areas and in towns with a significant
Serbian population.329 This was done by increasing police salaries but also
involved the exclusion of Serbs from the force.330 In early 1991, in coup for
Belgrade and the JNA, Croatian Defence Minister Martin Špegelj was recorded
making preparations to import arms for the nascent Croat forces, in which he
appeared to reference secret “liquidation squads.”331 General Kadijević of the
JNA produced a report in which it described in detail preparations being made
to establish an illegal paramilitary wing of Tudjman’s ruling party.332 The re-
port directly accused members of the Tudjman leadership of direct involvement,
but rather than suggest arrest, which Kadijević thought would have too great
ramifications, he recommended that the Federal Presidency disarm all Croatian
paramilitary formations.333 Nevertheless, Stipe Mešić later argued that, in con-
trast to the Serbian and JNA leaderships, Croatia armed the police as a “legal
paramilitary organisation”.334 Josip Boljkovac, made first Interior Minister of
328IT-06-90, Gotovina et al., Exhibit D97-1, ‘Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create a
“State for all Serbs,” ’ Renaud de la Brosse, 4 February 2003, p.64
329Transcript of interview with Josip Boljkovac, DoY, July 1994-July 1995, Doc.3/9. p5-6
330Ibid., p5
331Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, p111
332The Yugoslav Presidency adopted in January 1991 an Order disbanding and disarming
all irregular armed forces; see International Court of Justice Case Concerning Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, Counter-Memorial, 23 July 1997, p220
333Ibid., Kadijević said that this would be the only was to avoid war.
334Transcript, of interview with Stipe Mešić, DoY, Doc. 3/53, p5
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Croatia in 1991, justified the decision to use irregular formations by arguing
that “Croatia wasn’t internationally recognised and didn’t have its own army.
It only had the right to have regular police, reserve police forces, and a limited
number of special units.”
President Tudjman himself put forward the same position, repeatedly claim-
ing his administration was against the creation of unlawful military formations
and that Croatia was entitled to develop its own units of military defence.335
For those parts of the international community that felt Croatia had a right to
defend itself, this narrative went some way to normalising this dimension of the
Croat irregular dynamic. That members of Tudjman’s cabinet organised their
own volunteer groups or that the Interior Ministry forged closer and closer links
with a number of irregular groups was either not fully known at the time by
all international observers or not politically convenient to pursue.336 It is per-
haps interesting that as a younger man, during his time in the JNA, Tudjman’s
first major written work explored the history of partisan warfare and advoc-
ated for this kind of structure, against what he perceived as a the centralising
perspectives that emphasised the role of the regular army.337
In the months before the Serbo-Croat conflict began, Boljkovac had talked
to German officials about the incorporation of the military police force into the
Bundeswehr and used that experience as a model to imitate:
[T]he world didn’t know much about it. President Tudjman had
an infinite trust in me, especially in the first days. That is why he
asked me to do this, knowing I was a professional...he knew that I
could engage many people abroad because I was known in Germany
and Italy.338
This external support for Croatia throughout 1990 clearly influenced the devel-
opment of the Croatian military architecture, and being able to draw comparis-
ons between their own military force to those of other European states provided
335See Transcript of interview with Franjo Tudjman. DoY, Doc.3/79, p4
336Certainly the US knew; see ‘Intelligence Report; Croatia: Tomislav Mercep’s Role in
Atrocities,’ DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, United State Central Intelligence Agency,
19 Oct. 1995
337Elements of Tudjman’s thesis are said to have been incorporated into JNA reorganisation
in the late 1950s; see Okey, ‘The “Jasaenovac Myth” and breakdown of communist Yugoslavia,’
p271
338Boljkovac, DoY, p11
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an additional veneer of legitimacy to the processes of arming and restructuring
in preparation for action.339 However, relations between the Interior Ministry
and their European contacts went beyond educational conversations –Croatia
was importing “tens of tens of trucks from abroad.”340 It was Boljkovac, together
with Defence Minister Špegelj and Deputy Police Minister Jurić, who were ex-
posed by Belgrade to be arming Croatia’s forces in the months preceding the
violence. During the period of federal conversations over constitutional reform
and as Croatia prepared its institutions for independence, the armed forces were
able to expand through the clandestine import of arms.341 Thus, “thanks to the
good cooperation between Špegelj and [Boljkovac] and the trust...from the top
from Tudjman, Mandić, and Mešić”, the government was able to arm their police
units.342
Nevertheless, the early weeks of the fighting revealed the military discrepan-
cies between the warring parties. JNA capability easily outstretched Croatia’s
militarised police and TO, but so too did Belgrade’s professional paramilitaries
out class Croat irregulars. The localised conflict that preceded the national
emergency saw community-based irregulars committing community-level viol-
ence, supported by Croat or Serb police forces that acted as proxies for state
involvement. Political paramilitaries, on both sides, were some of the most mil-
itant, better armed, and as members of hierarchical structures had experience
of organising themselves.343 From the decisions made early on in the conflict,
it appears as if the Zagreb regime quickly realised that instigating and facilitat-
ing organised violence on the local level was not sufficient and –perhaps noting
the clear presence of Belgrade in Serbian efforts– began a fairly successful ef-
fort to centralise state forces and paramilitaries fighting under the Croatian flag
(although not necessarily in support of the government).
In late summer and early autumn 1991, the debacle at Vukovar revealed the
striking contrast between the organisation and cooperation that existed between
339In his own interview with the Death of Yugoslavia team, Mešić compared the Croatian
National Guard (ZNG) that was established in April 1991 as a precursor to the Croatian
Army to the French Gendarmerie and the Italian Carabinieri within the ordinary police force,
emphasising the significant role of the police in the early military formations. See interview
with Stipe Mešić, DoY, p.6
340Ibid. p.12
341Aleksander Pavković with Peter Radan, Creating New States; Theory and Practice of
Secession, Ashgate, 2007, p149
342Boljkovac, DoY
343Particularly the HOS on the Croat side, and Šešelj’s Chetniks
82
the Serbian paramilitary forces, the JNA, and Serbian military control, and
the absence of a central Croatian command. Mile Dedaković-Jastreb, Croatian
commander at Vukovar described the situation he found on his arrival at the
front lines:
Coming to Vukovar very quickly I realised that everyone who
had money or respect had their own army. There wasn’t a common
command post which would be normal. Everyone was making war
in their own way, thinking they knew better and there was no help,
no connection between one part of the town and the other. Straight
away I organised all this, and unified all these armies of volunteers.344
By way of comparison, General Života Panić, who was JNA commander of the
First Army District during the Vukovar operation, recalled that Arkan agreed
“immediately” to fight under JNA command adding, “it was clear that [Arkan’s
men] were well trained, well prepared for battle, and disciplined. And that there
was only one person...that they obeyed and that was Arkan.”345
Vukovar brought into stark relief for the Croatian leadership the chaos that
unregulated paramilitary groups and local defence groups brought to their mil-
itary and political structures in large scale operations, while similar pro-Serb
formations were successfully reinforcing the opposition. The Serbian operation
had destroyed most of the city and over 20,000 inhabitants had been forcibly
expelled.346 This had been achieved because the Serbian coalition of actors had
cooperated and collaborated, and the paramilitary groups had been subordinate
to the central command structure. In Vukovar, as elsewhere in Croatia in 1991,
nationalist enthusiasm from the community to take up arms was not enough to
form efficient paramilitary formations and nor was the emerging army structure
experienced or confident enough to command control.
For that reason, as with the Serbian structure, the largest paramilitary co-
hort within the pro-Croatian military mélange came from political parties. The
344Interview with Mile Dedaković-Jastreb, DoY, Doc.3/16, p4
345Transcript of interview with Života Panić, DoY, Doc.3/59. p31; The Novi Sad JNA
Commanding officer was recorded praising Arkan’s contribution to the assault on Vukovar,
“The greatest credit for this goes to Arkan’s volunteers! Although some people accuse me of
acting in collusion with some paramilitary formations, these are not paramilitary formations
here. They are men who came voluntarily to fight for the Serbian people. We surround a
village, he dashes in and kills whoever refuses to surrender. On we go!”, quotes in Armatta,
The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milošević, p188
346IT-02-52, Milošević, Annex A (Amended Croatia indictment), 23 November 2002, p12
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difference was that Zagreb was unable to secure the same kind of war-time polit-
ical alliance of political parties and could therefore not ever fully rely on the
paramilitary wings of other parties as Belgrade and Pale were able to in the
early years of conflict.
The Croatian Defence Force (HOS) was the largest Croatian paramilitary
organisation and operated with the most independence.347 It was one of the
only Croatian paramilitary groups that can be considered ‘national’ in both its
membership and presence. Formed as the paramilitary wing of the far right
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), the HOS was founded in the Croatian capital
in June 1991 by Dobroslav Paraga. Later the HOS had their headquarters in
Ljubuški in Central Bosnia, although it is thought that command still came from
HSP in Zagreb.348 The HSP leadership argued that the formation of the group
had been a necessary response to the Serb aggression in Croatia in 1990/91
and the failure of President Tudjman to take definitive military action.349 Thus
rather than assist the regime, its raison d’être was to challenge the political and
military establishment, promoting a more extreme national response to the real
(and imagined) threats facing Croatia.
The HOS was well armed and reportedly received training in Slovenia on the
invitation of Slovene Defence Minister Janez Janša.350 The group grew to ap-
proximately 15,000 although details of how and where the group acquired their
arms is unclear.351 and wore black uniforms with more than a conscious nod to
the World War Two Ustaše. When Paraga demanded “Hrvatska do Drine” –or
‘Croatia to the Drina’, he attracted many of the diaspora extremists.352
From the beginning, pubic relations between the Croatian government and
the HOS were fraught. In November 1991, Tudjman had Paraga arrested on
charges of arms dealing and plotting to overthrow the government. Unlike the
powerful Serbian paramilitary groups, the HOS were no puppets of the state.
Tudjman certainly sought international political mileage from the arrest, taking
the opportunity to distance himself and his regime from all paramilitary activity.
347Until official Croatian armed forces sufficiently centralised and were able to incorporate
some HOS units and dissolve others.
348UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p13
349HSP Vice President Milan Vuković, ‘Croatian right gets tough,’ BBC Newnight report,
BBC, Dec. 1991
350The BBC reported the rumour in 1993, citing Slovenian periodical Mladina as its source;
UN Experts’ Report, Annex IIIA, ref83
351Carey et. al., ‘A New Database on Pro-Government Militias’; The Pro-Government Mi-
litias Database (PGMD), (2013), www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias/
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Manchester University Press, 2003, p77
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Thanks to Wikileaks, we can see that the American embassy was keeping a close
eye on how Tudjman dealt with Paraga and the HOS. Confidential US cables
sent from Zagreb on 24 and 25 November 1991 flag Tudjman’s assault on the
HOS, focussing on the issue of Paraga’s arrest and Tujman’s unsubstantiated
suggestions on national broadcasts that the HOS were being manipulated by
the intelligence branch of the Yugoslav Army in plots to overthrow the Croatian
government.353 The same cable also noted Tudjman’s attempts to distance his
government from the rehabilitation of fascist pageantry; “Tudjman criticised
Paraga and his party for reviving fascist symbols which discredited Croatia.”354
Tudjman himself tackled the subject of the NDH without much apology’.355
He was conscious of the emotional power an Ustaše symbolic revival would
hold among the extremists abroad as well as at home. Throughout the 1980s,
Tudjman travelled around the world, establishing relationships with émigrés who
would in time secure his leadership, and with some who would fund his war.356
The decision to invite many influential and wealthy émigrés back to Croatia
for the 1990 HDZ Congress in Zagreb was not just a shrewd financial move, it
represented a symbolic watershed; communist Yugoslavia had been merciless in
its pursuit of political emigrants, particularly those who had left Croatia, and
dedicated a special unit to their liquidation. Tudjman later admitted that;
to invite the émigré back to the homeland for a great meeting
was risky to the point that even those people who were later in my
leadership waited until the last minute to see whether we would be
arrested or not. This is why that was the turning point in my life in
terms of decision making.357
One such returnee was Gojko Šušak. Running a pizzeria in Canada, Šušak and
his circle moved in ‘a seamy underground of military ultranationalist splinter
groups,’ where they imagined a Croatia of the 1940s, stretching all the way to the
Drina.358 His brother and father were Ustaša officers, and his father was said to
353Cable 91ZAGREB1658, Zagreb Update, 25 Nov. 1991, retrieved from Wikileaks.org
354Ibid.
355Tanner, Croatia, p225
356And it worked; Tudjman’s leadership campaign allegedly cost over $4 million, a phenom-
enal amount considering the economic and financial crises that gripped the country, Silber
and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, p84
357Ibid., p.85
358Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile, Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2003, p10
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have been killed by partisans when Gojko was still a baby.359 When he ‘returned’
to Croatia, Šušak was made First Minister for the Return of Immigration, a
position that he would use to redress the ethnic balance of the nation; he later
coordinated with paramilitary combatants in the ethnic cleansing of Muslims.360
The Croatian nation had long enjoyed pride of place in diaspora conscious-
ness, but as many Croatian diaspora communities consolidated and as more
Croats returned home in 1990-91, the relationship between the Croatian state
and the diaspora community strengthened. Francesco Ragazzi argues that the
Croatian diaspora was ‘an invention of the 1990’s,’ suggesting that the excep-
tional context of the war led to ‘a short-lived unity when diasporic organisations
provided a vast humanitarian, military and lobbying support.’361 However,
the process of diasporic unification began during the years before the conflicts
began in the 1980s, having at its centre the centuries old dream of Croatian
independence. As with the processes occurring within the resident communities
within Yugoslavia, this unification was never all encompassing –many Croats or
descendants of Croats living abroad rejected the nationalist narrative, while a
significant number of Croats fled the Yugoslav territories on ideological grounds
as well as for their own safety.362 Within Yugoslavia, this unification was never
all encompassing –many Croats or descendants of Croats living abroad rejected
the nationalist narrative, while a significant number of Croats fled the Yugoslav
territories on ideological grounds as well as for their own safety.
The rehabilitation of the symbolism and pageantry from the NDH that char-
acterised the HOS, though perhaps more extreme, was not exceptional. Croa-
tia’s declaration of independence in 1991 was accompanied by a resurrection of
the NDH that was not just state sanctioned but initiated by Tudjman’s govern-
ment. While the government was careful to reap the international public rela-
tions benefits of distancing Croatia’s fledgling democracy from extremism, the
political establishment simultaneously appealed to domestic and diaspora pop-
ulism by celebrating a national past anchored in Axis patriarchy. The political
patois of the HOS leadership and of the government was heavy with rancourous
359David Binder, ‘Gojko Šušak, Defence Minister of Croatia is Dead at 53,’ New York Times,
5 May 1998
360See below for Šušak’s relationship, as a member of the Ministry of Defence, with Mostar
paramilitaries
361Francesco Ragazzi, ‘The Invention of the Croatian Diaspora: Unpacking the Politics
of “Diaspora” During the War in Yugoslavia,’ Global Migration and Transnational Politics,
Working Paper, 10 November 2009
362Also see significant scale of Serbian draft dodging, Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom;
the Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević, Westview Press, 2002, p197
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historicism; and the rhetoric of incitement shifted the social moral sphere to
such an extent as to not only further entrench the “us” and “them” exclusionary
paradigm but promote a sense of national impunity. Writing for the OTP at the
ICTY on the dangers of using media for ultra-nationalist ends for the OTP at
the ICTY, Renaud de la Brosse, stated that ‘[t]hose who came to power...used
the media like a weapon which could help them to attain their political goals in
the short and long term.’363
A number of Croatian political parties formed their own paramilitary groups,
making use of the existing local infrastructure of the Territorial Defence as the
organisational framework and the national narrative to provide legitimacy.364
In contrast to the HOS, the case of Tomislav Mercep and his Mercepovici is
demonstrative of the close proximity between some other independent political
paramilitary groups and the government. Mercep was a member of Tudjman’s
government and, as National Defence Secretary, oversaw the assault of Vukovar
in 1991. Over Vukovar, Mercep publicly admitted being involved in the pro-
curement of weapons for the town, paid for by the local population.365 He then
became an assistant minister of the Interior Ministry before serving as Chair-
man for the Association of Refugees, Croatian Police Special Units Commander
and President of the Croatian Volunteers of the War for the Homeland. As he
gained political prominence in 1991, Mercep recruited a body of approximately
2000 men to fight under his command for Croatian independence.366 Mercep
is currently on trial in Croatia for command and direct responsibility for war
crimes committed in 1991.367 Included in the indictment are charges for the
murder of 43 people, including three members of the Serbian Zec family, but it
does not include Mercep’s alleged crimes against Serbian civilians in Vukovar.368
A CIA report from October 1995 indicates that the war-time Croatian gov-
ernment were fully aware of the criminal activity of Mercep and his paramilit-
aries but were reluctant to pursue substantive investigation or prosecution.369
363IT-06-90, Gotovina et al., Exhibit D97-1, p4
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During Mercep’s trial, the war-time Security Service Chief Josip Perković has
testified that he personally sent reports from the areas where Mercep’s para-
military police unit, the Mercepovci, were operating to Defence Minister Šušak,
adding that “those reports reached the leaders of the state.”370 The relationship
between the Mercepovci and the government was at best tacit toleration of a col-
league’s criminal excesses followed by a a period of protection from prosecution.
The full extent of the relationship will probably never be known but the dispar-
ity in response towards the HOS and Mercep suggests that efforts to dismantle
the former was the result of their political threat rather than objections to the
violence the group was committing. It is also worth nothing that Human Rights
Watch have reported allegations from Croatian civil society organisations that
the Croatian government is paying for Mercep’s defence.371
As the conflict evolved, central command sought further control over the irreg-
ular groups, including the police units that had dominated Croatian operations
in 1991, and the organisation of Croatian forces changed as the Croatian theatre
of war spilled over into Bosnia. In the Mercep trial, Franjo Gregurić, the war-
time Prime Minister, claimed that President Tudjman requested control over
the paramilitaries as early as November 1991.372 The Croatian Defence Council
(HVO), however, was established on 8 April 1992. Two days later the military
police of the HVO was also established. Valentin Ćorić was appointed command-
ing officer of the military police and was charged with assembling all previously
established municipal units of military police under one command structure.373
Praljak claimed that the HVO came together spontaneously but political and
military elites from Croatia as well as the emerging Bosnian-Croat entity shaped
the army’s development from its inception.374 Emerging simultaneously were
spontaneous expressions from the community of Croat nationalism and particu-
larly young men would be seen from spring 1992 adopting the dress of the HVO
or the neo-fascist uniforms of some of the paramilitaries.375 Locally organised
370‘Witness: Government Knew About "Mercepovci" Crimes,’ Balkan Insight, 13 April 2012
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militia or defence units were carolled by HZ and Zagreb powers into becoming
the HVO, perhaps suggesting the Croat elites had learnt from the lessons of
Vukovar that the spontaneity and fervour of numerous groups needed a com-
mand structure.376 Some Bosnian Muslims remember seeing small Croatian
children in camouflage uniforms that had been made for them by their moth-
ers.377 Despite local divisions, a number of Muslims joined the HVO in its early
months and before it began to move against the Bosniaks; once Croat forces
began targeting Muslim men for arrest, or worse, the Bosniak members of the
HVO were also arrested.378
The early military successes of the HOS against Serbian forces had attracted
new recruits prompting the HVO to sign an agreement with the paramilitary
group on 23 August 1992.379 Before relations between the Croats and Bosniaks
broke down in early 1993, up to thirty percent of HOS staff were Muslims.380
Muslim collaboration with the right-wing Croatian paramilitaries appears sur-
prising but under the NDH, Muslims had actively participated in the military
structure that implemented the haphazard genocide against Serbs within Croa-
tia’s extended wartime borders, which stretched down towards the Drina.381
According to the Ustaša, the Muslims were the ‘purest’ of Croats and deemed
to be part of the Croatian nation but this view significantly diminished after
the 1960s.382 In the 1990s, anti-Muslim feeling increased on the community
level as political relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo broke down, yet among
many far-right Croat and and foreign recruits such views were already common.
American mercenary Rob Krott describes a prevalent anti-Muslim sentiment
in the international Tomislavgrad brigade as well as a close social and profes-
sional (military) affiliation with HOS members.383 A young British volunteer
376Hockenos, Homeland Calling, p92-93
377IT-95-16, Kupreškić et al., Judgement, p16
378IT-04-74, Prlić et al., Judgement, part III of VI, p12-13
379UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p13
380see Ibid. and IT-95-14/2 Kordić and Cerkež, Statement of Stjepan Tuka, Exhibit D42/2,
16 Nov. 1996, p35
381On the genocide, see Dulić’s discussion of the dimensions of killings; 17-18 percent of
Serbs in NDH were killed, Tomislav Dulić, ‘Mass killing in the Independent State of Croatia,
1941-1945: a case for comparative research’, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol.8, No.3 (2006),
p255-281
382Marko Attila Hoare, The Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War, Oxford University
Press, 2013 p17; Note that to a point, the battle between Luburić and Pavelić was about
whether to include Muslims in the Croatian nation
383None of the international volunteers qualify their anti-Muslim prejudices nor explain where
the animosity came from. Instead it is discussed or referenced as something banal or nor-
mal. However, in a post-9/11 context the online demonstrations by international fighters of
anti-Muslim and Islamaphobic commentary is difficult to accurately attribute solely to their
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described how quickly he assimilated into the Croatian military milieu, taking
on their divisive narratives;
When you live with people for a while you really want to kill for
them. You see what’s been done to them and I just want to kill to
get, like, revenge for these people. That’s why I want to go to war as
soon as possible and take some of these people out and really injure
them –cause as much pain as possible to the enemy.384
But anti-Muslim attitudes may well have come as much from the international
volunteers as their Croatian comrades; Krott and many of his Tomislavgrad
contemporaries kept close company with known neo-Nazis from Germany that
fought with the brigade and several shared their prejudices.385 ‘Without a
doubt’, Krott claimed, ‘there were HOS members and hardcore HOS sympath-
isers in the Hrvatski Vojnik.’ 386 On arriving in Croatia in spring 1992, Krott’s
travelling companion was surprised at the lack of ceremony with which they were
received by the disorganised Croatian forces and so they considered fighting for
the HOS instead:
We considered taking our ball and going home, but decided this
might be our only chance to see an honest-to-God shooting war
on the European continent in our lifetimes, and damn it, we were
not going to miss it. We figured if worse came to worst, we would
go find the right wing paramilitary group known as the HOS, an
wartime experience and could equally have been reinforced by the Europe-wide upturn of
prejudice against Muslims, arabs and Islam.
384Inside Story; Dogs of War, (Exec. Producer) Paul Hamann, BBC, 1992
385Rob Krott, Save the last bullet for yourself; A soldier of fortune in the Balkans and
Somalia, Casemate (Philadelphia & Newbury), 2008, p59,144,155; see also explicit racism
and anti-Muslim in war memoirs of Finnish volunteer Marco Casagrande, written under the
name Luca Moconesi, Mostarin tien liftarit: Suomalainen palkkasoturi Bosnian sodassa,
WSOY (Helsinki), 1997; Casagrande quotes John Morris, a British volunteer with the bri-
gade; ‘John Morris sits on my mattress and offers a cigarette. He tells about his plans to
demolish a dam in front of Jablanica. “Fifteen thousand Muslims – all straight to paradise.
Fuck, we are doing them a favour. Allah u akbar – fuck them.” ’ (p58); See also analysis of
the work in Johnny Antora, ‘Marco Casagrande –the Mostar Road Hitchhiker,’ Dispatches
from war and culture, http://johnnyantora.com/2013/11/07/marco-casagrande-the-mostar-
road-hitchhiker/; and war diary of English volunteer Steve Gaunt, on close relations with the
HOS in November 1991, War and Beer (originally War and Pivo), Panic Press (Coventry,
UK), 2010, p9
386Krott, Save the last Bullet, p59
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armed nationalist group that was operating somewhat autonomously
as an independent military organisation. I’d heard they had an
international company.387
As relations between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia deteriorated, Croa-
tian central command in Bosnia and in Zagreb found it increasingly difficult to
maintain control over the irregular fighters and were less willing to tolerate their
excesses. In March-April 1993, Zagreb passed a martial law that every Croat
male of military age was conscripted to fight for the HVO.388 It was announced
around that time that all Croatian paramilitaries would come under the central
command of the HVO.389 All municipalities were sent the same instructions to
deal with paramilitary groups in their vicinity; to gain control of them and seize
their arms.390 Stjepan Tuka, HVO battalion commander at Fojnica in Cent-
ral Bosnia, suggested that following the issuing of the instructions, options for
dealing with the irregulars were ‘either disbanding them, talking to them, or
killing them. The third choice was not really an option.’391 Tuka added that:
...when the war was in full swing officially there were no paramil-
itary formations any longer. There may have been situations where
an individual commander would act on his own and refuse to obey
orders but he would still have been under the command and control
of the HVO. The HVO was a young army so it was difficult to expect
a high level of professionalism.392
Krott’s account contradicts claims that the HOS was so quickly disbanded but
Croatian irregular dynamics were certainly more effective in Bosnia than they
had been in Croatia, which was in part because a coherent chain of command
emerged that successfully established control over most pro-Croat armed act-
ors.393
387Ibid., p19
388IT-95-14/2 Kordić and Cerkež, Statement of Stjepan Tuka, Exhibit D42/2., p35
389Ibid., p33
390Ibid.
391Ibid.
392Ibid.
393See also Documentation for HOS, the Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD)
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Within the HVO structure there were a number of special forces units that
operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina under less conventional military command;
special formations such as the anti-terrorist units, the military police, and a
small number of paramilitary groups. Although these formations were part of
the central command and control structure, they were not part of the ordinary
army ranks. They were also often responsible for or implicated in pattens of
grave crimes against civilians, prisoners and property. Although part of the
ordinary structure, the Croat Central Bosnia Operational Zone and its special
units Maturice and Apostoli, had the benefit of a special regime within the
armed forces.394
The Croatian anti-terrorist groups and the special forces units were either
state sanctioned and subordinated to ordinary command, or purpose-built para-
military groups. Many crossed official national structures and underground
criminal networks. The Convicts’ Battalion, founded in 1991 by Mladen Naletilić,
became one of the largest so-called anti-terrorist groups of the Croatian military.
The derivation of the battalion’s name seems unclear; conflicting explanations
include claims that members of the battalion from all over the world were wanted
by interpol when they joined or that the ‘convicts’ referred to the émigré fighters
returning home from political exile.395Naletilić himself was born in Herzegov-
ina in 1946 and emigrated to Germany with his family as a child, where later
he joined a émigré group ‘United Croats of Germany.’ It has been suggested
that while he was in Germany he ran a casino and reportedly was a pimp.396
Naletilić was a true child of Germany’s radical Croatian diaspora.
Naletilić, also known by his nom de guerre “Tuta”, commanded eight anti-
terrorist groups made up of a number of units grouped together under the um-
brella of the Convict’s Battalion.397 Together they numbered 13,000 soldiers.398
Formed initially to combat Serbian forces, after the restructuring of the HVO
at the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993, the Convicts’ Battalion became what
was regarded as a professional unit under the direct command of the HVO main
394IT-04-74, Praljak et al., Judgement, Part I of VI, 28 May 2013, p261
395The Kažnjenička Bojna have sometimes been referred to as the Punishment Battalion,
suggesting connotations of the Nazi Strafbattalion or Stalin’s Shrafbat but there is no indic-
ation that there were any similar penal recruitment methods used. Certainly the level of
criminal activity attributed to the Convict’s Battalion would point towards pre-war criminal
dispositions.
396Robert Bajruši, ‘M. Tuđman u pismu ocu: Tuta je kriminalac i svodnik’, Nacional, 7 Oct.
2002
397IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Judgement, 31 March, 2003, p30
398IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Exhibit PP927/2
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staff, used for ‘special combat purposes.’399 On 13 August 1993, Major General
Slobodan Praljak subordinated the Convicts’ Battalion and other irregular units
to his control as Commander of the HVO staff.400 Praljak was explicit, stating
“I categorically forbid disruptions in the command system in the OS HZ H-B
regulated my this Order. I hereby make the commanders directly subordinate
to me and individual HVO OS organs responsible for the strict implementation
of this Order.”401
Unlike the Serbian model, the Croatian structure of command and control
became increasingly centralised, bringing many irregular groups closer the Croa-
tian state and disbanding others. The Convicts’ Battalion was therefore taking
direct orders from the commander of the HVO forces but was also in contact
with the Croatian Ministry for Defence; Major General Praljak, in addition to
his military title, also held office within the Ministry of Defence. This relation-
ship between the Ministry of Defence and the Convicts’ Battalion was already
established when Praljak’s order was issued. In a handwritten note dated 3 Au-
gust 1993 and addressed simply to Gojko, Naletilić requested that Battleship
Captain Ante Budmir and Frigate Lt. Ivica Mandić in Pula be given permis-
sion to join him for action; the addressee was Croatian Defence Minister Gojko
Šušak.402
While Serbian forces left the area in summer 1992, Muslims from other parts
of Bosnia and Herzegovina came to the Mostar region to seek refuge. As more
Muslims arrived, the pre-war ethnic demography of Mostar shifted and Muslims
became the clear majority population.403 Politically, Mostar remained domin-
ated by Bosnian Croats and under the military control of the HVO. The political
and military institutions worked closely together and their remits often over-
lapped.404 Naletilić’s men worked together with HVO forces throughout the
spring of 1993, while tensions between the local Croat and Muslim populations
deteriorated. While ostensibly part of the ordinary military command struc-
ture, Naletilić’s direct communication with the Department of Defence and the
399IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Judgement, p29
400IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Exhibit PP564.1
401Ibid., p2
402see IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Exhibit PP588; see also Exhibit PP437, On 8
June in a letter to the Department of Defence, Naletilić signed himself “Commander of the
Independent Unit for Special Tasks, Convicts’ Battalion, Mladen Naletilić “Tuta”
403According to the 1991 census the population of the municipality of Mostar comprised of
126,628 inhabitants, of which 34.6% were BH Muslims, 33.9% BH Croats and 18.8% Serbs.
The remainder were Yugoslavs.
404This can be seen for example in official documents which are often marked by both “HVO”
and “HZ H-B”
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decision taken by Praljak to subordinate the special units to his direct command
indicate that the operations of such formations were by nature as much political
entities as they were military. During the ethnic cleansing of local and refugee
Bosnian Muslims in Mostar, in early summer 1993, it was men under Naletilić’s
command who carried out much of the criminal activity.
Throughout the restructuring process and integration of irregular groups
under HVO control, a number of former HOS soldiers were absorbed into more
official special units. Commander of Mrmak or the Vinko Škrobo unit of the
Convicts’ Battalion, and subordinate to Naletilić, Vinko Martinović had joined
the HOS in 1992 and served as a commander.405 Martinović was indicted along-
side Naletilić after the war and both were found guilty of a number of breaches
of the Geneva conventions, war crimes and crimes against humanity.406
Naletilić’s military influence in the region was significant. He was described
as a co-ordinator for Herceg-Bosna by HVO commanders,407 and appeared to
have been well respected within the ordinary Croatian military. The Battalion
operated in and around Mostar where Naletilić was a well known figure and was
seen during the conflict as a local war hero.408 Posters in Croatian colours of
Naletilić in a military flack jacket with the words “Tuta” and “Naša pobjeda!”
–“Our victory!”– were pasted around Herzegovina and Široki Brijeg.409 During
the trial, defence witnesses said that many of the posters remain and that graffiti
can often be found reading “We love Tuta”.410 Like many of the paramilitaries
involved in the defence of Sarajevo, Tuta acquired a reputation for giving money
away to the poor, presumably Croatian, residents in the area he operated.411
As we shall see in chapter four, the Robin Hood figure assumed by or bestowed
upon paramilitaries became a familiar motif in the social-paramilitary dynamics
across Croatia and Bosnia, particularly in situations where communities were
living in close proximity for a period of time with irregulars fighting on behalf
of their group or identity.412
405IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Judgement, 31 March 2003, p7782
406IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Second Amended Indictment, 28 September 2001
407see IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Exhibit 299.1 dated 15 April 1993
408Ibid.
409for image of poster see IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Exhibit PP939
410For summary of testimonies see references in Judgement, IT-98-34, Naletilić and Mar-
tinović, p29
411Ibid., p29
412On Socio-anthropological discussion of the Robin Hood motif see Žanić, The Flag on the
Mountain, p503-4
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A characteristic distinct to the Croatian military model in both Croatia and
in Bosnia was the emergence and development of a military police force. In
terms of a command structure, relations between the Croatian Army and police
units of the Ministry of the Interior were already planned and implemented by
1991.413 The relationship was laid out in a letter by the assistant Minister of
the Interior, Joško Morić to the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior,
the Deputy Minister, and the Chief of Main Staff:
The relationship between Croatian Army commanders must be
based on coordination and cooperation at all levels of responsib-
ility...However when police are to be used for defence purposes at
the request of any Croatian Army command, police units are placed
under the command of the Croatian Army. The Croatian Army com-
mand has an obligation to supply and replenish the police unit with
material and technical equipment in accordance to the task assigned
to it.414
In Croatia, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač had direct command over the
special police units once they had been deployed to become part of the collective
Special Police Forces in operative areas.415 In HZ H-B, this fell to Praljak. Be-
fore and after this engagement, their usual local command retained control.416
The military police increasingly became an organised auxiliary force subordin-
ated to central command. Rules came into effect in February 1994 that meant
members of the military police could not be engaged in combat activities by a
commander without approval of the Croatian Minister of Defence.417
The role of the military police changed as the Croatian lines moved into
Bosnia and then during the operations in Croatia towards the end of the war.
One reason was simply that by 1993 the Croatian Army and the HVO had had
time to arm themselves and strengthen their organisational structure. Another
reason was that Croatian war aims were different in Bosnia and had altered in
413IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Exhibit DO1919.E; and IT-06-90, Gotovina et al.,
Expert report by Dragutin Repinc: “The Special Police in Operation Storm,” 1 December
2009, p11
414Repinc, “The Special Police in Operation Storm,” p11
415Ibid.
416Ibid.
417IT-06-90, Gotovina et al, Exhibit D1532, Boris Milas, witness statement, 19 May 2009,
paras 19, 34-35
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Croatia. Much of the initial fighting with the Serb forces in Croatia took place
on a local level, with regional command structures emerging in response to the
rising political tensions. Operation Storm was, to be sure, something else, but
by summer 1995 Croatia had centralised its forces and so the paramilitaries that
participated were present as part of the official structure rather than as irregular
participants. However, local armed formations and criminal groups remained
until after the war ended.418 Furthermore, the centralising efforts of the official
state structures did not bring less criminal behaviour; in August 1995, Croatian
soldiers in army uniforms systematically looted Serbian properties in Knin, while
‘skipp[ing] over houses with Croatian markings on them.’419
The interim period, as the process of centralisation was underway, was often
one of fractured loyalties, poor discipline, and impunity. In Croatia and in
Bosnia, the HVO police were involved in a number of human rights abuses,
including mass atrocity crimes.420 They operated as a paramilitary structure
of local brigades with loose connection to each other and flexible relationships
with state authorities. While state documents describe a clear formal command
structure, military police enjoyed the benefits of devolved responsibility in that
they were rarely held to account for their actions despite their often criminal
patterns of behaviour.
Officially at least, the Jokers were a brigade of HVO military police. The
Jokers were simultaneously described as an autonomous local paramilitary form-
ation and as an antiterrorism unit of the HVO; they were a local formation, un-
der the command of the HVO but with a significant degree of autonomy when it
came to how orders were carried out.421 With locally grown groups such as the
Jokers, determining the roles of local and national structures of command can
be more difficult. Bosnian Defence Minister Hamdo Hadžihasanović identified
the Jokers as one of the special units of the HVO that received training and
support from the Croatian Army.422 The unit was listed in the UN Commission
of Experts’ final report as a paramilitary formation but at the ICTY were de-
scribed as the anti-terrorist platoon of the 4th Military Police Battalion of the
418For example details of incident in August 1995 where UN officers were held up by local
“war lords,” see IT-06-90, Gotovina et al, Exhibit P740, Philip Berikoff, witness statement, 21
May 1997
419IT-06-90, Gotovina et al, Judgement, Part I, p205, 15 April 2011
420IT-06-90, Gotovina et al, “Chronology of Human Rights Violations in South Sector,”
Exhibit P00689, prepared by Peggy Hicks, Human Rights Action Centre, 1991
421IT-95-17 Lašva valley, Judgement, 10 December 1998, p17
422UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p39
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HVO, which is more accurate.423
The Jokers operated in the Lašva valley in the Vitez municipality in central
Bosnia. Recognisable from their Joker patches on their black uniforms, fin-
gerless leather gloves, and bands on their heads, the Jokers conformed to the
net-fascist fashions of the time.424 Many of the Jokers were local to the area
they operated in, including the sometime unit commander Anto Furundžija.
Traditional military discipline was lacking; in the place of a clear superior, a
number of individuals within the unit were able to control and command others,
but it remained under the official auspices of the HVO.425 At the ICTY Dario
Kordić was linked directly to the Jokers. A British intelligence officer reported
that the Jokers came under the direct control of Kordić and Tihomir Blaškić.426
Furthermore, an ECMM monitor recalled that the person who most often com-
manded the Jokers and the Apostoli (another irregular Croatian formation) was
Kordić.427 Thus, even despite their apparent degree of local autonomy, the
Jokers and other similar formations were controlled from from the top of the
Croatian political-military structure; as Vice-President of Herceg-Bosna, and
for a time Commander of the HVO, Kordić’s portfolio crossed both the political
and military.
In the local area of Vitez, the unit often functioned more like a local para-
military group or volunteer guard than battalion of the ordinary corps. The
HVO used groups such as the Jokers and Black Knights as “intervention units”
for more offensive roles, compared to the defensive responsibility of HVO bri-
gades.428 This was exacerbated by the nature of the political nature of their
activities, namely the expulsion of non-Croats from their designated area of re-
sponsibility. The Jokers are the clearest example within the Croatian military
machine of local paramilitaries working with the official structures because, un-
like the Serbian command, Croatia sought to either dissolve or assimilate all
substantial pro-Croat irregular groups.
423Ibid. and IT-95-17, Miroslav Bralo, Indictment
424IT-95-17 Lašva valley, Witness testimony during Opening session, 15 June 1998, p518-19
425Anto Furundžija was certainly in command during the short period in April 1993, relevant
to his ICTY crimes, but Vlado Stanić (Commander of Vitez military police unit) and Ivica
Vujica held positions of rank in the Vitez HVO structure superior to Furundžija. Miroslav
Bralo is also referenced in various documents as a commander of the Jokers. According to a
chart drawn by Kavazović, Furundžija, Bralo and Stanić commanded the Jokers. See IT-95-17
Lašva valley, Exhibit D14A
426IT-95-14, Tihomir Blaškić, Judgement, 3 March 2000, p165
427Ibid.
428This is the analysis of former JNA Captain an officer in ABiH; IT-01-47, Hadžinasanović
et al., Exhibit DH343, witness statement dated 13.06.97
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The Jokers committed a catalogue of atrocity throughout the spring of 1993.
Evidence heard during the case against the local commander, Anto Furundžija
provides an example of the often contradictory relationships that developed as
a result of the localised mechanics that remained in place. Because they were
a local formation, many of the those targeted and victimised by the Jokers,
whether in day-to-day intimidation or during more grave assaults on personal
dignity (including rape) were already known by the perpetrators. As other in-
vestigations into crimes committed by local fighters have found, Furundžija and
other HVO ‘specialists’ in the area were familiar to a number of their victims, as
neighbours, school friends,429 or from serving together in the TO.430 A Bosniak
man who was interrogated by the Jokers and described how he and four other
non-Croat prisoners were told to cross themselves while being threatened with
an axe, had spent six months in the Territorial Army with Furundžija before
the Croat left to join the HVO431 Known simply as Witness B, a young woman
from Ahmići, was forced with her mother to leave their family home and taken
to the gymnasium outside the town where they were registered as undesirables
and forced to leave the town.432 Witness B went to school with Furundžija and
knew him well as a former member of the TO.433 She describes the moment
she and her mother were interrogated in their own basement by members of the
Jokers (including Furundžija) and told they had to leave:
I turned around and started talking to one of the soldiers whom
I knew, and I asked him, "Anto, could I put my shoes on and take
my jacket"...And I told him, "You know me very well. You know
I’ve never been a nationalist." I had lots of friends. I had friends
among Croats as well. 434
Some of the most systematic ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian conflict took place
in the Lašva valley, carried out by a coalition of ordinary HVO forces and special
units that included formations such as the Jokers and the Croatian military
police, including rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war.
429IT-95-17 Lašva valley, Witness B, 09 June 1998, p249-50
430IT-95-17 Lašva valley, Testimony of Sulejman Kavazović 15 June 98, p521-522
431Ibid., note too the element of ritual to the violence.
432IT-95-17 Lašva valley, Witness B, 09 June 98, p249
433Ibid.
434Ibid.
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There were also a significant number of foreign fighters. These volunteers
joined the HOS or attached themselves to units of the regular army. A sun-
dry group that identified with the Croatian national(ist) struggle, including
Eduardo Rózsa-Flores, the former Croatia correspondent of the Spanish news-
paper La Vanguardia, fought in a special foreigners’ legion based in Osijek in
eastern Croatia.435 The King Tomislav Brigade was largely comprised of loc-
ally recruited young men in their late teens and early twenties without military
experience, expatriate Croats, and international volunteers from across Europe,
the US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.436 Seven or eight volunteers from
the Croatian community in Queens, New York, were said to have coordinated
their journey to Zagreb, where the uncle of one of the party apparently worked
for the Defence Ministry.437
There was reportedly a Dutch formation called the First Dutch Volunteer
Unit which was possibly one of the first organised group of foreign fighters.438
The HV and HVO did take on foreign volunteers but the organisation and
command control over international recruits was poor.439 However, a military
attaché in Zagreb for the troops in central Bosnia called Branko Barbić appears
to have assisted a number of the foreign volunteers, suggesting state support
for their participation.440 Foreign volunteers were integrated into the ordinary
structures as the process of centralisation continued. A number of ex-foreign
servicemen were sanctioned trained Croatian and foreign fighters, including a
team from the American Soldier of Fortune magazine.441 In 1993 HVO pay
435Marcus Tanner, ‘British fighters’ fatal attraction for the thrill of battle: Marcus Tanner
met some ’dogs of war’ in the former Yugoslavia where they earn little money and no glory’,
Independent, 10 February 1993
436Krott, Save the last bullet, p121
437Ibid., p127
438See documentary about Johannes Tilder, a former Dutch commando who travelled to
Croatia in 1991 and fought alongside the Croat army as part of the Dutch Volunteer Unit.
The film includes footage Tilder’s interrogation by the Serbs; Soldaat in den Vreemde (Eng.
Soldier of Fortune), (Dirs.)Ada van de Weijer, Arnold Folkerts, BOOZ Audiovisule Produktie,
The Netherlands, 2002; see also Krott, Save the last bullet, p20
439See Krott, Save the last bullet, p10 and for looting see p179; and Britons flock to fight in
Bosnia: Steve Boggan, ‘Thousands of ex-soldiers and ’untrained idiots and psychopaths’ said
to be serving as mercenaries with all three sides,’ Independent, 10 February 1993
440Danish volunteer Allan Knudsen testified at the ICTY Barbić facilitated his journey to
join Croat forces in Mostar by writing a letter instructing all HV units to help his passage;
IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, 13 November 2001, p5590-3; Krott also describes him as
his contact in parliament, Save the last bullet, p144
441Lt. Col. Robert Brown, I Am Soldier of Fortune: Dancing with Devils, Casemate
Publishers, 2013, p307, 384; see also ‘Yanks fight in Croatia’, Soldier of Fortune, January
1992
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for internationals was eighty Deutschmarks, or one hundred dollars, a month
–which was less than the two hundred and fifty Deutschmarks they had received
from the HV in 1992.442
The participation of foreign fighters on all sides were presented simultan-
eously as evidence of a civilisational conflict and of a new kind of modern mercen-
ary warfare.443 In practice, however, the internationals were rarely motivated by
ideological or financial incentives. Kohlmann describes how the amateur nature
of the jihadi recruitment circuit often portrayed Bosnia as a holiday opportunity
for European Muslims bored over the summer.444Krott, the American volun-
teer who fought alongside the Croat army, ridiculed the idea that any foreign
soldier would seek their fortune in Yugoslavia’s wars.445 Nor were the majority
of the international paramilitaries professional soldiers. Of the 30 or so foreign
members of the Tomislavgrad international battalion, about five were thought
to have had military training.446 A Channel 4 documentary interviewed a co-
hort of British irregulars fighting on the side of Croatia, exposing more brutal
motivations for joining the fight:
I’ve always wanted to kill legally –to have that feeling, you know–take
people out. I mean, I’ve always wondered what goes on in a York-
shire Ripper, a Black Panther’s mind...he has no compassion, no feel-
ing. I want [that] feeling, it’s higher than anything can get you.447
Another confessed, “we are not good citizens, it’s a known fact” but then added,
“Croatia’s being supported by the west –how can it be wrong?”448
442Krott, Save the last bullet, p178
443Islamic fighters were seen to represent extremism, whereas international volunteers who
fought for the Croats and Serbs were viewed (and presented themselves) as modern mercen-
aries; see Kaldor, New Wars, p100
444For example, a 21 year old medical student from London at Birmingham University who
went out to fight in Bosnia was interviewed for a jihad propaganda video; “They don’t know
that we have ice cream and we have cake here. They don’t know that we can telephone or
fax anywhere in the world. They don’t know that this is a nice holiday for us where you meet
some of the best people you have ever met in your life.” Kohlmann, ‘The Afghan-Bosnian
Mujahideen Network,’ p1
445Krott, Save the last bullet, p178
446Interview with Kit Freeman, a young British volunteer who became chief training officer in
the battalion, Dogs of War, BBC; on Freeman also see Keith Cory-Jones, War Dogs; British
mercenaries in Bosnia tell their own story, Century, 1996, throughout but particularly p81-90
447Dogs of War, BBC, note he had Yorkshire Ripper painted on his helmet
448Ibid.
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In seeking to assert control over the irregular units that emerged, somewhat
but not wholly spontaneously, in the early months of conflict the state was able
to distance itself from some of those crimes. Within the military structure,
volunteer units such as the Convicts’ Battalion and elements of the HOS were
promoted and utilised but not always within the official structure of army com-
pany. Individuals, such as the Spanish journalist Rózsa-Flores were singled out
from the volunteer or mercenary ranks and promoted in the Croatian army. 449
The skills and ruthlessness of these men suited the political objectives of the
Croatian missions. Thus Tudjman and the military leadership developed their
own special units, using some of the formations they claimed to have disbanded
and others of their own creation. The structure under which Croatian irregu-
lars operated was different to the Serbian model, but the crimes they committed
were comparable in that they fulfilled the political ambitions of their respective
political leaderships. This can be more clearly seen in the irregular activity
in Bosnia against the non-Croat populations in support of efforts to expand
Croatian borders, and in the removal of Serb civilians from Croatian territory
towards the end of the period.
In the wake of the conflicts, some of Croatia’s paramilitaries received official
honours, while others, including Tuta Naletilić, found themselves the subject to
domestic and international investigation despite support from the community.450
The Croatian leadership continuously sought to deflect criticism from the
international community for the crimes being committed by regular and irreg-
ular units under Croatian command. Attempts from Zagreb to achieve milit-
ary discipline through centralism at times had more to do with political self-
preservation than humanitarian concern. Similarly, the Croatian military coali-
tion did not become less criminal as it took the shape of a more conventional
national structure but did assume more a conventional hierarchical structure
of command. Fractures within the political philosophy of Croatian nationhood
and independence were reflected in the war-time relationships of irregulars and
elites, and as the regime consolidated its political authority it was able to do
449Tihomir Ponoš, ‘Bolivijski predsjednik Morales htio tužiti Hrvatsku zbog Chica,’ Novi
list, 4 January 2011
450At the end of 1995, Tudjman’s son, who was a member of the Croatian Security Service
and later part of the Ministry of Defence, wrote a letter to the President describing Naletilić
as a “criminal and a pimp”; it is suggested that Miroslav Tudjman was behind Naletilić’s
consequent arrest and imprisonment in Zagreb, before he was handed over to face international
prosecution at The Hague in 2000; remnants of the Convict’s Battalion made preliminary plans
to assassinate Miroslav Tudjman but the conspiracy was leaked to the Security Services. see
Bajruši, ‘M. Tuđman u pismu ocu’
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the same on the battlefield. Furthermore, as Zagreb’s command and control
subsumed the political paramilitaries, its political challengers were neutralised.
3 Bosnian Government forces
As we have seen, political forces from Belgrade and Zagreb had worked hard
to perpetuate the sense of insecurity and approaching crisis in Yugoslavia, pro-
mulgating a highly charged rhetoric that normalised the concept of bearing arms
and presented the formation of local defence groups as patriotic duty. Croat
and Serb nationalists in Bosnia then watched how the international community
reacted to the Croatian conflict and learned valuable lessons. The Bosnian gov-
ernment in Sarajevo had watched in dismay (and denial). And yet the Bosnian
government made no official attempts to prepare their defences. In his efforts to
avoid war, President Alija Izetbegović, supported by his Interior Ministry, had
allowed the JNA Sarajevo Corps to disarm the Territorial Army and disband
paramilitary units.451
Unlike the Croat and Serb nationalists, the ambitions of the Bosnian gov-
ernment were never expansionist. Islamic revival in Bosnia was focussed on
reclaiming religious control in smaller spheres such as the home, in schools, and
role of the Mosque in the community Throughout the 1980s, Bosnia’s Muslim
community had undergone somewhat of a religious revival but this was neither
accompanied by the kind of revisionist historicism nor the national supremacism
that came to charecterise Serbian and Croatian politics throughout the federa-
tion. These moves towards Muslim conservatism came more from the Mosque
than the political establishment in Sarajevo, which though Muslim-dominated
included representatives from non-Muslim and secular groups. Thus, any escal-
ation of religious rhetoric in the social sphere was not accompanied ‘from above’
by nationalist political manoeuvres, nor by sensationalist and divisive media
stories. The role nationalism has historically played in Muslim identity –whether
Arab or Ottoman– is far less central than in Christian societies; emphasis in the
Koran is placed on communities of people. This might in part explain why many
of the changes taking place in Serbian and Croatian communities were not rep-
licated in pre-war Bosnia but there were other factors too.452 The majority of
451Gow, Serbian Project, p242
452see Izetbegović’s Islamic declaration originally published in 1980 but republished in 1993,
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Bosnia’s media outlets were based in Sarajevo, which was and remained cosmo-
politan and genuinely multicultural even throughout the siege. The result was
that the real ethnic tensions worsening in provinces outside Sarajevo were not
given the proper consideration they warranted. Neither substantive political
overtures nor military precautions were taken. The Bosnian government, and
much of the media and intellectual elite were concentrated in and on the capital,
which by 1991 was no longer, if it ever was, in step with the rest of the county.
And, much to the detriment of the country’s ethnic Muslims and the future of
an integrated Bosnian population, when steps were taken, they were focussed
on Sarajevo rather than protecting the rural areas more vulnerable to military
assault and cultural division.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH) emerged disjoin-
ted, and was at first made up of more or less organised units and spontaneously
created formations.453 The Sarajevo government relied upon a loose coalition of
irregular armed groups, some of which were created by state and pro-government
auspices while others were genuine grassroots paramilitary groups. The milit-
ary and political leaderships sought to create a centralised structure but until
at least 1993 operated a devolved chain of command that was unable to assert
control over the diverse irregular dynamics. In its first six months, or by the
autumn of 1992, the armed forces had grown from several armed groups into a
body of approximately 150,000 armed men, about eighty percent of whom were
Muslim.454 The Patriotic League, the Green Berets, special units answering
to the Interior Ministry (MUP), and the ARBiH made up the core of the pro-
government forces, but were supported by local defence groups that organised
spontaneously, often under the leadership of someone with military or criminal
experience. In Sarajevo, the early local defence was made up of the city’s resid-
ents but a number of local criminals soon came to dominate key positions. The
spontaneity of the Bosnian defence came out of necessity rather than design
and meant that irregular armed groups were the foundation of the military cap-
abilities, but as the conflict progressed, central authorities sought to create a
disciplined regular command structure.
The first defensive initiative on the part of the Bosnian government was
taken in early 1991, with the formation of the Patriotic League, subordinated
Islamska deklaracija, Sarajevo, 1990
453IT-01-48, Halilović, Judgement, 16 November 2005, p41
454IT-01-48, Halilović, Exhibit 00482, ‘Conclusions of the First War Council on Organisa-
tional and Establishment Changes in the OS’ (dated 6 October 1992)
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to the political leadership of Izetbegović ’s Party of Democratic Action (SDA).
The Patriotic League began as a small and professional pseudo-paramilitary
group but the following month, established by the SDA, in order to provide an
umbrella structure to ‘cells being formed for resistance by individuals at the
local level.’455 On the 10 June 1991, the League was expanded to incorporate
356 Muslim ‘political, cultural and humanitarian representatives’, and formed
a Council for National Defence of the Muslim People.456 The civilian wing was
headed by Izetbegović while the military wing, the Patriotic League, was run by
Muslim ex-JNA officers who had defected.457 A number of experienced but dis-
illusioned soldiers and officers left the JNA in Bosnia during 1991, particularly
in Sarajevo. They were mostly Muslims but some Serbs and Croats left too.458
These Sarajevan ex-JNA officers formed the basis of the Patriotic League. Sefer
Halilović, First Commander of the ARBiH, suggested that there had been strict
secrecy in the formation of the Patriotic League in 1991 and that only Izetbe-
gović and a ‘very, very narrow circle’ were aware about the League and their
units.459 Rusmir Mahmutćehajić recalls the formation of the Patriotic League
as more of a broad patriotic forum and rallying point rather than an organ-
isation.460 For at least the first months of its conception the Patriotic League
operated out of the Cafe Herceg-Bosna although by the beginning of 1992, the
League was ‘firmly established in Sarajevo and several other locations.461 The
League’s membership reportedly even extended to émigré and migrant com-
munities, although it is not clear if these members travelled to the Bosnia to
fight.462
The irregulars that came to be known as the Green Berets began to come
together at much the same time, although once war began Green Berets was a
term used freely to describe state and non-state units that fought in support
of Izetbegović and and Republic of Bosnia. Burg and Shoup suggest that the
Green Berets were organised in autumn 1991, and according to Izetbegović
455Marko-Attila Hoare, ‘Civilian-Military Relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995,’ in
(ed.) Magaš and Žanić, War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, p181
456Ibid., and Donia, Sarajevo, p276
457Hoare, ‘Civilian-Military Relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, p181
458Donia, Sarajevo, p276
459Interview with Halilović, DoY, p6
460See Rusmir Mahmutćehajić ‘The Road to War’ in Magaš and Žanić, War in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, p148; Mahmutćehajić served as Deputy Prime Minister for the Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1992 although he was not a member of any political
party.
461’Donia, Sarajevo, p277
462Gow’s testimony at the ICTY, IT-03-68, Orić, 24 November 2004, p2005-06
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numbered between 35,000 and 40,000 by the time the war started.463 During
the war, Helsinki Watch described the Green Berets as a paramilitary group that
surfaced in Sarajevo when the conflict broke out, and that most if its members
had close links to the regular Bosnian army.464 The UN Experts Report states
that there was never a single unit called the Green Berets but that there were
‘ several units which may have had different names, but [were] identified as
Green Berets.’ Gow also believes that the label of Green Berets was used to
refer to a number of groups, and this was further confused in Serbian, Croat and
international press, which tended to use the term for all pro-Bosniak/Sarajevo
groups.465 Bosniak politician and founding member of the SDA Sulejman Tihić
claimed that the Berets were formations of the ARBiH and TO and later became
ordinary forces and were no longer called the Green Berets.466 For the purpose
of this study, the two names will not –as far as is possible– be conflated. Here,
the Patriotic League refers specifically to the formation under SDA command,
which tended to have a more experienced and more politically engaged calibre
of membership.467
Although less often referred to as such, both the Patriotic League and the
composite groups that made up the Berets should be considered as typical para-
military formations. The Patriotic League answered to the SDA leadership and
as such were a private force rather than part of the national command struc-
ture. Thus the League were often described as Izetbegović’s private army.468
In simple terms, the League is somewhat comparable in structure to the milit-
ary wings of political parties elsewhere in the federation such as the HOS and
Šešelj’s Eagles. In contrast, the Green Berets emerged without formal struc-
ture or any kind of unified command. Initially the Green Berets were more
of a traditional volunteer formation, with a less distinct structure of command
and communication. There is evidence, for example, that the Commander of
the 10th Mountain Brigade and the Deputy Commander of the 9th Motorised
Brigade were selected by members of those units rather than elected by higher
463Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p.74
464Ivana Nizich, ‘War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume II,’ Human Rights Watch,
1993, p.141; Helsinki Watch was a division of Human Rights Watch
465However Gow argues that the ‘proper connotation for the Green Beret label is the Patriotic
League’; Serbian Project, see pages 243-244; see also UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p9
466IT-95-9, Simić et al., 8 November 2001, p3800
467This follows the usage in Donia Sarajevo, see p277
468Gow, Serbian Project, p243; see also US Official referring to the ARBiH as Izetbegović’s
private army quoted in John Pomfret, ‘Bosnian factions balk at US plan to merge forces,’
Washington Post, 20 June 1996
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military authority.469
At the beginning of December 1991, initial military defence had been organ-
ised in several regions of the country.470 In the months leading up to war, there
were other, less hierarchical units that came into the orbit of the League and
later the ARBiH. As news of the conflict in Croatia worsened, membership of
both the League and the Berets increased.471 Numbers vary but Donia suggests
that by the time war began in April 1992, the Green Berets and the Patriotic
League ‘each had thousands of volunteers and light infantry weapons.’472
Yugoslavia’s federal devolution meant that Bosnian MUP possessed its own
official forces, which participated in the military conflict. Included in this small
force were a number of specialist units, made up of highly trained men, equipped
with better weapons and equipment.473 The Bosnian Interior Ministry also had
control of the police force, which had undergone internal changes as Serbs had
left either at their own behest to join Serbian formations, or as a result of the
pressure ethnic tensions had on all Yugoslavia’s republic-services. Theoretically
at least, when MUP units participated in military operations, they were subor-
dinated to the command of the ARBiH, however, in the reality of battle, MUP
participation was based on the cooperation of local ARBiH units and locally
present MUP units.474 Nevertheless, it was largely from this milieu and the
leadership in the field of the Patriotic League that a coherent ARBiH command
later emerged. In all, according to Halilović, 126,000 men were organised as
part of the defence forces before the war started.475
Emerging in Sarajevo and across rural Bosnia at the same time as the
government-sanctioned paramilitary formations were pro-Serb irregular armed
groups and more clandestine criminal elements. From autumn 1991 a number
of pro-Serb political parties in Sarajevo had begun to arm paramilitary groups
and news of the Serbo-Croat violence led to an escalation in identity-based in-
cidents in and around the city. 476 The first shots of the Bosnian war are often
469IT-01-48 Halilović; Final Judgement, see footnote 227, p41, 16 Nov 2005
470Interview transcript, Halilović, July 1994-July 1995, DoY, Doc.2/28, p2; Halilović sug-
gests that in addition to Sarajevo, over ten municipalities were organised by the time of the
Hrasnica meeting on 2 December 1991. He added that following the meeting, “we started
organising the rest of the country”
471BiH v Yugoslavia, ICJ, p52
472Donia, Sarajevo, p277
473IT-01-48 Halilović , Judgement, p69
474Ibid. p69-70
475Transcript, Halilović, DoY, p2; Shoup and Burg also give Halilović’s estimate, War in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, p74
476Donia, Radovan Karadžić; Architect of the Bosnian Genocide, Cambridge University
Press, 2014, p100
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attributed to a Bosnian Muslim paramilitary, outside the old Orthodox church
in Sarajevo during a wedding on 1 March 1992. A Sarajevo criminal Ramiz
Delalić, who went by the nom de guerre of Ćelo, was implicated in what looked
like a fairly typical gangland plot. The Baščaršija shooting served as a power-
ful battle cry for the Bosnian Serb cause and as evidence that the Serb people
really were at risk in Sarajevo.477 The former Bosnian Serb leadership continue
to blame Bosniak paramilitaries for starting the Bosnian war in 1992.478 Delalić
was never investigated and whether he was actually responsible may never be
known. Whether or not the shots that killed the father of the bridegroom and
wounded the Orthodox priest should be considered the commencement of the
Bosnian war, the incident does illustrate that as tensions were rising in Sarajevo
in early spring 1992, militarised criminal networks were already emerging from
their underworld and that the authorities were reluctant to pursue them.479
If this was a tactical decision made in the knowledge that danger was ap-
proaching and the ill-prepared Bosnian government would need the support of
Delalić and his ilk is unclear but perhaps the mutually convenient relationship
that emerged between Bosnia’s embryonic military command and Sarajevo’s
mafioso should not be considered wholly spontaneous. Delalić was one of a
number of known criminals who became heroes during the first months of the
Sarajevo siege. Using their criminal contacts to build personal paramilitary
units, many rose through the ranks to become a brigade commanders and some
were officially decorated by the ARBiH.480 Peter Andreas uses the phrase patri-
otic mafia to describe this miscellaneous groups of fighters but their patriotism
was not enduring; without this irregular corps, who worked together with the
burgeoning ARBiH structures and Sarajevan civilian-combatants, the fate of
the capital could have been very different but once it was saved this criminal
corps held many of its inhabitants to ransom either through their black market
or more violent behaviour.481
Bosnian pre-war strategy was to avoid activity that could be construed as
477For example Vidomir Banduka, a former municipal official in Hadžić, said that following
the shooting many Serbs were prompted to form local defence units, IT-95-4 Karadžić, 12
February 2013, p33492
478Former Bosnian Serb deputy Interior Minister Dobrislav Planojević during Karadžić trial;
‘Karadžić ally blames Bosniak paramilitaries for war,’ Balkan Insight, 1 April 2013; for tran-
script see IT-95-4 Karadžić, 28 March 2013, p36251
479See expert testimony of defence witness, IT-09-92, Mladić, ‘Defence Notice of disclosure
of Expert Reports of Milos Ković pursuant to rule 94bis,’ 30 March 2015, p41
480This is discussed in more detail in Part IV
481Peter Andreas, Blue Hats, Black Markets; the business of survival in the siege of Sarajevo,
Cornell University Press, 2008
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belligerent; instead, the failure to prepare an adequate defensive structure led
some within the early military leadership to forge a network of mutually conveni-
ent alliances with elements they could not control. As a result, the role criminal
gangs played in the early stage of the Bosnian war, particularly in Sarajevo, was
intimately entwined with the emerging military command structure. However,
the composition of the early defence brigades that formed throughout Sarajevo
in the early months of war was ethnically mixed, made up of both genders, and
of all ages.
Many of the serious problems that further encumbered Bosnian Republican
command are laid out in the November 1993 investigation by the Bosnian MUP
of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the ARBiH Sefer Halilović.482 In
a report on ‘the negative conduct and activities of Sefer Halilović’ the Bosnian
MUP asserted that Halilović operated ‘deliberately and methodically with the
goal of provoking a crisis situation in BH’.483 According to the report, Halilović
‘found support in the commands of units which included a large number of
criminals’ and:
Every day, Sefer encouraged such people, though direct contacts,
by phone or via radio, especially after the office of Commander of
the Staff of the Supreme Command was created, to obstruct their
official corps commands (the 1st and 4th Corps) and to grow inde-
pendent, distance themselves from and dodge any form of control by
their commands. In the process, he exploited every suitable oppor-
tunity to firmly keep such commanders and their close accomplices
predisposed towards him as he organised and carried out the most
serious criminal acts.484
During his testimony at The Hague, former Bosnian Chief of Military Secur-
ity Jusuf Jašarević confirmed that this information had been available to him
and a small number of colleagues within the intelligence department.485 Bakir
Silajdžić, former Bosnian Interior Minister and head of the Muslim Intelligence
482IT-01-48, Halilović, Exhibit 00212, ‘MUP report on the negative conduct and activities
of Sefer Halilović, ’ 2 November 1992
483Ibid.
484Ibid. p2
485IT-01-48 Halilović, 1 March 2005, see p34
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Agency for Research and Documentation confirmed that the report had been
compiled by the State and Military Security Services.486
The report states that Halilović ‘made special efforts to foster hatred’ among
these contacts towards Izetbegović, Commander of the Supreme Command Staff
Rasim Delić, and corps commander Arif Pašalić, thereby challenging the ‘com-
mand and control authority of top officials in the Supreme Command and those
subordinated to them.’487
[Halilović] especially imbued the individuals listed hereafter with
a high degree of personal animosity towards the figures mentioned
above: Ramiz Delalić, aka Ćelo, Commander of the 9th Motorised
Brigade, Mušan Topalović, aka Caco, Commander of the 10th Moun-
tain Brigade, Zulfikar Ališpaga, Commander of the so-called Special
Detachment of the Supreme Command Staff”, and individual com-
manders in the Konjic, Jablanica and Visoko area. In so doing,
he presented himself as the sole rightful military leader who had the
right concept of how to defend the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina.488
Mirko Pejanović defends Halilović in his memoir, describing him as ‘a solid per-
sonality, a fine professional, a man who took a firm stand in the fight for a unified
and multiethnic Bosnia.’489 Nevertheless, the episode revealed the dangers that
irregular military dynamics posed to state authority where the state’s military
command structure was weak. For the purposes of this study a further detail
is relevant. The authors of the report emphasise that Halilović ‘harboured the
obvious intention to raid the organisational level of units under his control...and
so persistently insisted that Zulfikar Ališpaga be promoted to Commander of
the 6th Corps.’490(Ališpaga, born in 1958 in Novi Pazar in Serbia, was arrested
in February 2011 and is currently on trial in Bosnia for failing to take necessary
measures to prevent and punish crimes committed by his subordinates during
486IT-01-48, Halilović, 26 May 2005
487IT-01-48; Halilović, Exhibit 00212, p2
488Ibid., p2-3
489Pejanović was president of Bosnia’s Socialist Alliance party and a Serb member of the
wartime presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Mirko Pejanović, Through Bosnian
Eyes; The Political Memoir of a Bosnian Serb, Purdue University Press, 2004, p97
490Ibid., p4
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the Bosnian conflict.)491 The report’s findings suggest that Halilović was build-
ing his own power base with the paramilitary and criminal networks in order to
challenge Izetbegović ’s authority. Yet the Halilović investigation shows that the
Sarajevo authorities attempted to respond to its fractured command structure.
Furthermore, it reveals an unwillingness on the part of the central authorities to
devolve war-making and defence beyond the temporary utilisation on the ground
of irregular formations. We see a similar relationship between paramilitaries and
the state on the Bosnian side as on the Croat, where in the immediate after-
math of early-war chaos, state auspices identified the potential political threats
some of the irregulars posed and then sought to neutralise them. However, the
paramilitary forces identified as Halilović’s allies were not political in the same
way that the HOS or Šešelj’s Chetniks were the product of a political party and
therefore fought overtly for ideological cause.
The realities of such poor command can be seen in an incident recounted
by Vehbija Karić, Colonel of the Territorial Defence of the ARBiH, involving
Ramiz Ćelo Delalić and fellow convict Musan Ćaco Topalović. Both units were
ordered to participate in the Nervetva-93 operation and when the units had
arrived at the field, both Delalić and Topalović relinquished their units to com-
pany command because they preferred to engage in their own “activities” in
the Jablanica area.492 Both Delalić and Topalović epitomise the failure of the
ARBiH to fully subordinate independent irregular units to official command,
and should be considered as paramilitary leaders operating within the system
rather than rogue members of the ARBiH. They were respected by the men who
served them, so much so that even when Delalić was replaced by the ARBiH as
commander of the 9th Brigade, ‘he was still in charge’; he was respected more
than his replacement, a former JNA colonel.493 Several witnesses gave evid-
ence suggesting that both the 9th and the 10th Brigades were ’not completely
integrated into the system of military subordination’ as demonstrated by the
lack of discipline of the brigades and the particular attitude of the commanders,
491See Trialwatch database (www.trial-ch.org) The Trialwatch report on Zulfikar suggests
that he was also the commander of the Black Swans unit, although I have yet to find corrob-
oration.
492Operation Neretva ’93 was an ARBiH advance against the HVO and Croatian Army in
September 1993 and was launched in order to end the siege of the Muslim part of Mostar
surrounded by Croat forces and severely destroyed, and to recapture areas of Herzegovina,
which were included in self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna; IT-01-48 Halilović,
10 July 2003, p.114; Karić described this behaviour as “totally out of line in terms of military
organisation”
493IT-01-48 Halilović , Judgement, p50-51
110
who often had to be ‘persuaded’ rather than ‘ordered’.’494 Suggestions have
also been made that members of both brigades were drug addicts, which made
behaviour erratic and further diluted the sense of military command.495
In stark contrast to the loose cohort of Sarajevan criminal irregulars was the
stratified Patriotic League. Gow argues that the degree of influence the Patriotic
League had on the development of the ARBiH and Bosnia’s defence structures
was such that the republic’s army became ‘almost a party army’ that ‘comprised
those elements of the military most closely linked to the SDA leadership, a band
of loyalists who would organise defence and other activities.’496 Thus, ‘the
framework for the ARBiH came not from not the structures of the Territorial
Defence but from the Patriotic League.’497 And certainly the role of Halilović,
one of the first to join the Patriotic League, must be considered central to the
early evolution and structuring of the ARBiH.498
While units may have been brought under nominal command of the ARBiH
staff and were referred to as part of official structures, throughout the first year
of the war there were a number of people commanding units, including quite
large units, who had no military training.499 Throughout the ARBiH there was
significant fluctuation among the State Security staff and a shortage of people of
experience.500 Giving evidence in the Halilović case at the ICTY, Ramiz Delalić
testified that following the transfer of former JNA officers to the ARBiH soon
after the war in Bosnia began:
...there was a lot of animosity between them and the ordinary
commanders because those who were former JNA members actually
took part in attacking Sarajevo before being transferred...In addition
to that, there was a lot of mistrust among the former JNA officers
and the commanders who were ordinary people.’501
494Ibid., p62
495see IT-01-48 Halilović, Exhibit 444, testimony of Vehbija Karić
496Gow, Serbian Project, p244
497Ibid.
498IT-01-48 Halilović, Judgement asserts that it was under Halilović’s leadership that the
attempt to transform the various units into a functioning army was made. see p41
499T-01-48 Halilović, Witness F, 8 March 2005, p65
500Ibid., p66
501See IT-01-48 Halilović, Judgement, p41-2 and testimony of Ramiz Delalić, 17 May 2005,
p15; see questions about Delalić’s testimony, ‘Witness has already lied in court, Defence says’,
Sense Agency, 18 May 2005; Hoare, ‘Civilian-Military Relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina,’ see
Operation Trebević: Attack on the Private Armies, p191-2
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Thus, even after being incorporated into the official army, the command struggled
to pull rogue commanders and their units under their control. Lack of military
training, failure to make significant military preparations in the lead-up to war,
and the absence of military strategy meant that the ARBiH had to respond
to the events on the ground while also attempting to bring rogue elements to
heel. As a result, internal discipline was poor and the ‘paramilitary leaders’,
now part of the army, became as much of a hindrance to the Bosnian war effort
as they remained necessary to keep their men –loyal to their unit commanders
rather than the government– in the field. The resulting military structure that
emerged not only reveals the limits of Sarajevo’s command, but also underline
the limits of both ideological Bosnian (Muslim) nationalism and the failure of
socialist Yugoslavs.
Although operating under more coherent and conventional commands, by
September 1993 the ARBiH was still ‘very much a work in progress.’502 Pejan-
ović claims that towards the end of 1992 the Presidency and the Board for the
Protection of the Constitutional Order had already met on several occasions
and issued orders regarding the criminal prosecution of members of military
units.503 Pejanović also describes how, in 1993, a state-run structure for the
security services was established and consolidated, which meant that the MUP,
the Army and the emerging military policy were more effectively brought to-
gether under an ordered command and a military judiciary –although Pejanović
admits “the process did not always go smoothly.”504 As with the HVO, as the
ARBiH strengthened its internal organisation and clarified its structures of com-
mand, independent paramilitary units were subordinated to the official control
of the national army. Initially, units were ‘collectivised’ for specific operations or
to form groups; the Black Swans (a reconnaissance and sabotage detachment),
the Silver Foxes independent platoon, and the Special Zulfikar Detachment for
Special Purposes were pulled together under Operation Group Ingman. All
contained a significant proportion of irregular fighters, or were entirely para-
military formations, nominally part of the ARBiH.505Attempts to subordinate
special units were not wholly successful. This was partly due to the criminal
composition of many of the units that as a result lacked both extreme nationalist
502IT-01-48 Halilović, Namik Džanković, 21 March 2005, p5; in same case , Judgement; “in
September 1993 the ARBiH was still not a fully functioning army,” p41
503Pejanović, Through Bosnian Eyes, p92
504Ibid.
505IT-01-48, Halilović, Exhibit 00193, ‘Order on organisational changes in the organic
strengths of the Corps’, 5 July 1993
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conviction and military discipline. Orders appear to have been reissued in the
summer and early autumn of 1993 as the Bosnian military leadership sought to
“re-subordinate” a number of irregular units, but it was not until 1994-95 that
an effective centralised authority was in place.506
As the war progressed and battle lines in Sarajevo hardened, the military and
political command pulled together a centralised and coherent army. The League
and Berets were integrated into ordinary military formations while criminal
commanders were dismantled where possible. Outside Sarajevo there were few
organised and numerically substantial groups that could be considered paramil-
itary units. An exception, although they were not always well organised, were
the mujahideen. Holy warriors from Europe and the Middle East were present
and operated within and outside of the ARBiH command.
Despite the fears of the west, the mujahideen presence in Bosnia was not
considerable. While the Islamist irregulars did not contribute significantly to
the military defence and subsequent advance of the ARBiH,507 their involve-
ment shifted the external conceptualisations of the Bosnian war’s geopolitical
importance. Their influence tends to be overestimated and their significance
has too often been seen retrospectively through the post-9/11 experience.508
Recalling the role of self-termed mujahideen in a European conflagration in the
post-9/11 world is heavy with the knowledge of “what came next” –not least be-
cause at least two of the Jihadists involved in the bombing of the World Trade
Centre had cut their teeth in Bosnia.509 There were also a number of well docu-
mented and reported war crimes committed by the El mujahideen unit against
non-Muslims towards the end of the war.510 As a result much of the (limited)
academic literature on the role of Islamic fighters in Bosnia exists as part of the
narrative on the evolution of Muslim extremism, terrorism and the rest.511
There were several different dimensions to the support that came from the
506IT-01-48, Halilović, Exhibit 00193 and Exhibit 00121 ‘Resubordination Order of Arif
Pasalić of Units to the IKM post Jablanica’, 7 Sept. 1993; Order refers to subordination of
the Zufikar, Muderiz, Akrepi and Silver Fox units to the control of the North 2OG of ARBIH
507UN Expert Report, Annex IIIA, p11
508J.R. Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad, Zenith
Press, 2007; C. Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe
and the West, Praeger, 2007
509‘The 9/11 Commission Report,’ The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, 22 July 2004, p147, p155
510IT-01-47, Hadžihasanović et al., Case Information Sheet; and Judgement, 22 Apr 2008
511Kohlmann, ‘The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe’; Gordon N. Bardos,
‘Jihad in the Balkans: The Next Generation’, World Affairs, Sept-Oct 2014
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Muslim community: some networks, run by extreme clerics and Islamic radic-
als used the atrocities against the Bosniaks and the reluctance of the western
powers to intervene to recruit young men, not just in the Middle East but from
across Europe. According to Evan Kohlmann, the Bosnian conflict was ‘cynic-
ally offered by jihad recruiters to desperate youths in many European capitals
as a chivalrous escape from the drudgery of their own boring urban lives.’512
Bosnia was an opportunity to develop terrorist cells (which for the purpose of
this study are considered under our loose definition of paramilitary units) in the
’heart of Europe.’
In 1994-95, as it became clear that international peacekeeping attempts were
not going to take a more active role, the number of foreign fighters who travelled
to fight for besieged Bosnia increased and the term mujahideen was used gener-
ically to describe these volunteers as well as Yugoslav Muslim fighters.513 Volun-
teers, mostly from Muslim countries, began to arrive in June 1992; in Zenica at
the beginning of September 1992 there were 250 Mujahideen allegedly from Tur-
key, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran.514 Volunteers in Travnik reportedly came from
Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.515 In an official note about different
mujahideen groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated 24 August 1995, Serbian
state security reported that ‘about 50 Pakistanis [were] undergoing training
in Austria and should join the ranks of the of the so-called BH army in late
October.’516 Some of these foreign fighters were young, with no military exper-
ience.517
According to British journalist Christopher Lockward, writing in July 1991,
the number of volunteers from Muslim states never exceeded three or four hun-
dred.518 This figure presumably did not include the Handžar Division of the 44th
Brigade –a wholly Albanian unit that fought in Jablanica.519 It was an odd,
although surely deliberate, choice of name because during the Second World
War the Handžar Division, then also known as the 13th SS Waffen Mountain
Division, was largest Muslim unit of the Germany army and was formed of thou-
sands of Bosnian Muslims.520 The symbol of the handžar, the Ottoman curved
512Kohlmann, ‘The Mujahideen Network’, p1
513UN Expert Report Annex IIIA, p11
514Ibid.
515Ibid.
516IT-04-83, Rasim Delić, Exhibit 01428, ‘Official note about existence of different Mu-
jahideen groups in BIH during the war’ dated 24 August 1995
517Kohlmann, ‘The Mujahideen Network,’ p3
518Christopher Lockward, ‘Muslim Nations to Send Troops’, Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1993
519IT-01-48 Halilović, Judgement, p68
520David Motadel, Islam and Nazi Germany’s War, Harvard University Press, 2014, p229
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sword, was the emblem of the SS 13th.521
However, while the Albanian Muslims fought in support and defence of their
Bosnian Muslims neighbours, and were therefore engaging in jihad (or defend-
ing the religion), it was the Muslim irregulars from outside of the region who
arrived in Bosnia as a result of external Islamic (perhaps Islamist is more accur-
ate) command structures who also sought to impose Koranic lessons. An Arab
Mujahid leader in Bosnia, Abdul Aziz, said “In Bosnia we have two duties, the
first is jihad and the second is dawa, which means to teach correct Islam.”522 For
Kohlmann, ‘a new base for jihad was quickly growing in the Balkans’ as news of
the assault on the local Muslim population reached Afghanistan and secured the
attention of radical Islamist formations such as Al-Qaida.523 Kohlmann argues
that:
With the help of influential clerics and Al-Qaida commanders,
the foreign Bosniak brigades was coalescing together various dis-
parate elements in the international Arab-Afghan network. The
mujahideen war machine so familiar in Afghanistan had been suc-
cessfully revived many hundred of miles westward in the heart of
Europe.524
However, Kohlmann’s assessment of the “mujahideen war machine” suggests a
level of organisation, expertise and military prowess far beyond the impact such
groups had on the ground. The arrival of elements of the Arab-Afghan network
did influence how Bosniak paramilitaries were perceived, in the Yugoslav states
and abroad.525 The images of the black jihadi flag and the battle cries of Allahu
Akbar! reinforced both the external Islamist and internal Serbian rhetoric of a
European jihad but should be seen in the same light as the Croatian penchant for
the Roman salute, or the Serbian glorification of the Chetnik; a self-perpetuating
manifestation of powerful cultural symbolism, but one that appears more foreign
(and therefore frightening) to western eyes.526
521George Lepre, Himmler’s Bosnian Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division,
1943-1945, Schiffer Military History, 1997, p47
522UN Expert Report Annex IIIA, reference 51
523Kohlmann, ‘Al-Qaeda’s jihad in Europe’, p30
524Ibid.
525For précis of international coverage of the Mujahid units see Carey et al., The Pro-
Government Militias Database
526Battle cries listed as part of the information on combat operations of ARBiH and mu-
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Like the domestic irregular groups, the mujahideen units were, theoretically,
under the command of the ARBiH but frequently flouted the official command
structure. There are a number of exhibits used in the ICTY trials, particularly
during that of Rasim Delić, which reveal an uneasy relationship between the
ARBiH authorities and the foreign fighters. Although the ARBiH was not able
to exercise sufficient control over some of the foreign Muslim fighters, central
command continued to make use of the volunteers. In a query to the 7th Mo-
torised Mountain Brigade, Enver Hadžihasanović referred to the engagement of
‘Arabs, who are ready to carry out combat activities in the 333rd [Mountain
Brigade.]’527 The structural weaknesses of the ARBiH meant that the army not
only needed men to fight but lacked the mechanisms of command and control
to impose either discipline or strategy.
As the war progressed and the organisational structure of the ARBiH de-
veloped, foreign fighters were required to officially join the army.528 However,
Bosnian military secret service obtained details of foreign members of the El
mujahideen detachment and Green Berets who refused to do so on the grounds
that their information might then be shared with Croatia and lead to their
arrest.529 Furthermore, Serbian intelligence reported that the Bosniak police
in Kakanj ‘started rounding up young men fit for military service and taking
them to a private army (probably El mujahideen [sic]) and parents are trying
to pull strings to transfer their children to the territory of the 2nd Corps of the
so-called BH army’530
Many of the units that fought under the black jihadist flag were responsible
for brutal crimes against civilians and prisoners of war, but without a clear idea
of numbers, of those fighting on the ground and those who committed criminal
acts, it is difficult to ascertain to any certainty what proportion of the jihadis
were responsible for war crimes and other mass atrocities. The Commission of
Experts received reports that alleged mujahideen soldiers had committed crimes
including “mutilation and killing of civilians, rape, looting, the destruction of
purport, and the expulsion of non-Muslim populations.’531 The Trial Chamber
of the ICTY explored the extent to which jihadi irregulars had been integrated
jahideen during the attack on Jezero, collected by the ARBiH General Staff, see IT-02-68,
Naser Orić, Exhibit D990
527IT-04-83 Delić, Exhibit 01004
528IT-04-83 Delić, Exhibit 01433, dated 7 Nov 1995
529Ibid.
530IT-04-83 Delić, Exhibit 01428
531see UN Expert Report Annex IIIA, p11
116
into the ARBiH ranks in the case of ARBiH Chief of Staff Rasim Delić.532 Delić
was found by the ICTY to have had sufficient command responsibility over the
El Mujahideen detachment that he was sentenced to serve three years in part
because of his failure to prevent or punish the cruel treatment of Serb captives
by the detachment’s members.533 Amir Kubura and Enver Hadžihasanović were
both acquitted by the ICTY for charges relating to mujahideen fighters.534
Chaos in Bosnia was presented as evidence of the inability (and at times
unwillingness) on the part of the ARBiH to control forces fighting in their name.
As with the criminal fighters in Sarajevo, Bosnian state structures devolved
responsibility to foreign fighters initially because they no other option. As the
conviction against Delić suggests, more could have been done by the ARBiH
to reign in the excesses of the Islamist irregulars –but, the conflict in Bosnia
became more entrenched and the ARBiH slowly made advances in the field,
elements of command hardened in the face of ethnic cleansing and the lack
of international support. Therefore, the failure to sufficiently condemn crimes
committed by foreign fighters, and ostensibly in the name of Islam, should be
interpreted as evidence not of an exclusively religious radicalisation on the part
of the Bosnian republic, but the shifting of a pervasive moral framework that
perceived the (gross) misdemeanours of those fighting to defend their cause (and
Muslim right to life) as legitimate in the face of the enemy. Such analysis does
not absolve responsibility, nor should it diminish accountability, but stresses
that mujahideen violence was no more an expression of Muslim culture as the
Croat and Catholic irregulars were representative of Christian traditions.
But this sense of shifting boundaries was not universal throughout the AR-
BiH and therefore the identity-based violence never became systematic or stra-
tegic. The deputy commander of the ARBiH, Colonel Šiber, later said that “it
was a mistake to let [the mujahideen] here...They commit most of the atrocities
and work against the interests of the Muslim people. They have been killing,
looting and stealing.”535 According to a report by the US on war crimes in
former Yugoslavia, an American doctor working at the Kosevo hospital in Sara-
jevo ‘reportedly found that Muslim and mujahideen irregular troops –some from
Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia - had routinely performed crude, disfiguring, non-
medical circumcisions on Bosnian Serb soldiers, and he treated one 18-year-old
532IT-04-83 Delić, Case Information Sheet
533IT-04-83 Delić, Judgement
534IT-01-47, Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, 15 March 2006
535Ibid., see also Andrew Hogg,‘Terror Trail of the mujahideen’, Sunday Times, 27 June
1993
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Bosnian Serb soldier who was so brutally circumcised that eventually the entire
organ required amputation.’536
The tragedy of the Bosnian war has sometimes been compared to the Spanish
Civil War, with the western journalists who took up their pens-as-swords in the
fight for humanitarian intervention painted as morally-driven combatants.537
However, of the independent and foreign soldiers –most of Muslim extraction–
who travelled to Bosnia to fight, often in the name of Islam but not all under
banners of extremism, no similar debate exists, thus common (and sometimes
scholarly) conceptualisation has been somewhat two dimensional. This is not to
romanticise Islamic extremists who used Bosnia’s crisis to their own advantage,
nor to excuse the crimes committed by their followers, but rather to stress that
there was a spectrum of Muslim (and non-Muslim) actors motivated by their
own understandings of what they considered to be a just cause. If jihadism
is taken in a more literal sense, without the context it has today (or had in
the 1990s), it can be applied to any Muslim who fights (or strives) against
the oppression of other Muslims.538 This is pertinent not only for our current
discussion but also (the need for) a wider understanding of young Muslim men
who travel abroad to fight for what they may perceive as injustice, but is often
framed in (western) international discourse simply as terrorism. Just as there
was a difference between Arkan’s forces and the local defence groups, who felt
they were defending their family first and national second, we should apply a
more nuanced lens to the jihadi irregulars and not allow prejudices to obscure
the banality of reality.
Neil Ferguson and his colleagues have conducted extensive quantitative and
qualitative research into the motivations behind paramilitary membership in
Northern Ireland, and similarly reject reductivist explanations based on indi-
536‘Fourth Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Part II—Torture of Prisoners,’
US Department of State Dispatch, 3:52, 28 December 1992, This is corroborated by a letter
from the Deputy Representative of the US to the UN, dated 7 December 1992, discussed in
UN Experts Report Annex IIIA, p12-13, see reference 76; see also Kohlmann, ‘Al-Qaida’s
Jihad in Europe’, p30
537Israel W. Charny, Simon Wiesenthal, Desmond Tutu, Encyclopedia of Genocide: Vol. 1,
The Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide, 1999, p126; Ashdown described Bosnia as the
“Spanish civil war of our generation” Interview with the author, 8 March 2010, quoted in
Ferguson, The Bosnia Debates, p100
538Like many religious words and concepts, understanding the meaning and usage of the
word jihad is complex; for brief remarks, Douglas E. Streusand, ‘What Does Jihad Mean?’
Middle East Quarterly, 4:3 (1997), pp9-17
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vidual abnormality or cultural predilection.539 They present a number of risk
factors that suggest a correlation with many of the paramilitary cohorts oper-
ating on all sides in Bosnia and Croatia.
(a) The existence of a grievance or perceived injustice by a sub-group
of the population
(b) Age and gender (terrorist acts are generally committed by young
males aged 15 to 25)
(c) Past family involvement with or support for the movement (pro-
moting membership through historical connections within the fam-
ily)
(d) Community support for the insurgent group, or high status as-
sociated with membership of the group
(e) Coercion or conscription into the movement
(f) Eventual membership as the result of an incremental process of
increasing acts of insurgence; this process may start with relatively
mundane behaviour such as spray painting, before progressing to
destroying property and finally becoming involved in injuring and
killing opponents
(g) Vengeance as the individual’s motivation, feels a need to hit back
and right wrongs
(h) [T]o become a member of an armed group there must be an
organisation that the individual has the opportunity to join, and
that wants his or her membership540
Such factors can be seen in force in Bosnia, not only among the jihadis, but
across the spectrum –however, the age bracket was older, and particularly so
of the domestic paramilitaries, who were usually between 24 and 45.541It is in-
teresting that James Waller’s study of perpetrators in genocide presents many
539Neil Ferguson, Mark Burgess & Ian Hollywood, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Deciding to Be-
come a Paramilitary in Northern Ireland’, International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2:1
(2008), pp130-137
540Ibid., p132-133
541Based on observations of date of births provided to the ICTY of paramilitary and irregular
combatants. Throughout the research, I came across no examples of irregular combatants
under 20. While young irregulars were almost certainly present, their roles perhaps were less
central and as a result have not been recorded.
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similar conclusions.542 While Waller contends that there is a ‘dark side of hu-
man nature’ he admits that ‘this only tells us we all are capable of extraordinary
evil,’543 Waller instead points to dispositional influences, including socialisation
processes, the context of action, and the definition of the target group (or vic-
tims.)544 Thus our assessment of irregular perpetrators should be framed by
the search for the processes that led to their participation in the first place, and
question where the onus of instigation of those influences.
A full examination of the holy warriors who fought in Bosnia cannot be
included here as such an analysis would require an expert understanding that
far exceeds my own. However, even a brief discussion of their involvement, I
hope, can clarify some important aspects of the Muslim units present on the
Bosnian front line and their relationship with the Bosnian state.
A motley collection of irregular military leaders and paramilitary groups
fought in broad support of Bosnia’s sovereign integrity but the coalition was
fragile. Sarajevan criminal commanders played a significant role in the defence
of their city and thus were held up as urban heroes. Yet as the siege became
more entrenched and economic opportunities opened for the practiced black
market entrepreneurs, the balance of loyalties shifted. Foreign Islamic fighters
came to Bosnia as much to spread the Salafist teachings of Muhammed as to
fight the infidel invasions.545 The presence of Islamic irregulars made small
contribution to Sarajevo’s military efforts but fanned internal and external pre-
judices, emphasising the sense of a civilisational divide and spurring fears of an
Islamification of Europe especially among conservative observers of the conflict.
The irony of course was the unintended consequence of the west’s circumspect
response to Bosnia’s suffering; failure to intervene and protect Bosnia’s Muslims
almost certainly led to a hardening of Islamic resentment and increased sense
of Muslim alienation in Europe in Bosnia and throughout the Muslim world.
The ARBiH struggled to create a military defence, without adequate weapons
and equipment, in the face of a better organised, better equipped enemy with
chilling objectives against the Bosniak civilian population. In early 1995, a
number of the Bosnian Presidency raised objections to the increasing public
542James Waller, Becoming Evil; How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing,
Oxford University Press, 2002
543Ibid., p272
544Ibid., p272-274
545Onder Cetinm, ‘Mujahidin in Bosnia: From Ally to Challenger’, ISIM Review, (Spring
2008), pp14-15
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display within the ARBiH of Muslim symbols and ethno-religious pageantry.546
Genuine efforts were made to establish law, order, and command within the
ARBiH but the corruption and self-interest of individual commanders and poor
discipline throughout the ranks, perpetuated by the instability that irregular
elements encouraged, had tragic consequences. The atrocities committed by
ARBiH and its collaborators could have been avoided and should have been
foreseen. Ultimate responsibility for the crimes of the mujahideen or by the
likes of Ćelo or Čaćo must lie with the senior command of the ARBiH and
their failure to properly control their irregular allies. Whether there was an
alternative to integrating such unsavoury comrades into the Bosnian defence is
questionable but that cannot make those responsible for the gross crimes that
were committed any less accountable.
In Bosnia we see the broad paramilitary coalition of unlikely collaborators
that worked together under temporary tacit agreements that was able to shore
up a rickety defence in the early, crucial months of war. Unlike the Serbian and
Croatian structures, paramilitaries were not so much used to augment the Bos-
nian defence, but rather formed its base until the central command staff could
develop a regular structure. Approximately eighty percent of the JNA forces
present in Bosnia and Herzegovina were integrated into the army of the Serbian
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and as a result, the participation of the para-
militaries and irregulars in support of the Bosnian government was both more
important and less substantial than their Croatian and Serbian counterparts.547
This was because the collective efforts of the Patriotic League, the Green Berets,
and the spontaneous collaboration of local defence groups and criminal gangs
in the first stages of the Sarajevo siege ensured the city’s survival. However,
as the conflict became more entrenched it became clear that the earlier co-
alition had succeeded only because of short-term shared interests rather than
any demonstration of command or control from Sarajevo. Even more so than
in Croatia, Sarajevo’s state forces were inherently paramilitary and it was not
until towards the end of the war that central administration, with substantial
outside assistance, was able to pull together a coherent conventional structure.
546Prejanović, Through Bosnian Eyes, p97
547This figure was given by expert witness Dr. Marie-Janine Calic; see IT-96-21, Mucić et al.
Judgement, 16 November 1998, p47-8; Brigadier Vejzagić testified that a huge concentration
of JNA manpower was present; approximately 100,000 soldiers, 800 tanks, 1,000 armoured
personnel carriers, 4,000 artillery pieces, 100 planes, and 50 helicopters. see Ibid. p46-7
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4 Building national structures of command & control;
some conclusions
In the Yugoslavia, it was the stronger states –Serbia and Croatia– that were
able to best utilise the paramilitary combatants on the field, and in support
of their respective objectives. Serbia had inherited the Yugoslav army but
also its secret services, central governmental departments, staff and bureau-
cracy, a multi-platform media nexus, and the experience (and confidence) that
a European capital affords. Croatia’s government was united and supported by
a wealthy diaspora. The Croatian military and political elite had made prepar-
ations for armed defence earlier than Sarajevo and as a result could claim to
possess a legitimate (state) force when hostilities began. The Church further
unified Croats.548 Sarajevo, on the other hand, faced a fracturing populace and
a cultural division between Sarajevo and the rural areas that meant the govern-
ment was able either to remain unaware of the approaching identity-based crisis
or to ignore it.549 The Muslim community, the Bosnian government, and those
who supported a unified and multicultural state were equipped with neither an
army nor an effective national infrastructure: the Bosnian Serb Instructions had
ensured that local authorities were, where possible, in the hands of the SDS. BiH
structures succeeded in recruiting fighters to their cause but had no weapons
to arm them with.550 Divisions in the political and military leadership further
divided the inexperienced command structure. Thus for the Bosnian Muslims,
the irregulars were a necessity rather than a tool of political violence.
All the war commands planned and sanctioned military collaboration with
irregular military groups.551 In their preparations for armed conflict, Belgrade,
Zagreb, and Sarajevo recruited and armed paramilitary formations that became
crucial components of their national military structures. The self-declared re-
publics of Republika Srpska, Herceg-Bosna, and Krajina were supported by
Zagreb and Belgrade, and also utilised national and local paramilitary forma-
548Vjekoslav Perica, ‘The most Catholic country in Europe? Church, state, and society in
contemporary Croatia,’ Religion, State, and Society, 30:4, (2006), pp311-346
549In her anthropological study of the city, Ivana Maček wrote that ‘being Sarajevan was
considered to be morally and culturally superior to being Bosnian,’ Sarajevo Under Siege;
Anthropology in wartime, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, p189
550Enver Hadžihasanović interview, Our World; Bosnia: Cradle of Modern Jihad?, BBC,
(dir.) Maria Polachowska, 4 July 2015
551Meaning commands from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and RSK, SAO, RS and
Herceg-Bosna.
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tions.552 However, the Serbian paramilitary participation was intentional; the
devolved nature of the perpetrating structure was in itself part of the strategy.
Not only did the obscurity of command hinder international responses to the
crisis, but the perception of non-state violence accelerated the division of the
communities themselves and thus expedited the policy of ethnic cleansing.
The Serbian Red Berets, which included the units led by Arkan, Legija, and
Captain Dragan, operated in throughout Serbian positions in Bosnia and Croa-
tia and were made up of volunteers and conscripts from the local areas or from
Serbia. Many of the individual fighters and unit commanders who were from
Serbia proper were sent first to Croatia when local violence began and then to
Bosnia, under the direct instruction of Serbian state authorities in the MUP and
security services.553 In Croatia, all pro-Serb forces –MUP paramilitaries, local
irregular armed groups, former TO– were subordinated to the JNA (Belgrade)
command.554 This was replicated in Bosnia and maintained until after the mas-
sacres at Srebrenica.555 The paramilitary component of the Serbian forces were
supported by the regular army structures from Belgrade, RSK and RS. Central
military command came through the JNA and then, following its dissolution in
1992, the VRS but MUP and political paramilitary groups retained their own
chains of communication and sometimes of command.556
Zagreb and Sarajevo responded differently to being stripped by Belgrade of
JNA defences and weaponry. Croatian elites took advantage of their paramil-
itary dynamics despite having had little choice during the first phase of war
but to encourage a paramilitary structure. Zagreb pursued an immediate and
aggressive policy of rapid rearmament along what was essentially a paramilit-
ary structure by militarising the police and creating the Guard.557 Central and
local Croatian state authorities and local powers provided arms, political sup-
port, and moral legitimacy to the local defence units that emerged in response
to the rising Serbo-Croat tensions.558 The first wave of the Croatian conflict
revealed the discrepancies in the two command structures as much as it did the
552Use of local formations is discussed in Part VI
553IT-03-69, Stanišić & Simatović, Judgement, Part II, p.460, 461, 463, 849
554See testimony of ex-MUP paramilitary C-020 IT-02-54, Milošević, 27 October 2002; also
‘Super Tiger Testifies: Serbia trained paramilitaries to fight in Bosnia,’ IWPR, 27 Oct 2002
555Karadžić’s “7th Directive” reiterated the 1991 Instructions, calling for a ‘unified state-
political and military concept under a common leadership’, IT-02-54, Milošević, Exhibit
P553.2a, ‘Republika Srpska Supreme Command Directive 7, dated 8 March 1995
556IT-02-54, Milošević, 16 April 2003, p19426
557DOY transcripts, Boljkovac, p5-6; and Mešić, p6
558Boljkovac, DoY, p5-6
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uneven distribution of weaponry.559 In summer 1991, the ZNG was far from
an effective combat force; many of the volunteers who had joined up were ‘mo-
tivated but they had no training, no equipment, no leadership.’560 Over time
Croatian command asserted stronger control and as the focal point shifted to
Bosnia, Croat forces made military gains. As the military capacity strengthened,
Zagreb centralised the command structure and sent a message to the irregular
armed groups; they could join the centralised command or dissolve.561 While
the results of this process were mixed –HOS and local armed groups maintained
a presence in Bosnia and Croatia– the central authorities had acknowledged
the challenge posed by the irregulars and subsequently claimed to have quashed
it. In truth, the HOS expertise and personnel that were officially integrated
into structures such as the HVO retained many of the visual and political traits
of the fascist formation’s identity.562 Like Sarajevo, Zagreb initially found it-
self unable to exercise control over all the composite strands but was able to
establish a strong central command long before Sarajevo could do the same.
Serbian and Croatian state paramilitary forces and their “non-state” allies
committed war crimes systematically. In Croatia and Bosnia, MUP units, sup-
ported by the White Eagles and the Chetniks, were the forces that implemented
ethnic cleansing.563 The 7th Directive was not exceptional; pro-Serb irregular
forces were intended to, ‘[b]y planned and well though out combat operations
create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further sur-
vival or life for the inhabitants,’ not only of Srebrenica and Zepa in 1995 but
throughout strategically important areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.564 These
acts were regularly performed in collaboration with regular state forces and
elsewhere solely by paramilitaries. In Srebrenica, experienced paramilitaries
participated in the massacres under the command control of the VRS.565 Bri-
gades of the Croatian military police were responsible for the numerous war
crimes, establishing a clear line of command and control from the field to the
national elite.566 The shifting command structures of the local and military po-
559Dedaković-Jastreb, DoY, p4
560IT-02-54, Milošević, Exhibit P373, ‘Statement of Witness Ivo Simunović’, p2
561IT-95-14/2, Kordić and Cerkež, Statement of Stjepan Tuka, Exhibit D42/2, p35
562Krott, Save the last bullet, p59; IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Judgement, 31 March
2003, p7782
563The paramilitary tactics of entering towns and targeting Muslim civilians and the crimes
that were committed are described above.
564IT-02-54, Milošević, Exhibit P553.2a, ‘Republika Srpska Supreme Command Directive 7’
565And, according to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, also the Serbian MUP, IT-05-88, Vujidin
Popović et al, Appeal Judgement, 30 January 2015, p368, para 1063
566Can be seen most explicitly and much detail in IT-04-74, Prlić et al., Judgement, 29 May
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lice according to what kind of activity the units were participating in created an
obscurity of accountability for the police committed.567 Despite contemporary
and subsequent protestations by the war-time government, efforts to curb these
excesses were minimal. What is more, investigations, such as there have been,
have lead to the heart of Tudjman’s administration, nullifying arguments of
plausible deniability.568 However, the broader military networks that operated
in support of Croatian aims were less hierarchical than Serbian structures. Pro-
Bosniak irregulars, in contrast, committed war crimes but never systematically.
Irregular military combatants were integrated into devolved and often non-
linear structures of national military and political command, and it was within
the state structures that exercised the greatest degree of control over those ir-
regular elements where the irregular perpetration of mass atrocity crimes and
systematic identity-based violence was highest. The evidence challenges as-
sumptions that the presence of irregular armed groups in conflicts indicate a
weakness on the part of the state and its command and capacity for control.
The use of paramilitary combatants by the Sarajevo government make plain
that state weakness or lack of military capacity can lead to a reliance upon
irregular armed groups, but by contrast, the planned use of paramilitaries by
Serbian national leaderships was both intentional and intentionally concealed.
There were many strategic and pragmatic reasons why state powers from Ser-
bia, Croatia, and Bosnia (both in Pale and Sarajevo) used irregular combatants,
but the socio-economic and military crises also precipitated localised militarisa-
tion and the formation of genuine volunteer groups. Irregulars under state
command or operating independently, on all sides, committed human rights
violations, but without the identity-based conflict of which these combatants
considered themselves a part, was the product of elites, not of community-level
violence.569
For all national leaderships, the irregular military dynamic was a mutually
beneficial relationship, but required a delicate balance of power to sustain itself.
State authorities thus sought to normalise the irregular presence (and therefore
also their crimes) by sanctioning the glorification of their paramilitaries, while
simultaneously denying influence over the fighters themselves with narratives
2013
567Repinc, “The Special Police in Operation Storm,” p11
568CIA Report ‘Tomislav Mercep’; Pavelić, ‘Witness: Government Knew About "Merce-
povci" Crimes’; IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, Exhibit PP588
569On violations, UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p8
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of cultural or historical proclivity for non-state violence.570 On the field, this
translated into a state of impunity for the irregular combatants. Paramilitary
leaders reaped the rewards political immunity and military capacity can bring.
The individual fighters, typically but not always young, became fleeting heroes
–until they were no longer of political or military use, when they were presented
as solely responsible for the crimes they had committed.571 And yet, during
the conflicts the national military and political commands did take measures
to counter irregular activity when it suited them.572 Serbian structures were
well organised and had the capacity to halt local-level violations but chose not
to because the community-based irregular dynamics deepened discord and so
contributed to their ultimate objective. Sarajevo made the most concerted
efforts of the wartime leaderships to challenge criminal and extremist elements
but were unable to control the (very) loose coalition that fought in support of
Bosnia’s Muslims.
Establishing the intent on the part of state structures or their elites to con-
spire with irregular combatants to commit mass atrocity crimes has proven
difficult for the ICTY. Intent appears to be more explicit when it comes to
the ‘middlemen’ of the paramilitary-national structure, but even here can still
be challenging to establish in a legal framework. Furthermore, many of these
individuals who bridged the national structure and the irregular networks died
before they could be investigated, or disappeared. Arkan’s assassination (almost
certainly intentionally) prevented his trial. Captain Dragan has just lost his ex-
tradition appeal and his trial, if it takes place, will likely expose further details
of the covert nexus that existed between elite paramilitaries and the Serbian
state.573 Dragan’s trial will undoubtedly focus upon the relationship between
the paramilitary units he commanded and the MUP and DB authorities in Bel-
grade: Dragan’s defence has always been that he was following the instruction
of Belgrade government personnel. Whether the Šešelj case will ever reach its
verdict is unlikely but the trial has brought to light a wealth of evidence that not
only connects his personal network of paramilitaries with the Serbian military
and political structures, but that stresses the intent with which their identity-
based crimes were committed.The Prosecution at the ICTY have documented
570Hero-worship of paramilitaries is addressed more fully in Part VII
571As can be seen in aspects of the defence positions of wartime leaders Karadžić, Mladić,
Gotovina, Markac, Babić, Hadzić
572For example, Tudjman’s elimination of the HOS leadership in August 1992 or the efforts
made by the ARBIH in Sarajevo to wrest control away from the criminal gang-leadership
573Charles Miranda, ‘Accused war criminal Dragan Vasiljković to be extradited to Croatia
to face war crimes,’ News Corp Australia Network, June 26 2015
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a series of occasions where ‘Šešelj told his volunteers that their task was to kill
Ustasha or Turks‘:
God’s help, heroes! Serbian brothers, heroic Serbian Chetniks,
today you are going to war. Today you are going to free Serbian
Vukovar and to defend Serbian Slavonija. You are going to join
hundreds, thousands of our volunteers. You are going from all parts
of today’s shrunken Serbia to return glory to the Serbian weapons.
You will act with units of the JNA, because that is our army. It is
foremost a Serbian army, because of its senior staff and its struggle
for the salvation of Serbian lands, of Serbian territories.574
We can see a similar intent in Mladić’s words as he prepared to take Srebrenica,
“This is revenge for the Turks!”575 Describing how and why the SDS organised
village guards in Krajina, Milan Babić contextualised the Serbian defence by
drawing a historical continuum from the atrocities of the Second World War and
the contemporary situation. Speaking in 1995 to the BBC Death of Yugoslavia
team, Babić invoked the genocide against the Croatian Serbs before stating
that “the same aspirations where shown by the HDZ in the nineties.”576 In
their collective historicised incitement to commit grave identity-based crimes,
the Serbian elites connected themselves to the irregular perpetrators while also
placing responsibility for the violence on the past.
In international law, there is a legal obligation upon state not to commit gen-
ocide and other gross human rights abuses, but after the fact international
criminal law seeks to hold individuals to account. Thus Rosenberg wrote in
reference to the Yugoslav conflicts that:
many of the crimes were committed by the Bosnian Serbs, who
themselves were non-state actors acting under a certain level of in-
fluence from Serbia...In those situations the question then becomes
what obligations, under existing international human rights law, do
574IT-03-67, Šešelj, Final Trial Prosecution Brief, 25 July 2007, see p14
575Carmichael, ‘Violence and ethnic boundary maintenance in Bosnia in the 1990s’, Journal
of Genocide Research, 8:3, (2006) pp283-293, p285
576Babić, DoY, p1
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states have to prevent individuals or other states from committing
human rights abuses, in particular human rights abuses which in-
volve the right to life, like atrocity crimes.577
While the evidence presented in this work challenges the assumption that “the
Bosnian Serbs” who committed crimes were all non-state actors, Rosenberg
draws attention to a significant legal and practical loophole that encourages
state architects of identity-based mass violence to devolve the responsibility of
actual implementation –or perpetration of the crimes– to others. In Yugoslavia,
irregular groups such at the MUP forces were subordinated to regular struc-
tures but worked closely and covertly with state elites; thus the devolution from
the central command was communicated obliquely and along parallel chains of
communication. It is not surprising therefore that a lack of material evidence
demonstrating a conspiracy between state authorities and irregular perpetrators
has hindered the prosecution process at the ICTY. It is probable that prosecut-
ing irregular military structures will always be difficult because of the necessary
burden of proof in any legal trial. A number of state elites have been found
accountable for crimes committed by irregulars: The Croatian leadership in
Herceg-Bosna were found guilty of crimes committed by the Special Police, and
members of the ARBiH were convicted of crimes related to the Mujahideen, but
the Serbian Security Service chiefs were acquitted of all charges, including those
relating to the MUP paramilitary units.
However, Rosenberg’s observation considers the problematic but somewhat
inevitable gap in-between state responsibility and culpability in a court of law.
She argues that because international human rights law traditionally focussed
on state conduct, there were not specific requirements of states to protect their
citizens from interferences by non-state actors.578 It is notable that the principle
of responsibility to protect, adopted by at the 2005 World Summit, is rooted
in the agreement that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from
mass atrocity crimes but contains no reference to non-state actors (or actors
who appear to be non-state). If irregular armed groups are indeed important,
if not at times primary, perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes and identity-based
mass violence this absence must be redressed if both the architects and the
irregular foot soldiers of these crimes are able to be held to account.
577Rosenberg, ‘A Framework for Prevention,’ p452
578Ibid
128
In this grey area, also lies the issue of accountability for the wartime culture
of identity-based division, violence, and impunity. All leaderships, but most
particularly the Bosnian Serb structure and Croatian elite, recognised the power
of propaganda and purposefully used the media and communication outlets
to deepen divisions within communities and encourage local-level resistance or
defence.579 At the ICTY (and ICTR) interpretation of the Statute has tended
to recognise “instigation” of a crime where it is possible to establish a causal
link between the incitement and the act.580 In the case of Kvocka et al., the
Chamber concluded that the element of instigation is satisfied if ‘it is shown that
the conduct of the accused was a clear contributing factor to the conduct of the
other person(s). It is not necessary to demonstrate that the crime would not
have occurred without the accused’s involvement.’581 In the Naletilić judgement,
it was added that the requisite mens rea for instigating must be understood as
the intention to provoke or induce the commission of the crime, or an awareness
of the ‘substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime would be a probable
consequence.’582
However, direct and public incitement, generally considered to be an incho-
ate crime, in international law is applicable ‘only in connection with the crime of
genocide.’583 The decision, for example, by the High Court of Canada to deport
Leon Mugesera to face trial in Rwanda for his 1992 speech to 1000 Hutus where
he ‘explicitly called on Hutus to kill Tutsis and to dump their bodies in the rivers
of Rwanda’ marked a precedent in genocide law.584 Mugesera did not occupy a
position of command or control during the genocide; in fact he was not even in
the country, but the ruling can be seen to have recognised the contributive role
propaganda and incitement plays in decentralised identity-based mass violence.
In sentencing Milan Gvero, Assistant Commander for Morale and Legal and
Religious Affairs of the VRS, the ICTY for the first time recognised the import-
ance of media propaganda in the mass executions that took place in Srebrenica
in 1995.585 In reference to a press statement on July 19 1995 Gvero had issued
579IT-00-39&40, Biljana Plavšić, Report on the Media (Mark Thompson)
580‘International human rights case law; ICTR & ICTY case law,’ Human Rights Watch,
2007, p202-204
581IT-98-30/1, Kvocka et al., (Omarska), Judgement, 2 November 2001, para252
582IT-98-34, Naletilić & Martinović, Judgement, 31 March 2003, para60; the Kordić judge-
ment stated that it must be proved that there was a direct intention to provoke the commission
of the crime, IT-95-14/2, Kordić & Čerkez, 26 Feb 2001, para387
583Wibke Kristin Timmermann, ‘Incitement in international criminal law’, International
Review of the Red Cross, 88:864 (2006), pp832-852, p839
584Leon Mugesera vs. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Judgement, Ottawa,
Ontario on September 8, 2003, p35
585Nidzara Ahmetasević, ‘Hague Recognises Propaganda’s Role in Srebrenica Genocide,’
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saying that the activities of the VRS were directed towards neutralising Muslim
terrorists and not civilians, the Chamber concluded that
While the release of false information to the media and interna-
tional authorities does not constitute a criminal act, the purpose of
the release was not an innocent one...the only reasonable inference
as to the goal behind this communiqué is that it was intended to
mislead, in particular the international authorities concerned with
protecting the enclave, with a view to delaying any action on their
part that might thwart the VRS’s military effort586
According the judgement, Gvero’s duty was to ‘disseminate information and
propaganda for the troops in support of [Serbian] war aims, in the preparation
for and during the course of combat operations’ but also to mislead the interna-
tional community.587 A similar pattern can be seen in the Drina valley and in
Herceg-Bosna. It is clear that where irregular chains of military command are
present and the perpetrators of identity-based violence are irregular combatants,
the state and its infrastructure must be investigated to determine whether state
authorities contributed, provoked, or induced the commissions of those crimes.
During the conflicts, the chains of command and control that existed within the
Serbian and Croatian warring structures were denied and misrepresented to the
international community by the leaderships. The engaging diplomatic relation-
ship Milošević, and to a lesser extent Tudjman, enjoyed with many statesmen
of the international community, especially when compared with how the in-
ternational (western) elite interacted with Izetbegović, revealed an entrenched
preoccupation with appearances over realities. For many who belonged to the
British establishment, Milošević and the Serbian military were comprehendible,
and therefore reasonable. Brendan Simms exposed what he calls British Serbo-
philia in his unforgiving indictment of Britain’s failed Bosnia police, Unfinest
Hour; ‘was it’ he asks, ‘the Serbian military spit and polish when contrasted to
the ragtag Bosnians in tennis shoes?588 The Serbs were generally seen as people
Balkan Insight , 7 July 2010
586IT-05-88, Popović et al., Judgement, 10 June 2012, para1815, emphasis added
587Ibid.; see also IT-05-88 Popović et al., Judgement I & II, 10 June 2010
588Simms, Unfinest Hour, p178
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the British had and could continue do business with.589 This had direct impact
upon the conflicts as the UK found itself the reluctant leader of the international
response to Bosnia.590
To negotiator for the EU David Owen, Milošević was a man who rejected the
‘trappings of power,’ and was ‘neither racist nor paranoid about the rest of the
world.’591 Owen did not see Milošević as a nationalist, but instead ‘often likened
him to someone who has jumped on the tiger of nationalism and is finding it
difficult to get off again without the tiger eating him.’592 In contrast, Owen’s
opinion of Izetbegović appears to have been overshadowed by his confusion
about Muslim Europeans; ‘There were no outward and visible signs that he
(Izetbegović) was a Muslim. He, his son and his daughter dressed and acted as
Europeans.’593 The attitudes of Owen’s colleagues were more alarmist; ‘some
feel [Izetbegović] is the most difficult of all the people they had to deal with
in the former Yugoslavia, manipulative and untrustworthy, and that his closet
advisories are shadowy fundamentalists.’594
When Slobodan Milošević was put on trial in 2001 it became clear that he
had not only participated in the planning of and preparation for the take-over of
municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the subsequent forcible removal of
the majority of non-Serbs from those municipalities, but had provided the finan-
cial, material and logistical support necessary for such a take-over.595 However,
until archives are fully opened the extent to which international governments
were aware of developments on the ground in Bosnia, or of the involvement
of Milošević and the Serbian government, many of the most important ques-
tions about international involvement in Bosnia must remain unanswered. Most
recently, Florence Hartmann’s investigation of documents relating to the safe
haven of Srebrenica before the July 1995 attack reveals western policy makers,
including the US, UK and UN, were aware of Mladić’s declared intention to have
the Bosniak Muslim population of the entire region “vanish completely.”596
589Sometimes literally, see case of Douglas Hurd and Pauline Neville-Jones, Ian Traynor,
‘Pauline Neville-Jones: diplomat who did business with Milošević. How the Tory security
minister headed Balkan peace talks – then months later negotiated a billion-dollar deal with
Serbia’, The Guardian, 13 May 2010
590Hodge, Britain and the Balkan, p1
591Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p127; see also US impressions of Milošević in Holbrooke, To End
a War, p4
592Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p129
593Ibid., p39
594Ibid.
595IT-02-54-T, Milošević, Amended Indictment
596Florence Hartmann and Ed Vulliamy, How Britain and the US decided to abandon
Srebrenica to its fate, Observer, 4 July 2015; see also full investigation, Hartmann, Le sang
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Britain almost certainly obstructed the vague sense of responsibility in the
EU towards those under threat in Bosnia from manifesting itself into concrete
policy, and did so on the premise that chains of command in Bosnia were un-
clear.597 US Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger’s caution against
foreign intervention was clearly based in part on such reasoning:
If people are intent on killing each other under conditions in
which it is almost impossible for the outside world to do anything
without losing itself many lives, then my answer is: ‘I’m sorry, but
they are going to have to kill each other until they wear themselves
out and have enough sense to stop.’598
Todorova has argued convincingly that it was precisely the ‘historicised’ charac-
ter of the violence in Bosnia that shaped western opinion of the conflict. It was
as if, in Bosnia, ‘the mountaineers of the seventeenth century [had] reentered
the political stage of the twentieth, unmarked by any change.’599 The political
discourse of a Balkan warrior ethos, and the significance of history, memory
and hatred in the ‘Balkan’ psyche, purposely or not, framed these atrocities as
Balkan cultural and historical norm.600 Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd recalled
‘working our way through a tangled thicket without paths or signposts. . . [and]
the great majority of those with whom I dealt shared this feeling of fog and
frustration. That was true of most Britons, continental Europeans and Amer-
icans.’601 In November 1992, Douglas Hogg MP (then with the Foreign Of-
fice) stated in the House of Commons that he believed neither Milošević nor
Karadžić had control over events in Bosnia, citing as evidence ‘the assurances
Milošević gave regarding the removal of aircraft were not adhered to by General
Mladić. . . [and that] war lords in Bosnia ware pursuing their own policies and
objectives.’602 Thus the presence of irregular combatants and the historicised
nationalist narratives of non-state violence further worked to Serbian advant-
age by legitimising and encouraging a policy of non-intervention. Bosnia’s fait
de la realpolitik - L’affaire Srebrenica, Don Quichotte, July 2015
597John Major has since admitted that that he strategically stifled efforts from the Neth-
erlands to single out Belgrade as the primary culprit of the Bosnian war, Simms, Unfinest
Hour, p21
598Quoted Flemming, ‘Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan historiography, p2
599Todorova, Imagining the Balkans¸ p137
600Ibid.
601Hurd, Memoirs, p435
602Hansard, 16 November, 1992, col.107
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accompli was that the narratives suited western policy makers who wanted to
avoid the financial, political, and human costs of military engagement
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Part III
Criminal shadows
The criminal dimensions of the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts were extens-
ive and multilayered. The corruption generated by the communist transition
had invigorated smuggling channels throughout the Balkans and developed a
propensity within state structures for criminality, personal profit, and racket-
eering. Economic collapse throughout the 1980s had seen mass unemployment
collide with a growing culture of materialism, leading to greater demand in a
time of great (official) shortage. Thus, the grey economy and black markets
were already well established across Yugoslavia by 1990. As political elites in
Croatia and (more so) in Serbia endorsed narratives of community level identity-
based violence, national struggle appeared to legitimise a suspension of certain
pre-war values, ushering an embrace of a new (a)moral social contract. Many
of the irregular combatants transcended the different levels of society, bridging
the elite cause juste and the day-to-day anxieties of the community. Perhaps
in part as a result of this unique positioning, a wartime conceptualisation of
the paramilitary hero and of a patriotic mafia emerged. Regional traditions
of banditry and guerrilla warfare appeared to give these conceptualisations an
historical context.603 Moreover, the fact that many paramilitaries had previ-
ous civilian convictions or engaged in crimes during the war ensured that the
irregular dynamics contributed to an increasing public acceptance of criminality.
Analysis of the criminal dynamics is complicated by the different levels of
criminal behaviour that found space during the period. Much like the struc-
tures of violent implementation, the criminal networks operated according to
a broadly similar hierarchy. Following the imposition of the arms embargo in
1991, international organised crime networks that stretched beyond the Balkans
to South America and the Middle East facilitated the transfer of arms to vari-
ous Yugoslav recipients. Elite organised crime syndicates operated in concert
with national political leaderships, while local authorities sanctioned or collab-
orated with local felons. The relationship between official apparatus and the
irregular fighters in itself led to a criminalisation of military and political activ-
ities. The nature of the conflicts and their impact upon civilian populations
meant that black markets and grey economies became increasingly common-
603On themes see Žanić, Prevarena povijest; Čolović, Bordel ratnika; also The terror of
culture
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place, particularly in urban areas. Because the destruction of Muslim property
was so intimately intertwined with the Serbian and Croatian military strategies
in Bosnia, many crimes such as looting, theft, and even rape, were ascribed
political (defensive) significance.604 There were, too, patterns of spontaneous
and opportunistic violence and crime among the affected communities, probably
as much a result of perceived legal impunity as changes to what was and was
not morally perceptible. The reality was that the entire war making and state
building enterprise in former Yugoslavia was criminal– and a form of organised
crime. Charles Tilly’s eminent essay proves less of an analogy for the Yugoslav
wars as a literal assessment.605
The criminal dimensions of Yugoslavia’s collapse, but especially in relation
to the violence in Bosnia, served to further obscure political responsibility for
the crisis. Rather than be interpreted as evidence of corrupt national structures,
the explicit criminality of the conflicts instead further masked strategic intent
and reinforced narratives of societal chaos. The misreading of war-time crim-
inal behaviour led to the creation of a new paradigm in international relations
theory with publications such as Ignatieff’s Blood and Belonging and Kaldor’s
New Wars, which focused disproportionately on the mercenary actions of para-
militaries as evidence for their independence from state authorities.606 While
historical, economic, and certain cultural factors contributed to the distinct
criminal component, external and international actions provided the circum-
stances from which widespread black markets became essential and that forced
the beleaguered Bosnian government to turn to covert channels in the desperate
pursuit of weapons. The decisions to impose an arms embargo upon all parties
and apply economic sanctions to FRY were disastrous. Finally, the large num-
ber of international personnel on the ground, particularly in Sarajevo, further
facilitated black market trading. This reached a terrible crescendo of hypocrisy
when it was exposed in the late 1990s that a network of western expats working
for private security firms and the United Nations were involved in trafficking
women for the western sex industry.607
604On rape as political act, Ruth Seifert, ‘The second front: The logic of sexual violence in
wars’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 19:1–2, 1996, pp35-43
605Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organised Crime’ in (ed.) Peter Evans,
Dietrich. Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1985, pp169-91
606Blood and Belonging was published in 1993, New Wars in 1998; Kaldor maintains her
argument of the criminal logic of new wars in ‘In Defence of NewWars,’ Stability: International
Journal of Security and Development, 7 March 2013 (open-source); see also Mueller’s emphasis
on criminal elements in modern mass violence in ‘Ethnic War’ (2000)
607Kathryn Bolkovac & Cari Lynn, The Whistleblower: Sex Trafficking, Military Contract-
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If we take organised crime to be defined in the broadest possible terms, it can
be described as ‘illegal activities committed by three or more persons working
together as a group.’608 Such a broad definition is useful for this context as
what follows does not seek to discuss criminal or legal categorisation. Until the
end of the Bosnian war there were roughly three kinds of criminal structure in
operation, across all sides of the conflict. On the local or community level, local
needs and local opportunities led to the organic emergence of black market
economies where stolen and trafficked goods could be purchased by the local
population and the profits pocketed. Local war crimes such as looting and
theft were common. So too was the illegal purchasing of arms. Local-level
identity-based violence also occurred, but as such crimes were themselves part
of a military and political strategy they are not included in this analysis. On a
national level existed, on all sides, a symbiotic relationship between state elites
from government, administration, and the security services, and elite organised
criminal groups that purportedly identified with the ethnic group in question.
At the beginning of the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts, these criminal groups
were often involved in paramilitary activities on behalf of the state but later
assumed their own command. In the wake of Dayton, the long-term damage of
this relationship became clear. The third contributing criminal structure was
international, and enabled the war-time states and criminal groups to receive
large shipments of arms, or in Serbia’s case oil, to ensure their respective war
efforts (or war-businesses) could continue. Within the Croat forces was a radical
diaspora corps from terrorist cells around the world and a number of neo-fascist
supporters.
5 Social banditry
The western Balkans has a history of smuggling and of political banditry but
it was the socio-economic and political problems that accompanied the collapse
of communism that led to the criminalisation of popular culture, politics, and
later of war. Once the United Nations voted to impose the arms embargo, power
shifted even further away from the legal to the illicit as Croatia and the Bos-
nian government, which was woefully underprepared and underarmed, sought
ors, and One Woman’s Fight for Justice. Palgrave, 2011
608This definition is used by Sheelagh Brady in her analysis, ‘Organised Crime in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; A silent war fought by an ambush of toothless tigers or a war not yet fought,’
for the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, October 2012, p10
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to acquire arms through any means necessary.609 While well armed, Serbia and
the Bosnian Serb forces required oil in order to keep their war machine moving.
The impositions of sanctions on FRY elevated the black market from a criminal
economy that had existed largely on the margins of Serbian and Montenegrin
society to a patriotic method of survival that simultaneously challenged the west-
ern governments and supported the aggressors’ cause.610 This process further
normalised criminal behaviour and altered the socio-political moral compass. In
Serbia, this had the effect of unifying Serbian society in common frustration at
the new limitations imposed upon daily life.
Paramilitary groups and other irregular armed formations such as terrorist
or resistance groups regularly rely upon illegal networks in order to transfer
funds, arms, and other collateral such as drugs or oil. Similarly, the chaos and
mayhem of war has forever drawn the profiteer, the mercenary, the opportun-
ist. Sarah Percy in her detailed history defines mercenaries as operating outside
of legitimate control and as not being motivated to fight by an ‘appropriate’
cause.611 Our understanding of mercenaries, like irregular fighters more gener-
ally, is governed by normative concepts of legitimacy and our subjective percep-
tion of what is or is not appropriate motivation to take up arms; in other words,
definition currently relies upon a conformity to what can be highly subjective
interpretations of a charged context or situation. In the context of Yugoslavia,
certain pattens of criminal activity and certain crimes were considered by many
to be legitimate because they were considered to be in support of an appropriate
cause. In Yugoslavia, many who profited from the war were regarded as neither
mercenaries nor criminals but as patriotic heroes. While we should interpret
their actions as no less criminal, it is important to consider the motivations of
the actors themselves as a means to better understand the interaction between
the national elites, criminal activity and local networks.
The Balkans, like many places in the world, have a rich and varied history of
subverting official structures. Centuries of foreign rule produced ‘a tradition
of cheating the authorities and evading the laws’.612 Banditry, like guerrilla
609United Nations Security Council Resolution 713; Arms Embargo, applying to (former)
Yugoslavia, 25 September 1991
610United Nations Security Council Resolution 757; Mandatory sanctions against FRY (Ser-
bia and Montenegro), 30 May 1992
611Sarah Percy, Mercenaries; The History of a Norm in International Relations, Oxford
University Press, 2007, p49
612Maček, Sarajevo under siege, p79
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insurgency, has an established place in Yugoslav memory and tradition; both are
irregular armed structures. Much like the many faces of the Yugoslav guerrilla
were resurrected by domestic and international actors, the Balkan bandit was
revived from both the collective memories of local populations and the pages of
foreign literature.613 Thus some have drawn historical comparisons between the
paramilitaries of the 1990s and the hajduk tradition of the nineteenth century.
And certainly, the legacy and tradition of banditry appears to provide many
parallels, not least in their positive imaging in the eyes of society. Banditry
has long been considered one of the earliest forms of social protest; the Robin
Hood figure who robs from the rich and champions the poor is an ‘international
paradigm of social banditry.’614 During the siege of Sarajevo, many of the most
well known defenders of the city were criminals before the war and capitalised
on the conflict by running their own black market rackets (or worse) but were
portrayed by parts of the local community, and sometimes by the western media,
as Robin Hood saviours.615 Christian Giordano believes that the popularisation
of people outside the law is a Mediterranean particularity, where mistrust in
governments and the rule of law is rife.616 Yet in socialist Yugoslavia, respect
for Tito had been considerable and genuine. Influences from the Mediterranean
were more likely to be modern, such as the new glorification of organised crime
and mafia culture imported from the Italy and Sicily in the 1980s and 1990s.
Yugoslavia’s terrain is probably the most obvious explanation for its rich
history of bandits and guerrilla fighters, and its long-time position between em-
pires. The mountains, hills, and forests, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina
is ideal for resistance fighting –as the Wehrmacht discovered during the Second
World War.617 But the violence that took place in Bosnia between 1992 and
1995 was not guerrilla warfare, despite the oft repeated fears of the British
Parliament. Speaking in 1993, Tam Dalyell (Lab) asked the Defence Secret-
ary Malcolm Rifkind if ‘the deterrent to Stalin’s armies devised by Tito was
613Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p136-37
614Hobsbawm, Bandits Primitive Rebels; Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in
the 19th and 20th Centuries’, University of Manchester Press, 1971, ch.2, ‘Social Banditry’;
and on equivalent international examples, Žanić, Flag on the Mountain, p.245
615This concept was first put forward by journalists and around the same time by Žanić, The
Flag on the Mountain
616Christian Giordano, ‘The Anthropology of Mediterranean Societies’ in (ed.) Ullrich
Kockel, Mairead Nic Craith, & Jonas Frykman, A Companion to the Anthropology of Europe,
Blackwell, 2012, p23; see also Čolović. ‘A national Criminal-Hero? But who else?’ in (ed.)
Todorova, Balkan Identities, Nation and Memory, New York University Press, 2004, p23
617Fitzroy Maclean’s account of his time with the Partisans contributed to this conceptual-
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the training of whole generations in guerrilla warfare?’ adding ‘[t]hese are ex-
tremely tough, determined and skilled people.’618 Rifkind replied, ‘I agree with
the hon. Gentleman’s assessment...We are conscious that these are tough people
who have a strong tradition of fighting skills. That is clearly a factor we must
all take into account.’619
In fact, on the whole, in the 1990s the irregular fighters acted in concert with
state forces, not against them. The small Bosniak forces in Serb held territory
did use guerrilla tactics, true, yet tend not to be referenced –perhaps because
such skills are not a part of the Muslim ethnic stereotype. Bandit tradition
played its part when it came to the style and identity of many of the irregular
(and sometimes regular) Serb combatants but it is worth noting that so too did
Rambo.620
Bracewell draws this tension in Yugoslav culture to our attention in her
essay, The Proud Name of Hajduks; 621
The Balkan bandit is an excellent example of a national symbol
used to encapsulate and communicate political messages to natur-
alise preset ideological understandings through reference to the na-
tion’s history. He has served both as a symbol of the nation and its
struggle for freedom and as a device for making boundaries between
one national community and another.622
Thus, in Balkan cultural history at least, the ‘the line between mutual aid and
individualism was very thin and the distinction between what was considered
moral and immoral became blurred.’623 While Bracewell stresses that historical
cultural representation of the Balkan bandit has been multidimensional, within
the context of the 1990s struggles the history of the Serbian hajduk was suitably
618Hansard, 14 January 1993, col.1063-64
619Ibid., col.1064, Leader of the Liberal Democrats Paddy Ashdown referred to this persistent
view point in the House of Commons and in fact highlighted what he saw to be a ‘great
conundrum about the Bosnian war’ asking, ’why wasn’t any guerrilla warfare used? Rt. Hon.
Lord. Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, Interview with the author, London, 8 March 2010
620On bandit culture see Žanić, Prevrarena povijest; on Rambo, (ed.) John B Allcock,
Marko Milivojević, John J Horton, Conflict in the former Yugoslavia: an encyclopaedia,
Colo; ABC-CLIO (Denver) 1998, p.207
621Wendy Bracewell, “ ‘The Proud Name of Hajduks”: Bandits as Ambiguous Heroes in
Balkan Politics and Culture’ in (ed.) Naimark and H. Case, Yugoslavia and its Historians:
Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, Stanford University Press, 2003, pp22-36
622Ibid., p23
623Maček, Sarajevo under siege, p79
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nationalised; the irregulars were imitating a hero that ‘played the role of a
national elite when Ottoman conquest had left the Serb people leaderless; they
had defended the Serbs against the Ottoman oppression; they had kept alive a
sense of national consciousness under foreign rule.’624 Finally, Bracewell warns
of the fatalism resulting from the persistence of these images:
...in such interpretations they seem to take on a life of their own,
regardless of who uses them and for what purpose. Trapped in
an all-encompassing culture of patriotic violence, the people of the
Balkans (or of the former Yugoslavia or, most frequently the Serbs)
have no choice but to act out its unchanging scripts–at best failing to
confront the possibility of choice (“relishing” rather than “disarming”
their myths.)625
The motif of the bandit, or terrorist even, is often romanticised and examples
can be found throughout European history and culture, and variations exist
all over the world. He represents a challenge to oppressors in the eyes of the
suppressed. The tension that exists between his criminal behaviour and any
genuine conviction of righting social or economic injustice is therefore usually
underplayed in myth and story-telling. Even if the bandit himself does not
possess a Robin Hood-like social consciousness, the poor who watch him rob
the rich may still choose to bestow upon him heroic qualities; as Hobsbawm
observed ‘the fact that the bandit, especially when he was not himself filled
with a strong sense of mission, lived well and showed off his wealth did not
normally put the public off’.626 As such, bandits become people’s ‘champions’,
who are ‘idealised’ and turned ‘into myth.’627 Perhaps what is significant then
in the history of bandit culture in the western Balkans is not the substance of the
myths, but the practice of myth-making and storytelling –and the romanticising
of the anti-hero or anti-establishment figure. Hobsbawm presents banditry as a
peasant phenomenon but many of its features can be seen in popular reactions to
certain individual paramilitaries in the 1990s. Here, Čolović describes the moral
legitimacy that was bestowed upon the modern paramilitary heroes; ‘[t]hey
624Bracewell. ‘The Proud Name of Hajduks,’ p25
625Ibid., p34; see also Čolović, Balkan-teror kulture, Biblioteka XX vek, 2008, p201
626Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p22
627Ibid., p.13
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personified and defended a form of justice and humanity opposed to the law
and perceived social values, but they were authentic, lived deeply, and paid
with their lives.’628 Both Čolović and Žanić identified how this appropriation
of historical context and costume within the wartime culture developed into
ethno-nationalist hero cults, celebrating gangsters, paramilitaries, and ordinary
criminals.629
This glorification of the violent criminal-hero was not wholly a wartime phe-
nomenon; the godfather of the Serbian mafia, Ljuba Zemunac Magaš, died in
1986 and was commemorated in the epitaph as Robin Hood
A warm heart he had for the weak,
In a world of wrong, he had a sharp sword,
Punished rapacious thugs,
Travelled the war of Robin Hood630
Considering the prodigious position Magaš occupied in Serbian criminal counter
culture, many belonging to the wartime patriotic mafia would have been aware
of his hagiography.
A legacy of this subversive worship can be seen in the celebration by contem-
porary European right-wing extremists of Serbian paramilitary leaders Arkan
and Legija Ulemek for both the violence they committed against Muslims and
their criminal expertise; The Anders Breivik manifesto extols the Tigers, in-
cluding Arkan and Ulemek, as role models.631 Furthermore, Breivik claims
to have ‘had the privilege of meeting one of the greatest living war heroes of
Europe at the time, a Serbian crusader and war hero who had killed many
Muslims in battle. Due to EU persecution for alleged crimes against Muslims
628Čolović quoted in (ed.) Dina Siegel, H. Bunt and D. Zaitch, Global Organized Crime:
Trends and Developments, Kluwer (Dordrecht) 2003, p49
629Žanić, Flag on the Mountain, ch.7; Čolović, Bordel ratnika; also The terror of culture,
p34-61
630This is the opening verse of three; see Čolović, Bordel Ratnika, p5-6
631Andrew Berwick (Anders Breivik), 2083; A European Declaration of Independ-
ence; De laude Novae Militiae; Pauperes cooilitones Christi Templique Solomonici
(also known as the Compendium), London, 2011; published online by the Washington
Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2011/07/24/National-
Politics/Graphics/2083+-+A+European+Declaration+of+Independence.pdf; Breivik also
created YouTube videos praising the Tigers, once again emphasising the online interaction
that connects communities of violent political extremists.
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he was living at one point in Liberia.’632 The Norwegian police suspect this
was Ulemek.633 The relationships that existed in Yugoslavia between many of
the irregulars (foreign and domestic) and the European criminal underworld
were extensive and enduring: when looking at contemporary networks of viol-
ent extremism (whether of right-wing supremacism or Islamism) it is necessary
to search beyond ideology for similar illegal and covert networks, such as those
that connect Milorad Ulemek with Breivik’s melieu. In their elevation of para-
militaries rather than the Serbian state elites, Breivik and his ilk demonstrate
the power of a modern folklore of non-state violence to perpetuate grassroots
responses; and it is therefore significant that Breivik sought during his trial and
Declaration to emphasise that he was inspired by the Serbian Tigers and not
Nazism, which is inherently bound to state hierarchy.
In the 1990s, as many western perceptions of Yugoslavia and the Balkans were
revived, the criminal element of the conflict was interpreted as being demon-
strative of a Balkan mentality –and signalled a return to the orientalised Balkan
imagination of Rebecca West, Agatha Christie, and John Gunther. Todorova
summarised:
The jump from medieval brigands to contemporary armed hills-
men involves a comparison of medieval violence (of which both are
representative) with highly technological contemporary warfare, in
which backwardness is attributed not only to the weapons of de-
struction but also to the perpetrators. Primitive technology and
primitive warfare then, goes parallel with human primitiveness.634
The use of paramilitaries during the first Balkan wars (1912-1913) by Bulgaria
and Serbia as organised, auxiliaries to their regular armies was not acknow-
ledged in the 1990s in either Yugoslav or international war-time discourse.635
632Ibid.
633Haroon Siddique and Helen Pidd, ‘Anders Behring Breivik trial, day three
–Wednesday 18 April,’ The Guardian (online stream), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2012/apr/18/anders-behring-breivik-trial-live#block-6
634Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p137
635John Paul Newman, in ‘The Origins, Attributes, and Legacies of Paramilitary Violence in
the Balkans,’ in (ed.) Robert Gerwarth & John Horne, War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence
in Europe After the Great War, Oxford University Press, 2012, p148
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The Serbian paramilitaries were organised, had official support from the polit-
ical leadership, and pursued coherent political objectives; they were primarily
concerned in the years immediately preceding the First World War with ex-
pelling Ottomans, and thereby ‘Serbianizing’ territory under Serbian control.636
Even hajduks, who operated up until the Second World War, were employed
as muscle and intimidation in political struggles.637 Western Balkan pre-First
World War traditions of irregular violence were not wholly non-state, and nor
did the fighters all belong to guerrilla or bandit cultures. Instead, there was a
strong pattern of paramilitary behaviour within a discernible official structure,
and where irregular combatants were deployed in order to implement exclusion-
ary nationalist strategies. Social Serbian resistance was never directed against
the Serbian state or its elites but external threats from Ottoman or European
empires; distrust was not of authority but of other. This was in contrast to
the social banditry prevalent throughout the same pre-World War One period
in many of the peripheral and unpacified regions of eastern Turkey, where local
Kurdish and tribal communities with no state structure of their own to support
engaged in high levels of violence against the Ottoman authorities.638
Although the war-time criminals of the 1990s and their command structures
consciously emulated a pastiche of traditional bandit culture supplemented with
hajduk, ustaše, or jihadi garb, they did not acknowledge the similarities they
shared with the earlier parainstitutional structures of the first Balkan War.
Beyond the pastiche, they found cultural endorsement from more contemporary
aspects of society. The celebration of nationalist paramilitaries and their (newly
accrued) material wealth –whether expensive cars, designer labels, or highly
sexualised women– was particularly explicit in dominant cultures of Croatian
dance music and Serbian turbo-folk.639 ‘Both genres’, writes Catherine Baker,
‘were preoccupied with conspicuous consumption, fast cars and other markers
of the newly-enriched semi-criminal elite.’640
Several paramilitaries were awarded a kind of celebrity status. The press
printed their photos– Captain Dragan had his own TV show and there was a
comic strip depicting the war-time activities of his unit the Knindže.641 The
636Ibid.
637Žanić, Flag on the Mountain, p123
638Üngör, ‘Rethinking the Violence of Pacification: State Formation and Bandits in Turkey,
1914-1937,’ Comparative studies in society and history, 54:4 (2012) pp746-769, p744
639Catherine Baker, Sounds of the Borderland: Popular Music, War and Nationalism in
Croatia Since 1991, Ashgate Publishing, 2012, p75
640Ibid.
641‘Knindže –Vitezovi Srpske Krajine’ (Knights of Serbian Krajina) was published by
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Croats and Bosnian Muslims also had their own superheroes. Super Hrvoje was
a Croat superhero who fought against the Serbian forces, while Bosman was
a young comic book hero who fought Chetniks and in Sarajevo.642 The back
story to Super Hrvoje, or Hrvoje Horvat, was that as a boy his family had fled
socialist Yugoslavia to escape the communist regime, but the Yugoslav secret
service tracked the family down and assassinated his parents; on returning to
Croatia, Hrvoje learns that it is his destiny to defend his homeland.643 The
Bosman comic, while appearing to champion the unity of Sarajevo, in a scene
representing the first shots on Vrbanja Most, where Suada Dilberović and Olga
Sučić became the first casualities of the siege, the Muslim Suada is depicted
but Croatian Olga is not. Such apparently banal mediums of social interaction
and pop culture were important structures of normalising not only the conflict
but also identity-based violence and crime, indicating that as those moral para-
meters break down in specific regard to the identity-based targeting of certain
communities a wider moral crisis can occur. While Bosman and Hrvoje were
not paramilitaries, they were presented as nationalist figures who protected their
communities and by existing outside the ordinary frameworks of society.
On the local and individual level, historical or political motivations overtly
legitmised criminality but it was opportunism and the desire for personal gain
that became pervasive. At the same time, the economic pressures of war and em-
bargo resulted in black markets of necessity. In Bosnia, but especially the area
under Serbian control that became Republika Srpska, was (and remains) a poor
country. During his testimony at The Hague, former UN official Michael Charles
Williams recalled that ‘there was virtually no functioning economy during [the
war] period other than smuggling’.644 According to expert testimony, in 1993,
‘99.6 percent of the RS budget came from “credits” from the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia; 95.6 percent of that budget was used to fund the military and
police’.645 In the Krajina, the heart of the self-declared Serb republic in Croatia
Politika newspaper in autumn 1991
642Super Hrvoje fist appeared in June 1992 in the magazine Nedjeljna Dalmacija, Slobodna
Dalmacija (Split); Bosman was printed in Sarajevo in October 1994, thanks to the Patriotic
League, the comic can be read in its entirety here; http://www.scribd.com/doc/51724795/Bos-
man
643Ibid., also Sinisa Ercegovac, ‘Super Hrvoje’ available at http://www.international-
hero.co.uk/s/superhrvoje.htm
644IT-02-54Milošević, Witness testimony of Michael Charles Williams, 24 June 2003, p22912;
it is perhaps noteworthy that in his testimony Williams suggests that while many profited
from such actions, they also ‘earned the scorn and dismay of General Mladić’
645Sara Darehshori, ‘Weighing the Evidence: Lessons from the Slobodan Milošević Trial,’
Human Rights Watch, Reports, 2006, p18
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and a region where local paramilitary presence was high, the situation was even
more dire. There were some elements of subsistence economy, but many Serbs
survived on UN humanitarian deliveries and from support that was given by
Belgrade.646 In the 1990s, the grey or informal economy in Yugoslavia amoun-
ted to approximately 40 percent of GDP.647 Pervasive crime was sometimes
genuinely a means of survival and therefore it is little wonder that romanticised
and historical narratives of national struggle or unity emerged to legitimise new
behaviours.
The acute situation in Srebrenica crushed all but the informal economy. In
summer 1992, the Serbian forces looted the town, taking all of the food that
was there.648 This prompted, a month or so later, the remaining population
in Srebrenica to search the surrounding area for sustenance: “Thousands of us
would go to these places every day to look for food,” recalled a former inhabitant
of the town.649 On these expeditions, they were referred to as tobari because
“we all had bags, tobra”.650 Some witnesses suggested that these raids were
sometimes run simultaneously with attempts to push back the Serbian lines,
indicating the thin line that sometimes existed between petty criminality and
irregular military activity.651 Leading the initially ramshackle irregulars pro-
tecting Srebrenica was Naser Orić. Orić, a Bosnian paramilitary leader who
worked closely with military and political structures in and around Srebrenica,
combined his protection of the fated safe haven with the pursuit of personal eco-
nomic gain –sometimes prioritising the former at the expense of those he was
defending. According to the CIA, ‘[o]ver time, Naser Orić’s Srebrenica became a
Hobbesian world of black marketeers and gun-toting quasi-military command-
ers.’652 Between June 1992 and March 1993, Bosnian Muslim irregulars and
volunteers raided a number of Serbian villages and hamlets ostensibly to ac-
quire food, weapons, and ammunition for the besieged town but also reportedly
caused much loss of life and property on the Serbian side.653
In Sarajevo, the needs of the besieged city and of its growing expat com-
646IT-02-54 Milošević, 23 June 2003, p22-12
647M. Blagojević (1998) quoted in (ed.)Victor Roudometof, Collective Memory, National
Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question, Praeger Pub-
lishing, 2002, p185
648IT-03-68, Orić, Witness Testimony Sabra Kolenović, 31 August 2005, p10079
649Ibid., p10089
650Ibid.
651Ibid.
652‘Balkan Battlegrounds; a military history of the Yugoslav conflict,’ United States Central
Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, 10 Sept 2002, p318
653IT-03-68 Orić, Judgement, 30 June 2006, p37; for further discussion of Orić see Part VI
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munity were served by many of the paramilitary groups who had first defended
the capital. National authorities on all sides decided when to cut off supplies
or let them reach the city in order to support their war aims.654 Many of these
actions were supported by paramilitary and criminal networks on the ground.
Karadžić and Krajišnik were reportedly behind the Serbian smuggling lines in
and out of Sarajevo at Ilidža, although run on the ground by criminal companies
manned by irregular or mafia combatants.655 These irregular mafia combatants
dominated the organised Serb smuggling lines, and present another layer of ir-
regular collaboration on the part of the Serbian leadership structures. Donia
describes gang control as the major characteristic of the economy in war-time
Serb Sarajevo.656 Mayor Trifko Radić paints a grim picture of these groups at
work:
[In Ilijaš] we have at least 150 mafia guys who drive unregistered
Volkswagens. They wear uniforms, carry pistols and the most con-
temporary weapons, [sun]glasses, walk around, and no one dares
engage them. They steal, walk, kill, engage in black market opera-
tions, etc....No one dares mobilise them. That’s linked to mafia from
Ilidža, Rajlovac, Vogošća, to Ilijaš, and we all fear them.657
The poor organisation of the Bosnian federation and lack of proper command
structure meant that authorities could establish little control over the criminal
networks beyond what could be gained through shared interests. As a res-
ult, many of those criminals-cum-paramilitaries who had initially defended the
capital later came to terrorise its inhabitants. Juka went rogue with his own
personal army, collaborating with the Croats and establishing a volatile HQ
on Mount Igman, overlooking the Sarajevans who had previously championed
him.658 Caco Topalović, who remained officially subordinated to the 1st Corps
Commander, routinely abducted people from Sarajevo to undertake war labour
654Maček, Sarajevo Under Siege, p64
655for role of Karadžić and Krajišnik see Andreas, Blue Helmets, p68 (see fn151 for discus-
sion)
656Donia, Sarajevo, p325
657Quoted ibid.
658‘Feljton Dana - Jusuf Prazina Juka (I): Bacio je samo jednog snajperistu,’ Dani, (259)
31 May 2002; Juka’s smiling face filled the front page of this edition with the headline; Heroj
I(li) Zločinac (Hero and (or) criminal)
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such as digging trenches.659 Ćelo Delalić’s men also used threats of forced la-
bour against members of the public in order to extort money.660 When Ćelo
was shot and transferred to the local Sarajevan hospital, threats of reprisals
should he die were made against the government and prompted the state to fly
him the out of the country.661 Bougarel has suggested that Juka’s expulsion
from Sarajevo in the autumn of 1992 symbolised the marginalisation of what
he called the neighbourhood gangs by the urban militia, such as Caco’s 10th
Mountain Brigade.662 According to Bougarel, these urban militias, forged new
systems of predation and terror that were more excessive than the first wave of
gangster defence had been (under the neighbourhood gangs.)663
Greater Sarajevo represented a convergence of irregular networks from all
sides of the conflict. In many ways the capital was the visual and organisational
focus of the Bosnian conflict –even if the war’s objectives lay in the hinterland–
but the city also drew the attention of many for its economic opportunities. As
with the atrocities committed in the countryside, it was irregular foot soldiers
who carried out the day-to-day criminal duties but their covert command often
came from within state infrastructure. Corruption and personal gain became
deeply ingrained in state architecture, furthering the disconnect between the
local communities and their political leaderships, engendering the sense of need
for self-sufficiency that endured long after the conflicts.
6 Institutional banditry
Misha Glenny contends that by 1991, ‘[m]ore than any other communist
country, politics and organised crime were tightly intertwined throughout the
former Yugoslavia.’664 Marko Hajdinjak, in his 2002 study of regional criminal
networks in the Balkans, writes that in the wake of the Cold War ‘trans-border
crime in Southeast Europe rose to an unprecedented...extent. This has not
been the case in the other East European post-communist states.’665 The dec-
659Andreas, Blue Helmets, p92
660Ibid. p93
661Ibid.
662Xavier Bougarel, Bosnie: Anatomie d’un conflit, La Découverte (Paris), p113
663Ibid.
664Glenny, McMafia, p38
665Marko Hajdinjak, ‘Smuggling in Southeast Europe; The Yugoslav wars and the develop-
ment of regional criminal networks in the Balkans’, Centre for the Study of Democracy, Sofia,
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ade preceding war in the Balkans saw widespread expansion of Yugoslav and
regional organised criminal networks. Economic crisis and the collapsing le-
gitimacy of communist politics created fertile ground for corruption. Socialist
Yugoslavia’s state (party) run infrastructures had become hollowed out insti-
tutions that were easily taken over by those with foresight or entrepreneurial
aptitude before the transition to the open market began. More specifically, in
the communist bloc state security services held significantly more power than
their western counterparts. Security services in communist states tended to be-
come more involved in the economy, both in their general intelligence activities
and efforts to ‘gather scientific and technological information by circumventing
the restrictions of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Con-
trols’.666 Thus organised crime in the early transition period was marked across
the region by the widespread participation of former or current security service
personnel. Their already shadowy existence enabled them to keep their eco-
nomic activities off the record. Socialist secret services relied upon a network
of informal informants that made up a substantial ‘soft periphery’ drawn from
all corners of society; ‘in this grey zone of the spy state, the border between
law enforcement and crime was hard to distinguish.’667According to a study of
the risks of symbiosis between the security sector and organised crime by the
Sofia-based Centre for the Study of Democracy, ‘the involvement of security
sector officers from adjacent countries in large-scale contraband was the main
factor in the emergence of corruption networks that sustained stable smuggling
channels [through Yugoslavia]’.668
During the conflicts of the 1990s, much was made about the geopolitical spa-
cing of Yugoslavia, particularly about its position as a cultural and civilisational
crossroads. Little was made of Yugoslavia’s geo-criminal spacing. Connecting
the eastern Balkans and Turkey to western Europe, Yugoslavia was already a
main criminal thoroughfare.669 The liberalisation of movement of both goods
and people as communist border restrictions were lifted not only facilitated
the already established criminal routes through the western Balkans, but en-
couraged the creation of new ones. As state control over Yugoslavia’s borders
weakened, criminal and semi-criminal groups consolidated their influence, with
2002, p5
666‘The Security Sector and Organised Crime in Post-Communist State’ in Partners in
Crimes, p8
667Ibid.
668Ibid., p.12
669Peter Klebnikov, ‘Heroin Heroes,’ Mother Jones, January/February 2000
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help from security services and state administrators in customs and the po-
lice.670 Kosovo’s involvement with the European drugs trade, heroin most of
all, boomed in the 1990s and the cultivation of extensive criminal networks
in neighbouring states had significant cross-border consequences671 ‘The smug-
gling channels, developed in Croatia and Bosnia in 1990-1991, and in Kosovo
between 1994 and 1998,’ says Hajdinjak, ‘had an enormous impact on the pro-
cess of Yugoslavia’s disintegration.672
Running concurrently to many of these domestic and regional processes was
the development of an international Balkan network of organised crime. In Ams-
terdam, Sreten Jocić (aka Joca Amsterdam) was fast becoming Europe’s cocaine
king.673 He was associated with the Suča clan, and was later involved in the
infamous car bombing of Croatian journalists Ivo Pukanić and Niko Franjić.674
In the late 1980s, he formed relationships with Ljuba Zemunac and Arkan.675
They became three of the most powerful men in the Balkans. Serbia, nowhere
more than Belgrade, was consolidating as a criminal power base.
By the end of the 1980s, there were Serbian mafia groups spread as far as
the US and Australia.676 A global network of diaspora criminality, with an
impressive array of illegal business ventures, stretched throughout Europe, to
the Americas and Asia. Human trafficking began to surge throughout the ex-
communist Balkan states, particularly in Romania and Bulgaria, where Serbian
criminal groups operated. In Bulgaria Serbian mafia came to specialise in the
trafficking of young women for sex work, often against their will.677 These cor-
ridors of human trafficking, which ran through Bosnia, were exploited during the
war by para-criminal networks to smuggle refugees out of Yugoslavia’s borders
–for a price. In Finland, Serbian criminal organisations worked with Chinese
Triad cells to set up an illegal immigration racket, and under Milošević Chinese
670Hajdinjak, ‘Smuggling in Southeast Europe’, p6
671Francesco Strazzari, ‘L’Oeuvre au Noir: The Shadow Economy of Kosovo’s Independence,’
International Peacekeeping, 15:2 (2008) pp155-170, p158-60
672Hajdinjak, ‘Smuggling in Southeast Europe’, p13
673See profile, OCCRP People of Interest, Reporting Project, https://www.reportingpro-
ject.net/peopleofinterest/profil.php?profil=22
674Matteo Albertini, ‘Mafia links between the Balkans and Scandinavia; State of affairs,’ Ro-
manian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies (Revista Română de Studii Baltice şi Nordice),
4:2 (2012), pp111-150, p133
675‘Serbian Mob Boss’ Victims,’ Nacional, no.702, 28 April 2009
676On Australian connection, Marko Lopušina, ‘Srpska mafija u svetu (8); Australijski Klan,’
15 April 2005, http://www.novine.ca/feljton/feljton-0999.html
677for growth of human trafficking in the Balkans see Lucia Ovidia Vreja, ‘Human Trafficking
in South Eastern Europe,’ Connections: The Quarterly Journal, (Winter 2013), Institute for
the Political Study of defence and Military History, Ministry of defence, Romania, pp42-69
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triads and snakehead gangs established new strongholds in Serbia.678 In fact,
during Milošević’s rule, a Chinese population of approximately 100,000 consol-
idated in Belgrade, which then became a new transit point for illegal migrants
arriving on direct flights from Beijing; ‘From Belgrade, snakeheads moved their
people to Vienna via Vojvodina and Hungary, to Italy via Montenegro, and to
Austria and Italy via Zagreb.’679
The Pink Panthers, one of the world’s most infamous jewellery rings, is be-
lieved to have its roots in socialist Yugoslavia and the Zemun clan; the Panthers
are considered to have carried out robberies worth in excess of EUR 330 million
since 1999; hundreds of suspects are linked to more than 340 robberies in 35
countries.680
During the conflicts, there were rumoured to be groups in Denmark, Greece
and Italy –where the Zemun Clan had first begun in 1971. When war started,
these international criminal networks – many forged in the crisis of the 1980s–
formed the basis of many a Serbian paramilitary group or supported the Serbian
project though arms smuggling, money laundering and, other criminal activity.
At the same time still, Yugoslavia’s state security services were taking full ad-
vantage of the collapsing infrastructure. Much of Yugoslavia’s border adminis-
tration and state security services were run from Belgrade. On coming to power,
Slobodan Milošević inherited it all. The Milošević regime became inherently
criminal. Dejan Anastasijević describes it as ‘a criminal regime, whose whole
security sector was deeply involved in not just war crimes, but also in classic
forms of organised crime; drugs and weapons trafficking, extortion, kidnapping,
and targeted assassinations.’681 During the early 1990s, the Serbian state secur-
ity orchestrated much of the state’s smuggling operations. The Serbian DB had
been the direct successor of Yugoslavia’s security apparatus, ‘inheriting most of
its agents, assets and practices.’682 The Yugoslav DB had long been involved in
illicit operations that involved a close working relationship with the Yugoslav,
678‘Transnational Activities of Chinese Crime Organisations’, A Report Prepared by the
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the
Crime and Narcotics Center, Directorate of Central Intelligence, April 2003, p8
679Ibid.
680Project Pink Panthers, Interpol, http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Organized-
crime/Project-Pink-Panthers
681Dejan Anastasijević, ‘Organised Crime in the Western Balkans,’ First Annual Conference
on Human Security, Terrorism and Organised Crime in the Western Balkan Region, for the
HUMSEC Project, Ljubljana, 23-25 Nov. 2006; see p2; See also Glenny on Milošević personally
sanctioning cigarette smuggling, McMafia, p48
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Balkan, and international criminal underworld.683 Like the Yugoslav DB, the
MUP were funded in part through the sale of contraband that had been seized
by officials on the borders.684
When war started and economic sanctions were imposed upon FRY, oil had
to be obtained covertly to ensure the Serbian forces could continue. Such meth-
ods were greatly aided by Mihalj Kertes, former deputy at the DB being installed
as customs chief.685 Smuggling routes were established specifically to circum-
vent the UN sanctions. It is estimated that the Milošević government bartered
between $100 and $250 million worth of grain for oil each year with Russian
giant Gazprom in order to avoid hard currency transactions being traced by
international watchdogs.686 Another oil channel was the Lake Skadar “pipeline”
where up to 200 boats would make the short trip from Zeta in Montenegro
to Vraka in Albania each night, collecting oil for the Serbian black market.687
Belgrade-sponsored paramilitaries such as Arkan Ražnatović were used not only
for their propensity for violence but their criminal aptitude and links to serious
organised crime.
Working through covert and illegal networks enabled Milošević to publicly
support the arms embargo while ensuring that Serbian forces (regular and ir-
regular) remained well armed and the regime solvent. Thanks to a number of
high level investigations into organised crime circles in Belgrade, the signific-
ant overlap that existed between Milošević’s elite paramilitaries and criminal
networks has been made a little more explicit. The leaders of the Zemun Clan,
Belgrade’s most powerful and notorious criminal group during the Milošević and
post-Milošević years, were –more often than not– of paramilitary stock. Milorad
Legija Ulemek, who was involved in the assassination of Prime Minister Djindić,
was not only a member of the Tigers but also served as Arkan’s best man.688
Legija was later a leader of the Special Operations Unit (JSO) –as the Tigers
later became in Kosovo.689 His wife, Aleksandra Ivanović, before marrying Ule-
mek, was married to Nebojša Šuca Ðordević, a founding member of Arkan’s
683Ibid.,
684Ibid., Brady and Glenny also corroborate this
685IT-02-54, Milošević, Exhibit P427.62, ‘Record of Interview with Accused Slobodan
Milošević compiled on 01-Apr-01 before the investigating judge of the district court in Bel-
grade’
686Ibid., p14
687Ibid., p15; the value of the smuggled oil sometimes exceeded $1 million per day
688‘Milorad Ulemek, Luković; Person of Interest’, Reporting Project resource archive, OC-
CRP (online), https://reporting project.net/PeopleOfInterest/profil.php?profil=21
689Ibid.
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Tigers.690 During investigation of another Zemun murder in 2006, information
emerged that appeared to link Vojislav Šešelj to Zemun leader Dušan Šiptar
Spasojević by suggesting that Spasojević had been an informant for Šešelj.691
In 2010 rumours circulated that from his cell in The Hague, Šešelj had ordered
members of the Zemun Clan to assassinate future Serbian president Tomislav
Nikolić.692 The accuracy of these claims are, as with the majority of testimonies
associated with organised crime, all but impossible to corroborate.
The other national command structures all made pacts with criminal elements
on a more functional and basic level. Firstly, all national structures sanctioned
criminals to participate in their special military formations, either as subordin-
ates to direct command or were left to interpret their responsibilities as they
saw fit. Hadjinjak describes the process thus;
The war in which the Croatian, Bosnian Muslim and Kosovo
Albanian armies were fighting against a military superior and bet-
ter armed adversary contributed to the creation of a socio-political
environment where smuggling (especially of weapons) was not per-
ceived as harmful to the interests of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and Kosovo. On the contrary, smuggling came to be regarded as
essential for their survival.693
In the lead up to war, Croatia engaged in a dual policy of militarising their po-
lice while simultaneously illegally importing vast quantities of weaponry through
the international black market orchestrated by the Croatian leadership. When
the documentary was broadcast in January 1991 across Yugoslavia, it showed
Croatia’s defence Minister Špegelj seeking to buy 4,600 automatic rifles from
Hungary.694 The film, aired by Belgrade Television, fanned fears among Serbs
living in Croatia and heightened tensions across the federation but also con-
firmed, from the highest state authority, that the disregard for Yugoslav laws
690IT-02-54 Milošević, Witness 129-B, 16 and 17 April 2003
691‘Šešelj’s alleged ties with Zemun Gang revealed’, B92, 18 October 2006
692see local news coverage, in particular ‘SNS leader on assassination claims’, B92, 30 June
2010; and ‘Šešelj ordered murder of Nikolić from prison in The Hague’, Blic Online, 29 June
2010
693Hadjinjak, ‘Smuggling in Southeast Europe’, p8
694Chuck Sudetic, ‘Yugoslavia Tense Over TV Film on Croatian Arms’, The New York
Times, January 26, 1991
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and the purchase of arms was acceptable. In 1994, Branko Mamula, Yugoslav
Defence Minister in the late 1980s, said of the film:
It looks ridiculous when you speak about that today. That you
would allow someone to import such large quantities of arms –forty
thousand Kalashnikov rifles– and it is ridiculous to film it and not
to stop it. I mean it’s completely illogical er...unless you wanted to
see the country broken up.695
Diaspora connections provide a map of the global movement of arms into the
warring republics. Transfers were secured along international criminal networks
but also by state leaderships. Official investigation showed that the then Argen-
tinian President Carols Menem was directly involved in the sale of weapons to
Croatia in 1991 and 1992, after the UN arms embargo had come into force.696
Menem first authorised the sale of 6,500 tons of weapons to Panama that were
instead shipped to Croatia by a Croatian state-owned company.697 The follow-
ing year, Menem authorised a similar stunt supposedly selling weapons worth
$51 million to Bolivia that instead found their way to Croatia.698
Serbia relied on close relations with Russia to (illegally) supply their oil
while the Sarajevo leadership accepted covert aid from the Middle East. A key
facilitator for the Bosnian government in procuring arms was the Third World
Relief Agency (TWRA), a Vienna-based INGO. The Agency was used to transfer
$350 million to the Bosnian government between 1992 and 1995. According to
western intelligence, at least half was used to purchase weapons on the black
market.699 Donations to the Agency came from largely the Middle East, with
Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia making the greatest contributions, but Pakistan,
Turkey, Brunei and Malaysia were also tracked as donors.700 As well as Muslim
governments, extremist movements are also believed to have channeled funds to
Bosnia through the TWRA, including ‘the wealthy Saudi Arabian emigre Osama
Bin Laden.’701 Hasan Ćengić, a Bosnian official responsible for ‘negotiating
695Interview transcript with Branko Mamula, DoY, Doc.3/49, p24
696Hadjinjak, ‘Smuggling in Southeast Europe’, p9
697Ibid.
698Ibid.
699John Pomfret, ‘Bosnia’s Muslims Dodged Embargo’, Washington Post, 22 Sept. 1996
700Ibid.
701Ibid.
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clandestine arms deals’ was a member of the TWRA’s advisory board.702 In
1993, 30 Bosnian Muslim and Turkish arms dealers were arrested by German
police in the midst of an attempted purchase of $15 million work of light arms;
subsequent investigation implicated TWRA as financial broker of the deal.703
There were a number of minor organisations operating from Bosnia with
links to Muslim governments or Islamic movements. The identity-based nature
of the conflict attracted pro-Muslim funds and interest groups but their influence
has been retrospectively interpreted through the post-9/11 lens.704 Funds and
arms from Muslim governments had far more impact upon the course of the war
than the small number of jihadi fighters and mujahideen funds, and almost cer-
tainly contributed more directly to the rise in stricter Islamic practice in Bosnia
thanks to the Saudi funded mosques and charities promoting Wahabbism in the
post war years. Covert shipments from Iran in 1994 enabled the Bosnian army
to make limited gains against the Serbian forces. According to investigation
by the US Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Select Subcommittee,
‘after April 1994, the U.S. began to ignore –and some might argue, encourage–
violations of the UN embargo with respect to arms shipments to Bosnia.’705 In
1997, U.S Congress released a press statement titled ‘Clinton-Approved Iranian
Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base’ revealing that
Clinton ‘personally participated’ in the decision to allow Iranian shipments to
reach Bosnia through Croatia.706 Richard Holbrooke, appointed Assistant Sec-
retary of State for European Affairs in 1994, reportedly sought ways to bypass
the arms embargo.707 In the last eighteen months of the Bosnian war, there
were allegations of NATO and US complicity in the illegal shipment to the Bos-
nian government of arms, including military helicopters, from Turkey and the
702Andreas, ‘The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia,’ in (ed.) Mi-
chael A. Innes, Bosnian Security After Dayton: New Perspectives, Oxford University Press,
2006, p82
703Hadjinjak, ‘Smuggling in Southeast Europe’, p11
704For comprehensive but problematically un-nuanced list of organisations with radical con-
nections operating in Bosnia see Shaul Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, The Interdis-
ciplinary Center Herzilya Projects, Tel Aviv, 2009, p50-69
705‘Investigation into Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia: Report of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives together with Minority and Additional
Views’, House Report, October 9 1998, pp105-804; it is interesting that the US began to
sanction the arms shipments to the beleaguered Bosnian forces following the beginning of the
genocide in Rwanda, which Clinton was aware of but did not respond to.
706‘Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base’,
Congressional Press Release, United States Congress, 16 January 1997
707Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p308; see also Hoare, How Bosnia
armed, Saqi Books, 2004, p124
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Middle East.708 Hadjinjak estimates that the total value of weapons smuggled
into Bosnia between 1994 and 1995 reached between $500 and $800 million.709
By 1995, the Bosnian army was far better equipped than it had been at any
other point in the conflict.
The personal intervention of Holbrooke and Clinton can be seen as an in-
dicator of the frustrations among many in the international community at the
military imbalance the arms embargo had enforced upon the Yugoslav republics.
It should also be considered as an example of the elasticity of moral frameworks
in times of conflict, and of perceptions of permissible criminal behaviour for
an appropriate cause. The actions of the US or NATO, or of the Argentinian
President were part of a much wider narrative of criminal activity, to be sure,
but are nonetheless part of the same story.
The role of criminals in elite strategy extended from the more sophisticated
circles of organised crime to low level opportunism. Serbian forces that oper-
ated under the patronage of Belgrade, as we have seen, were usually armed by
the JNA, receiving weapons either from the disbanded Muslim or Croat TO,
or from the Yugoslav stockpiles. Other more local groups found other ways to
arm themselves. Dragoslav Bokan, a Serbian paramilitary leader of the White
Eagles, recalled “we always obtained arms on the ground, from the local popula-
tion who actually seized some arms from the army or obtained arms from their
resources.”710 Milan Martić, Knin police chief and paramilitary leader in Ser-
bian Krajina acquired arms along similar channels: “we bought some weapons
from Serbs working abroad, we got some from JNA patriot officers, secretly
from the storages, We got some from people we didn’t like, like Slovenia and
Croatia.”711
It was not unusual for criminals to lead paramilitary units. Some created
their own personal formations,712 but the bulk of petty criminals that actively
participated in the wars simply joined the ranks of irregular units. Criminality
was endemic in paramilitary activity. Ethnic cleansing included forced economic
transfer from victim group to perpetrator. Paramilitaries would remove all
items of value from the homes they were ‘cleansing’; as described in the Los
708for fuller discussion of arms shipments allegedly received by Bosnia at this time see ibid.,
p308-09
709Hadjinjak, ‘Smuggling in Southeast Europe’, p11
710Bokan, DoY, Doc.3/8, 13.oct.1994, p.4
711Ibid., p.7
712Čolović, ‘A criminal-national hero?’ p253
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Angeles Times, ‘when they entered a...house, a couple of Tigers would head
for the kitchen and start moving out kitchen appliances. Others would go for
the television and the VCR. Somebody else would start digging in the garden,
looking for buried jewellery.’713 According to an unverified document from the
Serbian DB, there was an agreement between Arkan and the Serbian Security
Services at the time of the Croatian conflict that detailed how their plunder
from Vukovar should be apportioned; ‘For the needs of the unit, keep 2,500,000
German Marks and 15 kilograms of gold...[and] 3,876,000 dollars, and 430,600
Swiss Francs and 38 kilograms of gold will be taken by our agents.’714
It is worth noting here that according to the testimony of Witness B-129,
the former secretary of the Tigers, when the Tigers were on operation they
also deployed their own military police unit as part of the Serbian Volunteer
Guard structure and made up of its members for the purpose of preventing the
Tigers/SDG ‘from looting and from mistreating the civilian population, from
getting drunk and so on...to act in any way contrary to the code of conduct of
the SDG.’715 These military police units were then disbanded when the action
was terminated. No further information regarding this practice is available so it
is impossible to know to what extent it was implemented and with what degree
of conviction. What is clear is evidence of the systematic looting that the
Tigers and other paramilitary groups engaged in. Given Belgrade’s enthusiasm
for looting and war bounty as an economically viable practice, it is more likely
that what B-129 described was the monitoring of criminal activity for personal
gain.
The dual role of Serbian irregulars as combatants and agents of the black
market was recorded in a report on paramilitary activity in Croatia, submitted
by the prosecution during the Milošević trial:
From the start of the war in 1991, a large number of various
paramilitary units and groups were engaged on the territory of the
RSK/Republic of Serbian Krajina. None of them were [sic] com-
pletely independent, and in various ways they were connected to
713Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p163
714Roger Cohen, ‘Serb Says Files Link Milosevic to War Crimes in Bosnia,’ New York Times
13 April 1995
715IT-02-54, Milošević, 16 April 2003, p19439; presumably the civilian population refers to
local Serb communities, although this is unclear; Arkan’s son also claims that “one of the
deeds my father most detested was when a member of his paramilitary force would steal
and racketeer in his name.” Vojin Ražnatović, Stories of my father, self-published through
CreateSpace Publishing, 2014, p152
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certain structures in the Republic of Serbia. In agreement with and
as tasked by these structures, they frequently performed specific
tasks, including the extraction of natural and other resources in the
said territories (tree felling, petroleum extractions), black racketeer-
ing of cereal crops and other foodstuffs and going as far as open
looting and the worst forms of crime and individual actions of ter-
rorism against the local population.716
The wartime report details the case of Slobodan Boca Medić and his paramilit-
ary unit, which numbered between 150-200.
The unit was engaged in securing terminals and smuggling pet-
roleum from Ðeletovci, and more recently they have been work-
ing intensively on felling oak trees, which they smuggle into Ser-
bia via private channels using lorries from Serbia...and they share
the profits with their sponsors in the SBiZS area (Slavonia, Baranja
and Western Srem) and Serbia. Medić is also involved in the black-
marketeering of cigarettes.717
Unlike many paramilitary leaders who had criminal pasts, the report suggests
that before the war Medić was ‘an ordinary worker’ who was then able to invest
his war profits in ‘a house in Divčibari, a flat in Novi Sad, and a farm in the
village of Stavanovici’.718
Yet it was not only the Balkan combatants who took part in mercenary
activities. A young British fighter with the Croats interviewed for the docu-
mentary The Dogs of War admitted to having “liberated two televisions.”719
Similarly, Krott describes how many international irregulars were involved in
petty theft and looting.720 The words of another British volunteer perhaps sum
up the banality behind these actions better than more culturally rooted anthro-
pological explanations: “What most soldiers want to have is good memorabilia.
716IT-02-54 Milošević; Exhibit P643.19, ‘Report on the paramilitary and the link between
these units operating in Croatia and Bosnia and the Serbian MUP’ - origin of report unknown;
submitted by the Prosecution
717Ibid., brackets added
718Ibid.
719Dogs of War, BBC; one of his comrades (not old enough to have fought in Vietnam)
added, “it’s like Vietnam –it’s your own law.”
720Krott, Save the last bullet, p179
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It gives you a standing, it gives you your identity... [It says;] this is what I’m
capable of doing.”721
Thus three, somewhat overlapping, forms of looting and plunder were present
during the violence: Some combatants sought trophies and symbolic acquisi-
tions. Some members of the public in the affected region and local paramilitaries
took advantage of the chaos, carrying out individual acts of opportunism. The
third and most dominant strain was the intentional destruction or confiscation
of property by regular and irregular forces as part of the strategies of ethnic
cleansing. The destruction of the National Library in Sarajevo, for example,
could have no military benefit; nor could the mass destruction of properties
by the HVO in Mostar. Together, Croat and Muslim forces destroyed fourteen
hundred mosques.722 The evidence given by B-192 confirms that the elite Ser-
bian paramilitary formations systematically confiscated Muslim property for a
purpose beyond personal gain or wanton criminality, which shines light on an
additional dimension of the ethnic cleansing strategy. Üngör and Mehmet Pola-
tel have documented how the dispossession of the Ottoman Armenians formed
part of the genocidal strategy and process, also implemented by a coalition of
state and paramilitary entities.723 Unlike in Bosnia, the confiscation of Ar-
menian property was largely fulfilled through a centralised bureaucracy (there
were 33 commissions across the country as well as local administrations that
were responsible for inventorying, liquidating, appropriating and allocated Ar-
menian property).724 We know that local RS administration was involved in
transferring cleansed houses to Serbs., however, B-192’s testimony and the Or-
der of November 1991 indicates that that criminal processes of looting were
devolved to the irregular combatants, suggesting that local authorities and ir-
regulars worked together to fulfil orders from above. As with the implementation
of the violent human rights abuses, by devolving implementation Serbian elites
ensured the destruction of Muslim communities was achieved in a manner that
further reinforced conceptualisations of the conflict as being driven by local and
spontaneous forces.
721Dogs of War, BBC
722Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, p3; Bosnian Muslim forces engaged in reprisals but, whereas
the intention of Serb and Croat strategies was the destruction or removal of Muslim com-
munities from geographic regions, the Sarajevo never pursued widespread policies of ethnic
cleansing.
723Üngör and Polatel, Confiscation and Destruction
724Ibid. p66
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Many Serbian paramilitaries and volunteers were known at the time to be crim-
inals, but it is only those who were most closely associated with the DB or Šešelj
whose pasts have been investigated and documented.725 Arkan’s history as a
jewellery thief and assassin is well known but not exceptional. Before returning
to Serbia to fight, Captain Dragan earned a string of convictions in Australia
relating to prostitution and the running of a brothel.726 Djordje Giska Božović
was another international criminal who became commander of the Serbian Vo-
lunteer Guard at the beginning of the war in Croatia. He was killed in the
autumn of that year. At his funeral, in newspaper articles, and in a book hur-
riedly published after his death, Giska is described as ‘a new knight in the heaven
of the Serbian people.’727 Tuta Naletilić, the Croatian paramilitary, came from
the mafia underground and had lived and operated abroad before returning to
Yugoslavia in 1990. In the war he was involved in serious war crimes in Mostar
and the surrounding area. As discussed in the previous chapter, his name con-
tinues to be celebrated in the local graffiti art in and around Mostar and during
the war was considered something of a Robin Hood hero. His partner Vinko
also had a criminal record before joining the Croatian forces. These are only a
few examples of what was a dominant trend.
State structures utilised ordinary criminals as well as members of organised
criminal networks. Bralo was conscripted into the HVO in 1991 where he served
until February 1993, when he was detained for killing one of his neighbours.728
Bralo was released on the evening of 15 April 1993 from Kaonik prison in order
to participate in the HVO attack of Ahmići, a small village in the Lašva valley
in central Bosnia. On his release, Bralo went to the headquarters of the Jokers
–the HVO-led paramilitary group– to prepare for the following day’s assault;
he was given weapons and a uniform, effectively becoming a member of the
Jokers.729 (He was twenty-five.) Bralo pleaded guilty to all eight of the charges
contained within his indictment, including persecutions on political, racial and
religious grounds; murder; torture; outrages on personal dignity, including rape;
and unlawful confinement. He was found guilty of war crimes, crimes against
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, with a sentence of
725IT-03-67 Šešelj, Case Brief, p17 and 20
726Bormann, ‘The Real Captain Dragan’
727Čolović, ‘A criminal-national hero?’ p256
728see case IT-95-17 Bralo, particularly Judgement, p16
729IT-95-17 Bralo, Judgement, p4
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20 years.730 In one incident, he oversaw the summary execution of 14 Muslim
civilians, nine of whom were children. His defence argued that Bralo was used as
a weapon of war by his superiors in the HVO between April and May 1993731.
The case provides insight into the difficulties of determining both individual
mens rea and command control, both in our present study here and in legal
contexts. The case reveals a willingness on the part of Croat authorities to
induct a known murderer into a special purpose paramilitary group tasked with
ethnic cleansing.
7 A terrorist diaspora
Our name is our programme, and we call ourselves Drina. Our entire pro-
gramme is there. No more, no less. This is a programme for the millennia and
for all Croats.
Vjekoslav Luberić
Included in the criminal and irregular dynamics were criminals and mercenaries
who travelled to the collapsing Yugoslavia from the diasporas. The Croatian
diaspora being larger, more radically politicised and better organised perhaps
contributed their greater number, but Serbs also returned from around the globe.
From the moment Ustaše had fled Croatia at the end of the Second World War,
the Croatian diaspora had included a militant network of political extremists
that endeavoured to radicalise their communities through the ‘institutionalisa-
tion of quasi-military structures’.732 The generation who had left the NDH had
settled in West Germany, Franco’s Spain, South America, the US, Canada, and
Australia, and in the 1990s these were the countries where many of the most
radical international pro-Croat volunteers came from. However, where as the
radical elements of the Serbian diaspora and Serbian international crime net-
works generally supported the national leaderships and tended to be integrated
into the loose coalition pursuing state-led strategy, the radical Croatian diaspora
did not. Thus, the pro-Serb irregulars from the diaspora and paramilitaries with
their own criminal power base were loyal to the central authorities while many
Croat volunteers from the diaspora fought for the centuries old dream rather
730Ibid., p32
731Ibid., p15, para 43
732Mate Nikola Tokić, ‘Landscapes of conflict: unity and disunity in post-Second World War
Croatian émigré separatism,’ European Review of History, 16:5 (2009), pp739-753, p744
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than the Zagreb government. The result was an extremist corps of foreign ir-
regulars, many of whom had belonged to terrorist organisations that had been
fighting for Croatian independence since 1945.
The Croatian diaspora had always been fractured and disjointed, and al-
though it remained so, throughout the 1960s and 1970s radicals increasingly
embraced political violence and terrorism: Croatian terrorists averaged one act
of political violence every five weeks including more than 50 assassinations or as-
sassination attempts, 40 bombings of public buildings and monuments, and two
aircraft highjackings.733 Hrvatski Narodni Otpor or Otpor (Croatian National
Resistance) had been created in 1957, when former Ustaša general Vjekoslav
Luburić broke with NDH poglavnik Ante Pavelić. The split led to a cleavage
in Croatian nationalism that even in the 1990s ‘war of independence’ could not
be reconciled. Luburić, commander of the Jasenovac concentration camp, fled
to Spain after 1945 where he led a European division of Pavelić’s Ustaše. The
two parted ways when Luberić insisted an independent Croatia must include
all Bosnia to the River Drina, parts of Serbia proper and the Sandžak whereas
Pavelić was rumoured to favour a more pragmatic approach.734 For Luburić:
“Our name is our programme, and we call ourselves Drina. Our entire pro-
gramme is there. No more, no less. This is a programme for the millennia and
for all Croats.”735 From within the diaspora communities there came was a split
between Otpor supporters that dreamed of a Croatia to the Drina, and therefore
included vast areas of Herzegovina, and decedents of the Pavelić lineage that,
though radical, favoured pragmatism. Both lines pursued strategies of interna-
tional terrorism. There were probably never more than a few thousand members
of Otpor but the group’s evolution, and that of rival groups in South America
and West Germany ‘is key to tracking the ideas, personnel, and strategy that
link the distinct but interwoven strains of Croat nationalist activity over half a
century.’736 Certainly, throughout the 1970s, Ustaša and separatist circles were
operating in Spain under the tacit approval of Franco. It was during these years
733Ibid., p739; international reportage contains numerous and regular articles detailing ter-
rorist activities committed in pursuit of an independent Croatian state.
734Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile, p70; Robert B. McCormick, Croatia Under Ante
Pavelić: America, the Ustaše and Croatian Genocide, MacMillan, 2014, for the significance
of the Drina in Croatian nationalism see Ivo Goldstein, ‘The Boundary on the Drina –the
meaning and the development of the mythologem,’ in (ed.) P. Kolsto Myths and Boundaries
in South Eastern Europe, Hurst, 2005; and Carmichael, ‘Watch on the Drina’
735Perica et. al, Political Myths in the Former Yugoslavia and Successor States, Institute
for Historic Justice and Reconciliation, 2011, p49
736Hockenos, Homeland Calling, p69
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that Otpor established links with the IRA and la Cosa Nostra, and with the
Croatian mafia in San Pedro, LA; contacts which would prove invaluable to the
Croatian paramilitary networks during the 1990s.
From the 1970s, a radical Croatian milieu in West Germany began develop-
ing quasi-militant structures that advocated radical separatist politics through
violence. The young, dissatisfied workers that travelled to West Germany
were drawn into what were essentially paramilitary organisations; new mem-
bers were ‘required to sign a statement declaring themselves ready, should the
need arise, “to fight for the establishment of the Independent State of Croa-
tia.” ’737 Tokić cites the example of Essen, an industrial town in Germany, where
a former Ustaše lieutenant ‘oversaw a system of contacts, which organised doc-
uments, living arrangements and work opportunities for several thousand Croa-
tian émigrés,’ with the intention of recruiting young, unmarried nationalists
into “Croatian Divisions.”738 The division ‘trained at weekends in preparation
for the “coming conflict” against socialist Yugoslavia.’739 A militant scene had
also formed in Sweden and was involved in the assassination of the Yugoslav
ambassador in 1971. The presence of German and Sweden right-wing extrem-
ists and neo-nazis in pro-Croat volunteer formations strongly suggests that the
militant Croatian groups operating in those countries in the 1980s had become
integrated into the European Catholic axis of fascist paramilitary networks.740
The case of Miro Barešić reveals the complex networks that existed within
the Croatian diaspora and later were to influence paramilitary processes once
conflict broke out: In 1968, in the midst of Croatia’s national revival, Barešić,
aged 18, refused to enrol for military service on the grounds that Croatia was
ruled from Belgrade.741 After he had served his time in prison, Barešić escaped
to Italy and made contacts with members of the fascist Croatian Statehood
Movement, an offshoot from Otpor. Barešić, was then involved in the assassina-
tion of the Yugoslav ambassador in Sweden. During his trial, Barešić said of the
unfortunate envoy “I hated him so much that I could have cut him into pieces
because of the thousands of Croats he killed in the 1940s.”742 He was released
from prison as a result of demands made by Croatian nationalists who high-
737Tokić, ‘Landscapes of conflict,’ p745
738Ibid.
739Ibid.
740See Miroslav Mareš and Richard Stojar, ‘Extreme-Right Paramilitary Units in Eastern
Europe’, in (ed.) Andrea Mammone, et. al., Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary
Europe: From Local to Transnational, Routledge, 2012
741For full biography, Hockenos, Homeland Calling, p64-5
742‘Croat tells court of hatred for murdered envoy’, The Times, 30 June 1971, p.7
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jacked a Swedish plane and rerouted to Spain. He then travelled to Paraguay,
where he trained military commando units, or death squads, for the dictator,
Alfredo Stroessner. Barešić, now Tony Sarić, worked for the Paraguayan foreign
service as the ambassador’s body guard in the US.
Barešić’s terrorist career was extensive but not out of keeping with the na-
tionalist diaspora.743 In the US, from 1975-81, Otpor had plotted to bomb and
assassinate Croatian moderates as a way of applying accute pressure on the
community for financial support.744 The famous Otpor RICO trials included
charges for over fifty acts of extortion where letters had been sent from West
Germany to Croatian nationalists in the US demanding contributions between
$5,000 and $10,000: Payments were to be made to a post office in Asuncian,
Paraguay –owned by Miro Barešić.745
When fighting in Croatia broke out, Barešić returned to his homeland where,
despite Interpol warrants for his arrest, he was given positions in the Croatian
Army. Although this made him a regular combatant, his record as a prolific
international terrorist and known criminal is noteworthy, while not being ex-
ceptional. The Barešić story ended with his death in Krajina in 1991, Tudjman
posthumously decorated him as ‘Knight,’ and his statue being blessed by the
Archbishop of Zadar.746 In the biography of one man, the complex international
networks of communication, radicalisation and finance are exposed, revealing an
evolution from a web of extremist cells outside of Yugoslav state control to a
structure of patronage for the Croatian national project.
Tudjman’s actions in Bosnia suggest that he did not share a die-hard com-
mitment to Croatia’s Drina border. Those that did clearly thought so too as in
the lead up to war, the HOS emerged and other extremists began arming their
own paramilitary formations, not to support the state’s objectives but to rad-
icalise them. At the same time, Pavelić’s pragmatic decendants recognised that
743After Croatian nationalists highjacked a plane and demanded his release, Barešić travelled
to Paraguay where he trained military commando units, or death squads, for the dictator,
Alfredo Stroessner. Barešić, now Tony Sarić, worked for the Paraguayan foreign service as the
ambassador’s body guard in the US. Barešić was arrested in 1983 for his part in the large-scale
racketeering that “declared war on almost every moderate Croatian group in the [USA] which
wanted independence but not through violence.” see Christopher Dickey, ‘Terrorist Worked As
Ambassador’s Bodyguard Here; Ambassador’s Bodyguard Was Croatian Terrorist,’ Washing-
ton Post, July 25, 1979; and ‘Radical Resistance’, The FBI Files, Season 6, episode 16 (101),
November 2004; ‘U.S. Seeks To Extradite Terrorist To Sweden’, Associated Press, December
28, 1979
744For example, Leonard Buder, ‘Bomb Shatters Windows in Courthouse Downtown’, New
York Times, January 24, 1981
745The Federal Reporter, West Publishing Company, St. Paul [Minn.], 1983, p49
746IT-95-11, Milan Martić, (ICTY), 12 July 2006, p6121
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Tudjman was a pragmatist also, leading to a consolidation of right-wing support
for the new government. Thus consequences of the split between Luburić and
Pavelić influenced the early Croat military and paramilitary structures, and pre-
vented the Zagreb government from uniting the more spontaneous dimension of
the irregular dynamics under. Perhaps as a result of his pragmatism, Tudjman
rarely disabused the extreme right and honoured their irregulars who died.
As a result of the radical international Croat networks, HOS counted within
its ranks an assorted collection of foreign fighters. Whether mercenaries, crimin-
als or true believers, the internationals were regarded as national heroes in much
the same way as their native comrades– sometimes even more so.747 The For-
eign Volunteers of the Croatian Homeland War (Udruga Stranih Dragovoljaca
Domovinskog Rata –or USDDR) believes that 481 volunteers from thirty-five
countries fought in pro-Croat formations.748 The actions of those who died
continue to be celebrated by loyalists, thus ensuring threads of emotional and
historical connection are maintained between the homeland and diaspora, and
sympathetic communities abroad, many of whom have been given a second life
online since the mid-1990s. An example is that of Thomas Crowley, 1949 -1995,
who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Petar Zrniski and Fran Krsto
Frankopan for his contribution to the defence of Croatia.749 The medal was
awarded to Crowley’s family on 12 December 2012 by the Office of the Presid-
ent of Croatia.750
Details of foreign fighters and the parts they played in connecting internal
structures with international criminal networks are muddled to say the least but
figures emerge such as Tony Cascarino (alias), a supposed IRA paramilitary who
became a member of the HOS. Cascarino is alleged to have had connections to
the Sicilian mafia and was linked to facilitating Ante Gotovina’s hiding before
his trial at the ICTY, but there is little reliable evidence to support the nar-
rative.751 Cascarino published his account of the war online but attracts little
747Although Danish volunteer Allan Knedsen recalled that at the time animosity towards
foreign fighters was evident; “the HV guys, the soldiers, didn’t like us because we were foreign-
ers who had come to fight in their country” IT-98-34, Naletilić and Martinović, 13 November
2001, p5993
748http://www.croatia.org/crown/articles/9991/1/481-foreign-volunteers-from-
35-countries-defended-Croatia-in-1991-1995.html; also see Nir Arielli, ‘In Search of Meaning;
Foreign Volunteers in the Croatian Armed Forces, 1991-95,’ Contemporary European History,
Vol.12 No.1 (2012), pp.1-17
749‘Čepo: HOS-ovci su Podrugu samo instrument za proboj u Sabor,’ Dalmacija News, 27
January 2015
750News Bulletin, 12 December 2012, Ured Predsjednika Rupublike Hrvatske (Office of the
President of Croatia), 12 December 2012
751“ ‘Call me Cascarino”, says gun for hire’, Irish Echo,17 Feb 2014; Cascarino denies this,
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attention beyond a narrow following of IRA and Croatian extremists and cannot
be considered either definitive or genuine.752 Yet the criminal networks at work
during the Yugoslav wars did often involve international connections that were
rooted in past relationships of historical or political complementarity, even if
the driving force was pragmatism or gain.
8 Assessing the criminal dynamics
It is evident is that all the national command structures used criminals to
supplement and support their military or political objectives, and clear too that
the criminal dimensions of the conflicts should be considered as a different kind
of irregular dynamic.The parts played by criminals in chaotic military-civilian
crises are many. The challenge of this research has been unravelling the threads
that make up the intwined mass of complex relationships between national elites,
local powers, social actors, and criminal networks. The most difficult relation-
ships to deconstruct and expose are those that existed, and in some cases persist,
between national stakeholders and professional criminals. Corruption remains a
significant problem in the western Balkans, a legacy from the communist era as
well as the 1990s. Trials are halted, rumours of witness intimidation circulate,
and Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo and Albania have struggled with transparency and
anti-corruption. What is more, the ten years following the Bosnian war saw a
spate of assassinations that wiped out many of the best known criminals.
Brady suggests that there was a self-perpetuating logic of the war-time crim-
inal enterprises;
the criminal economy occurring during the war actually created
in itself a self-sustaining logic to the war, as it provided a significant
income for many. In addition, it has been suggested that the pro-
longed war was a means of protecting the war-time criminals from
possible investigation post-war.753
Hajdinjak goes further, arguing that the root cause for the conflicts was or-
see ‘Ante Gotovina,’ www.cascarino.homestead.com
752Ibid.
753Brady, ‘Organised Crime in Bosnia’, p14
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ganised crime; ‘war provided the perfect smokescreen behind which the ruling
elites and the criminal underworld grabbed total political and economic power
in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.’754 This ana-
lysis though valuable for its elevation of the issue of criminality during the war
to a more prominent position, overemphasises the intentionality of the criminal
actors. The primary forces of the Balkan dissolution came from political cap-
itals willing to utilise both ethnicity and criminality to fulfil their ambitions.
Andreas similarly overemphasises the determining role petty criminality had on
the nature of the war. Citing a number of articles from Belgrade’s VREME,
Andreas stresses that ‘[m]any fighters from Serbia were wooed to Bosnia by the
prospect of looting and selling stolen goods back on the black market.’755 This
approach to the Bosnian war was popularised by Kaldor in her theory of new
wars. Using Bosnia as one of her primary case studies, Kaldor set out that
new wars occur in situations in which state revenues decline be-
cause of the decline of the economy as well as the spread of crimin-
ality, corruption and inefficiency, violence is increasingly privatised
both as a result of organised crime and the emergence of paramilitary
groups, and political legitimacy is disappearing.756
All Kaldor’s factors were present in Bosnia, and no doubt elsewhere, but to place
the onus of war on what she refers to as the privatisation of violence and the
disintegration of political legitimacy is to obscure the ultimate responsibility of
those who engineered the Bosnian campaign; the Serbian political and military
leaderships. The privatisation of violence was not a result of the paramilitar-
ies and organised crime networks. Their very presence during the early 1990s
was sanctioned by the Serbian state in order to facilitate and pursue territorial,
political, and economic gains in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To
overemphasise the criminal dimension of the Croatian and Bosnian wars is akin
to overemphasising the role of ethnic hatreds and viewing the prevalence of the
paramilitaries as evidence of Balkan fratricide. Like the paramilitaries, organ-
ised crime was supported from Belgrade, and to a lesser extent from Zagreb,
754Hajdinjak, ‘The Root Cause of Instability in the Balkans: Ethnic Hatred or Transborder
Crime?’ for International Centre for Minority Studies and Interculture Relations, 2004, Sofia,
see p2
755Andreas, ‘The clandestine political economy of war and peace in Bosnia’, International
Studies Quarterly, 48, pp29-51, 2004, p35
756Kaldor, New Wars, p6
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Pale, and Sarajevo, in order to support the war efforts but also to avoid the
circumspect eye of international watchdogs and, in effect, further devolve ac-
countability for the crimes that were committed.
Further, much of the contraband traffic (especially heroin) was disrupted and
rerouted as a result of the war meaning that many of the most powerful crim-
inal networks in the western Balkans lost out to their competitors in Romania
and Bulgaria.757 Nevertheless, in conflicts where authority has been devolved,
Andreas is correct to point out that ‘military success often hinges on entre-
preneurial success in the murky underworld of smuggling.’758 Undoubtedly, the
Serbian forces held advantages in their control of and collaboration with traf-
ficking networks from Belgrade.759 Thus, the many roles played by organised
and petty criminals in the Balkan conflicts must be considered central to any
social, economic, political, or military analysis.
The state administrations in Bosnia, Croatia, and especially in Serbia, act-
ively collaborated with petty and serious criminals as part of their war effort,
transforming those individuals– and the cultures they represented– into bastions
of patriotism and power. The legacy of Serbia’s patriotic mafia crippled the
country’s political recovery throughout the 2000s. During the trial for Prime
Minister Djindjić’s murder in 2003, it was established that members of the
Zemun clan (responsible for the assassination) had received ‘special training
courses’ from the Serbian state security services and that ‘the agency routinely
provided protection for the gang members.’760
Rumours of underground mafia organisation Preventiva indicate the group
received substantial funding from the RS administration and is said to have
protected prominent war crimes suspects including Karadžić and Milan Lukić,
assisting in their hiding while they were on the run and reportedly assassin-
ating witnesses threatening to testify against them.761 An intelligence source
claimed that ‘money obtained from narcotics smuggling was vital in supporting
Karadžić’s life as a fugitive and provided Lukić with steady income.’762 It is
suggested that shortly before his arrest, Lukić fell out with members of Pre-
757Anastasijević, ‘Organised Crime in the Western Balkans’ p3
758Andreas, ‘The clandestine political economy in Bosnia’, p30
759Andreas, Blue Helmets, p23
760Anastasijević, ‘Organised Crime in the Western Balkans’, p5
761On RS government financing Preventiva see ‘RS Government financed Preventiva Opera-
tion Group and Zeljko Janković’, Dani, 6 February 2004; on alleged connections to Karadžić
and Lukić see Ed Vulliamy and Nerma Jelačić, ‘The Warlord of Višegrad,’ The Guardian, 11
August 2005 (this article was used as case evidence in the Lukić trial:; also Rob Miller, ‘The
fight for justice in Bosnia goes on,’ The Guardian, 16 August 2010
762Jelačić et al., ‘Serb police target Karadžić informer’
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ventiva, leading to a quarrel and a shoot-out between Lukić and Karadžić’s
bodyguards.763 The fight was reportedly over a drugs shipment and the size of
the cut in profits that Lukić would receive.764
The rise of petty, violent and organised crime is a common problem in
post-conflict states, commonly attributed to the prevalence of weapons, black
economies, poverty, and the grim options facing affected populations. The
case of Yugoslavia suggests that in conflicts where traditional power structures
–whether military, political, or economic– have been subverted in favour of more
devolved apparatus, the aftermath of criminalisation is likely to spread further
and deeper. After Dayton, arms smuggling through the Balkans increased.765
Former soldiers and paramilitaries continued to operate together with organised
crime groups –and as we have seen, sometimes were organised crime groups– in
order to traffic their war-time stockpiles to other paramilitary conflicts includ-
ing the IRA and ETA.766 In 2002, according to research undertaken by the US
Library of Congress, Croatian arms dealers trafficked the cocaine they received
in payment for arms, with the protection of ‘their connections with the Croatian
Democratic Union (HDZ)’.767
The criminality of the war cast long shadows in Bosnia too. The smuggling
routes into the country had become well established; as arms had come in,
people had paid to be smuggled out. In the wake of the war, human trafficking
became a serious problem orchestrated by local criminal networks together with
international personnel, including those who wore blue helmets.
Organised crime groups operating today in the western Balkans are ‘mul-
tiethnic, cross-border, and well integrated in corresponding European counter-
parts.’768 Organized crime is a rational business. It would be possible to say
that like the Italian and Sicilian mafia, organised crime groups operating across
former Yugoslavia were particularly ‘responsive to culture and are patterned by
tradition’ but during and in the wake of the war years, the pursuit of financial
gain and power underpinned the criminal strategy.769 That some members of
763Ibid.
764Ibid.; The ICTY has not investigated drug smuggling nor has evidence of such activities
been presented to the court.
765Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics, Traffickers,
Weapons Profliterators, and Organised Crime Networks in Western Europe, A Study Pre-
pared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement
with the United States Government December 2002, p10
766Ibid., p11
767Ibid.
768Anastasijević, ‘Organised Crime in the Western Balkans’, p3
769On mafia families, see Ianni and Ianni, (1972), quoted in Alan Wright, Organised Crime,
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criminal groups were also or had been members of paramilitary units in Croa-
tia, Bosnia, and later in Kosovo, inevitably led to a more ideological or patriotic
dimension to the criminal enterprise. Thus, some combatants presented them-
selves in Belgrade as ultra-patriots, just as Juka and Ćelo were happy to be seen
as Sarajevo’s protectors; it almost certainly was not bad for business. During
the war in Bosnia, illegal trade between paramilitaries of different sides was
much discussed by journalists and was often interpreted as further evidence of
the immorality and illogical nature of the war, but trading with the enemy is as
old as war itself;770 There is growing evidence to suggest that it is a practice as
common in contemporary civil wars as it was in traditional interstate wars.771
The UN decision to impose an arms embargo upon all parties and sanctions
upon FRY meant that a significant reliance on illicit trade was necessary to
sustain the war efforts, and in Sarajevo to sustain civilian life. The presence
of so many relatively wealthy international personnel created an easy market
for easy profit, the darker side of which came to light in the post war years
and saw multilevel international collaboration with human trafficking for the
sex industry. While established smuggling routes and the institutional corrup-
tion of the Yugoslav (later Serbian) DB facilitated Serbia’s criminalisation but
Milošević ‘intentionally merged’ Serbia’s law-enforcing institutions with organ-
ised crime.772
Eric Hobsbawm wrote that ‘[t]he population hardly ever helps the authorities
catch the peasants’ bandit, but on the contrary, protects him’.773 In the 1990s,
mass media and war-time culture was able to further elevate the brigand who
committed crimes in the name of the nation to that of a protector. Even the
petty crime of trading on the black market acquired deeper cultural significance.
Willan Publishing, 2013, p7
770On mercenary acts see John F. Burns, ‘Renegades Help Bosnia By Helping Themselves,
New York Times, July 5, 1993; Rieff describes a ‘feral’ society in Sarajevo, Slaughterhouse,
p122; unpublished research undertaken by Chuck Sudetic found that the flow of many com-
mercial goods into Sarajevo towards the end of the war was achieved through agreements
between the Serbian and Bosnian (Muslim) forces see Andreas, Blue Helmets, p46-48 (and
ftn.10)
771Jack S Levy and Katherine Barbieri, ‘Trading with the enemy during war-time’, Security
Studies, 13:3, (2004), pp1-47, p2
772Anastasijević, ‘Organised crime in the western Balkans’; By the end of the Milošević
the grey economy had grown from in 1989 10% to 80%, J. S. Sörensen, ‘The Shadow Eco-
nomy, War and State Building: Social Transformation and Re-stratification in an Illiberal
Economy (Serbia and Kosovo)’ Journal of Contemporary European Studies 14:3, December
2006, pp317-351, p236
773Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p14
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Part IV
Bellum omnium contra omnes? Looking
at local networks of command & control
In international law, a levée en masse is defined as a situation when:
[t]he inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on
the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the
invading troops, without having had time to organised themselves
in accordance with Article 1 shall be regarded as belligerents if they
carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war774
Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Regulations requires such belligerents
1. to be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. to have fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance;
3. to carry arms openly; and
4. to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
In countries where militia of volunteer corps constitute the army, or
form part of it, they are included under the denomination “army.”775
[T]hose who did not have any say on what was happening and
who were ready to make sacrifices actually suffered the most and
took the greatest burden, and I think that they would be ready to
do so again, even though...the[y] were not only betrayed but even
accused by those who make decisions in our names and who make
us wage our wars over and over again.
Dragoslav Bokan
Paramilitary leader of the White Eagles
As well as the state sponsored and state sanctioned paramilitary groups, there
were a substantial number of local armed groups. These ranged from small
bands of local men, perhaps from the same village, who carried arms and gave
7741907 Hague Regulations, Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The
Hague, 18 October 1907. Annex to the Convention: Regulations respecting the laws and cus-
toms of war on land - Section I : On belligerents - Chapter I : The qualifications of belligerents
- Regulations: Art. 2
775Ibid., Art. 1; see also 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 4(6)
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themselves a name, sometimes cultivating their own visual identity through cos-
tumes and mannerisms or by imitating others. The Croatian conflict involved
regions rather than the nation’s entire geography, inevitably bringing local dy-
namics to the fore. The Bosnian war was, as Gerard Toal and Carl Dahlman put
it,“ ‘mediated by localities’ rather than determined by them.776 The all encom-
passing social and economic dislocation of war pulled many young, disaffected
men into the paramilitary orbit. To a certain extent, the emergence of local
volunteer irregulars should be seen as a visual climax of the multidimensional
social, cultural, economic, and political processes that escalated throughout the
twilight years of the 1980s (as described in Part II). Unlike the political and mil-
itary elites, who tended to be pragmatic and strategic in their decision making,
local commanders were likely to be more ideologically fanatical, but oppor-
tunism and pursuit of personal gain was also common. Take Dragoslav Bokan,
a Serbian paramilitary volunteer from Belgrade. Bokan described himself as a
“national romantic” who understood the conflict as “an uncompromising struggle
with the enemy and [sic] was not prepared to make ideological compromises.”777
The socio-political dynamics of the local irregular armed groups, which
emerged with varying success and impacted on all sides of the Yugoslav con-
flagration, bridged the national projects and the communities to which they be-
longed. The majority of local paramilitary groups operated in their own towns
and villages, occasionally lending support to units and combatants within the
same opština.778 Local fighters were more likely to know their victims and were
less likely to be able to conceal their actions from their own family or com-
munity. The proximity between victims and perpetrators within the same local
area meant too that individuals were able to identify what they perceived to
be the direct personal benefits to be gained from participating in armed (often
criminal) activities. We know that promises of material profit gained through
looting or the destruction of economic interests belonging to an enemy group
provides easy justification within the context of acute dehumanisation, hate me-
dia and impunity for criminal opportunism.779 There is also a high correlation
between instances of militia violence and looting.780
776Carl Dahlman and Gerard Toal (Gearóid Ó Tuathail), ‘Broken Bosnia: The Localised
Geopolitics of Displacement and Return in two Bosnian Places’, Annals of the Association of
American Geographers, 95:3 (2005), pp644-662, p645
777Bokan, DoY, 12 Oct. 12 1994, Doc.3/8, p3
778UN Experts Report, Annex III, Military Structure, Strategy and Tactics, p9
779for discussion of looting and material profit in genocide see Alvarez, Genocidal Crimes,
Routledge, 2010, p110-111; see also Baum, Psychology of Genocide
780Not only in former Yugoslavia, but in Rwanda, and in contemporary situations in Burundi,
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Both academic and popular conceptualisations of the Yugoslav paramilitary
have primarily been informed by the accounts of journalists on the ground at the
time and from select evidence heard at the ICTY. Thus larger and/or more zeal-
ous formations have come to represent the entire irregular force; units under the
command of the Serbian DB, Arkan, and Šešelj; on the Croatian side the HOS;
and for the Muslims, the Mujahideen, obscure more nuanced analysis. Accounts
by foreign journalists described the paramilitaries as drunk, disorganised, and
disorderly –often mentally unstable, criminal, and with propensities for extreme
violence.781 This public profile of the Yugoslav paramilitary (that was invari-
ably Serbian) became part of international imagination and discourse. Causal
analysis of the paramilitary violence has therefore been undertaken through this
lens of understanding. If we accept that exploring the motives, actions, and re-
lationships of irregulars is valuable because fighters that operate (or appear to
operate) outside of official command and control structures constitute a differ-
ent perpetrating mechanism of violence, then it is perhaps even more important
to fully understand the full spectrum this catch-all term describes.
As the previous chapters have shown, the Croatian, Bosnian, and Serb cent-
ral commands required and relied upon coalitions of irregular military groups.
The incorporation of paramilitaries into the official fighting forces was considered
necessary in order to fulfil the political and military objectives of all. For the
Serbian leadership, greater popular participation not only increased military ca-
pacity but furthered the strategy of ethnic cleansing: the successful devolution
of the Bosnian Serb national network of violence to the local level facilitated the
removal non-Serbs and created a river of blood between perpetrating and victim
communities that remains difficult to bridge to this day. Similar processes were
felt among Croats in Croatia and Bosnia, and can be seen in the voluntary form-
ation of local units that characterised the early phase of the Croatian military
structure. Among Bosniaks and their supporters, the self-defence formations
emerged on an ad hoc basis and rarely enjoyed the coordinated structural or
financial support accorded to local Croatian and Serbian groups.
Considering how and why such groups formed raises questions about local
complicity in identity-based mass violence. Can we consider the pervasive pro-
paganda and incitement to be motivating factors for those who joined irregular
Central African Republic, Iraq, Burma/Myanmar and so on
781Vulliamy (Guardian and Observer), Judah (Times), Maass (Washington Post), and John
F. Burns (New York Times) all made such references in their wartime reportage; also Rieff,
Slaughterhouse, p116 and 125
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armed groups (as opposed to being recruited into them), and if so are such
pressures somehow mitigating? What can we learn from the relationships that
formed between local paramilitaries and local infrastructure? The pattens of
local government, administration, and law enforcement, indicate a tendency
of local bureaucracies to facilitate rather than obstruct paramilitary criminal-
ity. Furthermore, there are few recorded incidents of significant community-led
resistance to the targeting of ethnic and religious groups, although there are
numerous accounts of individual acts of resistance. The affirmative action of
some men (and even fewer women) to take up arms and become combatants
was matched by the passive decision of their communities to remain in their
towns or villages when victimised communities fled or were expelled. The Bos-
nian conflict in particular was framed in global discourse as a fratricidal fracas,
of neighbour against neighbour violence. But unlike the analysis of Huntington,
Kaldor –or even Hobbes– the vast majority of local communities did not become
active belligerents, but rather can perhaps be understood to have become what
I have termed existential belligerents. Many more than the number who took
up arms participated in the psychological struggle of identity and memory, and
others made decisions that contributed to the creation of the distorted wartime
realities. In the context of the irregular military dynamic, the social existence
and community environments had a much greater immediacy for the irregular
combatants.
Local fighting forces brought the conflict closer to home. Firstly, it meant
that the front lines were not in a distant part of the country but in familiar
territory to which the volunteer fighters often had familial or childhood con-
nections. The close proximity of the violence meant that combatants were not
separated from their families and communities, blurring the lines between civil-
ian life and the military experience. The nature of the activities irregulars were
involved in often meant that there were no conventional front lines of conflict at
all; the ‘enemy’ was in the next house or village. In this sense, the conflicts did
exist on the community level. Real and perceived threats to the right of com-
munities to exist permeated the home not only through the radio and television
airwaves but through the fighters themselves.
The networks, relationships, and processes that led to the emergence of local
irregular fighters can be considered a necessary linchpin in our understanding
of the devolved nature of the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts. Examining local
fighters provides opportunity too to consider root causes that induced so many
to join and many others to support voluntary military groups.
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9 Explaining local irregular participation
Those who joined local paramilitary groups experienced different pressures to
do so than their more professional counterparts operating within the larger, more
organised units. The professional paramilitary cadre on the Serbian side often
came from Serbia proper or abroad rather than Bosnia or Croatia, or were led
by individuals who had quickly amassed their own local power base. Members
of the Green Berets or Patriotic League were usually former JNA soldiers or
TO. Men prominent in political parties were a common feature across all of
the more ‘national’ paramilitary organisations. And, as we have seen, so too
was organised crime. Local irregulars tended to operate on a smaller scale and
thus claimed smaller spheres of influence. Many local irregulars were genuine
volunteers, joining their cause without coercion, but were sometimes officially
remunerated by central authorities.
Local groups committed atrocity crimes independently and in concert with
official military and paramilitary units. Psychological and sociological analysis
of perpetrators offer some explanatory factors for why ordinary men (and wo-
men) commit terrible crimes. I agree with Ervin Staub that ‘violence against a
subgroup of society is the outcome of a societal process’ and, if we accept this
premise, we must therefore undertake ‘analysis at the level of both individuals
and society.’782 While there is not space here to undertake a full psychoanalysis
of Yugoslavia’s paramilitary perpetrators, it is perhaps appropriate to briefly
consider the hypotheses of more experienced scholars in the field to provide
some context to this chapter.
Melvin Lerner’s concept of just-world thinking describes the human tend-
ency to believe the world is just and therefore people get what they deserve.783
Within the framework of mass violence, the hypothesis has been used to de-
scribe the tendency of perpetrators (or member of a perpetrating community)
to assume that the victim(s) deserve their suffering because of their actions or
782Ervin Staub, ‘The Psychology of Bystanders, Perpetrators, and Heroic Helpers’ in (ed.)
Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber, Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of
the Holocaust, Oxford University Press, 2002, p13
783Melvin J. Lerner and Leo Montada, ‘An Overview: Advances in Belief in a Just World
Theory and Methods’, in (ed.) Montada & Lerner Responses to Victimizations and Belief in
a Just World, Plenum Press, 1998; their original experiments took place in the 1960s.
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character.784 Thus, perpetrators are likely to ‘come to see themselves as able
and willing to engage in harmful, violent acts –against certain people, and for
good reasons, including higher ideals embodied in an ideology.’785 Lerner’s work
was considered an extension of Stanley Milgram’s study of obedience where he
tested the willingness of ordinary Americans to inflict serious pain upon an in-
nocent stranger when instructed to do so by an authority figure.786 His data
held that ‘nearly two-thirds were willing to administer what they believed to be
life-threatening [electric] shocks to an innocent victim, well after he lapsed into
perhaps an unconscious silence, at the command of a single experimenter with
no apparent means of enforcing his orders.’787
James Waller has rightly pointed out the limitations of applying Milgram’s
findings to perpetrators of mass atrocities but concedes that the experiment ’fo-
cuses our attention on the social and situational pressures that can lead ordinary
people to commit extraordinary evil.’788 Milgram himself concluded that
After witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to the au-
thority in our own experiments, I must conclude that Arendt’s con-
ception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one
might dare imagine. The ordinary person who shocked the victim
did so out of a sense of obligation –a conception of his duties as a
subject– and not from any peculiarly aggressive tendencies.789
Milgram and Lerner’s hypotheses both indirectly raise questions of intent and
responsibility. Lerner presents a viewpoint whereby guilty persons are able to
modify their perception of self and devalue the target of abuse, thus indicating
the need to recalibrate their own moral compass in order to justify what they
have done. Milgram suggested his experiments made it clear that ‘an act carried
out under command is, psychologically, of a profoundly different character than
action that is spontaneous’ in part because in yielding to authority, the subject
784see Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence,
Cambridge University Press, 1989, p79-80; and Newman and Erber, Understanding Genocide
785Newman and Erber, Understanding Genocide, p22
786Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority; An experimental view, Harper Collins, 1974
(this edition, Pinter & Martin, 1997)
787James Waller, Becoming Evil; How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing,
Oxford University Press, 2002, p106; for summary of Milgram’s experiments and Waller’s
assessment of their relevance in understanding perpetrators of extraordinary evil see p102-111
788Ibid., p108; I reject the term ‘evil’ and believe that beyond the study of theology it should
be avoided; here I am taking Waller to mean acts of mass violence or cruelty
789Milgram, Obedience to Authority, p23-4, italics in original
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becomes alienated from his or her own actions.790 If Milgram is correct then our
analysis in this chapter of whether the formation and actions of local irregulars
were genuinely spontaneous or the product of any kind of instruction becomes of
greater importance as it has bearing on our wider investigation into the covert
structures of command and control.
Hobbes argued that command responsibility supersedes the responsibility
of the individual who acts under instruction.791 The ICTY initially sought to
bring some semblance of legality to this concept, although has taught valu-
able lessons in the limitations of its application.792 Proving where the lines of
responsibility fell remains one of the most challenging obstacles faced by the
Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY and in the prosecution of mass atrocity
crimes world wide. Across Croatia and Bosnia, numerous processes enabled
the local paramilitary. Determining what can be considered a command in a
legal context is fairly straightforward in its inevitable limitations because of the
threshold of evidence required (although at this level of international law, all
decision are highly interpretive), but if we take a sociological, or even psycho-
logical approach, our conceptualisation becomes instantly broader but no less
significant; can we include radio and television propaganda? Or encouragement
from local or state authorities? Surely in our present analysis we must explore
the pressures of persuasion, instruction, or coercion at work on the local level,
beyond the written orders that can be accepted as evidence?
This chapter, therefore, explores the networks of relationships that suppor-
ted and enabled irregulars in the localities of conflict, but it also considers the
entropic socio-cultural processes that affected the paramilitary dynamic. Rich
debate exists between top-down and bottom-up theorists of mass violence but
I do not seek to promote either. Rather, in taking time to dissect the social,
psychological, cultural and political dynamics that enabled local paramilitary
formations in Croatia and Bosnia it is evident that elites and communities were
developing their own simultaneous violent processes. Many of the local irregu-
lars followed orders of some kind but many chose to take up arms because they
believed it was either right or beneficial to themselves to do so.
790Ibid., p29; note too in Straus’ interviews of Rwandan perpetrators, 91% claimed never
disobeyed the authorities, The Order of Genocide: race, power, and war in Rwanda, Cornell
University Press, 2006 p149
791Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 4, John
Bohn, 1840, p.205, also p370
792See ICTY Statute, Article 7.2
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* * *
In early March 1992, before the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia, Dario Kordić,
vice-president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, gave an interview
to local publication Lašvanski Krug (The Lašva Circle) and addressed directly
the question of local military groups. He explicitly provided explanation and
justification for many of the groups that had emerged, apparently spontaneously,
in Central Bosnia:
As one of the leaders of the Croatian Community of Herceg-
Bosna, I feel that only the politically blind fail to see that the Bosnia-
Herzegovina political reality is such that all the peoples have been
engaged in organising their defence. I would not allow anyone on
this territory, where the Croatian people are in the majority, to call
armed men paramilitary formations if there is a legal political struc-
ture behind them. It is an organised form of defence of one’s home
and territory in conditions where it has become evident that there
is no rule of law and people, therefore organise themselves.793
Before irregular Croatian units were either disbanded or incorporated into the
official military, legitimacy was cast for local military formations in a number of
ways by the national and local political and military structures in both Croatia
and among Bosnian Croatians. Much like their Serbian counterparts, leaders
encouraged local propaganda and incitement campaigns that championed the
nationalist ideal. Dissemination of information and propaganda was considered
a military and political priority.794 The Croatian strike on Knin, for example,
was in part predicated on a simultaneous propaganda strategy designed to en-
courage the local Serb population to flee: President Tudjman called for an exit
route from Knin “because it is important that those [Serb] civilians set out, and
then the army will follow them, and when the columns set out, they will have a
psychological effect on each other.”795 Tudjman and his son Miroslav, who was
head of military intelligence, proposed radio broadcasts to inform local popula-
tions that Serbs were leaving and ‘telling them which direction to head in “so
793IT-95-14/2, Kordić & Čerkez, Exhibit 58/a , p2
794Karadžić apparently declared to a crowd in Banja Luka at a pre-election rally “Sell your
cow and buy a gun.” quoted in Pejanović, Through Bosnian Eyes, p36
795IT-06-90 Gotovina et al, Prosecution Closing Statements, 30 Aug 2010, p290032
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we have as little to do as possible”.’796 Less than twenty-four hours after the
Croatian retaking of Knin in 1995, Croatian Radio & Television (HRT) workers
from Split and Zadar had established Hrvatski Radio Knin.797 Yet as Dickie
Wallace points out, the ‘HRK barely had an audience during its first months
of broadcasting as most native Croats had fled far from the transmission range
and had not yet returned.’798 Wallace interprets the prioritisation of the local
media broadcasts as ‘ “aural flags” symbolically laying claim to territory.’799
But, the intentionality of Tudjman’s comments suggests a more active raison
d’être. The exchange illustrates that Tudjman placed equal significance on the
military strategy and the propaganda strategy; they were two halves of the same
political plan with one objective, which was the removal of non-Croats. And
thus Tudjman sought to transform those who received the propaganda messages
into active participants in its implementation as armed actors or existential
combatants.
The Prosecution at the ICTY during the Gotovina trial described Tudj-
man’s propaganda techniques as simultaneously advancing the objective of eth-
nic cleansing while assuaging international concern.800 The use of propaganda
as a tactic of war was adopted by the Leaders of the Croatian Defence of Central
Bosnia on a more local level in order to impact their own local communities as
well as those they were targeting.801
The use of propaganda and agitation is inherently cynical. Though coined
by Russian communists in the early twentieth century, the process has become
bound to modern day politics and mass media. In identity-based politics, the
propagation of exclusionary narratives is almost always accompanied by covert
instruction or solution to the (usually imagined) problem. Thus the processes
of exclusionary agitprop that developed in the effected regions have intimate
bearing on our assessment of those who took up arms, and their supporting
communities.
A more institutionalised approach to propaganda efforts in local communities
can be seen in the Instructions from the Bosnian Serb leadership to Serbian
leaders in each municipality to:
796Ibid.
797Dickie Wallace, ‘Establishing a public sphere in a Croatian borderland,’ Anthropology of
East Europe Review, 21:2, 2003, pp95-102
798Ibid., p96
799Ibid.
800IT-06-90 Gotovina et al, Prosecution Closing Statements, 30 Aug 2010, p290032
801IT-95-14/2 Kordić & Čerkez, ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the Leaders of the Croatian
Defence of Central Bosnia,’ held on 6 Oct 1992, Exhibit.233/a
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Intensify information and propaganda activities in order to in-
form the Serbian people in timely and complete manner about the
political and security situation in the municipality and beyond.802
People remember Pale TV editor Risto Djogo sporting a long knife on air and
saying, “this is what we have for our former neighbours Balije.”803 The use of
propaganda was widespread and incitement to violence prolific across collapsing
Yugoslavia.
Determining the impact upon local populations is more difficult to quantify.
Recent research has found that in the local areas in Rwanda where radio sig-
nal from the infamous hate radio stations were strongest, participation in the
genocide by the local community was significantly higher.804 Using village-level
datasets, David Yanagizawa was able to attribute 51,000 perpetrators –or about
ten percent of the total violence– to broadcasts from Radio Télévision Libre des
Mille Collines (RTLM).805 Yanagizawa’s results showed that ‘the broadcasts led
to more violence during the genocide’ and had a direct effect on village participa-
tion.806 The data indicated that radio coverage increased militia (paramilitary)
violence by approximately 13-14 percent and individual (local) violence by 10-11
percent.807 Unlike the Holocaust and the Cambodian genocide where the vi-
olence had been committed by state authorities, including state paramilitaries,
the mass atrocities in Rwanda and Yugoslavia were carried out by coalitions
of state, non-state, and ambiguous actors. The roles of propaganda in such in-
stances therefore extend beyond justifying the identity-based crimes in the eyes
of the public to tools of incitement, and even of command.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) found that the
founders of RTLM acted with genocidal intent and were guilty of genocide.808
802Instructions for the Organisation and Activity of Organs of the Serbian People in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstance, Sarajevo, 19 Dec 1991; For excellent
discussion on implementation of propaganda activities see Thompson, Forging War.
803Kemal Kurspahić, ‘Media in Democracy Institute Bosnia’ paper given as seminar held by
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Words Translated Into Genocide Speech, Power,
Violence: Balkans experiences of 1990s, February 2009, p3-4
804David Yanagizawa, ‘Propaganda and Conflict: Theory and Evidence From the Rwandan
Genocide’, IIES, Stockholm University, 2010; see too updated paper, ‘Propaganda and Con-
flict: Evidence From the Rwandan Genocide’, David Yanagizawa-Drott, Harvard University,
August 2014
805Yanagizawa, ‘Propaganda and Conflict’ (2014), p1
806Ibid.
807Ibid. p18
808ICTR-99-52 Nahimana et al. (Media case) Judgement, 3 December 2003, point 99-101;
and Chapter IV; The Verdict
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Some, like Scott Straus, have questioned the extent to which racist propa-
ganda can be understood as an explanation for why people participate mass
violence.809 In relation to Rwanda, Straus found that the better educated per-
petrators he interviewed had a more developed sense of the racist Hutu ideology
than the less educated respondents; he concluded that ‘most Rwandans did not
participate in the genocide because they hated Tutsis...or because racist pro-
paganda had instilled racism in them.’810 Nevertheless, the normalisation and
promotion of violent acts towards a perceived enemy appears time and time
again in the history of identity-based atrocities.811 We know the power of pro-
paganda and misinformation, particularly of scapegoating, to recruit for political
parties, but it also works to stimulate collective irregular mass violence. During
the 2007 election violence in Kenya, text messages referred to ‘stolen elections’
and called on one ethnic group to ‘terminate’ or ‘exterminate’ another.812 The
roles played by the media and the potential of propaganda as a motivating force
becomes more explicit in devolved structures of violence and in situations where
members of local communities are able to become combatants themselves. It
was for this reason, perhaps, that a friend of journalist Misha Glenny described
RTV Serbia and HTV as ‘the greatest war criminals of them all’813 Recently,
international civil society has responded to this threat by developing new tech-
nology to map and track hate speech and incitement, while legal responses have
inevitably been more constrained.814
Thus in collapsing Yugoslavia establishing where instruction from higher au-
thorities ended and local personalities or communities acted independently is
tricky. First, it is necessary to recognise that the Serbian strategy was predic-
ated on the concept of devolved structures of violence operating with varying
relationships to the state towards a common cause of a greater Serbia, free
from non-Serbs. The degree of propagandist activities and direct incitement to
violence and social exclusion (of non-Serbs) involved political and media cooper-
ation on a local as well as national scale. While more detailed analysis of the
impact this had in local areas has yet to be undertaken it is clear that the scope
809Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: race, power, and war in Rwanda, Cornell University
Press, 2006, p134
810Ibid., the one exception Straus found was that those who were aware of the ‘Hutu Ten
Commandments’ were among the most violent.
811Somerville, Radio Propaganda and the Broadcasting of Hatred
812Simon Adams, ‘Killer SMS: Incitement and the Kenyan Elections’, Huffington Post, 26
Feb 2013
813Glenny, The Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, Granta 1999,
p630
814See work of Umati in Kenya and Hatebase, which operates worldwide
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of negative media presence stretched throughout the Yugoslav territories. The
influence of the Serb state and its desired strategy was pervasive and consider-
able. To a lesser degree, both the Croatian and Bosniak leaderships facilitated
the organisation and operation of local irregulars –at the very least turning a
blind eye to some of their activities.
Furthermore, the effect of propaganda extends beyond borders. The lies that
couch incitement can be difficult to unpick. Such lies are an inherent element of
identity-based propaganda: Adolf Hitler became fascinated with the potential
of lies in socio-political discourse. Writing in Mein Kampf, Hitler surmised that
‘the great mass of people will more easily fall victims to the big lie that the
small one.’815 Thus Jeffrey Herf argues that the Nazi regime and policies were
maintained and driven by the lie of an innocent Germany besieged by an inter-
national Jewry, reclaiming her natural supremacy.816 In the western Balkans in
the 1990s, it was not just ‘the great mass of people’ who internalised various
confused threads from the region’s real and imagined history, but international
journalists, policy makers and observers. The narratives, symbols, and lies be-
came part of the Balkan discourse. That local or low level leaders ascribed
historical roots to the violence actions that was apparently being committed in
their communities independently of the state command structure only served
to further reinforce this conceptualisation of the conflict as a powerful tribal
resurgence, both among the local and international communities.
Crimes such as ethnic cleansing are often community-based in their grievous
visions and in their implementation. Incitement and propaganda can build
momentum and provide justification for exclusionary or violent behaviour, but
without structure or instruction violence is less likely to become systematic.
Local bureaucracies are necessarily complicit in the facilitation, organisation,
and sometimes perpetration of violence within their spheres of influence. Max
Weber wrote prophetically that ‘bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the
more it is “dehumanised”, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from
official business love, hatred and all purely personal, irrational and emotional
elements which escape calculation.’817 The anonymity of fulfilling tasks and re-
sponsibilities because of your position within the bureaucratic structure rather
815Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, CPA Book Publishers, 2009, p134
816Jeffery Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holo-
caust, Harvard University Press, 2006
817Max Weber, Society and Economy; quoted by Alvarez, Governments, Citizens, and Gen-
ocide, p97
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than you as an individual appears to provide a veneer of diminished accountab-
ility or even impunity. Alvarez claims that ‘by their very nature, bureaucracies
lend themselves to the perpetration of certain crimes, including genocide.’818
It was not until the 1960s in studies of the Holocaust that the instrumental
role of bureaucrats in the destruction of whole groups of people was examined.
The Nazi infrastructure is still often regarded as the epitome of bureaucratic
culpability.819 However, for the most part, the Nazi administrative and govern-
ment structures were fiercely centralised, particularly where mass murder was
involved. When the decision makers of the World War II Independent State of
Croatia intensified their genocidal assault against the Serbs, Berlin intervened
directly to bring a halt to the massacres because of the destabilising effect they
were having on the region. During instances of ethnic cleansing and genocide
where the structures of violence have been significantly devolved, the roles of
local bureaucracies have been important not only in facilitating commands from
above but often in assuming more direct responsibility for fulfilling the chauvin-
ist vision themselves. In Bosnia, ‘local militia were organised by municipalities,
as in Tuzla, or by big enterprises, as in Velika Kladuša, in Abdić’s Agrokomerc,
or in Zenica where former communists still controlled the steelworks.’820 Ex-
posing the networks and relationships that form between local bureaucracies
and irregular perpetrators of mass violence is therefore an important step in the
deconstruction of the social, political, and geographic forces of mass atrocity
crimes.
Local bureaucracies in Rwanda worked closely with the militias during the
genocide and there are few recorded instances of local government of adminis-
trative leaders that sought to openly reject Hutu Power.821 There has been little
examination of how the genocide was implemented on the local level in Rwanda
but Luke Fletcher’s tentatively broad analysis of primary evidence raises clear
similarities between the local structures of violence that emerged in Rwanda
and those of the Bosnian Serb localities.
[T]he genocide (in Rwanda) was organized by local extremists as
much as by military or civilian authorities. Civilian authorities such
818Alvarez, Governments, Citizens, and Genocide, p.97; for role of bureaucracy more gen-
erally see p97-100
819Eric Markusen, ‘Mechanisms of Genocide’, in Will Genocide Ever End?, (ed.) Carol
Rittner, John K. Roth, James M. Smith, Paragon House, 2001, p85
820Kaldor, New Wars, p51
821Fletcher, ‘Turning interahamwe,’ p34
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as local bourgmestres (mayors), préfets (governors) and sub-préfets
(deputy governors) and counseilleurs (councillors) were almost al-
ways involved, but the organisers were just as likely to be non-office
holders from the rest of civil society, including heads of political
parties, teachers, priests, businessmen, and peasants.822
Similarly, the cast of Serbian actors included all levels of the political hierarchy,
the civilian, military and secret police, as well as local irregulars. Local networks
of the official and unofficial converged, providing mutual services throughout
and after the conflict period. In this sense, there are identifiable behavioural
parallels with the Hutu Power structure, although the intent and scale of the
violence in Rwanda was much greater.
10 Implementing (and interpreting) the Instructions of
the Serbian People
As earlier chapters have discussed, the Bosnian-Serb civilian authorities of
every municipality had been issued at the end of 1991 the Instructions for the
Organisation and Activity of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
Extraordinary Circumstances. The Instructions set out the ‘tasks, measures,
and other activities...[to] be carried out in order to increase mobility and readi-
ness for the defence of he interests of the Serbian people.’823 They detailed how
local SDS branches would assume local administrative control over local civilian
and military affairs. SDS staff had responsibility for increasing security of ‘crit-
ical facilities within the municipality’, and the ‘activation’ of the police force,
territorial defence units and civil defence units.824 Instructions for propaganda
activities were also included.
The structure of Serbian ‘defence’ was well planned and the accompanying
propaganda efforts coordinated. The ICTY indictment and subsequent convic-
tions of the SDS municipal Crisis Staff for Bosanski Šamac provided a legal
822Ibid., p35; note here the distinction between organisation and orchestration –I do intend
here (nor I suppose does Fletcher) to suggest that the genocide was not orchestrated from
Kigali, only that much of its organisation was taken up on the local level
823Instructions for the Organisation and Activity of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances, Sarajevo, 19 Dec 1991, p2
824Ibid., p3,4
183
framework for establishing the command responsibility held by the SDS Crisis
Committees.825 The Committee oversaw the widespread and systematic attack
on the local non-Serb population, and the transfer of much local power into the
hands of paramilitaries –and it is perhaps worth noting that in the first indict-
ment members of the committee and paramilitaries were grouped together to
face trial as a collective.826 The Trial Chamber found that members of the Crisis
Committee, a number of paramilitaries, and the 17th Tactical Group of the JNA
were participants in a basic form of joint criminal enterprise, sharing the same
intent to execute a common plan to persecute non-Serbs in the Bosanski Šamac
municipality. In May 1992, a decision was adopted by the Municipality that all
people of Croatian nationality within the municipal territory ‘shall be isolated
and taken to vital facilities in the towns and villages.’827 As President of the
Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party and President of the Serb
Crisis Staff (later renamed the War Presidency) in the municipality, the judges
determined that Blagoje Simić represented the apex of the local JCE, and was
punished accordingly.828 It was not found that Miroslav Tadić and Simo Zarić
were participants, although they were found guilty of other charges.829 The
case provides reference to the impracticalities of prosecuting the middle men of
atrocity crimes, even within hierarchical bureaucratic structures, but the case
also revealed the relationships involved in the Bosanski Šamac atrocities. On
appeal, Simić was exonerated of participation in a joint enterprise but his other
convictions held.830 Whatever the legal difficulties, the case established that the
bureaucrats of local administration worked in partnership with paramilitaries
and the JNA in order to achieve shared objectives.
The prosecution of SDS Crisis Committees or War Presidencies has at best
been inconsistent and many of those who enjoyed positions of authority during
the Bosnian conflict have escaped censure. From the cases that have been
heard and other forms of corroborative evidence, it is clear that most aspects
of the Serbian administration greatly facilitated ethnic cleansing, including the
organisation and supervision of irregular military units. Political responsibility
was devolved to localities who passed on military authority to a coalition of
local official and unofficial forces.
825IT-95-9 Simić et al., note dissenting opinion of Judge Lindholm rejecting concept of joint
responsibility, in relation to the case and in general
826IT-95-9, Simić et al., Judgement, 29 Oct 2003, from p126
827IT-95-9, Simić et al., Exhibit P71
828IT-95-9, Simić et al., Judgement, p310
829Ibid., p310-11
830IT-95-9, Simić et al., Appeal Judgement, 26 Nov. 2006, p114
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An exception to this pattern was Banja Luka. As the largest city in Bosnia-
Herzegovina after Sarajevo, Banja Luka saw some of the most systematic and
institutionalised ethnic cleansing and experienced little of the armed conflict.
Violence against non-Serbs was preceded by expelling Muslims, Croats, Roma,
and others from local government and administration, and scripts other than
cyrillic were banned in public institutions.831 The city council introduced a
series of measures of de jure discrimination reminiscent of 1930s Germany, in-
cluding the seizure of private businesses from non-Serbs and the restriction of
movement for non-Serbs. In Banja Luka and across Bosnia, bureaucratic in-
stitutions had been prepared to ensure easy removal of non-Serbs. In spring
1992, all employees of local public security forces and other public services had
to swear an oath of loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities.832 In Banja Luka it
was not paramilitaries who carried out the majority of the ethnic cleansing but
bureaucrats. City authorities, however, worked closely with paramilitary groups
to enforce their exclusionary urban policies. It was the high-ranking members
of the SDS, with support of the local police, TO and municipal authorities, who
coordinated the manning by paramilitaries of the checkpoints that blockaded
Banja Luka from the opening days of the conflict.833
Official formations such as local police, the TO, VRS forces, and DB paramil-
itaries were the primary perpetrators of violence in Banja Luka but elsewhere,
especially in more rural areas, local bureaucracies worked in partnership with
local military groups to fulfil the same objectives. While SDS Crisis Staffs
were formed in each municipality, where state or party infrastructure was less
established local personalities emerged. Often, local political leaders or party
men instigated the formation or personally recruited local men for their own
command.834 Some towns and villages formed their own military groups, often
described as self-defence units. Such groups rarely possessed the organisation,
arms, or capabilities to be compared to the special forces of the more estab-
lished paramilitary formations. According to the UN Final Report, these local
formations operated in their local areas, occasionally lending support to similar
831War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: U.N. Cease-Fire Won’t Help Banja Luka, Human
Rights Watch Report, Vol.6, Issue 8, June 1994, p.2 and pp.15-16
832IT-99-36 Brđanin, Trial Judgement, 1 September 2004,
833Serbia Defence Force (SOS) units set up checkpoints around the city in the early hours of
the morning on 3 April 1992, see IT-08-91 Stanišić & Župljanin, Trial Chamber Judgement
Summary, 27 March 2013, p3
834‘War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska: Who are the People in Your Neighbour-
hood?’, Europe Report Nř103, Crisis Group, 2 Nov 2000
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groups and other combatants in the same opština.835
Like the larger, more nationally organised paramilitaries, local units ‘com-
mitted many violations of international humanitarian law.’836 This was par-
ticularly so among Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croats in Krajina.837
Once equipped with arms and limited training, local fighters did not necessarily
fall under the military command structure. Having provided (usually young)
men with the tools and legitimacy to fight, the Serbian authorities then claimed
no responsibility for their actions. Local forces joined more established para-
military groups or the JNA/VRS under different degrees of command.
In and around Bijeljina, ethnic violence was high. In the nearby town of
Janja, displaced Serbs who had moved into Bosniak houses often committed vi-
olent crimes, but so too did local Serbs.838 Violence against non-Serbs was per-
missible; the local police would not intervene to protect the remaining Bosniak
population but instead harass them themselves.839 Local paramilitary leaders
involved in the ethnic cleansing enjoyed its profits. In Bijeljina, Arkan’s para-
militaries were supported by an unknown, large number of local Serbs that came
from the local area.840 At the same time, about seventy to eighty Muslims who
were mostly locals from the town were mobilised by the SDA (Party of Demo-
cratic Action) to form a local contingent of the Patriotic League.841 Thus there
were some very real instances of neighbours fighting against one another. Mirko
Blagojević, who led a group called the Mirko Četnici, allegedly participated in
the cleansing of Bijeljina and Brko and remained a powerful member of the Ser-
bian Radial Party.842 In other cases, senior paramilitaries became part of the
official local structures, either joining the administration or subordinating local
paramilitaries to their command; Vojkan Djuković, a Major in Arkan’s Tigers,
served as head of the Commission for the Exchange of the Civilian Population
in Bijeljina during the war.843 In 2000, Crisis Group reported that Djuković
was running a detective agency in Bijeljina, although he was arrested in 2005
by Bosnian police for crimes committed during the war.844
835UN Final Report, Part III. General Studies A
836Ibid.
837Ibid.
838‘Bosnia and Hercegovina Unfinished Business; The Return of Refugees and Displaced
Persons to Bijeljina’, Human Rights Watch, 12:7, May 2000, p17
839Ibid.
840UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p79
841‘Unfinished Business’, Human Rights Watch, p12
842‘War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska’, p11
843Ibid., p12
844On his detective agency, see ibid.; for arrest ‘Serb arrested for alleged war crimes,’ Al
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In Srebrenica, local paramilitary groups formed through the SDS are thought
to have been directly involved in the organisation and participation of ethnic
cleansing throughout the region.845 Local administration was involved in the
coordination of paramilitaries tasked with larger scale massacres in Zvornik,
Bratunac, and Srebrenica. Miroslav Deronjić, President of the Bratunac SDS
and Bratunac Crisis Staff, ‘played a crucial role in inviting and organising the ar-
rival of Serbian paramilitaries, such as the Beli Orlovi, and Arkan’s and Šešelj’s
groups into Bratunac in 1992.’846 Furthermore, Deronjić is said to have ‘con-
tributed financially to the hiring of Arkan’s paramilitaries to kill respected Bos-
niaks,’ although it is unclear where these funds came from.847 Local paramil-
itaries also operated in Bratunac, participating in the ethnic cleansing of local
villages in 1992 and in massacres of Srebrenica deportees in 1995.848
In Višegrad, as in many other localities, centrally commanded forces armed
and trained local Serbs –often with weapons that had been confiscated from
local Muslims.849 In Cajnice, the local SDS armed local Serbs and formed a
paramilitary group called Plavi Orlovi.850 The Plavi Orlovi are thought to have
carried out the execution of at least 76 civilians at a local detention camp.851
In mid-March, before fighting in Bosnia began, a group of local Serb men from
Bosanski Šamac were sent to a training camp in Western Slavonia.852 They were
trained by specialists and having returned to Šamac fought alongside paramil-
itaries from Belgrade. On 11 April 1992, paramilitaries arrived in Batkuša by
JNA helicopters; of the 50 men, 30 came from Serbia and the rest were from the
Šamac municipality and had been trained a few weeks before in Slavonia.853
In south-central Bosnia, a heavy attack was launched against the town of
Maglaj on 23 May 1993 reportedly by a coalition of JNA forces, the Serbian
army, Šešelj’s forces, and local “outlaws”.854 It is alleged that poisonous gasses
were used in the assault.855 Many more examples of the Bosnian Serb assault
Jazeera, Tuesday 15 November 2005
845‘War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,’ p19
846Ibid., p16
847Ibid.
848Ibid., p18
849IT-98-32, Vasiljević, Trial Judgement, 20 July 2009, p32
850‘War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,’ p23; see also ‘Bosnia: "Blue Eagles" Leader
Arrested’, Balkan Insight, 16 December 2009; note too the symbolism of the eagle, as with
the White Eagles under Šešelj, so common in Serbian heraldry.
851Ibid.
852IT-95-9, Simić et al, Judgement, p69
853Ibid, p70
854UN Experts Report Annex IIIA, p92
855Ibid.
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on Bosnian Muslims fit this pattern.
The conflict period facilitated a much closer relationship between officials and
local organised crime networks. In the regions that later became Republika
Srpska, corrupted local bureaucracies collaborated with local paramilitary lead-
ers and established mutually beneficial structures of control that lasted well into
the post-Dayton period. Police forces and local authorities frequently assisted
or instigated local irregular paramilitary activities. Across RS municipalities
local civilian and military authorities established personal empires during the
war years, amassing both power and assets.856 However, while personal oppor-
tunism and community nepotism certainly determined certain local details, the
broader Serbian war strategy can still be seen as the overriding influence. The
dominance of the SDS and the implementation of the Instructions provided a
replicable model where Serbs of influence within their communities benefitted
from ethnic cleansing. Individual criminality and organised crime accompanied
this dissolution of local integrity. Thus, local institutions of law enforcement
and social services refused to obstruct the activities of local irregulars and more
powerful political paramilitary formations.
The national SDS leadership fostered and encouraged exclusion and identity-
based criminality within the localities. Post-Dayton national elites then presen-
ted the failure of the rule of law as evidence of a breakdown of command and
control, implying instead that wholly independent local networks bore sole re-
sponsibility for the crimes committed within their localised geographic spheres.
As with the military structure, bureaucratic administration had been devolved
to the local level. Local governance and security was overseen by national
authorities but relied on local networks of local civilian and military leaders,
including paramilitary formations. Such networks were at times temporarily
subordinated to national authorities or professional paramilitary forces operat-
ing in their name, but were otherwise able to run their localities as personal
fiefdoms. It was a situation established and perpetuated by national elites that
later enabled elites to enter into a post-war narrative of denial.
Simo Drljaca, for example, was appointed by President Karadžić to com-
mand the civil and secret police in the Prijedor area in 1992, and was instru-
mental in the implementation of the Serbian operation in the region but was
later held denounced by the central Bosnian Serb leadership as responsible for
856‘War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,’ p77
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local crimes because he was a local leader. In a 1993 interview with Serbian
newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik, Drljaca said:
They (the police forces, including the secret services) carried out
my orders and the orders of the CSB (Centar Službene Bezbjed-
nosti, or Public Security Center) Banja Luka and the Minister of
Interior...the cooperation was excellent with the Army of Repub-
lika Srpska and with the officers of that army. The cooperation was
manifested in the joint cleansing of the terrain of traitors, joint work
at the checkpoints, a joint intervention group against disturbances
of public order and in fighting terrorist groups.857
Karadžić used the local police chief to deflect his own command responsibility
for the crimes that were taking place in the Prijedor areas.858 While Drljaca was
unquestionably directly involved in commanding local civil and secret police to
fulfil criminal objectives, and responsible for decisions pertaining to the running
of Serb-run concentration and detention camps in Prijedor, the devolved nature
of the violent (military and administrative) structure enabled –even encouraged–
central (elite) command to diminish or deny their own roles in the criminal
process. Drljaca personally profited from the conflict and his role within the
local war-time dynamics. Like many local leaders, he accrued great personal
power and influence in the region, including in paramilitary and organised crime
circles.859
As with the paramilitary leaders that national authorities employed or facil-
itated, local leaders were able to reap great rewards for their part in the Serbian
agenda. When post war investigation into crimes committed in specific localities
led to the uncovering of some local networks, Serbian and Bosnian-Serb elites
issues statements that denied their roles, rejected claims of shared objectives,
and blamed local structures for local violence.
857Interview, Kozarski Vjesnik on April 9, 1993, quoted in ‘Reaping the Rewards of "Ethnic
Cleansing,"’ Human Rights Watch Report, p21
858see Sudetic, ‘Serbs’ Gains in Bosnia Create Chaotic Patchwork,’ The New York Times,
August 21, 1992, also quoted Ibid.
859‘Reaping the Rewards of “Ethnic Cleansing,” ’ p23
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11 Bosniak Localities
President Izetbegović did attempt to instigate a coordinated nation-wide
resistance movement but in reality was unable to provide support to local armed
groups that formed outside of the central structures. Despite preparations made
in early 1992, local actions tended to be spontaneous and defensive. During the
peak period of ethnic cleansing, Bosnia’s Muslims worked together in ad hoc
formations and were easily overwhelmed by superior forces. Even in the capital,
where planning had been concentrated, the ARBiH was forced to rely upon
bands of resistance from the community. And without these efforts, Sarajevo
would have surely fallen.
The initial defence of the city was achieved by a coalition of organised mil-
itary units, MUP police, Green Berets, the Patriotic League, criminal groups,
and spontaneous defence committees.860 These grassroot formations were often
comprised of members from mixed background, age and gender.861 The break-
down of Yugoslav and Bosnian inter-confessional relations had sparked outrage
and protest in Sarajevo, demonstrating a strong civic resistance to division that
endured among many, though not all, Sarajevans throughout the siege.862 In
the weeks before war, thousands protested the erection of barricades. Local
radio station SA3 encouraged the peaceful, united protest movement, in direct
contrast to the messages of incitement and division promulgated by Serbian
and Croatian regional broadcasts.863 As tensions rose in the capital, protests
against the militarisation of the city grew. Even after Serbian paramilitaries
had begun to attack the central city and eastern Sarajevo from Pale, the civil-
ian crowds were over fifty thousand.864 The crowds were shot at by the SDS
and the security situation in the city quickly deteriorated, sending protestors in-
doors or into neighbourhood defence formations. Kerim Lučarević, Chief of the
Sarajevo Military Policy estimated that “just about every mahala had its own
commandant,” describing the defence network as “a spider’s web” that covered
the city.865
As the initial period of defence evolved into protracted siege, established
860IT-98-29, Dragomir Milošević (Sarajevo) Exhibit D106, Judgement, 27 Dec. 2007, p25,
para.71
861Donia, Sarajevo, p291
862Today Sarajevo is considered to all intents and purposes a predominantly Muslim city
863for SA3 broadcasts see Donia, Sarajevo, p279
864Account of Zlatko Hurtić, one of the leaders of the demonstrations; ‘Sarajevo peace
protests,’ BBC, 8 Apr 2012
865Donia, Sarajevo, p292
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along hardened front lines, the roles for neighbourhood military formations
lessened. Criminal groups and their paramilitaries began to capitalise on the fin-
ancial opportunities that the siege brought. As we saw in the previous chapter,
a thriving black market emerged in Sarajevo that was run by paramilitary and
mafia organisations on all sides of the conflict – and in close collaboration with
each other. John F. Burns reported that;
By day Serbian gunmen in the suburbs of Grbavica fire mortars
and sniper bullets into the Muslim-held quarters of the city, and
Muslim soldiers, some under Ćelo’s command, fire back. At night,
the two forces meet at the bridges spanning the Miljacka River,
separating the Serbian and Muslim parts of the city, and conduct a
thriving trade.866
Individuals and gangs were able to take control of entire neighbourhoods, either
to ostensibly support their defence or for purely material profit. Despite re-
ports in the international press of such activities, many of Sarajevo’s criminal
paramilitaries were still considered heroes in their own localities.867
All accounts of Sarajevo during the siege describe its enduring culture of civil
pride and unity, but there is less information available about the inhabitants
who joined the voluntary units.868 Nevertheless, we do know that the majority
of the military actors operating in and around Sarajevo were the same kinds of
formations that came together in the spring of 1992; the military police, official
army forces, professional paramilitaries, criminal groups, and some local form-
ations. Sarajevan volunteers were a minority force in an urban conflict, which
was prioritised by national authorities from both Sarajevo and Pale. Those who
targeted the city were largely from elsewhere in Bosnia or the federation, or part
of official structures. The exceptions, as have been examined in the previous
chapter, were local Serbian mafia-cum-paramilitary companies that operated on
the outskirts of the city in concert with Serb command.
Despite the fractured context, the Sarajevo authorities did achieve greater
centralisation as the war went on. In 1993, the ARBiH began its attempts to
866Burns, ‘Gangs in Sarajevo worry diplomats’, New York Times, 4 Oct. 1993
867see John Fullerton, ‘Sarajevo’s Robin Hood in Power Struggle’, Reuters, 21 Sept. 1992
868for example, Maček, Sarajevo under siege; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell; Tom Gjelten, Sa-
rajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper Under Siege, Harper Collins, 1995; Fred Doucette,
Empty Casing: A Soldier’s Memoir of Sarajevo Under Siege, Douglas & McIntyre, 2008; on
shortages see Zlata Filipović, Zlata’s Diary; a child’s life in Sarajevo, Penguin, 1994
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subordinate irregular forces and to normalise its national command structure.
This was probably best achieved in Sarajevo, where resources though limited
were greatest. The situation for Muslims in Bosnia’s localities was somewhat
different.
In the Srebrenica area, in early 1992, Serbian paramilitary groups arrived
together with the JNA and SDS in order to establish their position and distribute
arms to the local Serbian population.869 While paramilitary training began
covertly in public buildings in the Bosnian Serb villages throughout the area, no
such preparations were made in the region on either a local or more official level
by the Bosniak population.870 According to witness testimony at the ICTY,
“there were not even firearms to be found in the Bosnian Muslim villages, apart
from some privately owned pistols and hunting rifles; [and] a few light weapons
were kept at the Srebrenica police station.”871 During the Serbian takeover of
the town and surrounding area what scattered resistance there was came from a
few local and locally organised irregulars, including Naser Orić –a former body
guard of Slobodan Milošević and member of the Yugoslav security services.
Orić was later charged with several counts of war crimes, including wanton
destruction, murder and cruel treatment.872 He was found guilty of two counts
of the failure to discharge his authority as a superior to take necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent murder and cruel treatment, and not guilty of
all other charges.873
During his trial at the ICTY, the Defence and Prosecution disagreed over
how best to characterise the local Bosnian Muslim forces in and around Srebren-
ica. The Defence described;
an “island of resistance” of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica against
Serb attacks [that] was in fact a levée en masse composed of local
groups of fighters acting independently of one another and lack-
ing essential features of an army, including organised structure with
proper command, uniforms, weapons and headquarters.874
869IT-03-68 Orić, Judgement, 30 June 2006, p33
870Ibid.
871Ibid.
872IT-03-68 Orić, Third Amended Indictment, 16 June 2005
873IT-03-68 Orić, Judgement, 30 June 2006, p256-7
874See IT-03-68 Orić, Judgement, 30 June 2006, p46, and for presentation of both arguments
p46-48; for Defence position see Defence Final Brief.
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The Prosecution instead argued that the Srebrenica forces were sufficiently iden-
tifiable in that they wore ‘coloured ribbons and homemade uniforms’ and con-
spicuously bore arms, and, furthermore, were under the command control of
Naser Orić. In its Judgement of the case against Orić, the Trial Chamber found
that the situation in Srebrenica could be characterised as a levée en masse at the
time of the Serbian takeover and immediately thereafter (April through summer
1992), but noted that the concept of the definition in international law cannot
be applied to longterm situations.875
However, the conditions in Srebrenica remained distinct from those of con-
ventional combat, even in situations of devolved command. The Chamber noted
that it was not until a meeting held at Bajramovići on 20 May 1992 that the pop-
ulation of Srebrenica was able to make concrete steps towards organisation of a
coordinated defence; it was during this meeting that Orić was appointed as over-
all military commander of the Srebrenica forces.876 It was not until 27 June 1992
that Chief of the Supreme Command of the ARBiH, Sefer Halilović, officially
confirmed the appointment; in August the position was confirmed once more,
this time by President Izetbegović, establishing a chain of both understanding
and command between the irregular grassroots defence and the President.877
The Bajramovići meeting was called by an informal group of men, includ-
ing Orić, Akif Ustić, Ahmo Tihić and Zulfo Tursunović, who had established
small individual irregular fighting units in response to the Serbian attack in
mid-April 1992.878 Not all local leaders of the spontaneous military defence
were present as there was no uniform command and others were involved in
organising their own defensive actions at the time.879 Only on 3rd Septem-
ber 1992 did the Srebrenica group refer to themselves as the Srebrenica Armed
Forces.880 These markers do not simply reveal the slow integration process of
the grassroots formation into official military structure, but indicate the desire
on the part of the irregulars to formalise themselves. Perhaps most import-
antly, there was no formal mobilisation and all participation in the defence
groups was voluntary.881 Most of Srebrenica’s (Bosniak) irregulars resided with
875Ibid., pp.47-48
876IT-03-68 Orić, Ex.P76, ‘Appointment of Naser Orić as Commander of the Srebrenica TO
Staff’, from 26 May 1992
877IT-03-68 Orić, Ex.P176,‘Decision on the establishment of the Srebrenica Armed Forces’,
(from 3 Sept 1992)
878IT-03-68, Orić, Judgement, 30 June 2006, p49
879Ibid., p49
880Ibid., p50
881Ibid., p48
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their families or in makeshift accommodation.882 Despite efforts to establish
Srebrenica and the surrounding area as an operational sub-region, no political
or military authority successfully materialised in eastern Bosnia that was able
to maintain command.883 Srebrenica’s isolation and the terrible humanitarian
situation significantly hindered efforts to establish such a command structure
over the pro-government armed forces operating in and around the town.
The evidence heard during the Orić trial provides a detailed account of
the evolution of local resistance units during the conflict. As elsewhere, the
line between local civilian and military authorities in Srebrenica was blurred.
Leaders of local units were elected to participate in both the Srebrenica War
Presidency and Srebrenica TO staff.884 It demonstrates too the initial intent to
form as a defensive unit and later the attempts to become integrated into official
structures. The (Bosnian Muslim) Srebrenica formations are therefore distinct
from the local groups that sought to maintain their independence or to distance
themselves from central authorities in order to pursue their own objectives.
However, the trial evidence shows too how some local irregulars were not
always willing to accept the command of others. The murder in Srebrenica
police station of a Serbian detainee named Dragutin Kukić by Kemal Kemo
Mehmetović, a local irregular who dressed in civilian clothes, is an example of
several recorded incidents. Kemo was described as a ‘notoriously violent person
who resisted subordination.’885Nevertheless, Kemo was able to walk into the
police station, commit brutal acts of violence, and walk out freely. Kemo was
also held to have committed cruel acts against a number of Serbian detainees.
Kemo and another man used their fists and logs to smash the teeth of a male
detainee before using broad pliers to forcibly extract some of the broken teeth,
‘and then urinated [in] his mouth, purportedly to disinfect the wound.’ 886
A number of men thought to have been associated with the Srebrenica de-
fence committed violent acts against those held in detention. The overtly crim-
inal nature of this violence can be seen in the testimony of Ratko Nikolić, who
was beaten by two persons wearing black balaclavas with eye slits.887 Many vic-
tims who gave testimony agreed that their assailants wore military fatigues and
civilian clothes, suggesting parallel chains of command that obscured account-
882Ibid.
883Ibid., p53
884Ibid., p86
885Ibid., p140
886Ibid., p149 see also IT-03-68, Orić, victim testimony, Nedeljko Radić, T.3535-3526
887IT-03-68, Orić, Judgement, p158, see also IT-03-68, Orić, victim testimony, Ratko Nikolić,
T.2625-2626
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ability. None of the known perpetrators considered to be directly responsible
for the murder of detainees were members of the Srebrenica Military Police.888
This fact, and others, led the Trial Chamber to conclude that it was not able to
determine beyond reasonable doubt that Orić, as Commander of the Srebren-
ica Armed Forces, exercised control over the police station during the relevant
period (autumn 1992).
The findings confirmed in law the evolutionary process of the local paramil-
itary resistance in Srebrenica, accepting that there was a spontaneous, locally
coordinated effort of resistance that was later brought under the central com-
mand of the ARBiH, represented by Orić. Orić was cleared of charges of superior
command responsibility for crimes committed before he was considered to have
assumed command control but convicted of failing to prevent the criminal be-
haviour of his subordinates later in 1992 and 1993.889 He was sentenced to two
years but released immediately because of the time he had served during his
trial. His trial was, like many at the ICTY, one of controversy. To many of his
fellow citizens, Orić represents Srebrenica’s doomed resistance and is a war hero.
That Orić personally profited from the war and engaged in smuggling activities
with Serbian paramilitaries led western observers to be more critical.890 To
many Serbs, he is a criminal who was given preferential treatment at the ICTY,
reinforcing resentment of an inconsistent application of international law.
It is clear that wanton violence was perpetrated against a number of Serbian
prisoners held by men under Orić’s sphere of command. Individuals who were
not members of the Srebrenica Armed Forces or Military Police were able to
pass through the police station and commit violent crimes against those held
there. Many of these individual irregulars were characterised by the Defence
as ‘opportunistic visitors’ over whom Orić exercised no control.891 However,
there is no indication that Orić sought to limit the activities of such men. Orić,
like many local paramilitary leaders, ensured that he not only survived the
conflict but profited from it, arguably sometimes at the expense of those he
was ostensibly protecting. The military relationships revealed during the trial
suggest that a different command structure existed during the first months of the
conflicts that was both genuinely spontaneous and defensive. Yet it appears that
without an infrastructure of accountability, impunity flourished –and within the
888IT-03-68, Orić, Judgment, p141
889Ibid., p420
890Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil, p.134; Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s
Story of the War in Bosnia, Penguin Books, 1999, p.243, 245
891IT-03-68, Orić, Defence Final Brief, paras 532-549
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context of real and exacerbated fears for local survival, individuals carried out
acts of identity-based violence, considered to be legitimate or permissible as a
result of a localised war-time (a)moral framework.
There is limited evidence available of local Muslim defence units, except
those that have been investigated by the ICTY in relation to particular cases.
Thus more is known about local perpetrating irregulars than Muslim defence
in the countryside. It is, surely, an area that invites research as would likely
provide insight into the contradicting forces of resistance and radicalism.
In Bihać, another supposed safe haven, an all together different local dy-
namic emerged towards the end of the Bosnian war. Fikret Abdić, a powerful
local businessman, disagreed with President Izetbegović’s approach to the west’s
attempts at peace negotiations, and established his own military force made up
of local Bosnian Muslims who then fought against the ARBiH, creating a loc-
alised civil war.
In the 1980s, Abdić had been involved in serious allegations of corruption
surrounding his agricultural food-processing plant, Agrokomerc. He was a busi-
ness man but also involved in politics; during the 1991 election in Bosnia he had
stood against Izetbegović and initially won more of the votes but without the
support of the SDA decided to step down from the contest.892Brendan O’Shea’s
somewhat apologetic analysis of Abdić presents a rational and pragmatic man in
difficult circumstances, but the evidence heard at his trial in Croatia found him
guilty of war crimes, including opening detention camps for his Muslim oppon-
ents.893 Furthermore, we see in Adbić the pursuit of self interest; as one of the
richest men in Bosnia, his substantial economic standing was worth protecting
and, crucially, he was therefore able to finance his own fiefdom.
During the clashes in Bihać, former Tiger Borislav Pelević claims that Slobodan
Milošević, Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić had decided that members of
Arkan’s unit should be sent to the Cazin Krajina to train Abdić’s soldiers.894
According to Pelević, Arkan’s forces accepted an invitation from and went to
Velika Kladuša. While they were there, Abdić paid the soldiers their per diem
allowances. The Skorpions were described as the ‘backbone of Fikret Abdić’s
army.’895 On 30 June 1995, told Mladić that they must both “do something so
892Brendan O’Shea, The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995; Perception, Falsehood and
Deceit, Routledge, 2012, p80
893Ibid., p80-81
894‘Karadžić’s Medlas for Arkan and His Men,’ Sense Agency, 25 Jan 2012
895IT-02-54, Milošević, Exhibit P390.3a6, 19 Feb 2003
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he [Abdić] can take Cazin.”896
12 Local Croat Structures
The emergence of Croat paramilitary formations in the localities followed
a different tradition, more distinct from national authority but more closely
bound to national and cultural experience. The history of far-right politics in
Europe, especially in east and south east Europe, has been accompanied by a
strong non-state paramilitary dynamic. Despite being non-state, this kind of
paramilitarism is therefore a product of the modern phenomenon of European
nation-statehood. We can find the roots of such groups in the latter half of
the nineteenth century.897 Whether established as combatant paramilitaries or
vigilantes, their professed reason for existence is consciously political. In a sense,
the form such political paramilitary groups take represents the substance and
intent behind their formation.
Following the Knin rebellion, many locals of Croat and Serb descent fled
into the hills. Then followed a period where Croatian authorities and some
local communities sought to rapidly organise themselves. The TO had been
disbanded so attention was focussed on the national police to form a basis of
military structure. Thus, from the outset, Croatian militarisation had a dis-
tinctly local element. The nature of police formations is typically characterised
by strong local understanding and local relationships, but also of local loyalties
and prejudices. The Croatian administration was also undertaking a nationwide
expulsion of non-Croats from its bureaucracy, police, and all state authorities.
Many Croat businesses and organisations followed suit and thousands of Serbs
found themselves jobless.898 On the local and community level this had a direct
impact, pushing aggrieved unemployed Serbs into the local defence units being
armed and encouraged by the JNA.899 Simultaneously, the HOS emerged in
Zagreb but, like the Serbian political paramilitaries, was able to use it nation-
wide party appeal to recruit its members. The revival of Ustaše and neo-fascist
iconography, not only by HOS but in broader nationalist circles, brought too
896IT-06-90, Gotovina et al., from Milosevic’s diary; Exhibit D01465.E 4099, 2 June 2009
897for discussion of history of far right paramilitarism in Europe Mammone et al., Mapping
the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe, and see chapter 10, Miroslav Mares and Richard
Stojar ‘Extreme Paramilitary Units in Eastern Europe, particularly p160-62
898Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, p107-108
899Ibid. p108
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the military fascination that far-right sub-cultures are almost always associated
with. Miroslav Mares and Richard Stojar describe far right paramilitary vigil-
ante tendencies as ‘also typical of contemporary modern neo-Nazism in East
Europe in connection with ’warriors and weapons fetishism.’900
According to Silber and Little, Defence Minister Špegelj, who was tasked
with arming the Croatian police force, not only arranged the illegal import of
arms but ‘set up a network of village patrols, arming Croatian civilians and
training them to organise a defence force for each municipality.’901 Certainly in
his interview for the Death of Yugoslavia BBC series, Špegelj explains that in
late 1990 Tudjman realised local Croat defence of barracks and barricades would
take place across Croatia with or without formal agreement.902 In contrast to
the significance of local bureaucracy in the Serbian implementation of strategy in
parts of Croatia and across Bosnia, Tudjman refused to organise local networks
for conflict before fighting broke out. Thus Croatian civilian participation was
far less planned.
Local Croat civilians that did participate in the conflict in Croatia therefore
volunteered to join the Croatian National Guard or joined paramilitary groups
operating or recruiting in the local area. Petar Kriste, an economist within the
Croatian Ministry for Defence, recalled that following the assault on Dubrovnik
in early September 1991, local Croat volunteers came forth “quite freely” to
fight, adding “far more reported for duty than we could take in because there
were just enough – not enough weapons to go around.”903 Špegelj, too, recalled
that “so many people volunteered that it was above all expectations.”904 Grass-
roots mobilisation in the localities where tension was highest was followed by a
national mobilisation announced in Zagreb on 23 November 1991.905 Such large
numbers of volunteer recruits meant that the majority of men who wanted to
fight joined up through official processes, even if the structure of the national
military force was not yet fully formed. Therefore, with the exception of small
local defence groups and large paramilitary groups such as the HOS, which were
later subsumed into the Croatian forces anyway, early formations that could ar-
guably be considered local paramilitary units were still, however disorganised,
900Mares & Stojar, ‘Paramilitary Units in Eastern Europe,’ p168
901Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, p108
902Interview with Špegelj, DoY, p19
903IT-02-54, Milošević, 27 Jan, 2003, p14846
904Špegelj, DoY, p22
905Oliwia Berdak, ‘War, Gender and Citizenship in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia’, The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia
(CITSEE) CITSEE Working Paper Series 2013, Edinburgh, p8
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part of the national command structure. Even football fans joined the national
fight rather than form their own units –Dynamo Zagreb’s loyal fanbase, the
“Bad Blue Boys”, joined the Croatian army ‘en masse’ early in the conflict.906
Group identity remained important for the Boys and they wore Dynamo badges
on their fatigues.907
13 Paramilitaries of political parties
Paramilitaries and irregulars operating in the municipalities of Croatia and
Bosnia were further supported by the local infrastructure of political parties.
Local offices were used to recruit, organise and in some instances provide com-
mand oversight, but nowhere was the relationship more evident than in local
Serbian networks. The Serbian political paramilitary formations were recruited
in part through local party structures and, though they were eventually subor-
dinated to JNA/VRS, retained their own identities. The national structures of
command and control that governed these groups have already been discussed
but here there is an opportunity to consider the networks that supported them
on the local level. The devolution that characterised the Serbian military archi-
tecture enabled a secondary tier of command and control to develop, empowering
local figures to participate in the Serbian project.
The White Eagles and Dušan Silni, paramilitaries of the Serbian People’s
Renewal Party, rose to prominence quickly in Croatia with a grim reputation for
viciousness and violence. The Eagles were sometimes described as the party’s
youth wing908 but in the Serbian press were referred to as territorials or volun-
teers.909 Outside Serbia, they were more commonly known simply as četniks,
incorporated into the catch-all used to describe Serbian paramilitaries in general
but also the Eagles, the Serbian Četnik Movement (SČP), and other volunteer
structures that operated under the political parties Šešelj was involved in. These
forces operated across a broader geographic area than Belgrade’s paramilitaries,
and received substantial, multilateral support from the Serbian military infra-
structure.910 While most reports of Arkan’s Volunteer Guard describe highly
906Bellamy, The Formation of Croatian National Identity, p118
907Ibid.
908Described as youth wing of SPO by Washington Post, 27 Nov. 1991 and also during a
BBC broadcast, April 23, 1992
909James Gow, The Serbian Project, p81
910Forces under the broad control of Šešelj were reported to be operating in 34 counties and
those under Arkan operated in 28 counties throughout former Yugoslavia, UN Experts Report
Annex IIIA, p19
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trained, well disciplined and maybe Rambo-esque fighters, the While Eagles
appearing more ramshackle, were recruited from a different demographic. Tan-
ner describes the Eagles as ‘tatty, gap-toothed folk, mainly working-class city-
dwellers’.911
Once recruited, volunteers were allocated weapons by either the JNA, VRS,
the Serbian TO or the Serbian DB.912 On the front lines, some volunteers re-
ceived the same benefits as regular soldiers and when they died Serbia com-
pensated their families.913 However, unlike Arkan’s units that were specific-
ally created by the Serbian leadership in order to help fulfil their political and
military objectives, the Eagles, SČP, and other Serbian volunteer groups that
emerged did so outside of the official structures. Being attached to a national
political party gave the Eagles greater capabilities than the majority of the ir-
regular military formations created outside central Serbian command. Larger
political parties, such as the SPO, provided a national network that facilitated
the local recruitment, and maintained a network of communication across opšti-
nas.
These men occupied an unusual space in the Serbian networks of violence.
They existed outside of the officialdom of the paramilitaries hired and con-
trolled from Belgrade, yet were sufficiently part of the perpetrating structure
as to be able to command (and exploit) local dynamics. For many who came
from the grassroots, they were answering an ideological call to arms. During the
filming of The Death of Yugoslavia, one of the players interviewed was an ul-
tranationalist politician involved in the formation of the paramilitary group the
White Eagles, a man called Dragoslav Bokan. In the interview Bokan describes
himself as a “national romantic” and elevates his rejection of Milošević’s “ideo-
logical compromise” by presenting himself as an intellectual cast in the model
of Serbia’s nineteenth century nationalist thinkers.914 In Bokan we can see the
self-conscious adoption of Serbian history as personal memory, through which
he justifies his actions and way of thinking –and also his rejection of the Serbian
leadership. Bokan exemplifies the particularly Serbian (fatalist) approach to the
just world, in which Serbs have been martyred at the hands of others throughout
the centuries, simultaneously legitimising violence committed by Serbian hands
and embracing defeat as inevitable (perpetual?) martyrdom.
911Tanner, Croatia, p245
912IT-03-67, Šešelj, Final Pretrial Brief, 25 July 2007, p13
913Ibid.
914Bokan, DoY, Doc.3/8
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Throughout the interview, Bokan seeks to distance himself from Belgrade,
the JNA, and particularly Milošević. His interview presents him at times as cyn-
ically manipulative, at others fundamentally committed to his cause. The inter-
view transcript provides a detailed insight into the mind and mechanics of a Ser-
bian nationalist paramilitary construction that developed during Yugoslavia’s
collapse, independent of state control. When asked about the formation of the
White Eagles, Bokan states “it is always important to start at the beginning” be-
fore noting that both his parents were Serbs from Croatia and “like many other
families there, they were exposed to genocide.”915And thus Bokan connects the
terrors of the Serbian past with his family, the Serb-dominated Croatian ter-
ritory, and the contemporary crisis; “So we knew that even good-neighbourly
relations or what appeared to be harmony on the surface could turn into bloody
horror in just a few days.”916 He presents a unity of local experience and fear
that ensured in 1991, the local population organised its own self-defence:
So all of us from this part of the country were prepared for any
threat and when it all started we knew that this would not last just
a few days but that it was only the beginning of something worse to
come, this this would be a repetition of what had happened already
twice in this century. We arranged ourselves very quickly, very fast,
at the grassroots level.917
It was this kind of positioning of the local struggle during the conflict, distinct
from the explicitly political or state elite, that both undermined attempts by
the Bosnian government to demonstrate a joined up Serbian campaign, and
simultaneously appeared to substantiate the mythical parameters of Serbian
nationalist ideology. Individuals like Bokan were instrumental in developing and
promoting the manifestation of Serbian legitimacy on local and international
levels. During the interview, Bokan refers to Serbia’s mythical past as if it is
something current and legitimately part of the contemporary narrative:
I think a part of the Kosovo legend [was] a fundamental legend
for the Serbs and for the Serb national idea. And that was the
915Ibid.
916Ibid.
917Ibid.
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famous battle in which the Serbs won but most of them were killed
in preventing the Turks from coming to Europe.918
The legacy of Serbian resistance was one that had developed outside of state
structures, forming its own community power base. Carmichael’s discussion of
paramilitaries and bandits includes the following quotation from the Montenegrin
Chetnik Punoshevitch to George Sava in 1939:919
I am the leader of the Chetniks. We are an old organisation.
We are outlaws. Yet no government has been able to suppress us.
None has dares, nor I think has any ever thought it wise to make
the attempt. We came into being to fight the Turks. We have our
own uniforms and our own code of laws. We fought every Balkan
War. We are the natural guerrillas of our country.920
The četnik tradition of existing on the margins, outside of government control,
can therefore be seen as fundamental to the historic četnik identity. This inde-
pendence, like their historic mission to fight Turks, gave an imagined legitimacy
for četnik actions, which was deployed by modern irregulars during the 1990s.
In linking, even simply through ordinary conversation, the battle of the Serbs
against the Turks in 1389 to the conflagration of the 1990s, Bokan provides on
the simplest level explanation of and justification for the actions of his Serbian
comrades.
The historical legacy provided cultural context for the irregular dynamics of
the Yugoslav conflicts, but should not be interpreted as being explanatory. The
research here questions anthropological explanations put forward by Žanić and
Giordano that place their emphasis on a mistrust of authority. Žanić suggests
that Naletilić, Ćelo, Caco and Juka shared a similar ‘moral code’ because they
‘did not trust the regular authorities.’921 Uncovering the non-linear military
and criminal networks has revealed that all these men profited from personal,
professional or illegal relationships with local and state authorities. As such,
918Ibid.
919Sava was a British medic of Russian decent, he wrote an account of the World War II
Serbian Chetnik movement headed by General Draza Mihalilović, The Chetniks, published by
Faber and Faber in 1942
920Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans, p41
921Žanić, Flag on the Mountain, p508
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perhaps the relationship is better understood from the perspective of personal
gain and the pursuit of personal authority? That such “Robin Hood” mercenar-
ies exist in all conflicts all over the world again suggests that the proclivity to
conceal or legitimise the pursuit of personal gain in a time of collective suffering
may have more to do with sensible strategy than particular cultural habits.
14 Interpreting identity-based violence on the local level
The land was wild, the people impossible. What could be expec-
ted of women and children, creatures whom God had not endowed
with reason, in a country where even the men were violent and un-
couth? Nothing these people did or said had any significance, nor
could it affect the affairs of serious, cultivated men.
Ivo Andrić, The Bosnian Chronicle, 1941
Just as the crude methods of killing used in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 meant
that the slaughter was interpreted as tribal and spontaneous,922 the ritual that
accompanied mass violence in Yugoslavia led many to similar conclusions.923As
a result, responsibility for the violence in both instances was seen as local. The
presence of local Yugoslav paramilitary formations for many satisfied their (ra-
cist) romanticism of ethnic war. That the irregulars self-consciously cast them-
selves as characters from the past –either to assume some historical legitimacy
or simply to satisfy their own patriotic (racist) romanticism– further encour-
aged an analysis that appeared to chime with the existing Balkan paradigm.
The similarities of misunderstanding that characterised western responses to
mass violence in both Rwanda and the Balkans in the early 1990s suggests that
the [mis]framing of mass atrocities as inherently ethnic was representative of a
popular mindset of the time.924
A tension emerges in our attempts to contextualise the significance of local
and cultural dynamics during such conflicts in academic analysis. The signific-
ance of the local level is all the greater in our current analysis of the irregular and
paramilitary experience, where the visual and symbolic appropriation of violent
922Melvern, ‘Missing the story,’ p198
923(ed.) Dubravka Zarkov and Marlies Glasius, Narratives of Justice In and Out of the Court
Room, Springer International Publishing, 2014, for problem narratives of tribal violence facing
both ICTY and ICTR see p.28, for discussion of approaches to Yugoslav violence as tribal see
p.29; However, international volunteers also ritualised their acts of violence – some German
mercenaries reportedly “took Serb ears as trophies’, Krott, Save the last bullet, p180
924For more see Mueller, ‘Banality of Ethnic War’
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tradition was also most explicit. From the late 1980s, the historical memories of
such traditions were adopted as part of shared, yet ethnically specific, cultural
experiences. Therefore, it is relevant that the western Balkans have a long his-
tory of guerrilla warfare and banditry dating back to fifteenth century, however
that past does not transform the irregulars on the 1990s as the descendants of
that legacy.925 Yet, in the 1990s, to many, it was ‘as if the mountaineers of
the seventeenth century ha[d] reentered the political stage of the late twentieth
unmarked by any change.’926
The tools and analytical approaches of anthropology and sociology are help-
ful here. Concepts such as cultural or collective memory provide a framework
of understanding that can unpick the social forces from the cultural expres-
sions. Certainly, there were many acts of ritualised violence, committed by
all sides, through which paramilitary perpetrators consciously sought to imbue
their crimes with historical meaning. However, this does not mean that the
motivation or rationale of the crimes were rooted in the past. Journalist Ed
Vulliamy wrote about Muslim prisoners forced to perform sexual acts on one
another, including one incident where two Muslim prisoners held a third up-
right in the position of crucified Christ while a fourth was forced to bite off
his testicles.927 In other instances, locations provided symbolic illusion of con-
tinuity between the current atrocities and those of the past, real or imagined.
Nowhere was this more visible or visceral than on Višegrad bridge, where hun-
dreds –possibly thousands– of Muslims were murdered.928 The centuries old
bridge, as has already been mentioned, is an important cultural site for Serbs
largely because of its staging in Andrić’s Bridge Over the River Drina as a place
of Serbian martyrdom. The decision by local paramilitaries to use the bridge
for their executions might have been in part for its cultural and historical signi-
ficance –yet it is also possible that, as bridge, it offered banal practical value for
their grim acts. In his absurd memoirs, Višegrad’s paramilitary leader Milan
Lukić recalls talking to his girlfriend in Zurich about the river, the bridge, and
its importance before he returned to Bosnia to take up arms;
I told her lovingly about the Drina river, its ancient bridge and
925Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans, p38
926Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p137
927Vulliamy’s afterword in Suljagić, Postcards from the Grave, p183
928IT-98-32/1, Lukić et al., Witness VG-133,28 Oct. 2008, p.2972; and 24 Sept. 2001,
Witness VG21, p928
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the story that inspired them that received the Nobel Prize for liter-
ature.
Gabi would say “Oh, Milan, your Heimweh is so gentle”. I already
knew that Heimwee was the German word for “nostalgia”. She
listened to me with so much attention and so much Swiss-like tran-
quility, while her glistening eyes were inviting me to tell more, as it
they were saying: “Talk more..about life, your country, about your
brave people and their stormy history.”929
Whatever the intentions or cultural awareness of Lukić and his irregulars that
led to their choosing the bridge, the symbolism resonated across Yugoslavia
with collective memories of a divided past. External observers followed suit
and saw in the Drina, historical (which was read as cultural) inevitability. And
thus Chris Hedges, journalist for the New York Times, saw ‘[t]he steep wooded
hillsides that plunge to the river [that] have for centuries also produced killers
of appalling magnitude.’930
Assmann wrote that ‘[w]hich past becomes evident in [sic] heritage and
which values emerge in its identificatory appropriation tells us much about the
constitution and tendencies of a society.’931 However, in the reportage of the
Yugoslav conflicts we see too the tendencies in external discourses of the complex
and multiple socio-political processes to misinterpret actions informed by culture
as culturally determined. Unwrapping the explanations that were projected onto
the local communities as being culturally representative presents a challenge;
determining if and how the historical legacies of violent traditions played a
role in motivating or shaping local irregular action is more delicate still. The
resurrection of Yugoslavia as an uncivilised and unEuropean sphere reinforced
this obscurity. The racist, or orientalist, lens through which Yugoslavia was
viewed focused on unfounded assumptions of community habits, which further
929Milan Lukić, Confession of the Prisoner of the Hague, Gornji Milanović, 2011, p12; the
account presents the author as a local policeman of unbending social conscience, and provides
numerous accounts of his interventions to save the lives of Muslim women and children in the
area. For best examples, see p63-70. Note that the book was published by the Serbian Radical
Party and publicised at an event at the St Sava Cathedral in Belgrade attended by a number
of the Orthodox clergy; see ‘Fond za humanitarno pravo U Parohijskom domu Hrama svetog
Save veliča se ratni zločin,’ Fond za humanitarna pravo, 18 August 2011, Saša Ilić, ‘Patriarch
Pavle’s funeral as a cultural model,’ Pečanik, 1 August 2012
930Chris Hedges, ‘From One Serbian Militia Chief, A Trail of Plunder and Slaughter’, New
York Times, 25 March 1996
931Assman, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,’ p133
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facilitated narratives of spontaneous irregular warfare and placed responsibility
solely on local (which were interrupted as irregular) dynamics.
Thus, Balkan traditions of violence and the external discourse of Balkan
violence came together to obscure the realities paramilitary activity, particularly
on the local level. As we saw in chapter one, the discourse that emerged in the
west in the 1990s had its roots in a centuries-long narrative that stretched back
to the Eastern Question and the Crimean War, and included the first and second
Balkan Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century and the assignation of
Archduke Ferdinand. The long-lasting impact upon collective memories of the
retrospective anger in parts of Europe and the US towards the unknown Balkans
for the terrorist shot that precipitated the First World War and deaths of 15
million should not be underestimated either. Perhaps most of all, it was the
Yugoslav experience of the Second World War that cemented in the minds of
others abroad in the west that Yugoslavia was a region fraught with local and
community violence.932
The all too popular American commentator Robert Kaplan described the
Balkans as ‘the original Third World’, where ‘hostage taking and the whole-
sale slaughter or innocents were common’, where nazism could claim its origins,
and was responsible for producing the twentieth century’s first terrorists.933Of
Bosnia’s rural communities, Kaplan wrote ‘the villages all around were full of
savage hatreds, leavened by poverty and alcoholism.’934 Kaplan epitomised the
tendency in the 1990s to place emphasis on cultural and civilisational divides,
implicitly indicting entire ethnic and religious communities, rather than invite
more nuanced and accurate discussion of what the mechanisms of command,
control, and violence actually looked like. As Kaplan demonstrates, the discus-
sion of the irregular dimension of the Yugoslav conflicts was marred not only by
the simplification (or manipulation) of the region’s history but also by frequent
denigration of rural life as inferior and primitive. In reality, no aspect of the
Yugoslav conflagration could be described as a Hobbesian war of all against all.
How do we quantify the levels of local participation in Yugoslavia’s mass viol-
ence? What counts as participation? Who should take responsibility for crimes
committed in localities by local residents at the behest of greater authorities?
932See discussion in conclusion of Part III
933Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, p.xxiii; for the influence Kaplan had on US foreign policy towards
Yugoslavia and later Iraq see Michael T. Kaufman, ‘The Dangers of Letting a President Read’,
New York Times, May 22, 1999
934Ibid., p22
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And if each person who bore some responsibility for the crimes could be in-
dicted, what would appropriate punishment be? The mandate of the ICTY is
to take on only the gravest and most high profile cases. This has created a blind
spot within the evidence collected and possibly in jurisprudence. The priorities
of the international tribunal have not been to distinguish between the local level
groups. Efforts to establish responsibility for the creation of local armed groups
and the actions they committed have never been directly raised beyond the
evidence heard at The Hague in relation to propaganda and incitement. Some
local actors have been tried in national courts in Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia,
and there is a strong regional and international reportage that monitors and
publicises these cases. Perhaps inevitably, lower level local actors have for the
most part escaped investigation.
Numbers in history are always contentious, and nowhere more so in the
study of genocide and mass atrocity. While some such studies are therefore of
limited academic value, being able to determine what proportion of perpetrators
in identity-based violence are irregular or paramilitary combatants would be
useful indeed –determining how many irregulars came from local formations, or
genuinely non-state groups would not only expose patterns of covert networks of
command and control assume, but assist prevention and intervention strategies.
No research of this kind, has, to my knowledge been carried out in the south
west Balkans. The scale of the violence and size of perpetrating groups we are
concerned with is smaller than the Rwandan case, and of a different nature, but
Scott Straus’ research provides a perspective of local violence during situations
of acute violence that has bearing on our current discussion.
In 1994, the Rwandan genocide was interpreted by the outside world as a
Hobbesian ethnic war of two (often tribal rather than ethnic) groups commit-
ting extreme mass violence against one another on the local, even individual
level.935 Even more considered and informed analysis presented the violence as
a civi war and therefore beyond international responsibility. In its aftermath,
the entire Hutu adult population, some three million people, were presented by
the new (Tutsi) state as the perpetrators of the genocide against the minority
Tutsi population.936 Local courts heard over one million cases, prompting con-
cerns about whether collective guilt was being imposed.937In one of the more
935See Thompson, Media and the Rwandan Genocide
936See Straus, ‘How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide?’
937L. Waldorf, ‘Mass justice for mass atrocity: Rethinking local justice as transitional justice’
Temp. L. Rev., 79:1 (2006), pp1-87; a further problem with the Gacaca Courts is that they
will not hear cases against the Rwandan Patriotic Front, disenfranchising thousands of Hutu
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objective attempts to put a figure to the number of perpetrators in Rwanda,
Straus estimates 200,000 were responsible for the approximately 800,000 that
were killed.938 It is worth noting, without descending into the intricate politics
of numbers, that this figure is towards the lower end of those put forward in
scholarship. In his determination that the 51,000 perpetrators influenced by
radio instruction and propaganda constitute between 10-11 percent of the total,
Yanagizawa puts the figure higher at 500,000 perpetrators.939 It is unlikely that
the number of perpetrators was significantly greater than this upper estimate.
Most relevant to this discussion, however, is the subsequent analysis by Straus
of his own data, in which he concludes that the militia were responsible for
significantly more deaths in the Rwandan genocide than individuals or groups
mobilised spontaneously on the local level. 940
Straus suggests that ‘even if mass participation characterises the Rwandan
genocide, a small number of armed perpetrators and especially zealous ones
probably did the lion’s share of the killing.’941 His estimate that one in ten of
the ‘perpetrating group’ (the adult Hutu population) joined the killing (rather
than more passive acts of participation) has important implications for our
understanding of the local level dynamics of identity-based mass violence. While
thousands more will have participated in crimes like looting or informing killers
where victims were hiding, Straus’s findings implicitly suggest that even within
rural communities, the massacres were orchestrated rather than spontaneous.
Straus’ assessment supports the conclusions of Alvarez and Fletcher, who
both stress the importance of local level dynamics with militia groups in Rwanda
and Bosnia.942 We do not know how many local fighters there were in Croatia
and Bosnia in the early 1990s and what percentage of crimes they are responsible
for. There is little documentation, and it is in the interests of local actors,
their commanders, and their communities, not to publicise their experiences.
Nevertheless, the available sources do provide us some insight into the local level.
Endeavouring to understand this local milieu and how the units interacted with
central and local structures is an important prerequisite to tackling community
violence, and may raise interesting questions about the future of reconciliation
in the region.
survivors and families of victims from seeking justice for “revenge killings.”
938Straus, ‘How many perpetrators were there?’ p85
939Yanagizawa, ‘Propaganda and Conflict’ (2014), p1
940Straus, ‘How many perpetrators were there?’ p96
941Ibid., p95
942Alvarez, ‘Militia and Genocide’; Fletcher, ‘Turning interahamwe’
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The UN Experts’ report recorded evidence of paramilitary activity in 72
counties across the Yugoslav territories, reaching 45 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 21
in Croatia, and six in FRY.943 Although the research carried out by the Commis-
sion of Experts was fairly comprehensive, there were inevitably not international
observers, reporters or professionals in each opština throughout the entire period
of conflict and therefore some low level local activity has not been included in
these statistics. In Bosnia particularly the experience of paramilitary activity
was very high.
There are too many accounts to mention of local civilian and military police
officers acting like paramilitaries, committing violent acts and exploiting the
crisis situation for personal gain. Local police on all sides perpetrated grave
crimes that will most likely go unpunished. It appears that opportunity was
the most common motivator for local individuals who enjoyed midlevel author-
ity such as being a member of the police or local government. The military
forces of the Serbian and Croatian campaigns provided larger geographies of
opportunity, and had larger networks that were better armed. The Serbian and
Croatian propaganda campaigns were more systematic; Bosniak media was run
from Sarajevo, which was under siege.
Compared with other aspects of the Bosnian and Croatian conflicts, the roles
and relationships of local irregulars within and outside the immediate theatre
of violence has drawn less attention from researchers.944 Unlike the activities
of the better known groups, local units emerged and disbanded without much
international attention. Therefore, there is far less recorded evidence from third
party observers. YouTube hosts hundreds of videos and photo-montages of local
military formations, much of it little more than grainy footage or hagiographic
memorandums of those who died in battle. Nevertheless, they provide an im-
portant insight into the personalities of those actively engaged in the violence.
As current violence in Syria and Iraq have shown, to record and share the act
of killing or of ritualised humiliation has bestowed an additional dimension to
identity-based attack that transforms violence against an individual into a crime
that exists in perpetuity.
More mundane difficulties in determining precisely which groups operating
and under what, if any, kind of command structure come from the constant
943UN Experts Report, Annex IIIA, p185, notes 9 & 10
944Mills is an exception here, see Chapter Three of ‘Domestic Football and Nationalism’
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changing of formations, leaders, and pseudonyms. The prosecution of Višegrad
paramilitary leader Milan Lukić was faced with multiple descriptions of the units
with which he acted, tracing an incoherent evolution and no doubt also includ-
ing unreliable statements from witnesses brought by the defence. Practicalities
of translation also pose a problem here. ICTY documents, and particularly
international coverage at the time reveal inconsistencies and inaccuracies when
it comes to paramilitary groups. Without the prioritisation of local dynamics
there is a tendency to group local units under the larger, better known groups
that operated across a wider area.
Many localities in Bosnia were run according to an often uneasy relationship
between local bureaucracy, local militia, and a local criminal network. These
structures were sometimes subverted by the national command structures of
political parties, the military (or paramilitary), and organised crime. Nor did
the larger, better equipped paramilitary groups necessarily work in effective
partnership with local, less experienced groups. Because of the many different
levels of irregular units that were in operation, all acting to varying degrees
outside of official military structures and all adhering to their own fraternal
code, quarrels and contests were inevitable. In Bijeljina, according to documents
submitted to the UN Experts Report by the International Human Rights Law
Institute, there was an internal dispute between Arkan and Mirko, the leader of
a more local paramilitary group over ownership of the town.945
Many of the men who became local leaders of paramilitary groups were
already, or through their war actions became, men of (local) influence. This
observation appears to support the hypothesis of Roy Baumeister that violence
acts ‘follow from high self-esteem, not from low self-esteem...Perpetrators of
violence are typically people who think very highly of themselves.’946 This
fits with the analysis that identity-based violence follows from the belief or
understanding on the part of the perpetrator that he or she is superior to their
victim. However, it could easily be supposed that the incidents of violence
most likely to be recorded were those of a larger scale, or those committed (or
commanded) by well-known persons, and as a result thousands of low level, local
945UN Experts Reports, Annex IIIA, p124, see note 660
946Roy F. Baumeister, Brad J. Bushman, and W. Keith Campbell, ‘Self-Esteem, Narcissism
and Aggression: Does Violence Result from Low Self-Esteem or from Threatened Egotism?’
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9 (2000), pp26-29, quoted in Waller, Becoming
Evil, p193
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irregulars have fallen quietly by the wayside of study.
The relationships that were forged in war persisted, and in certain areas
continue to persist, under Dayton. In this way, though local irregular actors for
the most part played lesser roles than their comrades in paramilitary formations
that were either commanded from Belgrade or through a nation-wide political
party, their participation in the conflict (and possibly in war crimes) contributed
to the post-conflict consensus of criminality and corruption. What is more,
international and political attention over the past fifteen years on the more
high ranking or prolific war-time criminals has led to the successful capture and
prosecution, or in some cases assassination, of a significant proportion of the
national war-time elite. In the aftermath of war many Serb-held areas continue
to be controlled by local war-time power structures, often with significant mafia
and or paramilitary involvement. A year after Dayton was signed, Doboj and
Tesic in Republika Srpska were ‘under the absolute, autocratic control of a group
of local Bosnian Serb political leaders, police chiefs, party leaders, officials and
civilians who have established an underground mafia-type network bridging the
two towns.’947
Many towns in Bosnia became ‘ethnic garrisons’948 run by communities of
victors who had overseen the redistribution of former neighbours’ property. The
abuse and violence faced by returnees was encouraged by local officials, keen to
preserve their gains. The Dayton Agreement cemented localised division, creat-
ing a new ethnographic map that endorses the ethnic identity of villages, towns
and opštinas. Milan Ninković, responsible for creating Doboj’s paramilitaries,
exploited the local assets won through ethnic cleansing for personal gain.949
He also assumed the position of General Manager of the RS Railway Company
and Technogas, both of which were headquartered in Doboj and responsible for
thousands of local jobs.950
The conceptualisation of national struggle as something current and personal
transcended both generation and class. In many localities of former Yugoslavia,
the legacies of local violence and extremism remain entrenched. Incidents con-
tinue to give insight to the persistence of such divisive narratives. Most recently,
the hurling of stones at the Serbian Prime Minister during the twentieth com-
memoration of the Srebrenica genocide drew international attention, but only
947‘The Continuing Influence of Bosnia’s Warlords’, Human Rights Watch, December 1996,
p1-2
948Toal & Dahlman, Bosnia Remade, p273
949Ibid., p275
950Ibid.
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because it occurred in front of the world’s media.951 The enduring identity-
based hatred rarely draws headlines outside of the region. Three days following
the memorial at Srebrenica, a returnee to RS was attacked by masked men who
carved the four Serbian Cs in a cross on his stomach, which was not reported in
English language press.952 While state priorities no longer include perpetuating
narratives of non-state violence, the perpetual nature of social processes like
myth making and collective memory means that among some grassroots and
underground (often online) communities, the narratives continue. Furthermore,
state authorities continue to participate in and contribute to divisionsim. The
escalating tensions. around commemoration, for example, were reinforced this
year by the decision by Russia, following persistent and public pressure from
Belgrade, to veto the UNSC resolution to reaffirm international condemnation
of the Srebrenica atrocities as genocide.953
951‘Vucić attacked, hit with stones in Srebrenica (video)’, B92, 11 July 2015,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&mm=07&dd=11&nav_id=94733
952‘Napadnut i teško povrijeđen povratnik u RS,’ Al Jazeera, 14 july 2015
953‘Russia vetoes Srebrenica genocide resolution at UN,’ Reuters, 8 July 2015
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Part V
A note on social networks and the
wartime (a)moral order
The problem, I fear, is the Yugoslavs themselves. They are a
perverse group of folks, near tribal in their behaviour, suspicious of
each other (with usually sound reasons), friendly on the outside but
very cynical within, ever ready for a war or a battle, proud of their
warrior history, and completely incapable of coming to grips with
the modern world...So I would say, a plague on both houses [the
Croats and the Serbs]
David Anderson, former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia954
...individuals who witnessed or took part in mass killing would
have been morally blunted by their experiences and found banal
exemptions for their behaviour through racist discourse. It is often
stated by perpetrators that the first murder is always the hardest
one to commit. In this context, the continuity between violent events
–not just at the personal level, but as a marker of this (pre-World
War II) epoch– should be re-emphasised.
Cathie Carmichael, Genocide Before the Holocaust955
On 19 February 1995, Serbia celebrated an event akin to a royal wedding. The
ceremony was split between the small town where the young bride had grown
up and the capital city. Orthodox bishops travelled from across Serbia, Croatia
and Bosnia to preside over a fully mythologised ceremony where the groom was
dressed as a Prince Lazar-esque hero and his bride the Maiden of Kosovo.956
The proceedings were broadcast live on state television, and sales of the two
hour video broke national records.957 Thousands of people lined Belgrade’s
streets in collective celebration of the happy couple.958 The Bosnian war was
954David Anderson, former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, writing in 1992, quoted in Stje-
pan G Meštrović, Slaven Letica, and Miroslav Goreta, Habits of the Balkan Heart: Social
Character and the Fall of Communism, Texas A & M University Press, 1993, p48
955Carmichael, Genocide before the Holocaust, Yale University Press, p70; Note too implic-
ations of recent biological research into genetically hereditary trauma, revealing Holocaust
survivors pass on their trauma through their genes to their children, Rachel Yehuda et. al.,
‘Holocaust exposure induced intergenerational effects on FKBP5 methylation,’ Biological Psy-
chiatry, (in press; available online Aug 2015)
956(eds) Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack, In God’s Name: Genocide and Religion in the
Twentieth Century, Berghahn Books, 2001, p187
957Adam Higginbotham, ‘Beauty and the beast’ (part one), Observer, 4 January 2004
958Eric D. Gordy, Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Altern-
atives, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, p142
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not yet over and less than six months later the groom’s forces would participate
in the genocidal massacres in Srebrenica.
Serbia’s fairytale wedding was of an infamous paramilitary leader and his tur-
bofolk pop princess; Željko “Arkan” Ražnatović and Svetlana “Ceca” Veličković.
The event was given public, political, religious and even pseudo-historical en-
dorsement. It symbolised the apex of a new social (a)moral order that had
come in to being during the violence of the early 1990s, but that had its roots
as much in the corruption of communism as in the criminal-materialist culture.
Pop princesses are not unusual national treasures but the hero-worship of irreg-
ular fighters with publicly documented violent criminal histories, we assume, is
less mainstream.
The elevation of Arkan and Ceca was demonstrative of the extent to which
parts of Serbian society had radicalised since Tito’s death in 1980. It revealed
the voluntary willingness by the state, the church and members of the public to
bask in the opulence of the couple’s glamour, in celebration of Serbian national-
ism and, thus too, of Arkan’s actions in Croatia and Bosnia. More importantly,
the wedding revealed many of the supportive networks that had formed between
the perpetrators of parainstitutional violence, the Orthodox hierarchy, the state
and its media powerhouse; and it revealed that a section of Serbian society
had become a willing collaborator. Some might find the word collaborator too
strong but it is used here less as a moral pejorative to describe cooperation with
a chauvinist strategy than to highlight the necessarily participatory role of so-
ciety in what was a joint project brought about through processes that required
active and passive social decisions.959
All the war-time states elevated irregular combatants, publicly commemor-
ating them in parliament, in cemeteries, at football grounds, in newspapers and
magazines. The commemoration of combatants does not distinguish between
official army personnel and irregulars. Terms such as heroes, martyrs or the
fallen are used. Take this example from Republika Srpska; “To the heroes and
Bronco and fellow soldiers who engraved these borders [of RS] with their lives,
1992-1995.”960 The notorious Sarajevan criminal Caco Topalović was reburied
in an official military cemetery in 1996 following intense public pressure to hon-
our the paramilitary for his role in defending the capital, despite his record.
959To speak of social trends is not to preclude variety of experience or undermine pockets
of resistance, either in the minds of individuals or within communities; an alternative term
to use is “bystander” but with it comes an emphasis of non-action rather than decision. In
violent contexts, bystander is probably more appropriate.
960Toal and Dahlman, Bosnia Remade, p305-6
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The funeral was televised and reportedly attended by thousands of mourners,
although support for the funeral was not universal.961 ARBiH general Jovan
Divjak challenged Izetbegović in a letter, describing the decision as unaccept-
able and immoral, calling the funeral a ‘glorification of gangster.’962 Later in
Kosovo, the death of KLA founder Adem Jashari and fifty of his family in 1998
provoked outrage and national martyrdom.963 In some corners of the western
Balkans the fetishised commemoration of irregular combatants and culture of
national martyrdom continues today.
A cursory search online for almost anything to do with Yugoslavia’s collapse
brings up pages of nationalist propaganda that continue to celebrate individuals
and paramilitary groups, from rudimentary Youtube videos to pseudo-academic
archives and discussion forums. In Sarajevo, paramilitary and criminal leaders
who grew fat on smuggling and looting were painted as martyrs of the besieged
city, and Orić is still hailed by many as a hero despite his convictions. Though
more pronounced in Serbian and Croatian society, the hagiographic presenta-
tion of paramilitaries and irregular soldiers during and in the wake of the wars
in Croatia, Bosnia, and later in Kosovo, was widespread, and as much (if not
more) a glorification of material wealth as the violence itself. A similar cultural
process can be seen today among some young Syrians on social media platforms
such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, where men and women, usually aged
between late teens and early 30s, combine adulation of pro-government violence
and self-identification with a wealthy, fashionable, often paramilitary and some-
times sexualised culture.964 Certain Shabiha paramilitaries, members of a loose
state (or Alawite) controlled network of pro-government armed groups, con-
sciously adopt a heavily stylised machismo of steroid body-building and tight
fitting clothes, to match an (appearance of?) elite luxury lifestyle subsidised
by involvement in organised crime.965 As in former Yugoslavia, in Syria state
961Andreas quotes 20,000 while Michael Mann (citing an article in Domovina) puts the
figure at 5,000; see Blue Helmets, p.94 and The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic
Cleansing, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.418
962Jovan Divjak and Florence La Bruyère, Sarajevo, mon amour, Buchet-Chastel (Paris),
2004, p229
963See discussion of Jashari on official website of the Ministry for the Kosovo Security
Forces, http://mksf-ks.org/?page=2,24,500#.VcCRy0U1Cdc; and note the renaming of the
large multi-purpose stadium in Mitrovica to the Stadiumi Olimpik Adem Jashari.
964For example see https://instagram.com/realsyrianinsta/ and https://instagram.com/bas-
selkawas/; on wartime luxury culture among some young Alawites see Gilad Shiloach, ‘Syria’s
Elites Find Time For Fun As Country Burns ’, Vocativ, 28 May 2015
965Harriet Alexander and Ruth Sherlock, ‘The Shabiha: Inside Assad’s death squads’, The
Telegraph, 2 June 2012; Hugh Macleod and Annasofie Flamand, ‘Syria: Shabiha Militia Mem-
ber Tells It Like It Is’ NewsHour, PBS, 15 June 2012
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propaganda and semi-state auspices encourage this form of wartime culture
while also reaffirming many of the divisive narratives, which often explain the
violence as coming from the community (or an identity group) rather than the
state.966 What emerges is a pattern peculiar to the devolved and irregular imple-
mentation of identity-based violence; when national elites provide frameworks
of legitimacy, aspects of violent culture can be integrated into contemporary
banal cultural trends, and so lead to a normalisation (or even celebration) of
the violence among parts of society.967
In his anthropological study between 1960s-1980 of over two thousand Yugoslav
families along the Adriatic coast, in Bosnia, and in Serbia, which included Cath-
olics, Orthodox and Muslims, Andrei Simić found no great variation in cultural
patterns and instead noted that ‘superficial differences in cultural style tended
to mask a deeper level of ideological and structural homogeneity underlying the
ethnic and historical heterogeneity of the Yugoslav population.’968 The social
and cultural processes that took place in the 1980s and 1990s created con-
scious and visible cleavages between identity groups, and created sub-cultures
of Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims that adopted sometimes violent but per-
haps also superficial identities that masked a homogeneity of behaviour. In
many respects, cultural homogeneity was more evident among the irregular
military sub-cultures of the warring sides than between the violent and the non-
violent cultures within identity-groups. This position echoes those of Anderson,
Hobsbawm and Ranger, and Judt, who argue that identities, communities, and
traditions are constructed. In contexts of identity-based mass violence, the con-
struction of the myths and traditions, and invention (or revival) of community
divisions are essential precursors, or preludes, to the violence itself. As was
discussed in Part II, in 1980s Yugoslavia the consequences of the belligerent
media and political propaganda ensured that new social and cultural construc-
tions masked cynical political (elite) objectives. As a result, the construction
of the new identities was sufficiently devolved as to distance the ruling elites
from the social and community radicalisation that followed. What had begun
966For example see Asma Al-Assad’s Instagram account https://instagram.com/asmaalas-
sad/
967Similar processes are pursued by the ISIS central propaganda corps, Charlie Winter,
‘Islamic State Propaganda: Key Elements of the Group’s Messaging,’ Terrorism Monitor,
13:12, Jamestown Foundation, 12 June 2015
968Field research was collected between 1966 and 1978; Andrei Simić ‘Machismo and crypto-
matriarchy: power, affect, and authority in the traditional Yugoslav family’, in (ed.) Ramet,
Gender Politics in the Western Balkans: Women and Society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav
Successor States, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, p15
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as a top-down process, became a self-perpetuating force that shifted the moral
parameters of society. The winners of the new social paradigm were those who
appeared to champion the group; state elites and the new warrior class who sup-
ported them. Paramilitaries therefore acted as catalyst, further blurring lines
of responsibility between the narratives of atrocity and the state, but also those
lines that existed between combatant and civilian.
What had been counter culture in the late 1980s or in 1990, by 1995 was most
visible. As with any such rupture, the conflicts and their repercussions inevit-
ably overshadowed the day-to-day lives of all communities living within former
Yugoslavia’s borders. Messages of division permeated social, cultural, and polit-
ical discourses while the sanctions imposed by the international community
brought entire societies into the conflicts’ sphere. The devolved and irregular
nature of the military structures meant that many of the fighters remained part
of their pre-war communities and maintained personal social networks for the
duration of the war. This meant that many of the barriers that exist between
official army personnel and the civilian public were not present. Thus, the para-
militaries straddled political, military, and social domains, becoming (sometimes
unwitting) political agents of radicalisation in their own communities, further
blurring the lines between civilian and combatant.969 Similarly, the shifting
moral frameworks of certain civilian communities provided a legitimising con-
text for the irregulars, both from the perspective of their (apparently) non-state
character and their implementation of identity-based violence.
Writing about the Balkan hajduk Žanić concluded that while the definition
of the hajduk was ‘someone who had definitively broken with all the established
institutions of society and the state, and hence it is is hardly necessary addition-
ally to define him as extra-institutional,’ the hajduk also ‘remain[ed] integrated
into his original social milieu.’970 Žanić adds that such figures were
...bound to a certain section of society, which supported and pro-
tected him, if only passively, through the agency of his harbourers
(yataks) or some other institutions that had grown out of the tra-
dition and been verified by it, such as hospitality, godfathership or
variously motivated types of solidarity, or indeed fear, for this to
is a social relationship. Consequently he was, in an idiosyncratic
969This is seen in irregular military formations all over the world, particularly via the internet
and most clearly regarding identity-based struggles
970Žanić, Flag on the Mountain, p501
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way, institutionalised. And in addition, these two models, or pro-
cesses, his institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation, quite often
overlapped and interwove in various combinations.971
Thus too, perhaps, we can conceive the modern irregular, who exists simultan-
eously inside institutional structures and outside them, and who remains integ-
rated into their original social milieu.972 Where violent implementation have
been devolved to irregulars, many of whom are drawn from their communities
at the grassroots level, the social and cultural frameworks with which the irreg-
ulars continue to interact should be understood to be a crucial component of
the military and political process. In the former Yugoslav states, when civilians
joined local military brigades or volunteered with irregular armed groups, much
of their interaction came from more immediate, more local, and even familial
support networks than is usually possible within official military structures.
Understanding the dynamics of these social support networks is important as it
was from within these networks that local-level foot soldiers found legitimacy.
This is particularly significant when we note that the devolved nature of the
military command structure, especially in the case of the Serbian forces, gave
the individual paramilitary units a freedom to decide how to carry out their
instructions.
This final exploratory part of the work, rather than providing answers, seeks
to draw attention to the most intimate level of the networks that supported
the irregular military dynamics during the Yugoslav crisis. Cultural, social,
community, and family attitudes impacted the perceptions and choices of the
men who joined irregular armed groups or volunteered with the regular army.
Below, we briefly consider how and to what extent these personal networks
contributed to, or inhibited, the paramilitary presence.
In addition, it was because of the processes occurring within these networks
that the imagined or misappropriated narratives became seen as being proph-
etic, seeming to predict (rather than as instigating) the identity-based crisis.
The initial revival or creation of the narratives engendered a response from sus-
ceptible and sympathetic corners of society but the misappropriation of violent
tradition was also absorbed by the international community. When the rhetoric
971Ibid.
972As opposed to other modern militia structures such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
whose tactics often involve breaking all contact recruits have with family and community
networks
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coming from aggressors and their support networks in the region was taken up
by the west, it was fatally reinforced by existing (if somewhat dormant) Ori-
entalist prejudices and poor comprehension of Yugoslavia’s recent history. The
resurrection of historical conflicts and division was effective not only in reviv-
ing internal grievances but normalising in the eyes of external observers the
antipathy between Yugoslavia’s ethnic or political groups. Thus, attention was
deflected from the political reasoning and intentionality behind the crimes.
In summer 1992, Maja Gojković, vice-president of the right-wing Serbian Rad-
ical Party and one of the few women in high politics challenged; “You cannot
ask a woman to bear children to men who have capitulated in advance to every
threat. In order to raise natality we must awaken and develop the spirit of mas-
culine honour and heroism.”973 When Gojković made this statement, Muslim
towns had, over the previous few months, been ethnically cleansed by Serbian
paramilitaries and regular army forces. The string of Serb-run concentration
camps had been discovered and visited by the international press.974 In the
same month, the pop-hit Kukavica (Coward) was released by the young female
songstress Ceca.975
Throughout the early war years, Milošević and his family had actively pro-
moted this provocative moral shift through their monopoly over platforms of
popular culture. This is often considered to be have been most explicit in the
turbofolk scene, which effectively articulated an emerging culture of revived tra-
ditional gender politics, sexuality, nationalism, crime and money.976 And at its
centre was Arkan and Ceca. Newspapers supporting Milošević printed stories
of the couple on the front pages while Pink TV, owned by Milošević’s wife, and
the two TV stations controlled by Milošević’s daughter played turbofolk videos
on an almost continuous loop.977 The public were aware of Arkan’s reputa-
tion: During a phone-in on Pink TV with Arkan and his wife, a female viewer
rang to compliment Ceca on her gold and diamond necklace, correctly describ-
973Duga, 16 August 1992, cited in Bracewell, ‘Motherhood and Serbian nationalism’, p27
974Vulliamy, ‘Vulliamy gains access to Kula, Camp outside Sarajevo where Serbs are holding
Muslims’, The Guardian, 8 August, 1992; also Vulliamy, ‘Shame of Camp Omarska’, The
Guardian, 7 August 1992; The Daily Mirror ran with ‘Belsen ‘92’ and The Daily Star, ‘Belsen
1992,’ both 8 August 1992
975While the premise of the song is male infidelity, its broader meaning set against the
background of war is difficult to miss; Ceca, Kukavica, Arrangements by A. Radulović, JV
Commerce, 1993
976See Uroš Čvoro, Turbo-folk Music and Cultural Representations of National Identity in
Former Yugoslavia, Ashgate, 2014, particularly p180
977Gordy, Culture of Power in Serbia, p133
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ing an inscription on it; when the compere asked the caller how she could now
such details, she replied “Because Arkan stole it from me in Bijeljina"978 Arkan
was a true celebrity figure, and not only among what might be thought of as
counter-culture extremists; there is an photograph of a young girl requesting his
autograph in a Belgrade cafe.979
When, in 1994, Milošević sought to retract his support for the Bosnian Serb
campaign, the Serbian Ministry of Culture also declared a ‘struggle against
kitsch’ but the cultural process has already assumed a life of its own.980 As the
Belgrade regime sought to distance themselves from the ethnonationalism, most
crassly represented in the neofolk or turbofolk urban culture, it became clear
that the flames Milošević had fanned in the hearts of many Serbs throughout
the late 1980s now burned unaided.
As men returned from the battlefields, their status grew. Many of the
paramilitaries swapped their fatigues for designer glamour, or like the Dizelaši,
Belgrade’s designer diesel smugglers, wore labels as badges of pseudo-military
and/or criminal identification.981 Hollywood played a big part in determining
the fashion choices of the Serbian paramilitaries with Rambo being the best
documented, but there was also a more general fascination with cult status –of
dark glasses, a media image, and material wealth.982
The radical nationalist paraphernalia among paramilitaries of all sides con-
tributed to a fetishisation of the violence and the irregular dynamics of the
warfare. The rehabilitation of the Ustaše was at least as much about their dress
and symbolic strength as it was interest in or commitment to Ustaša history
history.983 Muslim fighters mostly adopted green fatigues and often bandanas
but some, including the Mujahideen, displayed jihadi symbols, including black
flags with verses of the Koran printed upon them. From this perspective, it
is possible to understand the decision to join irregular armed groups –particu-
larly Serb and Croat formations– as a fashionable choice. The prospect of being
called up to the national armies promised little financial incentive and certainly
978Gangster’s life of Serb warlord, BBC, 15 Jan. 2000
979Image part of lecture by Üngör, ‘Paramilitaries in Comparative Perspective: Yugoslavia
and Syria,’ 22 Feb 2013, University of East Anglia.
980Gordy, Culture of power, p133
981Ibid.
982On Hollywood see John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, Columbia University Press,
2000, p407; the cult status of paramilitaries in identity-based violence can also be seen in the
Rwandan interahamwe and Syrian Shabiha.
983Baker has written in much detail about the roles played by nationalist narratives pro-
mulgated by popular music in Croatia during and in the aftermath of war; see Sounds of the
Borderland
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not the same cult status as becoming a paramilitary. Yet, few irregular groups
received significant (official) renumeration and even fewer gained the kind of
fame (or notoriety) of those that have been discussed in this work so far. Given
the social context and (moral) cultural environment such motivations for the
irregulars are relevant to this present examination.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that these uniforms –ormasks as Michael
Sells calls them– enabled men to commit violent, ritualised acts.984 Whether it
the costumes were appropriated from the Catholic Church, Draža Mihailović,
or Sylvester Stallone, the paramilitary apparel conveyed an identity beyond na-
tional or ethnic background; they became masks of others. Barbara Ehrenreich
in her history of war wrote about rituals in traditional societies to ‘lift a man
out of his mundane existence and into a new, warrior-like mode of being’ often
denoted by body paint, masks and headdresses.985 Similarly, uniforms play an
important symbolic role in distinguishing official military personnel from their
own publics, from their enemies, and in international law986 The uniforms of
national armies are traditionally considered to invoke a sense of national pride
and patriotism for the combatants but also society. Among irregular forma-
tions, ritual and uniform are no less important –likewise for the combatants
themselves and for their civilian support base.987
I suggest that these masks had a similar distancing effect for the Yugoslav
women in relationships with the irregular fighters and that in some instances,
women used their own masks or uniforms to justify their own behaviour or inac-
tion.988 The trends among women who participated in the extremist Croatian
and Serbian wartime cultures served to reinforce the paramilitary chic. This
concept furthers my argument of existential combatants, where members of the
warring sides were drawn in to the conflict on a psychological level. A different
side to the hypothesis of female masks is reflected in a painful scene of Slavenka
Drakulić’s S., A Novel about the Balkans where, in a state of manic distress, the
984Sells, ‘masks of otherness’ see The Bridge Betrayed, p71
985Barbara Ehrenreich, Blood Rights; the origins and history of the passions of war, Granta,
2011, p10
986On international law and uniform in organised violence see Christopher Kutz, ‘The Dif-
ference Uniforms Make; Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War,’ Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 33:2 (2005), pp148-180
987For good images but poor analysis of fashion and ISIS and ISIS-affiliated groups see
Tom Wyke, ‘The bizarre world of ISIS fashion,’ Mail Online (Daily Mail), 6 March 2015; on
irregular formations in Ukraine, Marcin Mamon, ‘The Sword and the Cross; The Making of a
Christian Taliban in Ukraine,’ The Intercept, 18 March 2015
988This was discussed in more detail in a conference paper, Kate Ferguson, ‘Paramilitaries
and the WaGs of War, Yugoslavia 1980-95,’ Women’s History Network Conference; Women,
State and Nation, Cardiff University, 7-9 September 2012
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third-person narrator S. wants to wear lipstick, which she never wore before the
war, when she is being raped by the enemy fighters so as to ‘smile with painted
lips...[and] pretend it is not being forced on you but rather that it is fun and
you enjoy it.’989
The roles played by women in the nationalist wartime social framework –es-
pecially the wives and girlfriends of the paramilitary fighters– are worth greater
discussion here, if only because this dynamic of identity-based conflict is rarely
addressed but also in order to acknowledge the presence of intimate relation-
ships within the supportive social networks.990 First and foremost, it is difficult
to imagine that the women who were having relationships with the fighters
remained wholly unaware of their partners’ actions. The level of violent and
sexually violent crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo was systematic. Many of the vic-
tims knew their assailants –and thought initially that this would mean them
being spared. With regards to the sexual violence, it follows that many of
the raped women also knew the wives and girlfriends of their assailants. It is
therefore not inconceivable that the Serbian and Croatian women living in the
cleansed towns, like Foča and Višegrad, would not only have been aware of the
buildings that were being used as rape centres, but knew who was kept there
and –more significantly –who was frequenting them. The rapes and many other
abuses were also well publicised in the western press.
There is little information available regarding this hidden dimension of the
personal supportive framework as research of this kind has yet to be under-
taken. However, let us consider two women married to men that were part
of the devolved Serbian structure of violence, and who have been interviewed
by journalists. These interviews provide a rare insight into the minds of two
very different women married to war criminals and raise many questions regard-
ing the personal relationships that existed alongside irregular participation in
identity-based violence.
The first is Mira Tadić, married to Duško (Dušan) Tadić, the first man to be
put on trial at the ICTY.991 Duško was a local SDS leader convicted of crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and violations of the
laws and customs of war.992 Although not strictly an irregular combatant, he
was a local volunteer from the local community who participated in the violence
989Slavenka Drakulić, S., A Novel about the Balkans, Penguin, 2001, p85
990Ferguson, ‘Paramilitaries and the WaGs of War’
991IT-94-1 Prijedor, case information sheet
992IT-94-1 Tadić (as part of Prijedor case), Ammended Indictment, 14 Dec 1995
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in and around his own locality. Tadić’s crimes contributed to the cleansing of
the entire non-Serb population of his home town of Kozarac, which involved
the active participation of 800 (Serb) civilians from and around Kozarac.993 He
was also convicted of carrying out and ordering others to carry out beatings,
sexual assaults, torture and executions of male and female prisoners at the
Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje Camps.994 Tadić was sentenced to twenty
years’ imprisonment.
Being interviewed by Åsne Seierstad, Mira Tadić said that her husband:
...was convicted of having been a guard in the Omarska camp, but
he only worked in the traffic division, and the only thing he ever did
was to escort prisoners inside...He wasn’t even anywhere near where
the crimes he was convicted of took place. The Hague Tribunal
listened only to the Muslims, and a lot of them were paid to lie.
Whatever the Serbian witnesses testified to was never considered. I
sat there myself and listened to the lies of our Muslim neighbours.995
Mira considers Duško Tadić to be a ‘political prisoner’ or even a prisoner of
conscience; when he was moved from his prison cell in The Hague to one in
Germany to serve the remaining 14 years of his sentence, Mira told Seierstad:
‘To think, he’s doing time with ordinary criminals!...Ordinary criminals: killers
and rapists.’996
Seierstad interviewed Mira several times over a period of years, building a
tentative rapport with a woman struggling to come to terms with the impact
the conflict has had on her own life. Her husband’s paintings hang on her wall,
including one of hands in handcuffs where the cuffs are about to be cut by a
sword bearing the Cyrillic four Cs.997
Her denial is emphatic but also reductive:
Dušan is innocent...he couldn’t possibly have done any of the
things he’s been convicted of. Dušan is kindness itself, he’s charming,
993IT-94-1 Prijedor, Judgement, 7 May 1997, p195
994See ICTY documents relating to IT-94-1 Prijedor
995Åsne Seierstad, With Their Backs to the World; Portraits from Serbia, Virago, 2005,
p165
996Ibid., p69
997Ibid. p159; in a rather macabre twist, Tadić was going to illustrate the memoirs of his
cellmate at The Hague, from Rwanda
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handsome and the soul of an artist. Everyone who meets him falls
for him –he could have any woman he wanted. It just doesn’t add
up –why would he ever rape Muslim women, when he could have
had any Serbian woman he wanted?998
Yet Mira Tadić’s story is more complex than that of a wife in denial. In fact,
Mira and Duško were divorced before the war in Bosnia began, suggesting that
she could easily have distanced herself from his crimes. There is also evidence
that Mira took on a more participatory role in the local process of radicalisa-
tion than she presents in the interviews. Reading the transcripts of her cross-
examination at the ICTY, two incidents implicate Mira. The first relates to a
letter that appeared in a local newspaper in 1991 threatening the Tadić family
with liquidation if they did not leave Kozarac.999 Much was made of the letter
by the Defence team as justification for the fear and insecurity experienced by
the Tadić family (and therefore as justification for his actions). However the
Prosecution suggested that a police investigation, though never completed, sus-
pected either Duško or Mira of sending the letter.1000 A witness at the trial
also accused Mira Tadić of sending it to the newspaper.1001 The second in-
cident relates another letter, supposedly sent by Duško to Mira while he was
awaiting trial that appeared to ask Mira to commit perjury by lying about her
husband’s employment during the war.1002 Mira denied ever seeing the letter
before, although claimed it had been removed from her car.1003
In the final interview with Seierstad, in 2004, it becomes clear that her
husband’s incarceration has come to define Mira. In the twilight of the Milošević
reign, she lived alone, no longer in her home town but somewhere where no one
knows who her husband is, signalling that to be a war criminal’s wife, in her
rural Serbian town, was (and is) no longer a legitimate social status. Her belief
in Serbia has waned but her loyalty to her husband remains.
The second women, Ceca, cuts a different figure but shares many similarit-
ies with the bitter Mira. In an interview with the Observer Svetlana Ceca
998Ibid., p165
999IT-94-1, Prijedor, 9 Oct. 1996, p15093
1000Ibid.
1001IT-94-1, Prijedor, Hamdija Kahrimanović, 25 June 1996, p3129/p15-16
1002IT-94-1, Prijedor, 9 Oct. 1996, Mr Keegan cross examines Mira Tadić, p6805, ln.17-22
1003Ibid.
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Rażnatović responded to the question of what it was like being married to a
wanted war criminal thus:
To me, what my people thought about it was the important
thing. And we were the most popular couple in Serbia –in his own
country, he had a reputation as a great patriot. And to me, he
was a great husband. He had two children with me, and from a
previous marriage he had had seven. And he was very much drawn
to women, and always protective toward them. He was a great, great
gentleman. And I’ll never love anyone like I loved him.1004
She added; “My parents are very proud, because I am going to marry the bravest
man in the country.”1005
Ceca has assumed a more active role in her husband’s affairs, even since his
death in 2000. She is a shrewd ‘business’ woman, very much involved in the
financial (and almost certainly political) legacy of her husband. She has been
arrested for and convicted of a string of corruption and tax evasion charges. She
was also arrested following the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran
Djindjić in 2003 and detained for the illegal possession of weapons in a hidden
bunker including some ‘21 guns, three boxes of ammunition, compasses, a laser
rangefinder, a precision viewfinder for rifle sights, a bow, 20 arrows, silencers
for Scorpio and Heckler guns, police batons, gas masks.’1006 According to local
media reports, Ceca was arrested by Dragan Karleusa, a senior Serbian police
officer and the father of Jelena Karleusa, one of Ceca’s main pop rivals.1007
Furthermore, Jelena Karleusa is also the former girlfriend of Zoran Davidović,
a drug dealer and stolen car smuggler who was killed in March 2000 when
returning from the funeral of Branislav Lainović –a cofounder of Arkan’s Serbian
Volunteer Guard.1008 Ceca has repeatedly been photographed in the company of
Arkan’s former paramilitary colleagues, including the chief suspect for Djindjić’s
murder –Milorad Legija Luković (Ulemek).
1004Higginbotham, ‘Beauty and the Beast’
1005Ibid.
1006Milan Milošević, ‘Tragedija i politika,’ and Miloš Vasić, ‘Legija, Duća i momci iz Kule’
in Vreme, 20 March 2003; on weapons room in Ražnatović house see Higginbotham, ‘Beauty
and the Beast’
1007Higginbotham, ‘Beauty and the Beast’
1008V. Tasić, ‘Kako je počeo rat Cece i Karleuše?’ Vesti, 2 November 2013
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Despite her fall from grace, Ceca still enjoys a large fan base with 250,000 fol-
lowers on Twitter, 30,000 in Instagram and on Facebook she has 800,000 “likes.”
The tabloid press continue to write about Ceca, Jelena and their relationship
with the criminal underworld as well as about their music, which still continues
to sell out stadium tours in the region and elsewhere.
What comes across most clearly in interviews of Mira Tadić and Ceca is
denial. The result is a magnification of their respective husbands’ positive qual-
ities (as they as wives perceive them to be), particularly their good looks, and
an attitude of “I don’t care what you do to them (or her) just be good to me.”
Mira was married to a mid-level volunteer who was part of a local structure
of violence and committed crimes within his own locality. He and Mira would
have known many of his victims and been privy to the actions of the local SDS
but would rarely have come into contact with the national command structures.
Ceca on the other hand, was married to the foremost paramilitary of the war
and even after his death has remained something of figurehead for the remnants
of the Red Beret-Zemun counter-culture loyalists. Both women appear to have
been involved in their husbands’ deceptions and continue to identify themselves
as the wives of wronged, heroic men. This is important because it draws at-
tention to the roles played by, or the capacity for roles to be played by, the
wives and girlfriends of irregular fighters in endorsing or even encouraging a
new (shared) moral standard.
It would be a mistake to consider Mira and Ceca as representative of female
responses to the crises in former Yugoslavia; little is known about the general
attitudes of Yugoslav women towards the conflict, not to mention the women
in relationships with irregular combatants. More is known about the intimate
female support structures of the elites, but the positions of elites were distinct
and cannot be taken as evidence of a broader trend: General Mladić’s wife
recently gave evidence at The Hague and gave her husband an alibi for the days
of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, claiming they were together in Belgrade; under
cross-examination she said “I am sure he could not have committed such a crime
and I think he should not be convicted. I always condemn any crime, even if my
husband would commit one.”1009 Karadžić’s wife Ljiljana Zelen filed for $15,000
of criminal damages against the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) for raiding
her house in search of her husband, despite rumours that she and her sons knew
1009‘Ratko Mladić’s Wife Gives Him Srebrenica Alibi,’ Balkan Insight, 12 Aug 2015; the
transcripts will be released early September 2015
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of his whereabouts.1010
Mira Marković was a political force in her own right and took an active role
in Milošević’s rise and regime, as did his children. Asma Assad plays a similar
part in Syria today. Karadžić’s mother, on the other hand, stated clearly during
an interview with Channel 4 in 1998: “I did not want to pass the hatred on to
him.”1011 And Mladić’ daughter Ana reportedly killed herself during the war
with her father’s ceremonial pistol, supposedly after discovering from Bosnian
Muslims while studying in Moscow the details of his crimes.1012
The process of dehumanisation that precedes identity-based mass violence
is often deconstructed in relation to perpetrators (usually men), society in gen-
eral, or very specific women in positions of power such as female Nazi guards or
Biljana Plavšić1013 In situations where the violence is more explicitly devolved
from an elite centre, as in Rwanda and more contemporaneously within ISIS
structures, the roles played by women, as combatants and as active supporters
are discussed more freely.1014 Genocide and identity-based mass violence are (in
part) social crimes, which require social acquiescence to narratives that justify
the suffering of the enemy group(s). Unlike explicitly state-led political con-
flicts, identity-based conflicts include almost everyone, and ensure some level of
community ‘civilian’ participation, whether as armed or existential combatants.
Devolved structures of violence required broader bases of support than ordinary
armies, particularly when they are operating inside their own borders. In col-
lapsing Yugoslavia, extremist culture became not only increasingly acceptable
but also increasingly favoured –from above and from below. Musicians glorified
the new militaristic, supremacist elite while domestic fashions came to represent
group identities. At the same time, nationalist media broadcast narratives that
celebrated the new national warriors. These figures came to symbolise the apex
of a new amoral cultural hierarchy. The emergence of the visual symbols of the
1010‘Ljiljana Zelen Karadžić raises criminal charges against SFOR,’ Dnevni avaz, 6 February
2006; note too that his daughter, Sonja, ran the press office for her father at Pale, Ed Vulliamy,
‘Face to face with Radovan Karadžić,’ The Observer, 4 December 2011
1011The Reckoning, Channel 4, (dir.) Kevin Sim, 1998
1012Dobbs, ‘Visiting the grave of Ana Mladic,’ Foreign Policy, 14 Dec. 2011
1013Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in
Global Politics, Zed Books, 2007; exceptions include Elizabeth Harvey’s excellent,Women and
the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanisation, Yale University Press, 2003, p1-2;
see also Wendy Lower, Hitler’s Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields, Houghton
Miﬄin Harcourt, 2013
1014On Rwanda, Not so Innocent; on ISIS Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, ‘ “Till
Martyrdom Do Us Part” Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,’ Institute of Strategic Dialogue,
2015
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new national heroes facilitated the psychological transition of the civilian pop-
ulation from “ordinary man” (or woman) to perpetrator. For short lived time,
these young warriors, and their intimate supporters, become a privileged class
–exploited by those more powerful and more educated, in the most disastrous
way. And it was here that the members of the irregular groups became cata-
lysts in their own communities. Thus the indoctrination of young men– who
as a demographic are usually considered to pose the biggest threat to a state–
was doubly beneficial to the regime. The political elites temporarily elevated
the irregular combatants and their support base not only to glorify their actions
but to normalise their crimes, while simultaneously being able to deny influence
over the fighters themselves. For as long as this symbiotic relationship contin-
ued, paramilitary leaders were able to reap the special rewards only political
immunity and military capacity can bring.
In collapsing Yugoslavia there were areas of culture that spurned divisionism.
When war came, many who disagreed with the nationalist programmes left
Yugoslavia and a large number of men refused to fight. In Belgrade there was
mass draft dodging as the same time as the nationalist paramilitaries were re-
cruiting.1015 Despite the cultural and institutional changes that took place in
Belgrade throughout the late 1980s, the majority of the capital’s young men did
not participate in the wars. Only fifty percent of Serbian reservists answered
the draft and in Belgrade the figure was only fifteen percent.1016 It is thought
that up to 200,00 Serbs dodged the draft.1017 During the Serbian-Croat war,
between 2,000-3,000 volunteers were expected at the call-up in the Serbian town
of Valjevo and only two turned up.1018 In Croatia, the government denied re-
ports that only 1,500 and 2,000 reservists had volunteered to fight in Bosnia.1019
While it is unlikely the actual figure was so low, the Croatian army also struggled
with the challenges of draft dodging and desertion. Phillipp Ther has suggested
that the difficulties in mobilisation during the first phases of violence (1991-1992)
created a power vacuum that strengthened the paramilitary units like Arkan’s
Tigers, but formations such as the Tigers were intentionally created on state
1015Magaš and Žanić, The War in Croatia and Bosnia, p332
1016Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerović, ‘The People’s Mass Murderer,’ Village Voice,
November 7 1995
1017Cigar, ‘The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991,’ in (ed.) Stjepan Mestrović, Genocide After Emo-
tion: The Post-Emotional Balkan War, Routledge, 1996, p67
1018Ibid.
1019‘RFE/RL Research Report: Weekly Analyses from the RFE/RL Research Institute,’
Volume 3, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1994
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instruction before hostilities broke out and before the draft was issued.1020 The
high level of draft dodging appears to support the assumption that the Yugoslav
paramilitaries were employed simply to augment the regular military structure
but such an analysis ignores the fact that there was a fairly significant number
of irregular volunteers that took part in the wars (rather than join the regular
army), and that the irregular dynamics on the Serbian side were intentionally
created and promoted before the war began because the devolved structure of
violence was in itself part of the Serbian political and military strategies.1021
Ana Devic described the anti-war activism that took place across Yugoslavia
as ‘a mobilisation of the most articulate segment of a widespread, all-Yugoslav,
urban, cosmopolitan and genuinely non-ethnonationalistic cultural identity.’1022
The Women in Black held weekly protests in Belgrade against the war from
October 1991 and mourned all victims of the conflict, refusing to distinguish
between “our victims” and “theirs.”1023 In contrast, a group of mothers from
across the different warring parties whose sons were fighting and was known as
the Wall of Love quickly became divided by factionalism.1024 An exhibition in
2014 brought together over one hundred cartoons and graphic art works pro-
duced across former Yugoslavia during the 1990s in order to show how political
and absurdist humour was used by many to undermine nationalist militarism
and political repression.1025
Outside the anti-war groups and intellectual circles there were other corners
of resistance that concealed moderate, but important progressive, liberal devel-
opment. In Belgrade, for example, the second half of the 1990s saw the spread
of new genres of dance music and the growth of the urban rave scene, which be-
longed very much to a young cohort that rejected the regime and the wars.1026
A number of new scholars have argued that even within the nationalist turbofolk
1020Phillipp Ther, ‘Ethnic Cleansing, in (ed.) Dan Stone, The Oxford Handbook of Postwar
European History, Oxford University Press, 2012, p160
1021on augmenting regular structures see Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr., ‘Scorpions’ in (ed.) Paul R.
Bartrop, Steven Leonard Jacobs, Modern Genocide: The Definitive Resource and Document
Collection, ABC-CLIO, 2015, p358
1022Ana Devic, ‘Anti-War Initiatives and the Un-Making of Civic Identities in the Former
Yugoslav Republics,’ The Journal of Historical Sociology, 10:2 (1997), pp127-156
1023Laura McLeod, Gender Politics and Security Discourse: Personal-Political Imaginations
and Feminism in ’Post-conflict’ Serbia, Routledge, 2015, p57-8
1024Jude Howell and Diane Mulligan, Gender and Civil Society, Routledge, 2004, p42-43
1025Ristić, ‘Yugoslav Wartime Cartoon Show Relives 1990s Resistance,’ Balkan Insight, 19
June 2014
1026Ivana Kronja, ‘Turbo Folk and Dance Music in 1990s Serbia: Media, Ideology and the
Production of Spectacle’, The Anthropology of East Europe Review, 22:1 (2004), pp103-114,
p107
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and Serbian television platform PinkTV, there was some movement for ‘hidden
gay culture’.1027
There are many accounts of individuals on all sides of the conflicts actively
assisting individuals from other backgrounds. The example of local HVO per-
sonnel acting to protect non-Croats at risk in Bosnia, which came to light during
the Foča case against other HVO members of the Jokers, is typical of numer-
ous individual acts to protect individuals from victimisation.1028 There are far
fewer cases like that of Baljvine, a small village in north-western Bosnia where
Serbian residents refused to expel Muslim residents and as a result the popula-
tion remained united throughout the war.1029 In Janja, the brutal murder of a
Romany couple prompted local women from the town to protest, although the
small demonstration was quickly broken up and one women was fatally shot by
local police.1030 The local Serbian mayor of Vrginmost, Dmitar Obradović, who
resisted the division of Serbs and Croats in his community was assassinated by
a Serbian paramilitaries, reportedly part of the RSK army and on instruction
from Belgrade.1031
Individual participation in the pro- or anti-war cultures was not necessarily
consistent. Just as it is would be wrong to present a Croatian, Bosnian Muslim,
or Serbian point of view, to imply a homogeneity of an anti-war camp would
be to ignore the range of human experiences and responses to the crises. The
examples provided above illustrate the capacity for community-level resistance,
or what Stefan Jansen described as the ‘bubbles of resistance’ that prevented
the nationalist narratives from achieving the ‘complete discursive closure they
were attempting to establish.’1032 However, the social, cultural –even moral–al-
ternatives never coalesced to pose a significant threat to the divisive and violent
narratives, the atrocities that were committed, or the cultural and military
prominence of paramilitary forces.
The war-time cultures did not dissolve with the Dayton agreement. The ethnic
1027Eurovicious, ‘Queer As Turbofolk (Part III): Academic Voices’, The Balkanist, 14 Oct.
2014
1028IT-95-17, Furundžija, 9 June 1998, Witness B, p.255-56; Judgement 10 Dec. 1998, p.30
1029Marija Arnautović, ‘Bosnia: The Village Where Hate Never Triumphed’, IWPR, 10 Apr
2010
1030‘Unfinished Business’, Human Rights Watch, p17
1031IT-06-90-T, Gotovina et al, Tuesday, 2 June 2009, p17932; see also case of Josip Reihl-Kir,
Croat police chief in Osijek who sought to promote peaceful solutions in his community but
was assassinated in summer 1991, Udovicki and Ridgeway, Burn This House, p161
1032Stefan Jansen, Anti-nationalism: post-Yugoslav resistance and narratives of self and so-
ciety, PhD Thesis, University of Hull, 2000, p14
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stratification of the violence had also been predicated upon dividing groups
along new identity lines of victim and perpetrator. Belonging to either group
has brought psychological consequences. The denials issued by state authorities
renouncing responsibility for the crimes so many believed had been committed
in their name caused a collective crisis of cognitive dissonance. This dividing line
remains a highly subjective and emotionally charged issue. The legacy of the
wartime order continued into the 2000s. The cult and culture of street criminals
and paramilitary warriorship was judged in 2005 still to have a negative impact
on gender roles and the future outlook of Serbian youth, especially with its
misogynistic portrayal of women.1033 As time passes, the cultural extremes of
these societal moral frameworks are being increasingly pushed to the margins
as the parameters of mainstream culture are redrawn. Furthermore, in the
post-conflict period, cultural and community habits have been characterised
by the desire to forget or of collective amnesia, among victim and perpetrator
groups, rather than by the reinvention and myth-making that accompanied the
lead-up to violence.1034
Social or community-level responsibility is an unpleasant concept but societal
complicity is often –although not always– necessary for identity-based mass
violence to occur. In situations where the implementation of such violence
is carried out by devolved, non-linear networks of irregulars, drawn in part
(or represented as being) from the local community level, social acquiescence
is prerequisite. Yugoslavia’s wars exposed a fallibility of modern, educated,
developed societies by showing that they too are capable of disintegrating into
violence, hatred and the most brutal kind of opportunism.
1033‘USAID/Serbia & Montenegro Gender Assessment and Recommendations for a Draft
Gender Action Plan,’ May 2005, p.iv
1034Themes of forgetting see For Those Who Can Tell No Tales, (2013) and Drakulić, S.,
p114
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Part VI
Conclusions
In theory, none of the evidence presented in this work is new: the majority
of the sources have been presented at the tribunal in The Hague and, individu-
ally, many have been reported in the press or addressed by scholars. These
pages are the first attempt to collate and then analyse this evidence in an aca-
demic context, and thus presents a new analysis of the Croatian and Bosnian
conflicts. Rather than assess the paramilitary component of the wars as an
anomalous aside or interpret the irregular fighters through the framework of
the perpetrators’ narratives, the chapters above provide new analysis of the
integral and multidimensional roles these combatants played. The variety of
irregular behaviour and of paramilitary structures far from painting a picture
of chaotic community-level violence instead suggests that the majority of the
armed formations were the product of organisation, leadership, and power. The
most successful, disciplined and militarily effective groups were created by state
entities. Political parties, political leaders, local stakeholders, and powerful
criminals were responsible for the mid-level units. Local defence units may have
operated in small areas, and were perhaps more in the Serbo-Croat conflict, but
made little over all impact on the field. Even in the Croatian localities where
the impetus of communities was strong, authorities from Zagreb and Belgrade
provided many of the weapons and much strategic support to local groups. The
findings therefore refute arguments that prominent irregular military dynam-
ics in conflicts are always the result of state weakness. As well as being more
effective, the irregular military dynamics of the Serbian structure of violence
were more extensive; in addition to the formations created by the state, Serbian
authorities were more successful at encouraging the emergence of “spontaneous”
units. I argue this was a direct result of Serbia’s successful promotion of divis-
ive narratives, which sought to legitimise the implementation of identity-based
violence on the community level.
The use by Serbian elites of irregular combatants greatly assisted the Ser-
bian and Republika Srpska governments by concealing their role as architects of
mass atrocity crimes, which obscured for domestic and international observers
the reality on the ground, hindering international intervention and potentially
preventing those architects from being prosecuted for the crimes for which they
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were ultimately responsible. Serbian irregular dynamics, whether in Croatia or
Bosnia, were characterised by centralised Serbian state strength from Belgrade,
and, at times, central planning of the Republika Srpska leadership. MUP para-
military groups were formed, armed, trained, paid, and otherwise supported
from Belgrade but presented as spontaneous purveyors of violence. In Croa-
tia and then again in Bosnia, these paramilitary units worked in coordination
with the JNA, VRS and VJ, and extremist militia groups, in order to carry
out a planned strategy of identity-based mass violence. A consequence of the
irregular implementation of the mass violence, successfully devolved away from
the political centres, was to obscure the centrality of the Serbian state in the
military strategy carried out in Bosnia in 1992. When the Serbian state is con-
cealed from view, the violence in Bosnia cannot be explained as being wholly
political or strategic because the nascent Bosnian Serb entity did not possess a
sufficiently organised, well armed army in 1992 capable of implementing such
a strategy. The intentional removal and partial destruction of a religious or
ethnic group by a state-led coalition of forces is different in international law
to the wide-spread mass violence committed against a community by irregular
military actors. Yet, the Serbian cause was militarily successful in Bosnia be-
cause Belgrade was equipped with a functioning state infrastructure, including
a sophisticated interior ministry and secret service, and possessed command
of the lion’s share of the JNA. The authoritarian strength of the government
and Milošević’s popularity ensured greater state influence of public engagement,
which facilitated a celebration of the extremist paramilitary milieu from above
and below. As a result, Serbia’s aggressive role in the Croatian and Bosnian
crises was genuinely supported by elements of Serbian society and championed
by the Serbian media in such a way as to reinforce historicised narratives of
non-state Balkan violence.
In contrast, the irregular dynamics that characterised pro-Bosnian Muslim
and pro-Sarajevo government military activity was almost wholly spontaneous
and uncrentralised because of a state failure to prepare and organise. However,
efforts that were made were done so in pursuit of a central command. The Pat-
riotic League emerged as a centrally commanded paramilitary formation that
assisted the ARBiH in its efforts to create a disciplined, hierarchical military
command. Nevertheless, central structures were reinforced –or perhaps at first,
sustained by– a socio-military levée en masse. Within this cohort, and partic-
ularly in Sarajevo, were criminal elements and civilians from different religious
backgrounds and of both genders. The dynamics altered as the Bosnian conflict
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progressed, and as international states and criminal networks provided increased
assistance. The presence of foreign Muslim fighters, some under the banner of
international jihadism, altered public and international perceptions of the dy-
namics far more than they made an impact on the field (and to the detriment
of the Bosnian Muslim cause). Social support for the irregulars was initially
seen by the Bosnian authorities and the international community as support
for defenders of the Bosnian Muslims, a multicultural integrated Bosnia, and of
Sarajevo. However, as the civilian levée en masse was replaced by a strength-
ening organisational military structure and a prospering criminal component,
celebration of paramilitary culture became simultaneously more extreme and
less mainstream. Thus, because the Bosnian state was initially weak it relied
upon an unreliable volunteer paramilitary corps during the early months; the
irregular coalition probably saved Sarajevo but left the rural regions vulner-
able and often wholly unprotected. State failures and state weaknesses, such
as ill-equipped and poorly organised defence and poor communication between
localities, meant BiH was unable to respond to attack, despite the efforts of a
largely spontaneous irregular structure. By the end of the war, failures of the
state to establish effective command over the localities and irregular dynamics
hindered military efforts, while the present of foreign (Muslim) fighters hindered
international intervention policies.
In many ways, Croatia’s irregular development was perhaps the most dra-
matic; in 1991 there were a substantial number of local level and extreme polit-
ical paramilitary formations but by 1995 the majority of these had either been
dissolved or pragmatically subsumed into regular army structures. Croatian
authorities realised in Vukovar that the presence alone of supportive irregulars
was not sufficient to counter Serbian forces. On a more local level, in Croatia
and in Bosnia, Croatian structures operated in a similar way to their Serbian
counterparts, distributing weapons where they were available and otherwise in-
citing local populations to violence. However, Zagreb played a less central role
in these activities. The military police maintained their role as a reinforcing
paramilitary structure throughout the conflicts, and though subordinated to
central command often operated according to local networks. More import-
antly, Zagreb ensured that while the Croatian forces provided support to the
Herceg-Bosna strategy, command and control was almost wholly devolved to
the regional level.
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Strategies of identity-based mass violence such as ethnic cleansing or geno-
cide are often successful precisely because of the chameleon-like qualities of the
perpetrating dynamics; ambiguous chains of military and paramilitary control
evoke preconceptions and prejudices, which obscures clear analysis and hinders
policy responses from the international community.1035 Myth and pseudo-
history in contexts of identity politics and identity-based violence further rein-
force the (mis)conceptualisation that the violence itself is driven not from above
but from below. The ambiguity of responsibility for the violence in Croatia, and
particularly in Bosnia, was a significant factor in foreign conceptualisations of
the conflicts. The obscure, or covert, non-linear structures that implemented
patterns violence against Muslim civilians either dissuaded international action
or was used to legitimise policies of non-action. Among ‘elite foreign policy
decision-makers in NATO, the UN Security Council and the various national
military bureaucracies, Bosnia [was] persistently and relentlessly described as
a potential “European Vietnam,” a “vortex,” “morass,” “sinkhole,” “bog"”and
“quagmire.” ’1036 The result was to shape foreign attitudes towards the Yugoslav
violence and so place the crisis further away from international comprehension.
While the scale of the summary executions carried out in the Srebrenica
area in July 1995 was greater than any other single incident of the conflicts, the
murders did not represent a departure in Bosnian Serb objectives. However, in
the immediate aftermath of the massacres, several pieces of evidence emerged
that, because of the scale, reframed the murders in the eyes of the international
community. The satellite images of the freshly dug mass graves, and then later
the video footage capturing the Dutch UN troops at Potočari standing by as
VRS soldiers loaded unarmed Muslim men and boys on to buses, exposed the
intent of Bosnian Serb state forces to destroy Bosnian Muslim lives in a manner
that was suddenly too difficult to misinterpret or to ignore.1037 There were other
reasons why Srebrenica was, and continues to be, understood as distinct. Unlike
the initial siege tactics deployed to defeat Muslim towns in 1992, where local and
national paramilitary forces played a leading participatory role in the violence,
in Srebrenica in 1995 the visible and numerically dominant forces belonged to
1035Shaw uses the phrase “chameleon-like qualities of genocide” in ‘Historical Sociology and
International Relations: The Question of Genocide,’ E-International Relations, 5 May 2013
1036Ó Tuathail, ‘An Anti-geopolitical Eye’
1037On satellite images see Barbara Crossette, ‘U.S. Seeks to Prove Mass Killings’, New
York Times, August 11, 1995; on footage of UN soldiers in Potočari see John Sweeny, ‘U.N.
Cover-Up of Srebrenica Massacre,’ Observer, August 10, 1995; ‘The Fall of Srebrenica and
the Failure of UN Peacekeeping,’ Human Right Watch, 15 Oct. 1995, p8
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overt VRS structures.1038
Responses to the Kosovo crisis in 1999 highlight the relationship between
the western conceptualisation of perpetrating structures and western policy re-
sponses. Kosovo was framed as another potential Bosnia yet the conceptual-
isation of the systematic identity-based violence occurring in Kosovo was rarely
understood as irrational (as Bosnia had been); the responsibility and central-
ity of Serbian state forces, working with their paramilitaries (and particularly
the Red Berets, which were understood as Milošević loyalists) was emphasised
in western coverage, and reiterated as justification of affirmative international
military action.1039 Of the explicit references to Bosnia, US Secretary of State
Madeline Albright’s approach was typical when she stated “we are not going
to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can
no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.”1040 Serbian forces did indeed be-
come more centralised during operations in Kosovo and Milošević made less
effort to conceal the intentions of the Serbian state, but the explicit reference
by external observers to similarities in both Bosnia and Kosovo of the Serbian
state command and its objectives produced a kind of cognitive dissonance; the
identity-based strategy implemented against the Kosovar Muslims was seen as a
continuation of what had been achieved in Bosnia by those simultaneously main-
taining myths of Bosnian (as Balkan) cultural tendencies towards spontaneous
(community-based) Bosnian ethnic violence.
Of course, the rapid and comprehensive international response to Serb at-
rocities in Kosovo was as much a consequence of substantial shifts that had
occurred in Anglo-American politics and increased commitment to internation-
alism in the post Rwanda and Bosnia years as it was the explicitly dominant
role of Milošević.1041 Nevertheless, the visual presence of Serbia’s state struc-
tures in Kosovo impacted international public opinion and contributed in part
to the NATO intervention, highlighting once again the benefits to be gained by
perpetrating elites if their structures of violence appear to be non-state led.1042
In addition, the continuation of Serbian paramilitary personnel in Kosovo, seen
1038On the Srebrenica massacres see Honig and Both, Srebrenica; and NIOD report
1039For discussion of Serbian military actors and command in Kosovo in comparison to the
coverage of Bosnia, Chiara de Franco, Media Power and The Transformation of War, Mac-
millan, 2012, p56
1040Quoted in ibid. (emphasis added); for more examples see p56-7
1041On themes see Tony Blair’s speech at Chicago Economic Club, 22 April 1999
1042‘Statement by the Secretary general of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana, on the initiation of a
broader range of Air Operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,’ Press Release 044, 27
March 1999
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most violently in the participation in both conflicts of the Red Berets, underlines
the primary findings of this research: The presence of so-called non-state armed
groups does not always indicate a lack of state control, nor does it dictate that
their participation must occur along parallel (non-state) structures of command
and control.
The question of international intervention in mass atrocity situations is a
complex one yet it is evident that the manner in which a crisis is conceptualised
by foreign governments and their publics affect decision making processes. Thus
in a press conference in January 2004, the Sudanese Defence Minister challenged
the international community to differentiate between the “rebels” ’, the “Janja-
weed,” the “Popular Defence Forces,” and "tribal militias" such as the militias of
the Fur tribe, and the Nahayein of the Zaghawa.1043 He falsely claimed that the
Popular Defence Forces were volunteers and described the Janjaweed as “gangs
of armed bandits” with which the government had no relationship.1044
Similarly in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has sought since the beginning
of the revolution to invoke Al Qaeda’s name and the threat of Islamist terror-
ism.1045 The (real and imagined) dangers of Islamist terrorism have justified
western foreign policy for a decade; the name Al-Qaeda (and now ISIS) induces
a series of horrors in the collective western consciousness independent to the real-
ities of their criminal activity in Syria. Despite the fact that for the first year of
the conflict the influence of Islamic extremists was low, the threat of Al Qaeda
in Syria has been cited in western policy positions of non-intervention.1046 The
uncrentralised militia-style command structure of the Syrian opposition during
the first eighteen months of the crisis perpetuated this reading of the situation,
and Assad’s covert and devolved paramilitary network created an atmosphere
of plausible deniability around the early atrocities committed by his irregular
forces.1047 This position has been taken, in part, because the irregular dynam-
ics in Syria enable prejudices to conceal realities; in statistics very similar to
those collected by the CIA of Serb responsibility for atrocities in Bosnia, pro-
1043The vast majority of the victims of the human rights violations were from the Fur, Zaghawa
and other groups, at the hands of Sudanese government and janjaweed forces. ‘Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’,
Geneva, 25 January 2005, p3
1044Ibid., p35
1045Syrian jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra announced its formation a year into the crisis, in
January 2012 while the Islamist Front, a merger of six Islamism groups, formed in late 2013;
see also ABC’s Barbara Walters’ interview with Bashar al-Assad, 7 Dec. 2011
1046For example see John McDonnell, Hansard, 29 August 2013 (Motion on Syria and use of
chemical weapons) col.1461
1047See early responses to the Houla massacre, 25 May 2012
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Assad forces are considered to have been responsible for 95.5 percent of civilian
deaths in Syria, compared to 1.9 percent and 2.7 percent by rebel groups and
ISIS respectively, the international narrative is dominated by the threat posed
by ISIL and of a growing moral equivalency between government and rebel vi-
olence.1048 In March 2012, United States’ Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee by way of explaining the
factors impeding US intervention in Syria that it was “not clear what consti-
tutes the Syrian armed opposition –there has been no single unifying military
alternative that can be recognised, appointed, or contacted.”1049 The month
before, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Martin Dempsy said
in an interview on CNN “I would challenge anyone to clearly identify for me the
opposition movement in Syria at this point.” ’ The statements did not reflect
the realities of the situation in Syria at that time. The Institute for the Study
of War in response to Panetta’s comments prepared a detailed report on the
Syrian armed opposition and its devolved but coherent command structure.1050
It is evident that neither an appreciation of irregular dynamics in identity-
based conflicts nor how paramilitaries can be used as state-proxies in such con-
texts have been integrated into foreign and development policies or global at-
rocity prevention agendas. Looking at irregular forces in conflicts, particularly
in identity-based crises where the risks of atrocity crimes are high, is complex,
not only because of the domestic factors that enable or encourage the paramil-
itaries to establish themselves in the first place, but because of the labels that
are attributed to explain them. This raises issues of history and culture, and
their appropriation, but also the manner in which value judgements are placed
on conflict situations and their actors by external observers. Historically, mass
atrocity crimes have occurred during times of conflict, which further obscures
critical understanding of the networks and intentions of the perpetrating com-
mand structure. Shaw has written about the ‘hybridity’ of war and genocide,
and more recently of the chameleon-like nature of genocide, supporting a cent-
ral argument of this thesis that our prejudicial interpretations of identity-based
conflicts can mask atrocity crimes while they are occurring.1051 As modern con-
1048Between 15 March 2011 and 8 Jan. 2015, Violation Documentation Centre in Syria, as
quoted by The Syria Campaign, https://thesyriacampaign.org/about/
1049‘US military chief dubious about arming Syrian rebels,’ CNN, 20 Feb 2012, quoted in
‘Syria’s Armed Opposition’, Middle East Security Report, Institute for the Study of War,
March 2012, p1
1050Ibid.
1051Shaw, ‘The general hybridity of war and genocide,’ Journal of Genocide Research, 9:3
(2007), pp461–473; Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the Trans-
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flicts and atrocity crimes continue to rely increasingly on non-linear and devolved
military frameworks, dismantling these prejudices becomes more urgent. Policy
challenges requiring deeper understanding of the motivations and behaviours of
irregular armed actors in contexts of identity-based mass violence broadens the
scope for future research still further, and draws attention to combatants more
commonly termed extremists or terrorists. Furthermore, with regards to the
dismantling of divisive narratives, such research could impact global approaches
to counter-terrorism and policy-making efforts in counter-radicalisation.1052
The proliferation of post-Cold War conflicts have been marked by trends
of decentralisation and the rise of non-linear fighting units. During Cold War
proxy wars, external backing of unconventional or irregular military formations
cast irregular groups as rational actors in ‘rational conflicts,’ at least in the eyes
of their supporting sphere of influence.1053 The language was one of freedom
fighters and rebels rather than uncontrollable paramilitaries and sundry irreg-
ulars. Thus it is possible to see that the rise of the paramilitary in the 1990s
was as much a product of changing discourse than changing actors on the field.
Since the 1990s, language of paramilitaries and irregulars in the context of for-
eign (non-western) conflict has been one of denigration, perhaps akin to the use
of terms such as mercenaries or war lords –conveying a character that is less
sophisticated and more frightening because of their (apparent) lack of command
structure, and official uniforms. The result, in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, was to
understand the presence of irregular military dynamics as evidence of a less civ-
ilised type of warfare, and therefore of a less civilised struggle, which translated
in foreign policy terms as a means of distancing western responsibility to prevent
mass violence and legitimately disregarding the genocide convention. Moreover,
regular armed forces are not only reassuringly familiar to western eyes but the
west is far more likely to succeed in conflicts against similar structures to their
own.1054
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the politics of international responsib-
ility and humanitarian intervention have come to play a more dominant role in
itions of the Late Modern World, Cambridge University Press, 2013
1052For critical examination of recent counter-radicalisation policies, Christopher Baker-Beall,
Charlotte Heath-Kelly, Lee Jarvis, Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives, Routledge,
2015
1053On proxy wars see Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare, Polity Press, 2013; a notable current
exception to this trend is Ukraine, where, perhaps because of Cold War echoes, the role of
Russia and pro-Russian paramilitaries is unquestioned.
1054Schuurman, ‘Clausewitz and the “New Wars” Scholars,’ p89
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the global discourse of genocide and mass atrocity (if not in global policy).1055
Since its adoption, emerging normative responses to mass atrocities have been
increasingly influenced by the three pillars of the responsibility to protect (R2P),
yet the R2P initiative is almost wholly state orientated; at the 2005 World Sum-
mit where UN member states accepted the ‘responsibility to protect’,1056 the
roles and responsibilities of non-state armed groups were not addressed. A not
insignificant achievement of R2P has been to successfully pose a moral challenge
to state sovereignty in situations where sovereign powers are unwilling or un-
able to protect their citizens at risk from mass atrocities. Thus contained with
the very mandate or R2P is the implicit recognition that mass atrocities are
committed by actors within state borders but outside state structures. How-
ever, this acknowledgement also provides for states to deny command or control
over perpetrators and escape –or at the very least, postpone– international cen-
sure. As a result, within the framework of R2P, the presence of perpetrators
who appear to be operating outside of state structures complicates rather than
simplifies foreign policy options for the international community.
A similar loophole can be seen in the UN Secretary-General’s 2009 report
‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,’ in which Ban Ki-Moon suggested
that instances where non-state armed groups commit mass atrocity crimes ‘col-
lective international military assistance may be the surest way to support the
State in meeting its obligations relating to the responsibility to protect and,
in extreme cases, to restore its effective sovereignty.’1057 The report contained
no discussion of situations where states and non-state armed groups work to-
gether. This perspective on the relationship between obscure ‘non-state’ actors
and modern atrocity crimes is rooted in the assumption that such groups are
the product of weak states. Non-state actors are assumed to operate in parallel
to state auspices, rather than as part of a hierarchy with discernible chains of
command and control, yet genocides committed in Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur
were all characterised by the perpetrating role of irregulars considered to be
non-state but under the command control of state structures. Thus such an
1055On recent history of concepts see Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian
intervention in world politics,’ in (ed.) John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalisation of
World Politics; An introduction to international relations, (3rd Ed.) Oxford University Press,
2006; see also international public opinion ‘Publics around the world say UN has responsibility
to protect against genocide,’ The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 4 April 2007
1056‘Resolution 60/1:2005 World Summit Outcomes’, United Nations General Assembly,
para138-139
1057‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect; Report of the Secretary General’, United
Nations General Assembly, 21 January 2009, p18, emphasis added
240
analysis is generally problematic but particularly so in contexts of mass atrocit-
ies or identity-based mass violence, where the crimes themselves are inherently
political and therefore almost always connected to elites. This common gener-
alisation has demonstrable impact upon policy. In 2013, the taskforce on the
European Union and the prevention of mass atrocities stated that;
Non-state armed groups, rather than regular forces, are respons-
ible for a substantial proportion of the intentional killings of civil-
ians, even if these actions may be ultimately attributable to different
failures of state authorities. For the period 1989-2004 (and exclud-
ing Rwanda) two thirds of cases were attributable to such groups,
whereas in the early parts of the 20th century, regular state forces
tended to be the main aggressors.1058
This gap in understanding is repeated in the core institutions the world has
developed to combat mass atrocity crimes.1059 The Office of the Special Advisor
on the Prevention of Genocide for the United Nations (OSAPG) acknowledges
a more complex set of possibilities;
Where non-state armed groups (NSAG) exert control over territ-
ories and populations, governments may be unable or unwilling to
fulfil their responsibilities to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in those areas.
There may be cases, as well, where officials or political figures have
encouraged NSAGs to threaten or commit such crimes.1060
As yet, there is no strategy for implementing the R2P with regards to irregular
military dynamics that appear to be non-state. It is an area ripe for research
1058Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, The EU and the Prevention of
Mass Atrocities; An Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses, Budapest Centre for the In-
ternational Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities and Foundation for the International
Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, 2013, p32
1059An exception is the US Atrocity Prevention Board; see ‘Genocide A Blueprint for U.S.
Policymakers Preventing Genocide Prevention Task Force,’ (co-chairs) Madeleine K. Albright
and William S. Cohen, 2008 by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The Amer-
ican Academy of Diplomacy, and the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace;
while non-state actors are not discussed, the report does flag the creation of unaccountable
paramilitary forces as a possible indicator of preparation for atrocities, p47
1060OSAPG, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser
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and one I hope to pursue myself in the next stage of my research. 1061 Despite
advances made under the guise of R2P global approaches to atrocity crimes
remain reactive, with an emphasis on the pursuit of post-atrocity justice. How-
ever, here too state elites are able to benefit by using irregular combatants. The
acquittal in May 2013 of war-time Serbian State Security Chief Jovica Stanišić
and Commander of its Special Operations unit Franko Simatović demonstrated
that the limited existing jurisprudence for similar international crimes has con-
strained the ICTY Chamber in their final judgements, which has resulted in
what could be interpreted as an inconsistent application of the law. This was
seen too in the earlier acquittals of Croatian generals Gotovina and Markac in
a judgement that found no evidence of Joint Criminal Enterprise in relation
to Operation Storm.1062 These acquittals stand in contrast to the judgements
of numerous earlier ICTY cases. More recently in closing the Praljak trial the
Chamber asserted that, based upon the findings of the Tadić case;
to impute responsibility for acts committed by military or para-
military groups to a State, the Appeals Chamber found that it was
necessary to establish that the latter wielded overall control over the
group, not merely by equipping and financing the group, but also
by coordinating or providing its assistance in the overall planning of
its military activities.1063
Thus, without a significant paper trail or a similar portfolio of concrete evidence
that explicitly reveals the intent of the accused to commit specific international
crimes, it is impossible to find suspects guilty for the crimes they may be re-
sponsible for. This is not to recommend a dilution of the necessary rigours
of international justice but simply to highlight the legal benefits to be gained
by using non-linear or irregular military structures to carry out international
crimes. By devolving military responsibility and giving militia leaders who are
1061The OSAPG acknowledges this gap and in 2011 launched a research project ‘identifying,
assessing, and responding to situations involving non-state armed groups that control or target
civilian populations and put them at risk’ of mass atrocity crimes, with Dr. William Reno,
Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
However, any progress or outcomes of the project are as yet unpublished.
1062IT-06-90, Gotovina et al. Appeal Judgement, 15 April 2011
1063(As was found to have been the case in the Stanišić & Simatović case); IT-04-74, Praljak
et al, Judgement, Part I of VI, 28 May 2013, p.28; also see IT-94-1, Prijedor (Tadić), Appeals
Judgement, para141
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considered to lie outside the national structure the ‘latitude to improvise,’ state
elites not only ensure their ambitions are realised but they also safeguard their
own personal future against prosecution.
So long as the international community continues to focus its efforts on legal
responses to mass atrocities, this loophole will remain.1064 As the international
community strengthens its normative and legal responses to atrocity crimes, a
deeper understanding of devolved networks in identity-based violence is neces-
sary in order to improve policy responses and close the present loopholes that
protect elites while punishing their foot-soldiers. Understanding the experience
and culpability of individual members of paramilitary groups who collaborate in
genocide crime has implications too for post-atrocity justice and reconciliation.
This work has set forth a view of contemporary atrocity crimes that draws at-
tention to the manner in which state elites utilise irregular combatants as either
perpetrators or protectors. Within perpetrating structures, state elites are able
to manipulate domestic and international prejudices by perpetuating myths of
non-state violence as part of their imagined exclusionary narrative in order not
only to legitimise identity violence but to seemingly explain or even predict it.
This dimension of atrocity architecture, I suggest, has emerged in part as a
response to the apparent rise in proxy wars and the perceived prevalence of ir-
regular structures of violence around the world. Since the end of the Cold War,
roles played by these various unofficial military groups in organised violence and
in conflict have been more frequently reported and recorded by international ob-
servers marrying, particularly in the minds of western publics, responsibility for
numerous crises with amorphous irregular military formations. A result has
been to mask the continued dominance of the state in a number of conflicts
where, instead of a vertically organised hierarchical structure of violence, irreg-
ular actors have comprised all or part of the military force. Thus, I argue, the
significance of the state remains critical when we look at incidents of organised
identity-based violence and mass atrocity crimes. Such crimes are political acts,
increasingly framed in a context of uncontrollable civilian struggle. Further-
more, in the modern world, mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and genocide often
require a significant degree of social complicity. Perpetuating narratives of non-
state violence enables state elites to encourage and sanction a spectrum of actors
–civilian or otherwise– to participate in armed struggle while themselves remain-
1064For European and international emphasis on legal responses to genocide see Karen E.
Smith, Genocide and the Europeans, Cambridge University Press, 2010
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ing on the margins. When identity-based crimes are committed by combatants
claiming to represent the perpetrating identity rather than the state, the object-
ives of the crimes are fulfilled as much by the symbolism of their implementation
as their violent actualisation: By claiming to devolve violent implementation to
the community, elites ensure an unbridgeable blood divide between perpetrator
and victim groups. To this end, social collaboration becomes an integral aspect
of the strategy. The ensuing uncertainty obscures where responsibility lies for
the violence but consequently obscures where responsibility lies for preventing
or halting the violence; and so the irregular military dynamics of modern mass
atrocity can be understood as being simultaneously beneficial to perpetrating
elites and the foreign elites nominally tasked with upholding the commitments
that underpin our international system. I suggest that this trend will continue
even as global norms regarding human rights and the responsibility to protect
civilians at risk advance, and thus state powers wishing to commit atrocity
crimes will increasingly seek to mask their strategies by employing covert and
devolved structures of violence.
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